Connotations

A Journal for Critical Debate

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Connotations wants to encourage scholarly communication in the field of English Literature (from the Middle English period to the present), as well as American and Commonwealth Literature. It focuses on the semantic and stylistic energy of the language of literature in a historical perspective and aims to represent different approaches.

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ARTICLES

DISCUSSION

Inventional Mnemonics and the Ornaments of Style: The Case of Etymology[*]

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In the first issue of *Connotations*, William Engel argued for the importance of what he called "mnemonic criticism" in the study of Renaissance literature. I was pleased to see his essay, since it corroborated work that I had completed on the importance of mnemonic technique in late antiquity and in learned medieval literary culture.[1] Engel's interesting citations from sixteenth and seventeenth century Emblem books show how fundamental mnemotechnique was considered to be in the work of confession, pious meditation, and ethical "reading" generally at this time.

One limitation of the essay, however, is that it gives the impression (as does Frances Yates' work on the subject) that learned mnemonics are a development only of "the art of memory" described in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the "artificial memory" scheme of places and images. Engel also leaves the strong impression, as Yates did, that interest in mnemonics is to be identified with Neoplatonism.[2] My own researches in a wide range of medieval literatures from late antiquity through the late 15th century indicates that this is much too narrow a characterization.

"Mnemonic criticism" is not one "approach" among many to the *interpretation* of literature (as Engel's term might imply) but was a fundamental feature of ancient and medieval art, since it was basic both to elementary pedagogy and to all meditative composition (as though there were any other kind).[3] It is not particular to any ancient philosophic "school," though the reifying of mnemonics, objectified as

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[*]Reference: William E. Engel, "Mnemonic Criticism & Renaissance Literature: A Manifesto," *Connotations* 1.1 (1991): 12-33.

a "clavis" to universal knowledge, may be particular to some forms of Renaissance Neoplatonism.[4] Medieval mnemonics is a *technique*, a tool for thinking and inventing. In this essay, I would like to suggest how some of the rudiments of mnemonic technique underlie one principle category of the "ornaments of style," *etymologia*. I will suggest that such "ornaments" were cultivated in the various arts as delightful and *useful* tools, both for remembering and for further inventing. I will propose that an "ornament of style" be considered the literary equivalent of such other inventional features as page lay-out in books, and arches and columns in buildings—features often also called decorative or ornamental, and thought now to be neither functional nor essential in art.

Jacopo da Varagine (Dominican friar, Bishop of Genoa, and compiler, in the mid-thirteenth century, of the immensely popular anthology of saints' lives called *The Golden Legend*) prefaced his account of the life of St. Cecilia with an "etymology" of her name. When Chaucer translated the legend as the tale of the Second Nun, he included the etymology as preface to the story. Evidently he considered it to be an important introduction. Most modern students find it embarassingly "medieval," and far too long. Here it is, translated from the Latin:

> *Cecilia* is as though [quasi] "lily of heaven" [celi lilia] or "way of the blind" [cecis via] or from "heaven" [celo] and "Leah" [lya]. Or "Cecilia" is as though "free of blindness" [cecitate carens]. Or she is named from heaven" [celo] and "leos," that is "people." For she was a "lily of heaven" because of her virgin chastity. Or she is called "lily" because she had the white of purity, the green of conscience, the odor of good fame. She was "way of the blind" because of her teaching by example, "heaven" for her devoted contemplation, "Leah" for her constant business. Or she is called "heaven" because, as Isidore says, the scientists have said that heaven is swift, round, and burning. So also she was swift through her solicitous work, round through her perspecuity, burning through her flaming love. She also was "free of blindness" because of the brilliant light of her wisdom. She was also "heaven of people" [celum + leos] because in her, as in a heaven, people wanting a role-model might in a spiritual way gaze upon her sun, moon, and stars, that is the far-sightedness of her wisdom, the greatness of her faith, and the variety of her virtues.[5]

A grumpy note in modern editions of Chaucer points out that these etymologies are all "false." And indeed they all are, according to modern

suppositions of what an etymology should be. What we mean when we say these etymologies are "false" is that they are not historically verifiable, and therefore, that they do not "really and truly" have anything to do with how the name "Cecilia" came into being as a historically-conditioned "object." But suppose for a moment that there might have existed cultures for whom the question of "verifiable" historical origin was less important than other matters—such as what can I *make from* the name and life of this saint? Or (a variation of the same) how can I internalize, "make my own," the virtues and qualities exemplified in this saint's life? That is also a form of "remembering" Cecilia, though it isn't what most moderns think of when they consider "memory."[6]

Jacopo's etymologies of the name Cecilia resolve themselves into a series of homophonies, puns on the syllables of her name, and images derived from those puns that serve as mnemonics for some of her virtues. "Ce-ci-li-a" *sounds like* "caeca" and "lilia," or like "caeci" and "via," and so on. Lilies—at least for audiences used to seeing them painted in images of the Virgin and described in sermons—are white, with green stems and a sweet scent. Semantics is banished in favor of sounds, a play of coincident likenesses and oppositions: ce-ci-li-a is "like" [quasi] "lilia" and "via" and "Lya," like "caelum" and "caecus," because the syllables of her name *sound like* those words—sort of [quasi]. Such associative play is the method of the game of Charades. It is also the fundamental stuff of remembering.

But why, one must ask, would anyone go to the length of making up these elaborately punning riffs of memory, that do to a word what jazz does to a written musical phrase—just to remember a name? Isn't it easier and faster to memorize the name itself? Well—it depends on what you want to remember something *for*. It is a matter of how you want to *use* it.

If all you want is to be able to call up a word, then probably simple repetition is fine (unless for some reason you think you will have trouble recalling it later). But suppose you wanted more than that—suppose your objective was to meditate on the virtues of the saint for ethical purposes, "ad imitandum," as indeed Jacopo's text invites you to do. Suppose you weren't really interested at all in the historical "object"

that was St. Cecilia, let alone in the "verifiable" derivation of her name, but instead in "turning" her example into an ethically fruitful meditation about her life in relation to your own. In that case, the mechanism for such literary "turning" would be called a trope, your meditational exercise would be a "tropological com-position" or "reading" (as we now call it), and the whole point would be to invent as many variations on the basic syllables of the name as your recollective ingenuity, working within your memory-store, could manage. You would be using your memory, your "associations" with the name "Cecilia" to invent a composition, very much in the manner that a performer/composer of music uses a phrase (or "trope") as the foundation for "inventions."

Memory, not imagination, is the inventional faculty, both for antiquity and for the Middle Ages. That is how invention was taught in school and practiced in life. The imagination makes images, but memory both puts them away and hauls them out again, not as "random objects" but as parts of a construction, a network, a web, a texture of associations.

One fundamental problem with paying more attention to scholastic analyses of *memoria*, as intellectual histories have tended to do, than to the practices and results of inventional mnemonics is that definitional analyses of memory seem to require splitting up an activity that is simultaneous into separate "faculties," one that stores and one that recollects. But practical mnemonic techniques address storing and retrieving as the same activity, as a single "inventive" process of remembering which both "stores things away" and "finds things out."

Moreover, what people remember is not "objects" but inventionally valuable *images*, consciously set into heuristic schemes. These images result from external and internal sensory traces "translated" by imagination (the activity that makes them into images) and impressed on memory, in the way that the images-of-"things," in the form of words or other signs, are drawn onto a wax tablet. Such memory-graphs have meaning not in themselves, but as parts of an intricate invention machine. And, like all machines, it is only as "good," as useful, as the person, the "engine" or ingenuity, operating it.

Inventionally remembered, the name Cecilia is treated as a gathering place, a "common place" or com-position, into which material of various sorts has been "gathered" by a "chain" of punning associations. This

fundamental inventional tool is as well a fundamental mnemonic technique. Why should one wish to remember Cecilia? Not in order "to know the facts" about her, but to "re-member" her story, by re-telling it in our own selves, in literary, ethical meditation. Reading, says Gregory the Great, in the preface to his *Moralia in Job*, "presents a kind of mirror to the eyes of the mind, that our inner face may be seen in it. There indeed we learn our own ugliness, there *our own* beauty," for "we should transform what we read into our very selves."[7] It is in that activity, the "troping" of a literary work that goes on in memory, that the "meaning" of reading resides. The moral "commonplaces" summarized in the "etymologies" that accompany Cecilia's story should be used (if used at all) as the *beginning* of our "reading" of her story, not as definitive statements of *"its* meaning" (*it* has no "meaning" apart from the "fruits" the story brings forth in our recollective, inventional ruminations). And so, rightly, these associative suggestions precede the narrative.

Bernard Silvester (d. 1160?), articulating a commonplace, claims that "[e]thimologia divina aperit et practica humana regit" (etymologizing opens up divine matters and regulates human society). Commenting on this quotation, Ernst Curtius states that for Bernard etymologizing had "epistemological status," by which Curtius meant that it had "truth status" of a sort that modern logicians might recognize. But is that Bernard's claim? I don't think so.

Bernard was a teacher of, among other things, rhetoric, and thus familiar with rhetoric's terminology and pedagogic traditions, according to which *etymologia* is one of the "ornaments of style." Curtius disparages this classification as a limitation of pre-modern literary theory, and he is hardly alone among modern commentators. After citing, in his characteristic collational fashion, dozens of examples of etymologizing from the Bible, and both Greek and Roman writers from Homer to Augustine, Curtius comments that "all I have presented so far can be taken as more or less insipid trifling."[8] And he tries to distinguish such trifling from "serious" etymologizing. But I think Curtius fails to recognize in himself a prejudice against "mere" ornament, as lacking—I suppose—a proper degree of Arnoldian (and Kantian) "high seriousness."

The modern prejudice against ornament (like that against memoriz-ing—I think they are related modern disapprovals) fails to recognize that decoration functions heuristically, providing the markers that can inventory and so "invent" the "materials" of thought. Like the "etymologies" of Cecilia which precede the story of her life, they provide mnemonically—inventionally—valuable markers that can help to orient and join up the ways that the story is "ruminated" in people's minds. Literally heuristic, they have no meaning themselves but they can "find out" meanings, by "sprouting" and by "bearing fruit" in the schematized webs, the associational "orchards" (to finish the metaphor I began with) that "reside in" memories. (A memory not heuristically equipped was called a silva, a "forest" of disorganized, unretrievable junk.)

There is no point in talking about "meaning" in premodern cultures as though "it" had an existence apart from the complex of people's memories. And so, for the process of meaning-making to begin at all, one's memory must be "hooked up" and "hooked in" to the as-sociational "play" of the mind at work. That is the essential function of ornament, and it explains why the basic features of the "ornaments" also are elementary principles of mnemonics: surprise and delight, exaggeration, "brevity," orderliness and pattern, copiousness, similar-ity-and-contrariety. All of these characteristics are essential for making mnemonically powerful associations.

In a study of the architectural orders—"decorative elements" at their most evident—John Onians comments that by the time of the Empire, Romans "expected to scan a building and look for features, especially in the columnar organization, which would articulate it."[9] Roman imperial cities bristled with columns, used in part to mark their owners' status and, in a communal context, to give addresses to the places of the city. These columns, literally and figuratively, "invented" the city as a human community, a network of places by means of which a person could find her way.

This heuristic assumption about the nature of ornament, in both architecture and literature, intensified with Christian buildings, Onians argues, and was made an essential part of the way that buildings could invite prayer, conceived of as the "common prayer" and "commonplaces" of liturgy, upon which individual meditative prayer would be a

"dilation." So, for example, Constantine transferred the Composite order, used to mark imperial triumph, to the triumph of the new religion, when, instead of using it on his own triumphal arch as previous emperors had, he reserved it for the six spiralvine columns he had set up about the tomb of St. Peter in his new church. "It is as if Constantine, in gratitude for Christ's aid at Milvian Bridge, decided to surrender the [Composite] order to Him. The victory was Christ's, not the emperor's."[10] Onians continues, "Every step taken in a Christian church, every passage in liturgy, potentially involved psychological transformations and the dramatic realization of some bold metaphor such as rebirth or salvation."[11] *Potentially* is the right word—a potential that can only become actual in some person's mind by stirring the associational inventory of a well-furnished mind. So close is the bond between memory and ethics that Prudence (also called, in the twelfth century, Sophia and Fronesis)[12] is identified in many texts with memory itself—and is in all cases said to rely on memory.[13]

The connection of etymology to mnemonic technique is clear at least from the time of Cicero, who uses the same word, *notatio*, both to translate Greek *etymologia* (*Topica* 35; cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* I.6.28) and for the mnemonically valuable "notes" or "marks" that are the tools of memory work (*De orat.* 2.358; cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 3.34). Whatever its "truth status"—and that question was much argued in antiquity, as everyone knows—the *mnemonic* efficacy of "etymology" never was questioned. I would suggest that its standing as a valuable pedagogical practice, a sub-set of inventional mnemonics, was to a large extent independent of philosophical investigations (with differing outcomes) into the truth-value of etymologizing. I do not think that an appeal to Plato and his followers (or to Aristotle, for that matter) will suffice to account for the role of *etymologia* in either Roman or medieval pedagogy, or in the compositional habits of those trained in such schools; one should look instead to the elementary techniques, including mnemonics, for reading and composition employed in Hellenistic schools and in their medieval heirs.

One need look no farther than the *Origines*, soon dubbed the "Etymologies," of Isidore of Seville to find an instance of the pedagogical and mnemotechnical power attributed to etymologizing. Isidore's

encyclopedia, characterized rightly as supplying "a whole system of education,"[14] begins with some etymologizing that is recognizably in the fashion of Jacopo's meditation on "Cecilia," and proceeds to exfoliate this scheme. We would never now organize an encyclopedia on such a principle as paranomasia (we prefer alphabets) but the purpose is similar: to afford a ready mental heuristic. "Disciplina a discendo nomen accepit . . . Aliter dicta disciplina, quia discitur plena": the two etymologies are proffered not as competing "explanations" whose "truth" is to be objectively determined (Isidore shows no interest at all in which of these two is correct), but rather as "starting-points" for Isidore's encyclopedic composition. The concern always to have a firm "starting-point" (which is really a "starting-off-point" for a memory chain), the pride of place given to the beginning, the "inventor," recognizes a requirement of human remembering. Isidore's pedagogy incorporated the presumption that *all* learning is built up, like a wall or a concordance, upon a memorial base of "notationes" (including etymologies) that serve as recollective inventory markers.

The experiential belief in the pedagogical, compositional utility of "etymologizing" persisted in the *praxis* of monastic prayer, thence vernacularized and brought to the laity by friars like Jacopo da Varagine. Etymologizing, with other forms of paranomasia, is a persistent "ornament" of monastic composition, especially in the extensive "troping" which individual authors performed on the Name of Jesus. A good example is Bernard of Clairvaux's Sermon 15 on the *Song of Songs*, "The Name of Jesus," in which the six titles given to the Lord in Isaiah 9:6 provide the compositional *linea* or scheme for "finding out" the whole sermon. Here is a brief excerpt:

> In some mysterious way the name of majesty and power is transfused into that of love and mercy, an amalgam that is abundantly poured out in the person of our Savior Jesus Christ. The name "God" liquifies and dissolves into the title "God with us," that is, into "Emmanuel." He who is "Wonderful" becomes "Counsellor"; "God" and "the Mighty One" becomes the "Everlasting Father" and the "Prince of Peace."[15]

In the early Renaissance, "etymology" is classified as a form of mnemonic image in an "art of memory" by Jacobus Publicius of Florence,

printed in Venice by Erhard Ratdolt in 1482 and 1485.[16] Under the
general category of "Notatio" are listed a variety of punning devices,
including both "onamathopeya" and "etymologia." Of the latter we are
told

> Knowledge of etymology greatly aids the process of discovering images and
> signs. If finding an image for the name "Philippus" itself appears hard to us
> then it will readily yield a likeness of his name by the line of etymology. It
> derives from [*lit.* has its line from] *philos*, that is love, and *hippos*, horse, that
> is a lover of horses. Hieronymus is the holy law. Jacobus is interpreted as a
> wrestler. Frons from *foramen* [the hollows or cells of a honeycomb].[17]

The etymology is primarily a mnemonic, an image that "finds out"
something one wishes, for whatever reason, to recall. Counselling the
mnemonic value of such puns predates the systematizing of Hellenistic
education in the fourth century, B. C. It is a prominent feature of the
sophist fragment (c. 400) on the art of memory, called *Dialexeis* or *Dissoi
Logoi*. To remember words, the author says, one should connect them
via homophonies to mental images; for example, to remember the word
"pyrilampes," which means "glow-worm," one might connect it to a
flaming torch, via *pyr*, fire, and *lampein*, shine.[18]

The "reality" that the etymologies of Cecilia address, then, is an
operational one, that of what I am calling "inventional memory." So
when Bernard Silvester claimed that etymology "opens the way to
divinity and regulates human affairs," I do not think he meant to claim
an "epistemological status" for it, in any way that we now would
recognize (that is, as having "truth content" *in itself*, objectively).
Etymologizing—like all the other ornaments—helps "regulate" ethical
life by setting up and "setting in play" the memory machines that
construct the "practica humana"—the materials of human lives—with
wisdom and prudence (or at least they should: but "by their fruits ye
shall know them").

It "opens up" divine matters—again, through setting in motion the
associational paranomasia of our memories of sacred texts, the only
vehicle for the knowledge of God, as Augustine describes it, that humans
can have in this life:

See how I have explored the vast field of my memory in search of you, O lord! And I have not found you outside it. . . . since the time when I first learned of you, you have always been present in my memory, and it is there that I find you whenever I am reminded of you and find delight in you. This is my holy joy, which in your mercy you have given me, heedful of my poverty.[19]

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NOTES

[1]Published in my *The Book of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990). The first edition is now revised and published in paperback (1992). This essay is excerpted from my companion study, now in preparation, on the role of "inventional mnemonics" in literary composition. I was stimulated to consider *etymologia* in this fashion, in part by reading Inge Leimberg, "'Golden Apollo, a Poor Humble Swain . . .': A study of names in *The Winter's Tale*," *ShJW* (1991): 135-58.

[2]Yates modified this position later, suggesting, correctly I believe, that the Neoplatonic provenance of "the art of memory" is a development of the Renaissance, a "rectifying" of technique that accompanied the objectification of knowledge at that time; see her "Architecture and the Art of Memory," *Architectural Association Quarterly* (London) 12 (1980): 4-13.

[3]Composition was analysed and taught as a primarily mental discipline, the preliminary stage of which, the *res*, was best carried out without the assistance of physical supports, such as tablets or paper. This is also the mental activity called meditation: hence, all composition is necessarily "meditational," in its early stages. Of course, the word "meditation" could also be applied more specifically to prayer. On mental composing and *memoria* see *The Book of Memory*, esp. 194-208.

[4]I am out of my field of expertise here, and rely for these comments on Paolo Rossi's studies of Renaissance logic and arts of memory, especially *Clavis universalis: Arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria de Lullo a Leibnitz* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1960), Walter Ong's study of Pierre Ramus, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958), and Gerald Bruns, *Inventions: Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary History* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1982). I do not mean to suggest that *all* Neoplatonism is of the Baconian variety, but it does seem to me, that there is a keener appreciation of the limitations of human cognition, and hence of humanly-created signs such as memory-images, in medieval writers than in some Renaissance writers on mnemotechnique. I am thinking particularly of claims like that of Guilio Camillo (1579) that *all* knowledge could be inventoried in his memory theater. In contrast, I think of St. Augustine's casual admission that his memory contains everything he has learned "except the things which I have forgotten" (*Confessions* X. 8 and 9). On the continuities and changes between late medieval and Renaissance claims for *artes memoriales*, see especially the excellent essays by Paolo Rossi ("Le arti della memoria: rinascite e trasfigurazioni" 13-34), Lina Bolzoni ("Costruire immagini: L'arte della memoria tra letteratura e arti figurative" 57-97),

and Eugenio Battisti ("Schemi geometrici, artifizi retorici, oggetti di meraviglia nel trattato quattrocentesco sulla memoria di Giovanni Fontana" 117-38), all in Lina Bolzoni and Pietro Corsi, eds., *La cultura della memoria* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992).

[5]Transcribed from Bodleian MS. Bodley 336 (early 14th c.) by G. H. Gerould, W. F. Bryan and G. Dempster, eds., *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales* (1941; rpt. New York: Humanities P, 1958) 671.

[6]"Memory and the Ethics of Reading" is the topic of the fifth chapter of *The Book of Memory*; my discussions of the matter here depend upon the analysis of the process I gave there. Readers unfamiliar with what I said there may wish to read it first.

[7]*Moralia in Job* II.i and I. 33; see *The Book of Memory* 164-69 and 179-83 esp.

[8]Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask (1953; rpt. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963) 496. Peter Dronke, *Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) notes that in Latin rhetorics all figurative uses of language are classified as ornaments; Dronke is disappointed by this practice, because he appears to assume that "ornament" is essentially opposite to "function" and thus to "meaning" (14). It will become apparent that I do not accept this opposition.

[9]John Onians, *Bearers of Meaning: The Classical Orders in Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988) 58.

[10]Onians 57. On the use of columns in imperial Rome, see 51-58.

[11]Onians 60.

[12]Peter Dronke comments (*Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions* 129n20) that in *Anticlaudianus* Alan of Lille calls "Fronesis" (human wisdom) also both "Sophia" and "Prudentia" (though she is distinguished from divine Wisdom, "Hagia Sophia"). In his discussion of the virtue of Prudence in "De bono," Albertus Magnus also gives as synonyms both "Fronesis" and "Sophia." Albertus specifically identifies such "prudence" with trained memory in this discussion. Alanus was active at Paris at the end of the twelfth century, Albertus about fifty years later, and might have found this vocabulary still current enough to revive.

[13]See *The Book of Memory* especially 61-71.

[14]J. J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1974) 73.

[15]Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermons on the Song of Songs* 15:1, trans. Kilian Walsh (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981). Bernard's use of etymologies and puns more generally in this passage cannot be fully reproduced in English.

[16]I have translated a passage from the second, enlarged edition of 1485, although the same matter is in the earlier edition. This "art of memory" is part of a treatise on rhetoric. Cicero and Quintilian are both commended as masters of the art of memory. Ratdolt printed a third edition, identical (at least in the memory section) to the second, in Augsburg, 1490. Of Publicius not much is known; Mario Cosenza (*A Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary of the Italian Humanists*, 3 vols. [Boston: G. K. Hall, 1962-67]) says he was a friend of the French humanist, Robert Gaguin, that he may have been from Spain, and that he studied in various Swiss and German universities in the 1460's and 1470's.

[17]"Etymologiae cognitio plurimum inquirendis imaginibus et signis confert. Philippus si imaginem suam dure nobis praebeat, etymologiae et nominis sui ductu similitudinem facile accomodabit. A philos enim id est amor et hippos equus ductum habet hoc est amator equorum. Hieronymus sancta lex. Iacobus colluctator

interpraetat. Frons a foraminibus"; cited from the Huntington Library copy of Ratdolt's 1485 Venice printing, p. G-8 verso.

[18]Discussed briefly in *The Book of Memory* 28, and more fully by Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966) 44-45. The text is in H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-52) 405-16. There is an English translation by Rosamond Kent Sprague, "Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis," *Mind* 77 (1968): 155-67.

[19]*Confessions* X.24, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961).

Paronomastics: The Name of the Poet
from Shakespeare and Donne to Glück and Morgan

WILLIAM HARMON

Let me begin in the mode of medieval hermeneutics and offer a commentary on Psalm Forty-Six. It is short, scarcely more than 200 words. Here are the beginning and the end in the familiar "King James" English Version, first published in 1611:

> God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble.
>
> 2 Therefore will not we fear, though the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea.
>
> 3 Though the waters thereof roar and be troubled, though the mountains shake with the swelling thereof. Selah.
>
> . . .
>
> 9 He maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth; he breaketh the bow, and cutteth the spear in sunder; he burneth the chariot in the fire.
>
> 10 Be still, and know that I am God: I will be exalted among the heathen, I will be exalted in the earth.
>
> 11 The Lord of hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is our refuge. Selah.

To repeat: this is Psalm Forty-Six. Its forty-sixth word happens to be "shake." The forty-sixth word from the end (not counting Selah) is "spear." It was most probably drafted in 1609 or 1610, when William Shakespeare was either in his forty-sixth year or forty-six years old.

So what? Maybe nothing at all. But maybe something. It was an age that was fond of codes, ciphers, games, masks, and espionage. It was also an age in which playwrights and players occupied a comparatively low social level, lacking in dignity, possibly even rather scandalous—not the kind of person a conscientious committee would welcome into a project to translate sacred scripture—not welcome *by name* at any rate.

One of Rudyard Kipling's last stories, "'Proofs of Holy Writ,'" presents Shakespeare and Ben Jonson collaborating on a translation of the Sixtieth

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Chapter of Isaiah and eventually—what theology!—producing the great King James version, beginning, "Arise, shine; for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee."

Why not guess, then, that King James's translators were able linguists and scholars—some, like Lancelot Andrewes, were gifted preachers—but were they smart enough to know that their words did not always achieve the grandeur appropriate for holy scripture? A few may have recognized that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were more great writers flourishing in England than ever before (and, you could argue, than ever after). It would make sense to ask for help from some of these geniuses, even if one could not publicly acknowledge their aid. It would also make sense for one of them, however equable his temper and sweet his nature, to resent being unable to sign his work overtly and therefore to devise a way to sign one part of his work covertly, by introducing something of a charade on his name. "Shakespeare" is that kind of name, after all: you can shake a spear. The Shakespeare arms, granted to William's father John in 1596 but evidently requested by William, show an arm shaking a spear.

The Oxford Guide to Heraldry suggests that the term for such a practice is "canting arms," defined as "arms containing charges which allude punningly to the name of the bearer." I am not so sure that there is a proper pun in a design showing a spear being shaken in connection with the name "Shakespeare," any more than the *hind* on the arms of the Count of *Tier*stein is a pun as such. I do think it is a pun when the arms of a family named Moore or More show the head of a Moor.[1]

I shall return to the province of pun in a moment, but I want to devote one more paragraph to Psalm 46. As was known in Shakespeare's time, the *paytanim*, composers of Hebrew liturgical poetry, sometimes "signed" their works by placing their names or anagrams thereof as an acrostic at the beginning of each line of poetry. It is also said that certain Jewish names may have been formed as acronyms drawn from devotional formulae, as "Atlas" from *akh tov leyisrael selah* ("Truly God is good to Israel") and not from the name of the Titan or the German word for "satin."[2]

Now I want to try to distinguish three sorts of wordplay involving names; I am not certain that all of them qualify as paronomasia, or, as one might say, a "byname."

Already, poised on the brink of discussing the rebus, I find myself hesitating, because it is not, strictly speaking, wordplay: it is play that goes beyond the boundary of words, because in some forms it involves symbols that no longer represent letters that constitute words, even though the symbol may be indistinguishable from letters. The common American street sign

<div align="center">

PED
XING

</div>

means "Pedestrian Crossing" (itself rather ambiguous, since "Crossing" can be a participle as well as a gerund). The X in the sign is not a letter X but a graphic picture of crossing. A charming rebus-logo is hard to pronounce adequately: a chain of women's clothing shops is called "Aileen," pronounced "I lean"; and in the trademark

<div align="center">

Aileen

</div>

the i is *leaning*.

The second sort of name-wordplay I want to mention goes by a name that is bad French but established English: *double entendre*. I take this to be the realm of wordplay in which a single term has more than one meaning, or more than one level of meaning, including its use as a name. To show a shaken spear on the arms of Shakespeare is something of this sort, since we are dealing with a single term "Shakespeare" with two meanings: a name and an action.

It is *double entendre*, I believe, when William Shakespeare constructs elaborate jokes involving the word "Will," which seems to have been his byname. The various nouns and verbs all seem to be the same basic word, so the play is fairly simple. Certain texts of the *Sonnets* emphasize the possibility of play on the author's nickname. In Sonnet 57, "will" seems to be mostly a common noun:

> So true a fool is love that in your will,
> Though you do anything, he thinks no ill.[3]

Likewise in Sonnet 111, "Whilst, like a willing patient, I will drink . . . ."
The situation is different, however, in Sonnets 135, 136, and 143, in which
some uses of "will" are printed in the 1609 Quarto with an initial capital
and italicized. Sonnet 135 seems to concern a surplus of Wills:

> Whoever hath her wish, thou hast thy *Will*,
> And *Will* to boot, and Will in overplus,
> . . .[4]

Sonnet 136 even includes a "*Will* will." Thereafter, the poet relents, except
for the couplet ending Sonnet 143:

> So will I pray that thou mayst have thy *Will*,
> If thou turn back and my loud crying still.

We could engage in a discussion of the limits of the *double entendre*
as it involves an author's name. I hate to think that every time a person
named William says "will" there must be some kind of wordplay. I am
William called Bill, and I am pretty sure that I say "will" and "bill" all
the time with no awareness of their connection to my name. Likewise
with "harmony," which sounds like my family name but is linguistically
unrelated. (I might as well mention at this point that a friend of mine,
Bland Simpson, once sought and received my permission—I could add
my *indulgence*—to use the name "Billy Harmony" for an incidental
character in a novel about country music. There is a humorous reference
to a band called "Billy Harmony and the Harmony Grits"—a favorite
food in my native South.)

Double entendre, then, has to do with proper names that are also
common words. Such is the case more with family names than with first
names, since surnames are more likely to be words like "Cook" and
"Bauer." The movement in such wordplay could be called "vertical,"
since it shifts up and down among many meanings of a single word,
including meanings as part of a name.

Many names are also common nouns, and now and again you get
a potentially comic situation, as when you read a solemn poem by
Wordsworth about certain literary personages who happen to die
between 1832 and 1835, including three named Hogg, Crabbe, and Lamb.

The poem is called "Extempore Effusions upon the Death of James Hogg," and Crabbe and Lamb are mentioned by name; in the text of the poem, however, Hogg is spoken of as "the Ettrick Shepherd."[5]

I suppose that computer-assisted concordances will one day permit us to check on all such uses—for instance, how often did Oscar Wilde use "wild"? I can survey a few test-cases here. Thomas Hardy's earliest known poem, "Domicilium," contains the word "hardy":

> Red roses, lilacs, variegated box
> Are there in plenty, and such hardy flowers
> As flourish best untrained.[6]

It is difficult to think that the teen-aged Hardy did not know what he was doing. It is equally difficult to overlook all the occurrences of "frost" and "frosty" in the poems of Robert Frost. He seems at times to rub our noses in it, as when he says "Something there is that doesn't love a wall" and we provide the name "frost"; or in the witty late poem, "Peril of Hope":

> It is right in there
> Betwixt and between
> The orchard bare
> And the orchard green,
>
> When the boughs are right
> In a flowery burst
> Of pink and white,
> That we fear the worst.
>
> For there's not a clime
> But at any cost
> Will take that time
> For a night of frost.

In at least one of Frost's lines—"You see the snow-white through the white of frost?"—the poet includes not only his own name but also his wife's maiden name: White.[7]

I call this motion "vertical" because we have a single word "frost" with levels of meaning, one of which is the proper name. In English

these would look different, because we use capitals for proper nouns, thus:

> Frost
> frost

In German, however, all nouns are capitalized, so that the motion from name to word may be harder to detect. I want to suggest one example from prose. In the "Nachschrift" of *Doktor Faustus*, the narrator, Serenus Zeitblom, speaks movingly. "Es ist getan," he says, now writing as "ein alter Mann, gebeugt, fast gebrochen von den Schrecknissen der Zeit . . . ."[8]

I shall stay in German awhile to segue from *double entendre* to a kind of name-pun that better deserves the title "paronomasia." In Book X of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* Goethe describes a verse-note from the scoffing Herder:

> Der von Göttern du stammst, von Goten oder vom Kote,
> Goethe, sende mir sie.

That is:

> Thou, who from Gods art descended, or Goths, or from origin filthy,
> Goethe, send them to me.[9]

Goethe adds:

> It was not polite, indeed, that he should have permitted himself this jest on my name; for a man's name is not like a mantle, which merely hangs about him, and which, perchance, may be safely twitched and pulled, but a perfectly fitting garment, which has grown over and over like his very skin, at which one cannot scratch and scrape without wounding the man himself.[10]

Rebus and *double entendre*, then, are two sorts of wordplay in which names can be involved; the third that I want to talk about is closer to what we normally mean by pun, quibble, or paronomasia—that is, it concerns a lateral or horizontal movement from words that have the same or similar sounds. *Double entendre* has to do with a single word with multiple meanings or levels of meaning. Paronomasia has to do with a sound that signifies or suggests more than one word.

"Will" and "will" came together most vividly toward the end of Shakespeare's *Sonnets* (insofar as we can trust the 1609 arrangement); "ein Mann" and "Mann" coalesce in the "Nachschrift." It seems that the inscription of an author's name in a literary work or whole corpus comes, as it comes in a letter, toward the end. Just so, Donne's deepest paradoxical punning on his own name occurs in one of his last poems, "A Hymne to God the Father," composed during an illness in the winter of 1623: "done" recurs at the end of each stanza:

> . . .
> When thou hast done, thou hast not done,
>   For, I have more.

> . . .
> When thou hast done, thou hast not done,
>   For, I have more.

> . . .
> And, having done that, Thou haste done,
>   I have no more.[11]

Some modern poets have addressed their own names by way of the supposed meanings of those names in another language. On one occasion, Louise Glück ended a poem with the translation of her German last name:

> . . . Extend yourself—
> it is the Nile, the sun is shining,
> everywhere you turn is luck.[12]

John Frederick Nims, nearing eighty, has recently published a book called *Zany in Denim*, a title explained in the poem called "The Consolations of Etymology, with Fanfare":

> *Zany*—from *Giovanni* (John)
>   Through Venetian *Zanni*.
> *Denim*—from *de Nîmes*. Right on,
>   Sing hey nonny nonny!
> Once I thought my name—well, blah.
> *Zany in denim*, though! Ta DAH![13]

I can think of one counter-example: a poet alludes to a line by another poet but changes it so as to remove his own name. The line comes in Ezra Pound's Canto IV:

> Beat, beat, whirr, thud, . . .[14]

The source is patently Whitman's "Beat! Beat! Drums!" where the relevant lines read

> Beat! beat! drums!—blow! bugles! blow!
> . . .
> So fierce you whirr and pound you drums—so
>   shrill you bugles blow.[15]

Whitman nowhere says "thud," but he does say "thump." What Whitman does say after "whirr" and what Pound carefully does not say is "and pound."

I suppose that qualifies as suppressed or concealed *double entendre* in reverse (assuming that "Pound" and "pound" are the same word); also from American literature comes an instance of suppressed or concealed paronomasia. The poem is Poe's "To the River———." Careful research finally established, a century or more after the poem's first publication, that the river is the Po (and Poe seems to have been thinking of Byron's "Stanzas to the Po").[16] There happens to be a Po River in Virginia not far north of Richmond, where Poe was raised. No one will need to be told that Poe punned on his own name a good deal, including the word "poetry" itself and such names as Pym, Dupin, and Politian. In our time his spririt has returned in the cipher text of *Dr. Strangelove*, where P.O.E. seems to be derived from "Peace on Earth" and "Purity of Essence." (Kubrick also pays respect to Poe in *Lolita*.)[17]

This is as good a place as any to recall Kenneth Burke's speculations about names that may be encoded in Saint Augustine's *Confessions*. Burke "inclines to the notion that the adjective for 'modest' (*modica*) is Augustine's pun-name for 'Monica' [his mother . . . and] the similarly enigmatic name for himself would be the word 'strait' or 'narrow': *angustus*."[18] Augustine *was* an orator and verbalizer; when he calls Carthage a "frying pan" he is punning somewhat on *Cartaga* and *sartago*.

When we do have a name, such as Kurtz in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, we may be permitted to work back to possible sources. We know that Conrad, during a momentous journey to the Belgian Congo, met a failed idealist named Antoine Klein, whose initials are also those of another failed idealist, Apollo Korzeniowski: Conrad's father. But, if we did not know about Klein and Korzeniowski, there would be no way to get them via Kurtz. Likewise, if we knew only the book-version of Louis Zukofsky's "A-2"—

> —Clear music—
> Not calling names, says Kay,
> Poetry is not made of such things . . . .

we should never be able to reconstruct the earlier version published in a magazine:

> The clear music—
> Zoo-zoo-kaw-kaw-of-the-sky.
> Not mentioning names, says Kay,
> Poetry is not made of such things.

where the most conspicuous difference is the presence of the name "Zukofsky" anatomized into puns.[19]

Once we are alerted to such practices, we can keep our ears and eyes open. With A. R. Ammons, for example, we notice parts of his name turning up in odd places in his poems: he himself mentions that his first name "Archie" is embedded in *Starchief* (a model of Pontiac motorcar); and in Ammons's coinage "lowerarchy" we can see a lot of complex play that touches not only "hierarchy" but also Don Marquis's lowercase archy, a cockroach who writes.[20] It is not unthinkable that Ammons can capitalize and anatomize his last name into AM MONS.[21] Similarly, we should not be surprised to find the line "Mountain ash mindlessly dropping berries" in a poem called "Rural Objects" by John Ashbery.[22] Nor should we be surprised to find "pieces of the morgenland" at the end of a poem at the end of a book by Robert Morgan.[23]

Musicians must envy writers. We might recall from Mann's *Doktor Faustus* that the composer Leverkühn devises a motif that "spells" words. Not only can Bach spell his name (with "B" being B-flat and "H" B-

natural) but even such an unlikely person as Dimitri Shostakovich can divise what one critic calls a "musical monogram DSCH (Dimitri SCHostakowitsch, in the German transliteration, becoming the notes D-E flat-C-B)" in many works: the first violin concerto, the eighth string quartet, and the tenth symphony among them.[24] The familiar three-note motif used by the National Broadcasting Company of America began, I hear, as G-E-C: the musical initials of NBC's owner, the General Electric Company.

Let me end with a quick survey of writers who have somehow embedded their initials in titles or names of characters. The earliest that I know are in the nineteenth century, both born, in fact, in 1812: Charles Dickens created Charles Darnay and David Copperfield; Robert Browning created *The Ring and the Book*. Vladimir Nabokov has scattered his name and initials in many forms throughout many works: there is a "Vivian Darkbloom" and a "Van Veen." Aldous Huxley wrote *Antic Hay*, Hilda Doolittle *Hermetic Definition*, Hart Crane *Cape Hatteras*, Robert Frost "Range Finding" and *A Further Range*, T. S. Eliot *The Elder Statesman*. One of J. D. Salinger's characters is named Jean de Daumier Smith. One of my most brilliant students noticed a kinship between Bob Dylan and *Don't Look Back* (syllabically b-d-l and d-l-b). Bob Kane, who invented Batman, has confessed to devising an autobiographical name for his hero's alter ego, Bruce Wayne: "Bruce" alliterates with "Bob," and "Wayne" rhymes with "Kane."[25]

Finally, I want to quote the first lines of one of Stevens's last poems, the great "Madame La Fleurie":

> Weight him down, O side-stars, with the great weightings of the end.
> Seal him there. . . .[26]

The poem is full of puns ("a dew" must be seven or eight different locutions!) and the first two lines begin with "W" and "S."

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NOTES

[1]Thomas Woodcock and John Martin Robinson, *The Oxford Guide to Heraldry* (Oxford: OUP, 1988) 63, 83, and 198.

[2]See William Harmon, "Eiron Eyes," *Parnassus: Poetry in Review* 7.2 (Spring/Summer 1979): 17.

[3]William Shakespeare, *Complete Works*, ed. A. Harbage (New York: Viking, 1969) 1462.

[4]The phrase "sweet will" (l. 4) appears in later poems by Wordsworth and Keats, who were both named William.

[5]David Perkins, ed., *English Romantic Writers* (New York: Harcourt, 1967) 318-19.

[6]*The Variorum Edition of the Complete Poems of Thomas Hardy*, ed. James Gibson (New York: Macmillan-Collier, 1982) 3.

[7]*The Poetry of Robert Frost*, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rineheart and Winston, 1969) 33, 445, 148.

[8]Thomas Mann, *Doktor Faustus* (Berlin: Fischer, 1947) 540.

[9]This example was suggested by my friend Professor Christoph Schweitzer.

[10]*Goethe's Autobiography: Poetry and Truth*, trans. R. O. Moon (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949) 356.

[11]John Donne, *Complete Poems*, ed. J. Shawcross (Garden City, NY: Doubleday-Anchor, 1967) 392.

[12]Louise Glück, "The Undertaking," *The House on Marshland* (New York: Ecco Press, 1975) 27.

[13]John Frederick Nims, *Zany in Denim* (Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1990) 45.

[14]Ezra Pound, *The Cantos* (New York: New Directions, 1970) 13.

[15]Walt Whitman, *Leaves of Grass*, eds. Harold W. Blodgett and Sculley Bradley (New York: Norton, 1965) 283.

[16]E. A. Poe, *Selected Poetry and Prose*, ed. T. O. Mabbott (New York: Modern Library, 1951) 407.

[17]See N. Kagan, *The Cinema of Stanley Kubrick* (New York: Holt, 1972) 118-28; Vladimir Nabokov, *The Annotated Lolita*, ed. Alfred Appel Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) 330-33.

[18]Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961) 83. See also 120n.

[19]*Louis Zukofsky, "A"* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1978) 6. The original publication was in *Poetry* 40 (April 1932): 26-29.

[20]A. R. Ammons, *Collected Poems 1951-1971* (New York: Norton, 1972) 369.

[21]The SNOW of his *Snow Poems* may be regarded as an inversion of MONS.

[22]John Ashbery, *The Double Dream of Spring* (New York: Dutton, 1970) 44.

[23]Robert Morgan, *At the Edge of the Orchard Country* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1987) 68.

[24]See Christopher Norris, ed., *Shostakovich: the Man and His Music* (Boston: Boyars, 1982) 71-74, 154, 158-59, 179.

[25]Interview, "Entertainment Tonight," CBS Network, June 1992.

[26]Wallace Stevens, *Collected Poems* (New York: Knopf, 1978) 507.

"Single Natures Double Name":[1]
Some Comments on *The Phoenix and Turtle*

CHRISTIANE GILLHAM

In his comment on the "sole Arabian tree" in Shakespeare's *The Phoenix and Turtle* (*P&T*) Grosart drew attention to the homonymy of Greek φοῖνιξ: "The palm is meant. In Greek phoinix, and meaning both phoenix and palmtree."[2] This trace, which has never been followed, has given rise to the following comments.

In the Renaissance, agreement in the *verba* was still felt to be an indicator of hidden congruence in the *res*.[3] In other words, the identical or similar name suggested a parallel in the Book of Nature, i.e., in the case of *phoinix*, the integral relationship between the tree and the bird.

The following remarks are to show that this "natural" analogy was taken to be a fact by natural philosophers of the classical tradition, which means that when the one was named, the two were always addressed, this in turn bringing into focus a hitherto disregarded source for *The Phoenix and Turtle*.

In early speculations on the phoenix, this legendary bird is seen to be naturally related to the palmtree. Pliny, for instance, assumes that the phoenix obtained his name from the palm (*phoinix*). The bird is said to die and to rise again when the tree experiences its rebirth.[4] This entry in the "Book of Nature" finds an exact poetic parallel in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, where the phoenix fashions his pyre "in the topmost branches of a waving palm-tree."[5] The topical connection between the bird and the tree is further pursued in the Christian tradition, where the phoenix is frequently seen to be roosting on top of the palm in delineations of paradise.[6]

According to the myth, the uniqueness of the bird phoenix consists in its cremating itself every 500 years to rise again from the ashes,[7] first in the form of a worm which will have matured to the full-grown bird

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<http://www.connotations.de/debgillham00202.htm>.

after three days.[8] Accordingly, the ashes do not signify the death of the phoenix; they are not, as is generally maintained, merely an infertile, dead substance,[9] but on the contrary a breeding-ground of new life. To quote Henry Vaughan's translation of Claudian's *Phoenix*:

> . . . *life* which in the ashes lurks
> Hath framed the *heart*, and taught new *blood* new *works*;
> The whole *heap* stirs, and every *part* assumes
> Due vigour; . . . [10]

It is this substance of fertile ashes[11] which links the two natures, palm and bird, listed under the single name, *phoinix*. Thomas Mann in one of the most beautiful chapters of the beautiful story of *Joseph and His Brethren*, shows the young Joseph climbing date-palms in Potiphar's garden in order to transfer the pollen, also an ash-like substance, which the narrator calls "Samenstaub" (seed-dust), from a fruitless tree to a fructifying one.[12] The date-palm brings fruit only when fertilised (either naturally by the wind or artificially by the skill of the gardener) with the seed-dust or pollen of the stamen-bearing tree. The pollen hence assumes great significance in connection with the generation of fruits.

When Thomas Mann introduces the artificial fertilisation of the date-palm into his vision of Ancient Egypt as a major motif, speaking of the necessity of pollinating the "fertile specimens" with the pollen of the "infertile tree" so as to enable the maturation of fruit, he does not resort to irony and anachronism. The Egyptians are not wrongly credited with a knowledge usually accredited to Linné in the *Fundamenta et Philosophia Botanica* of 1732. It is a matter of fact that Thomas Mann's *Joseph and His Brethren* is based on meticulous study and, indeed, the artificial fertilisation of the date-palm has to be looked for just as far down in the "deep well of history" as the story of Joseph and his brethren itself.

Herodotus has it that the Assyrians stimulated palm-trees to generate fruit in much the same way as fig trees:

> . . . they tie the fruit of the palm called male by the Greeks to the date-bearing palm, that so the gall-fly might enter the dates and cause them to ripen.[13]

Herodotus here describes the so-called caprification, a technique which, with the aid of gall-flies, is specially intended to improve the fructification of figs.[14] He makes no mention, however, of the pollen, which in *Joseph and His Brethren* helps to make the female tree fruitful. So this brings us no nearer to an ancient knowledge and use of any word or thing resembling "seed-dust," and neither in the *OED* nor in Grimm's *Deutsches Wörterbuch* are there any entries dating back to the time before the systematic botanical studies of the late 17th century. "Pollen" as a technical term indicating the fertile dust of flowers or plants, is recorded in the *OED* for the first time in 1760. Linné himself used the term *fovilla*, a derivation from the Latin *favilla* meaning flying cinders, to denote the contents of the stamen said to be discovered by him. It would be tempting to connect *fovilla* with Shakespeare's "cinders" and use it to bridge the gap between the bird and tree as well as over the centuries but no earlier example can be found. Similarly, the synonymous terms "dust" or "powder" are not listed in this context before 1672.

There is, nevertheless, one synonymous term in the English language which in its linguistic evolution somehow reflects the phenomenon of the fertile dust or powder of plants or flowers as does the German word "Blütenstaub," namely "flour," "originally the 'flower' or finest quality of meal (lat. *flos farinae*); a fine soft powder."[15] The modern word "flour," moreover, still appears in the written form "flower" in Johnson's *Dictionary* (1755), so that the two meanings "flour" and "flower" were represented by the word "flower" right down into the 18th century; in fact there was no difference between the two words.

This is corroborated by the alchemistic definition of "flower" in the *OED*: "the pulverulent form of any substance."[16] Thus, the meanings of both words overlap as do the words themselves. Moreover, there is a possible association of the fertile dust of plants or flowers described by the German word "Blütenstaub."

The semantic development of "flower" and "flour" has a parallel in what happened to "pollen." This did not, originally, mean "Blütenstaub" but "fine flour or meal." Therefore, it is not unlikely that, inversely, "flower" may have meant "pollen" in the modern sense long before Linné. Sidney and Golding in *A Woorke concerning the trewnesse of the*

Christian Religion (the translation of Du Plessis Mornay's theological tract) provide an example:

> We shall see the Earth replenished with Herbes, Trees, and Fruites . . . Whence is all this? . . . Each thing serveth other, and all serve one alone. Whence may this bonde come? If things bee everlastingly, and of themselves; how have they thus put themselves in subjection? . . . So that if they have had their beginning of themselves; did they bring foorth them selves *in seed, in flower, or in kernell? In Egge* or in full life?[17]

As part of the triad "in seed, in flower, or in kernell," "flower" seems to be charged with the meaning of "pollen." Du Plessis Mornay obviously is concerned with "beginnings," more precisely with the beginnings of life in its smallest form, for both "seed" and "kernell" refer to the smallest fertile substance in nature.[18] Therefore "flower" here suggests the proverbially small particles of flour or meal which, in this close context, seems to share the procreative capacity of "seed" and "kernell."

Now, the two facts that the pollen of the date-palm played a role in horticulture at a very early date and that the phenomenon of fertile dust was long known before Linné's scientific discovery are corroborated by a very early text, well-known throughout the Middle Ages and in the Modern Period, Pliny's *Historia Naturalis*. Thomas Mann's "quaint tale" of fertilising the palm with seed-dust most likely has its origin here:

> . . . sine maribus non gignere feminas sponte edito nemore confirmant, circaque singulos plures nutare in eum pronas blandioribus comis; illum erectis hispidum adflatu visuque ipso et *pulvere* etiam reliquas maritare; . . . adeoque est veneris intellectus ut coitus etiam excogitatus sit ab homine e maribus flore ac languine, interim vero tantum *pulvere* insperso feminis.[19]

But, again, there is an earlier authority for Pliny to rely on. Theophrastus attributes to an ash-like substance a similar function as does Pliny to pollen in his description of the fertilisation of the date-palm. In *De causis plantarum* Theophrastus clearly points to the natural affinity of the date-palm and the phoenix suggested by the nominal identity:

> What occurs in the date-palm (φοινίκων), while not the same as caprification, nevertheless bears a certain resemblance to it, which is why the procedure is called ὀλυνθάζειν. For the flower (ἄνθος) and dust (κονιορτός) and down

(χνοῦς) from the male date-palm, when sprinkled on the fruit, effect by their heat (θερμότητι) and the rest of their power a certain dryness and ventilation, and by this means the fruit remains on the tree.[20]

Apart from the identity of the "proper" names of bird and palm, Theophrastus avails himself of quite a number of terms descriptive of both. The terms κονιορτός, dust or flying ashes—composed of κόνις, ash, and ὄρνυμι, whirl up—,[21] and θερμότης, heat,[22] serve to describe the development of the fruit of the date-palm. The same expressions can also be found in the phoenix-legend where the ashes are not infertile either but, on the contrary, are responsible for the development of the fruit. The fruit of the date-palm, which is, in turn, also called φοῖνιξ,[23] rises, so to speak, from its dust-bed of fertile ashes in exactly the same way as the bird phoenix does. This is to show that, long before Pliny pointed out the sexual correlations in the fertility of the palm (phoinix), the tree and the bird had been seen to be related by their common reliance on either the substance or the motif of the fertile ashes.

It is a matter of fact that these sources were well known in the English Renaissance. *Batman vppon Bartholome* may serve as an example. He maintains that the palm shares the name of the bird because of a natural "likenesse."[24] Conversely, referring to Pliny, Batman mentions an Arabian palm which, because of its regenerative affinity, gave its name to the bird:

> In the South Countrie is a manner Palme, that is alone in that kinde, none other springeth nor commeth thereof: but when this Palme is so olde, that it fayleth all for age: then oft it quickneth and springeth again of it selfe. Therefore men suppose, that *Phoenix*, that is a bird of *Arabia*, hath the name of this Palme in *Arabia*. For he dieth and quickneth, and liueth oft, as the foresayd Palme doth, ...[25]

This is another example (pointing to Shakespeare's "sole Arabian tree") which shows that verbal identity was regarded as an indicator of a natural relationship, and, moreover, that phoenix, bird and palm, was an outstanding example in this theoretical field. Its suggestiveness is borne out by Tertullian's interpretation of Psalm 92:12, which in the *Septuagint* (93:13) reads as follows:

δίκαιος ὡς φοῖνιξ ἀνθήσει, ...

Tertullian, however, does not read "iustus ut palma florebit" like the *Vulgate* but "Et florebis enim uelut phoenix,"[26] whereby he explicitly refers not to the tree but to the bird,[27] with its rich aura of christological symbolism.

Again, a converse example is provided by Sir Thomas Browne's rejection of common errors concerning the phoenix:

> Concerning its generation, that without all conjunction, it begets and reseminates it selfe, hereby we introduce a vegetable production in animalls, and unto sensible natures, transferre the propriety of plants.[28]

When it comes to the natural rather than verbal affinity, especially with a view to Shakespeare's *P&T*, the motif of the fertile ashes proves to be most rewarding. Therefore, the "cinders" in the Threnos, far from being an obstacle, help elucidate the meaning.

> Beautie, Truth, and Raritie,
> Grace in all simplicitie,
> here enclosde, in cinders lie.

In other words, the cinders left after the Phoenix and Turtle have risen from the pyre in their "mutual flame" contain the complete ideal substance of both. In prefering "cinders" to *ashes*, Shakespeare possibly harkened back to Theophrastus's description of the development of palm-fruits. There, the focus was on κονιορτός, a word which, as already mentioned above, is composed of κόνις and ὄρνυμι. *Cinders*, in Shakespeare's age, was taken to be derived from Latin *cinis*, which explains the spelling with an initial "c."[29] Latin *cinis*, however, is derived from the Greek κόνις[30] so that the (pseudo-)etymological series κόνις, *cinis*, *cinders* represents a phonetical as well as semantic connection between Theophrastus's κονιορτός and Shakespeare's "cinders." This is another link between the "bird of loudest lay" and the "sole Arabian tree" in Shakespeare's poem.

When it comes to Shakespeare's allocation of the sexes in his poem, that is to say, his making the Phoenix take over the role of bride and

the Turtle that of groom, yet another and even more venerable source than the *De causis plantarum* comes into view. This is the Song of Solomon, where the phoenix, meaning "palm-tree," figures as bride and the turtle as groom. The groom compares his bride to a palmtree (φοῖνιξ in the *Septuagint*):

> How fair and how pleasant art thou, O love, for delights!
> This thy stature is like to the palm tree (φοῖνιξ), and thy breasts, to clusters of grapes.
> I said, I will go up to the palm tree, and will take hold of its boughs;
>   (Cant. 7:6-8)

This is far from being the only parallel between *P&T* and the Song of Solomon. There is an equally striking, if hidden, example in Cant. 2:14:

> O my dove, who art in the clefts of the rock, in the secret places of the stairs, let me see thy countenance, let me hear thy voice; for sweet is thy voice, and thy countenance is comely.

This verse is, however, somewhat ambiguous. It is syntactically uncertain whether the bride in the preceding verses is meant to be repeating the words of the groom or whether she is actually addressing him in direct speech. Accordingly, two ways of mystical exegesis have been offered. On the one hand the dove may be identified with the bride and becomes then either a symbol of the church or of the individual soul.[31]

There is, however, another interpretation according to which the bridegroom is the dove meaning Christ. This interpretation is referred to in the chapter on the turtle-dove in the *Physiologus*:

> This bird may be compared to our Lord Jesus Christ, for he is our chattering spiritual turtle-dove, the truly sweet and melodious bird, that in preaching the gospel has made resound what is below the heavens. Therefore, the bride herself, that is the church of all people, says to the turtle: "Let me see your countenance, let me hear your voice, for your voice is sweet, and your countenance is comely." (Cant. 2:14)[32]

The ambiguous allocation of sexes in the Song of Solomon (the phoenix is meant to be the bride only,[33] but the turtle may mean both, bride and groom) may provide a background setting off some of the seeming

inconsistencies of *P&T*. It could, for example, help interpret what tends to be the neutralization of opposites between male and female:

> So they lov'd as love in twaine,
> Had the essence but in one,
> Two distincts, Division none,
> Number there in love was slaine.
>
> Hearts remote, yet not asunder,
> Distance and no space was seene,
> Twixt this *Turtle* and his *Queene*;
> But in them it were a wonder. (*P&T* 25-32)

The homonymy of φοῖνιξ in Greek, therefore, not only extends the meaning of the name "Phoenix" in Shakespeare's poem. It also brings into play, as a possible source, the Song of Solomon. This, again, is an instance of classical sources being indicators of typological lore.

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NOTES

[1]William Shakespeare, "The Phoenix and the Turtle" l. 39, *The Poems, A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare*, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins (Philadelphia: J. S. Lippincott, 1938) 323-31.

[2]Robert Chester, *Love's Martyr, or, Rosalins Complaint (1601). With its Supplement, "Diverse Poeticall Essaies" on the Turtle and Phoenix by Shakspere, Ben Jonson, George Chapman, John Marston, etc.*, ed. with introd., notes and illus. by Alexander B. Grosart, The New Shakspere Society, Ser.VIII No.2 (London: Trübner for the New Shakspere Society, 1878) 241. A similar relationship between bird and tree may be found in *The Tempest* 3.3.22-24 (ed. F. Kermode, The Arden Shakespeare [1954; London: Methuen; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1985]): ". . . that in Arabia / There is one tree, the phoenix' throne; one phoenix / At this hour reigning there."

[3]See for the relationship between *res* and *verba*, for instance, Friedrich Ohly, "Vom geistigen Sinn des Wortes im Mittelalter," *Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Bedeutungsforschung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977) 1-31.

[4]Pliny, *Historia Naturalis*, ed. H. Rockham, vol. 4 (1950; rpt. London: Heinemann, 1961) XIII.ix.42. Cf. also Philemon Holland's *Pliny (Pliny's History of the World, commonly called the Natural historie* [1601]) XIII.iv, I.387. See also *OED* phoenix 2.

Bot., and Christoph Gerhardt, "Der Phoenix auf dem dürren Baum," *Natura loquax: Naturkunde und allegorische Naturdeutung vom Mittelalter bis zur frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Wolfgang Harms and Heimo Reinitzer (Frankfurt: Lang, 1981) 73-108, esp. 77-79.

[5]"... illicet in ramis tremulaeque cacumine palmae" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, with an English transl. by Frank Justus Miller, vol. 2, The Loeb Classical Library [London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1960] xv.396 [pp. 392, 393]).

[6]See J. Poeschke, "Paradies," *Lexikon für christliche Ikonographie*—later referred to as *LCI*—vol. 3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1971) 375-82. For some more examples cf. Edward Payson Evans, *Animal Symbolism in Ecclesiastical Architecture* (London: Heinemann, 1896) 127.

[7]See, for example, Isidor Hispalensis Episcopi, *Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX*, ed. W. M. Lindsay, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1911) XII.7.22: "... de cineribus suis resurgit." See also Shakespeare, *Henry VI Part 3* 1.4.35 (ed. A. S. Cairncross, The Arden Shakespeare [London: Methuen; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1964]): "My ashes, as the Phoenix, may bring forth a bird . . . ."

[8]For known versions of the Phoenix-myth see, for instance, the chapter "Of the Phoenix" in *Batman vppon Bartholome his Booke* (1582; rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), XII.14, 183.

[9]See *Batman vppon Bartholome his Booke* X.10, 156v: "And ashes hath its default & imperfection, that though he be euery daye moysted and wet, and sprong with raine, yet he is always barren."

[10]"The Phoenix out of Claudian," Henry Vaughan, *The Poetical Works*, ed. A. Rudrum (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983) 364.83-86. See also J. Sylvester, "Of the admirable and onely Phoenix" I.626: "to burn her sacred bones to seedful cinders" ("The Fifth Day of the First Week," *Du Bartas his Divine Weekes, The Complete Works of Joshuah Sylvester in 2 vols.*, ed. Alexander B. Grosart, vol. 1 [New York: AMS Press, 1967] 66).

[11]The fact that "ashes" as a substance could well suggest the idea of fertility is corroborrated by a well-known text of classical antiquity. In the Odyssey (V.490) the phrase "σπέρμα πυρός" is used as a metaphor for "ashes." Chapman translates this as "seed of fire" (V.662). Cf. *The Odyssey & The Lesser Homerica*, vol. 2 of *Chapman's Homer: The Iliad, The Odyssey, and The Lesser Homerica*, ed. Allardyce Nicoll (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957) 104.

[12]Thomas Mann, *Joseph und seine Brüder, Das erzählerische Werk in 12 Bänden*, vol. 7 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1975) 661: "Die Dattelpalme ist ein zweihäusiger Baum, und die Bestäubung ihrer fruchtbaren Exemplare mit dem Samenstaube derjenigen, die keine Blüten mit Griffel und Narbe, sondern nur solche mit Staubgefäßen tragen, ist des Windes Sache. Doch hat diesem der Mensch von jeher das Geschäft auch wohl abgenommen und künstliche Befruchtung ausgeübt, nämlich so, daß er eigenhändig die abgeschnittenen Blütenstände eines unfruchtbaren Baumes mit denen fruchtbarer in Berührung brachte und sie besamte."

[13]Herodotus I.193, trans. A. D. Godley, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1963) 245.

[14]See the entry "Feige," *Der Kleine Pauly. Lexikon der Antike in 5 Bänden*, vol. 2 (1975; München: dtv, 1979) 528.

[15]*OED* flour 1.a.; 2.

[16]*OED* flour 2.c.

[17]Du Plessis Mornay, *A Woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian Religion, The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney,* ed. A. Feuillerat, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1923) 269 (italics mine).

[18]See, for instance, *Batman vppon Bartholome* XVII.145.321; William Perkins, "A Graine of Mustard-Seed," *Works* (London, 1635) I: 637-44; Nicolaus Cusanus, *De beryllo* chap. 26.

[19]Pliny, *Historia Naturalis* XIII.vii.34-36 (italics mine).

[20]Theophrastus, *De causis plantarum* II.9.15, trans. B. Einarson and G. K. K. Link, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967) 279-80 (italics mine).

[21]See Liddle/Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1901) 977.

[22]See Liddle/Scott, "θερμότης."

[23]See "Phoinix (8)," *Der Kleine Pauly* 4: 801.

[24]*Batman vppon Bartholome* XVII.116, 308v.

[25]*Batman vppon Bartholome* XVII.116, 309r.

[26]Tertullian, *De resurrectione mortuorum* 13.1-4, esp. 13.3, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina,* vol. 2 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954) 936. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne, *Pseudodoxia Epidemica* III.12, ed. R. Robbins, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1981) 202, 205, who attributes this misunderstanding not only to Tertullian but also to Epiphanius. See also E. P. Evans, *Animal Symbolism* 127.

[27]This is made evident by the context; but see also *Pseudodoxia Epidemica* III.12, 205.

[28]*Pseudodoxia* III.xii, 206.

[29]See *OED* cinder *sb. Forms.*

[30]See Alois Walde, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch,* 3rd rev. ed. by J. B. Hofmann, vol. 1 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1938) *s.v. cinis,* 217-18. Cf. Isidor, *Etymologiarum* XVII.2.

[31]See J. Poeschke, "Taube," *LCI,* vol. 4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1972) 242-44. See also Friedrich Ohly, *Hohelied-Studien: Grundzüge einer Geschichte der Hoheliedauslegung des Abendlandes bis um 1200* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1958); Paul Simon, "Sponsa Cantici: Die Deutung der Braut des Hohenliedes in der vornizänischen griechischen Theologie und in der lateinischen Theologie des dritten und vierten Jahrhunderts," 2 vols., diss., U of Bonn, 1951.

[32]*Physiologus,* ed. Franciscus Sbordone (Rome, 1936, rpt. Hildesheim: Olms 1976) 94, transl. from the Greek by Thomas Graumann; cf. also the editor's note on p. 93. Cyrill Alexandrinus, for instance, also interprets the turtle of Cant. 2:14 as Christ; see *De adoratione in spiritu et veritate* XV.532.

[33]In the chapter on orchids in Gerard's *Herbal* the interesting combination of the word "palma" with "Christ" is found. Palma Christi or Satyrion royall is an orchid growing in England, but it is said to have its origin in Arabia, like the palm-tree. The word "palma" here is, of course, the Latin *palma,* meaning both hand and palm-tree. Again, the phoenix/palm comes into view, whose fruits are called dates, derived from Greek δάκτυλος, meaning "finger," so that a rich field of associations is opened up, nourishing the idea that the Palma Christi would as well suggest "the sole Arabian tree," the palm-tree, and, in a more hidden sense, the bird phoenix, which in Christian allegory is usually seen as a symbol of Christ. The genitive link "Palma

Christi" therefore mirrors the somewhat ambiguous allocation of sexes in the Song of Solomon and the intended neutralisation of sexes in "The Phoenix and Turtle." See John Gerard's *Herbal* (*The Herbal or General History of Plants*, rpt. of 1633 ed. [New York: Dover, 1975]) 220-21, where the male and female Palma Christi stand close together, resembling each other very much, so that again the differences between the sexes are neutralized.

Reader Participation and Rationalism in Fielding's *Tom Jones*

LOTHAR ČERNY

Wolfgang Iser, developing his theory of reader participation and reader response, chose Fielding's *Tom Jones* and *Joseph Andrews* as his starting point.[1] Fielding's novels, therefore, do not just serve Iser as examples to illustrate his theory but actually provide the patterns or substrata on which it is based. This inductive method, however sound in itself, requires close attention to what the text says. In this paper, I am taking issue with Iser because his reading of Fielding does not seem quite close enough.

According to Iser the reader of *Tom Jones* or *Joseph Andrews* is encouraged by the author-narrator to help constitute the meaning of the novel. He sees Fielding's offer of co-operation at certain places in the novels which he calls "blanks" or "gaps." The reader is meant to fill the "Blanks" (*Tom Jones* II.i.76),[2] "vacant Spaces" (III.i.116) or "vacant Pages" (*Joseph Andrews* II.i.89)[3] with the help of certain textual signs.[4] Iser's main contention is that the novel does not explicitly state its meaning, but that it is the reader who constructs its meaning on the basis of these signs. In other words, the author provides the reader with guidelines, "prestructured by the written text."[5] These guidelines are mainly found in the initial essays to the 18 books of Fielding's *Tom Jones* and the prefaces to his novels.

Iser interprets Fielding's theoretical essays and statements in an intellectual and epistemological sense.[6] In this view he follows John Preston, who also claimed that Fielding aims at rational understanding and that the effect of his novels was "epistemological rather than moral."[7] I cannot agree with either of these propositions but shall argue that Fielding's aim was a composite one, ruled by feeling.

One of Iser's main stays is a passage from *Tom Jones* in which Fielding expands on "the vacant Spaces of Time." In Chapter III.i Fielding addresses his reader, attributing to him, as so often, "Sagacity" (116). As nothing of importance has happened in the history of Tom Jones, so he tells the reader, he intends to pass over a long stretch of time. The reader, therefore, has a chance of intelligent participation,

> an Opportunity of employing that wonderful Sagacity, of which he is Master, by filling up these vacant Spaces of Time with his own Conjectures. (116)

Iser comments this passage as follows:

> The vacant spaces in the text, here as in *Joseph Andrews*, are offered to the reader as pauses in which to reflect. They give him the chance to enter into the proceedings in such a way that he can construct their meaning.[8]

First of all, Iser does not meet the tone of the passage, but falls, to put it bluntly, into the trap of Fielding's irony. This is clearly indicated by the hyperbolic compliments concerning the reader's sagacity. Secondly, what Fielding calls "vacant Spaces" is hardly identical with spaces for a congenial interpretation leading up to "constructing" the text. He does not provide any spaces at all for readers to exercise their conjectural abilities but, on the contrary, he caricatures an altogether unwanted reader-participation.[9]

> . . . what Reader but knows that Mr. *Allworthy* felt at first for the Loss of his Friend, those Emotions of Grief, which on such Occasions enter into all Men whose Hearts are not composed of Flint, or their Heads of as solid Materials? Again, what Reader doth not know that Philosophy and Religion, in time, moderated, and at last extinguished this Grief? (116)

The "captatio benevolentiae" is followed, first, by an example showing what might happen if the wonderfully sagacious reader really availed himself of the offer to fill in the "the vacant Spaces." He would produce the typical clichés of the dilletante. Fielding recounts purely conventional reactions and his irony—". . . Flint, or . . . Heads of as solid Materials"—marks them as such. His approval of Bridget Allworthy's strict

observation of mourning as far as her garments are concerned points in the same direction. We should not, therefore, put too much trust in the reader's "Sagacity" nor in his ability to contribute intelligent conjectures or to participate in the construction of meaning.

This scepticism on Fielding's part is corroborated by some other comments on his readers. He distinguishes two types of readers, those of "the lowest Class" and "the upper Graduates in Criticism" (117). Of course, everybody will identify with the "graduates," but it is just the epithet "upper" which should warn the discerning reader. The events or episodes which these readers are supposed to be imagining, the author assures us, are "of equal Importance with those reported by the daily and weekly Historians of the age," yet all these things are obviously not "worthy of a Place" in his history and therefore negligible. Of course, the reader is at liberty to conjecture whatever he likes, but Fielding would hardly regard this type of literary activity as very much worthwhile.[10] He seems to have anticipated, ironically, Wittgenstein's famous phrase: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."[11] The reader should not talk of what the author is silent about.

After the ironic *captatio benevolentiae* Fielding then resorts to *hysteron proteron*, expressing his conviction that the conjectures about the characters and their actions will exercise "some of the most excellent Faculties of the Mind." It would be much more "useful," indeed, to foretell "the Actions of Men in any Circumstance from their Characters" rather than to take the trouble to judge them by their actions. In the light of this ironic inversion of cause and effect it is not surprising that Fielding emphasizes the great difficulty of exercising this talent, assisted though it be by "Penetration" and "Sagacity," of course.[12] The absurd flattery reaches its climax at the end of the chapter:

> As we are sensible that much the greatest Part of our Readers are very eminently possessed of this Quality, we have left them a Space of twelve Years to exert it in; and shall now bring forth our Heroe, at about fourteen Years of Age, not questioning that many have been long impatient to be introduced to his Acquaintance. (118)

Now we know what to make of the reader's attributed "Sagacity," warned by the assertion that most of the readers are "very eminently

possessed" of it. The ambiguity of the verb "possessed" is a special case of irony which allows Fielding to say and not say what he means. The very readers who are stupid enough to swallow his bait, "Sagacity," and believe (like the ass in the fable) to know better than the real craftsman, are the ones to whom the satirical epithet "possessed" applies. Perhaps the crowning absurdity in this passage is the offer of a twelve years' gap to be filled by volunteers. What they are offered is literally a stretch of twelve years in which to have their say. Discourse time and story time are inextricably mixed in the clause and sub-clause. The result is nonsense.

What Iser does not see or state clearly is that even "gaps" and "blanks" are a means of directing the reader. The gap is, if at all, the illusion of freedom to fill something in. The reader is confronted with schematised views and gaps between them, but they belong to schemes of textual presentation which aim at a particular reader-involvement.[13]

In Iser's description of the reading process the terms "gap," "vacant spaces," and "missing links" are not ironical as they are in Fielding's (or in Sterne's) dialogue with the reader and their literal meaning is taken to be stronger than their function as metaphors. For Iser they seem to signal a deficiency. The reader is supposed to fill in what the author left out—on purpose and by necessity (the text cannot spell out its own meaning). But an author like Fielding does not leave out anything essential. The metaphors of space, if not used ironically, are rather unsuitable in a theory of reading as they suggest the author left out parts, almost in the way of a puzzle.

If Fielding's irony points to nothing else it points out that the activity of the reader depends on what the author actually put into words. His words create impressions in the reader's mind and subsequently cause imaginative activities. The reader reacts to the features of language, responds to its various aesthetic and rhetorical qualities as well as to its semantic aspects. Metaphors for these activities should have more positive connotations than those of "filling in," an expression which does not do justice to the richness of textual connotations, implications, references, and emotional appeals.

The reader's imagination is able to work on the text, not because of what the text does not say or leaves out, but because of what its words

suggest. Granted that we can only picture what we do not actually see, as Iser says, it does not make much sense to say "the written part of the text gives us the knowledge, but it is the unwritten part that gives us the opportunity to picture things."[14] We imagine what the text says, precisely because the text is not picture but word, i.e. a sign which creates a picture in the mind. The contention that we "are not able to use our imagination" without the gaps in the text seems to ignore a fundamental function of language, especially literary language.

Throughout Iser's essays one encounters the notion that the reader is somehow competing with the author. This implies a wrong notion of the working of the imagination. Iser's interpretation of Virginia Woolf's comment on Jane Austen reflects this misunderstanding.[15] The things which in Virginia Woolf's view Jane Austen offers to the reader are said to "expand" in the imagination. In other words, the reader's imagination builds on what the author provides, but this is different from saying that the reader does not get the whole story, that he creates the unwritten parts of the text. "The most enduring form of life" Virginia Woolf speaks about is not a material, quantitative, addition, not a background created by the reader, but a quality with which the author "endows . . . scenes which are outwardly trivial." It is Jane Austen who offers this to the reader's mind and imagination.

Iser understands the reader's role in a substantive sense, in spite of his protestations that he regards it as re-creative.[16] The reader, however, is, and even ought to be, primarily an understander—words convey first of all meaning—and where the imagination is concerned, the reader is a visualizer. In the imagination the things signified come to life. Naturally, the author does not and cannot "give" that inner picture of the mind to the reader directly, but whoever would claim this to be the case? Therefore, the claim "no author worth his salt will ever attempt to set the *whole* picture before his reader's eyes"[17] is either a truism or does not make sense. Fielding, at any rate, does not invite the reader to participate (or rather intrude), quite the contrary. The spaces he leaves out are not spaces for the constitution of meaning. Fielding's addresses to the reader primarily aim at the fanciful reading habits of dilettante readers. He exposes such habits by ironical praise and tells us more about how not to read than how to read. But, although Fielding makes it quite

clear how he expects a really intelligent reader to deal with a literary text, Iser sticks to his theory and takes those appeals to the sagacious reader for granted:

> This typical appeal to the reader's "sagacity" aims at arousing a sense of discernment. . . . Here we have a clear outline of the role of the reader, which is fulfilled through the continual instigation of attitudes and reflections on those attitudes.[18]

Though Iser mentions Fielding's irony in the "history" part of the novel, he fails to account for it in the addresses to the reader, whose activity he describes, without qualification, as a process of rational reasoning.[19] Fielding's texts as well as the various philosophical treatises of the period demand an altogether different perspective. Rational self-righteousness, the supposed "Sagacity" of the dilettante, was nothing less than one of the targets of Fielding's satire. A reader reaching up to the author's ideal of participation would be a sensitive understander, wary of ironic overtones and far from being willing to interfere.

The irony of "Sagacity" is obvious enough in the context of *Tom Jones*—even Squire Western boasts about his "Sagacity"[20]—but its poignancy becomes even more apparent when it is looked at in the light of John Locke's definition.[21] In the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, "Sagacity" denotes the exercise of arriving at knowledge, not by intuition which is the highest form, but by "Demonstration," the use of "intermediate *Ideas*." In other words, sagacity is defined as an ability to arrive at knowledge through a process of "Reasoning," of using "intervening *Ideas*": "A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate *Ideas* . . . and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called *Sagacity*." Locke is concerned here with that quality of judgment which is achieved through a process of reasoning alone.[22] For Fielding this is just not good enough. His parody of sagacity suggests, rather, that he wants to question the possibility of arriving at any kind of true knowledge by this method at all. The reason for this ineffectiveness may be sought in the absence of wisdom, which is all the more apparent as it is present in "Sophia," the true end of Tom's journey. Keeping "Sagacity" and "Wisdom" so much apart, Fielding made it quite clear that he regarded the rationalist concept of sagacity as deficient. *Tom Jones*

much rather exemplifies Berkeley's view that "wit without wisdom . . . is hardly worth finding."[23]

One of the reasons why Iser mistakes Fielding's "vacant Spaces" in his theory of reading may be his observation that Fielding rejected Richardson's overt didacticism. But in ridiculing outright didacticism, Fielding does not altogether dispense with teaching. On the contrary, he wants to teach in a less obvious and more effective way. He makes the reader learn on his own, not by telling him what he thinks is right but by letting him discover sense and nonsense for himself. To let his readers, i.e. us, achieve this aim, Fielding addresses the reader in the novel, makes him his confidant, an observer of his world. The actual reader, then, becomes a meta-reader who communicates with the author through the figure of the reader in the novel,[24] a process reminding us of similar dramatic techniques, e.g. in Beaumont and Fletcher's *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*.[25] In that play the audience on the stage, being the object of satire, serves to make the spectator aware of his own aesthetic and emotional expectations and reactions. Similarly, by exposing his reader's follies, Fielding is holding the mirror up to us, who are thus led to discover what he did not want to pronounce in a didactic fashion.

In his attempt to establish a place for reader participation, Iser knows only one alternative, either didacticism or vacant spaces, tertium non datur. But if we do not accept this alternative, the question remains: what is the function of Fielding's addresses to the reader?

One possible answer is that Fielding uses the weapons of irony and satire to expose the rationalist school of thought. As has been shown, the words "sagacious," "Sagacity" etc. indicate his opposition to and the ridiculing of Enlightenment rationalism. Fielding's irony is directed against the dogma of the *animal rationale*, the claim of the Descartian school that we are human by virtue of our reasoning faculty only. However, Fielding counters this one-sided rationalism not on the level of philosophical discourse but in the context of an imaginative construction.

Fielding not only questions reading habits but also confronts the reader with his views on the nature of his novel as a work of art and the author as a creator.[26] In the prefatory chapter of Book X he links the topics of reading and literary creation. Having tried from the very beginning

to create in the reader a real understanding of his role in relation to the history of Tom Jones, Fielding chooses, at this stage, to approach the subject by discussing the author's position with regard to the nature of his work, thus leading up to a more distinct outline of the relationship between the reader and the meaning of the novel. He defines the roles of the author and reader. One might say, he puts the reader in his place.

> Reader, it is impossible we should know what Sort of Person thou wilt be: For, perhaps, thou may'st be as learned in Human Nature as *Shakespear* himself was, and, perhaps, thou may'st be no wiser than some of his Editors. (X.i.523)

As we can easily guess, Fielding takes no chances and decides to give the reader

> a few wholesome Admonitions; that thou may'st not as grosly misunderstand and misrepresent us, as some of the said Editors have misunderstood and misrepresented their Author.

Fielding stresses the primacy of the work and its own specific rules originating in the creative idea of the author. "This Work may, indeed, be considered as a great Creation of our own" (X.i.524-25). In the hierarchy of literary values Fielding puts all those categories in the first place which relate to the author as creator. Terms like "Design," "conceive," "Creation," the idea of the "Whole" and the "Parts" (524-25) suddenly abound and recall the fact that the idea of the poet as creator is an integral part of the epic tradition.[27] Accordingly, the analogy between the poet as creator and creation as the art of God belongs to the tradition of poetic theory leading up to and culminating in the Renaissance.[28] Placing himself within this tradition, Fielding seeks to affirm his control over his readers rather than open the way to reader participation. The prefatory chapters, just as the narrative reality in the novel, point to the unrelenting discipline of the author. Not surprisingly, therefore, Fielding asks the reader to refrain from passing judgment too quickly, because he may not have recognized the author's "Design."

It is not, however, Fielding's purpose to use this traditional metaphor in a merely affirmative sense.

> The Allusion and Metaphor we have here made use of, we must acknowledge
> to be infinitely too great for our Occasion, but there is, indeed, no other, which
> is at all adequate to express the Difference between an Author of the first Rate,
> and a Critic of the lowest. (X.i.525)

Fielding strikes a cautious note about his creative claim, after all. In the face of the older idea he sees himself and his role in the novel in an ironic light, particularly when he teasingly reminds the reader of his superior knowledge derived from "Inspiration" (III.v.135) or when he calls his work "prodigious" (V.i.209).

We should therefore take his assertion that he is "in reality, the Founder of a new Province of Writing" (II.i.77) with a pinch of salt. As an admirer of Cervantes, to whom he paid tribute for the kind of history he himself was composing, Fielding cannot but be ironic about his claim, the more so as he admits following a lost tradition, i.e. that of comic epic in prose, the definition of his comic romance.[29]

Fielding, therefore, neither pleads the cause of the sagacious reader nor of the creator-author. This puts him in opposition to the intellectual as well as moralist demand for exemplary characters in literature ("in any Work of Invention," X.i.527), which, on the other hand, shows him to be an author who follows the classical doctrine of the mixed character. This, again, leads up to the real subject of the novel: the moral improvement of the reader.

> Indeed, nothing can be of more moral Use than the Imperfections which are
> seen in Examples of this Kind; . . . The Foibles and Vices of Men in whom there
> is great Mixture of Good, become more glaring Objects, from the Virtues which
> contrast them, and shew their Deformity; . . . . (X.i.527)

The mixed character has a greater potential for improving the reader than an exemplary one, which is the reason why Fielding asks the reader to look closely at the differences between characters rather than to reduce them to popular literary types. The passage quoted is a seminal one for Fielding's concept of reader participation. It indicates how the reader should or is likely to react.

Fielding's various claims, however sparkling with irony, are no mere intellectual vagaries but serve a purpose. He refutes those critics who

believe they have discovered eternal rules, said to be conforming to reason, and who are able to find fault, therefore, with authors like Shakespeare and, by self-ironic implication, himself. Fielding undermines these contemporary judges of taste and their dogmas by his travesty of the *deus artifex* and, as he sets himself apart from the *"jure divino* Tyrant"* (II.i.77), by a parody of another great paradigm of the past, the "rule by divine right" of the Stuarts. By asserting his position as a lord over his province, free to follow his own rules, Fielding puts himself on the same pedestal with established literary criticism and quite rightly challenges the validity of literary dogmas which deny their own origin in literary practice: "Who ever demanded the Reasons of that nice Unity of Time or Place which is now established to be so essential to dramatick Poetry?" (V.i.209-10) The danger, however, of undercutting his own position by mixing with such critical company is met by Fielding's assertion to "wave the Privilege" (212) of demanding obedience for his own laws of writing and to provide reasons for them. Naturally this promise also belongs to the ironical exchange with the reader, who, in fact, has little choice but to accept the rules; Fielding obviously regards himself as the literary equivalent of the constitutional monarch, a Hanoverian King, as it were.[30] These allusions to contemporary criticism and politics as well as Fielding's promise to provide the reader with reasons for his literary rules lead up to a new climax of self-irony:

> And here we shall of Necessity be led to open a new Vein of Knowledge, which, if it hath been discovered, hath not to our Remembrance, been wrought on by any antient or modern Writer. This Vein is no other than that of Contrast, which runs through all the Works of the Creation. (212)

Fielding raises the reader's expectations by his promise of "a new Vein of Knowledge," but instead of providing a real climax he pulls something very trivial out of his conjuror's hat which, like the hyperbolic and rather self-laudatory style, reveals the ironist at work. As a matter of fact, the claim to a new "Vein" is contradicted by the very ubiquity of it, which he sees "through all the Works of the Creation," and by the fact that it is the principle of any kind of perception, e.g. of beauty "as well natural as artificial" (212). Even the arts serve to illustrate the principle.

Quite clearly, Fielding is not really *au sérieux*. As soon as he has assured the reader of what he "really" means, his example turns every idea of meaning into absurdity. While his criticism of contemporary comic practice on the stage is plausible enough—once again making the reader unaware of his ironic aim—at the end of the chapter he refers to "a late facetious Writer" (Sir Richard Steele) "who told the Public, that whenever he was dull, they might be assured there was a Design in it" (V.i.215), thus pointing out the evident absurdity of the very principle Fielding claims to have opened up.[31]

> In this Light then, or rather in this Darkness, I would have the Reader to consider these initial Essays. And after this Warning, if he shall be of Opinion, that he can find enough of Serious in other Parts of this History, he may pass over these, in which we profess to be laboriously dull, and begin the following Books, at the second Chapter. (215)

I find it difficult to believe with Iser that Fielding has provided here for his novel a key named "Contrast" (". . . at least it indicates clearly to the reader that this principle will provide him with a key to the narrative").[32] Even if Fielding were speaking quite in earnest, contrast is surely not a quality—structural or thematic—sufficiently specific to provide a key to plot or action. There is hardly any literary work that does not depend on contrasts.

And yet, Fielding's satire aims at the principle of contrast even quite specifically, because it is a rationalist commonplace. Seen from a sceptical point of view, the trust in the epistemological value of contrast has led into the darkness of absurdity. In the eyes of an ironist, sceptical of the absolute rule of kings as well as of reason, the light of reason and the rationalism of Enlightenment may be nothing but another version of darkness. Fielding makes use of the rationalist method of antithesis as the basis of thinking and knowing, i.e. of proving by contrast, in order to ridicule the rationalist ideal itself. What to the minds of rationalist critics appears as the brightness of reason turns out to be absolute non-sense when it has gone through the mill of Fielding's logic.

With his satire Fielding takes exception to a central issue of modern thought since Descartes, whose *"Je pense, donc je suis"*[33] marks the beginning of the epistemological separation between subject and object,

since the very act of consciousness constitutes an opposition between the subject thinking and the object of its thought.[34] Historically Descartes opened the way to the rationalist subject-object difference, as well as to the scientific dissection of the world.[35]

Though the image of light and darkness obviously links Fielding's discussion with the ideas of the Enlightenment, the link can be traced more specifically. In an epistemological context, the image of light and the idea of contrast both occur in Locke's *Essay* (after all the most notable document of rationalist philosophy in England). In the chapter "Of Knowledge and Opinion" Locke describes the method by which the mind arrives at the "clearest" kind of knowledge:

> The different clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of Perception, the Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*. . . . And this, I think, we may call *intuitive Knowledge*. For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, that *White* is not *Black*, . . . this kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, . . . This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be perceived, . . . the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it.[36]

Locke here explains that the idea of contrast and the image of light are virtually interchangeable. What to the eye is light, contrast is to the mind. Both light and contrast lead to immediate perception and clear knowledge. Here light imagery is made to serve the rationalist foundation of knowledge, though it is nearly ubiquitous in the history of philosophy[37] and therefore not characteristic as such. In the same way Pierre Bayle insists on the "natural light" of reason, as it provides the highest authority in the process of arriving at knowledge,[38] any claim to knowledge having to submit to its rule.[39] This rationalist dogma is ironically reflected in Fielding's "new Vein of Knowledge." It is precisely this philosophy whose light, in Fielding's eyes, leads into darkness.

As a "historian" concerned with "Human Nature" and not only "human understanding" Fielding points to pragmatic absurdities of the subject-object dichotomy, the principle of contrast and opposition. This has been exemplified in the figure of the author who assumes creator-like

supremacy, as well as in the pseudo-rational qualities of sagacity and judiciousness attributed to the reader. The absurd implications of the principle of contrast become even more evident when Fielding ironically applies it to the relation between the initial chapters and the history proper. Telling the reader that he might pass over these essays—"if . . . he can find enough of Serious in other Parts" (V.i.215)—he plays a rhetorical trick on him. Rather than deciding between what is supposedly important or not, serious or not, the reader is coaxed into recognizing that there is no such contrast. Fielding leaves him little choice but to read these chapters with particular attention, the more so as he ironically professes "to be laboriously dull." The author-reader relationship all but hides the author's omnipotence just as there is the unifying formal structure of the novel, even numerologically organized,[40] which symbolizes order in the apparent chaos of the world. This does not contradict but rather underlines the fact that Fielding displays a genuine concern for the reader, aesthetically as well as morally. It is the foundation of his kind of teaching.

Fielding's method is a case in point of the classic strategy of forensic rhetoric, namely to outmanoeuvre the opponent with his own weapons. Fielding's satirical attack against the rationalist principle of contrast employs the very means he attacks. The basis of satire, after all, is the perception of contrast. In other words, his weapon allows Fielding to turn the method against its rationalist proponents. His provocation, however, aims at more than just criticizing a principle, be it ethical (hypocrisy), aesthetic (reading), or philosophical (perception/knowledge); it aims at actually overcoming the discrepancies and contrasts laid open. Fielding, at least in the fictional context, does not accept the rationalist principle of contrast but establishes a dialectical method of using contrast to overcome it.

In the context of the philosophical arguments of the period, his "dialogue" with the reader questions basic tenets of rationalism. Like Richardson before him and Sterne after him, Fielding was sensitive to the limitations of a purely rationalist ethic. Harrison quite rightly pointed out that Fielding parts company even with Shaftesbury, because practical goodnes can hardly be grounded on moral rationalism.[41] This is what Fielding repeatedly holds against rationalist positions and their

spokesmen. He is not so much an anti-rationalist as that he looks upon rationalism as insufficient.

Philosophical questions are not Fielding's main concern, even though they are among his favourite targets, as characters like Thwackum and Square indicate. As a novelist he is, like Aristotle's dramatic poet, primarily interested in characters acting, in their motivation. Something other than intellectual principles or maxims are demanded, something Fielding does not name precisely, if for no other reason than to make the reader more attentive, but perhaps also to stay out of a merely nominalist controversy:

> Mr. Jones had Somewhat about him, which, though I think Writers are not thoroughly agreed in its Name, doth certainly inhabit some human Breasts; whose Use is not so properly to distinguish Right from Wrong, as to prompt and incite them to the former, and to restrain and with-hold them from the latter. (IV.vi.171-72)

What Fielding regards as important is the spring of action, not a conviction only. In his "Essay on Knowledge of Characters of Men" he identifies this spring as "Good-Nature," the most important aspect of which is that it is an active principle.

> Good-Nature is that benevolent and amiable Temper of Mind which disposes us to feel the Misfortunes, and enjoy the happiness of others; and consequently pushes us on to promote the latter, and prevent the former; and that without any abstract Contemplation of the Beauty of Virtue, and without the Allurements or Terrors of Religion.[42]

On the basis of this conviction, Fielding establishes a common ground between author and reader which remains untouched by doctrinal and nominalist disputes. Here he finds a criterion on which to base the unity of knowing and doing. Given good-nature and distinterestedness, the rationalist dissection disappears in favour of a sympathetic relationship between author and reader as well as reader and fictional character. It is hardly surprising, then, that Fielding builds his moral teaching in the novel on this axiom. The reader is invited to identify with Fieldings mixed characters rather than to judge them from a moral distance.

> ... when we find such Vices attended with their evil Consequence to our favourite Characters, we are not only taught to shun them for our own Sake, but to hate them for the Mischiefs they have already brought on those we love. (X.i.527)

In this explication of his moral teaching Fielding shows his scepticism toward rationalist objectivity. Fielding wants to excite "Compassion," "Admiration," and "Affection" in the reader (527). Though rational instruction might also be effective, the result of emotional response is far "more apt to affect and dwell upon our Minds," as Fielding says when he talks about the imperfections of characters. This way a different kind of reader-address becomes apparent, in which Fielding does not appeal to the reader's "Sagacity" but gives an advice familiar from the first sonnet of *Astrophil and Stella*:

> Examine your Heart, my good Reader, and resolve whether you do believe these Matters with me. If you do, you may now proceed to their Exemplification in the following Pages; if you do not, you have, I assure you, already read more than you have understood; . . . To treat of the Effects of Love to you, must be as absurd as to discourse on Colours to a Man born blind; . . . . (VI.i.271)

Fielding now not only speaks in a new tone to the reader, but also appeals to another faculty, the heart. The words "Heart," "believe," and "understand" signify the level on which Fielding wants to establish the relationship between author and reader as well as his hierarchy of values. In a later "aside" Fielding coaxes the reader with the assumption: "thy Heart may be better than thy Head" (X.i.526). This points the way to overcoming the dichotomies of rationalism. If the reader cannot look into his heart, or if, to follow Fielding's way of thinking, he does not have one, he will never understand what love is, like the utilitarian philosophers to whom Fielding satirically attributes the opinion that "Love probably may . . . very greatly resemble a Dish of Soup" (VI.i.272); or, like Mr. Locke's blind man, who thought he could describe colours (IV.1.152).[43]

In Fielding's eyes, then, the way which leads to knowledge is not rational analysis but empathy. This may also imply a possible explanation of Fielding's epistemological ideas. In IV.ii, in which the author an-

nounces the appearance of Sophia, we are able to observe Fielding's attempts to convey an "idea" to the reader, "the idea of Sophia," i.e. not the idea of beauty in the philosophical sense, but the notion of a particular beauty. As this is an example of a non-rational communication with the reader, the question arises how Fielding varies his technique in securing and directing the reader's participation. Fielding begins his announcement of Sophia with an atmospheric invocation drawing on myth and art to associate an image of beauty. Like Botticelli's *Primavera* "the lovely *Sophia* comes," "bedecked with Beauty, Youth, Sprightliness, Innocence, Modesty, and Tenderness, breathing Sweetness from her rosy Lips, and darting Brightness from her sparkling Eyes" (IV.ii.155). This allegorical vision then gives place to further examples of beautiful women in art and history and ends in an ironical remark to the reader about the naturalness of the effect of beauty: "If thou hast seen all these without knowing what Beauty is, thou hast no Eyes; if without feeling its Power, thou hast no Heart" (156).

And yet, although the effects of beauty seem to allow no question, Fielding remains doubtful whether the images evoked have conveyed "an exact Idea of *Sophia*: for she did not exactly resemble any of them." The reader, then, is left with ideas and images of beauty and their power, none of which can do justice to Sophia. It seems the reader is led on to ever new expectations, only to be disappointed. Even Fielding's promise to describe Sophia's appearance sounds rather sceptical: ". . . we are sensible that our highest Abilities are very inadequate to the Task" (156). Fielding is equally negative about his abilities to give an idea of Sophia's mind and again defers the reader's hopes:

> But as there are no Perfections of the Mind which do not discover themselves, in that perfect Intimacy, to which we intend to introduce our Reader, with this charming young Creature; so it is needless to mention them here: Nay, it is a Kind of tacit Affront to our Reader's Understanding, and may also rob him of that Pleasure which he will receive in forming his own Judgment of her Character. (IV.ii.157)

Ironically leaving it to the "Reader's Understanding," Fielding undercuts his description of Sophia's qualities by references to the inadequacy or superfluousness of his words. What the reader finally gets from the

author is neither a description which might convey an image of Sophia nor an adequate idea of her beauty, but a moral evaluation of her character, typically in the form of a negative compliment; she was not corrupted by the practises of the so-called polite circles or by the education of her experienced aunt.

> By her Conversation and Instructions, *Sophia* was perfectly well-bred, though perhaps she wanted a little of that Ease in her Behaviour, which is to be acquired only by Habit, and living within what is called the polite Circle . . . and though it hath Charms so inexpressible, that the *French* . . . mean to express this, when they declare they know not what it is, yet its Absence is well compensated by Innocence; nor can good Sense, and a natural Gentility ever stand in need of it. (158)

Fielding contrasts the corruptness of the very language of polite society—a kind of linguistic hypocrisy—with his moral norm. Ironically he reveals the emptiness and falseness of the words by applying the "je-ne-sais-quoi" of the aesthetic effect literally. As the terms are meaningless, so are the values they are supposed to denote. Sophia, however, untouched by such corruption, remains morally unstained as well. The fact that the "Absence" of that ominous social "Ease" rhymes with "Innocence" and "good Sense" explicitly points to its counterparts. This is what Fielding was aiming at: innocence, good sense, natural gentility. Sophia represents these moral ideals. Still, does Fielding convey an idea or a specific image or is this an instance of a "vacant Space" indeed,[44] left open to be filled by reader-friends capable of the empathy Fielding wants to establish?

If we look at the chapter again, we notice that Fielding does not, like a socratic teacher, make the reader ascend to an ever higher stage of cognition; on the contrary, he leads the reader to ever new impossibilities of knowing or forming the idea of Sophia. The "exact Idea of *Sophia*" resembles none of the beauties mentioned, nor does she represent an abstraction. Instead,

> . . . she resembled one whose Image never can depart from my Breast, and whom, if thou dost remember, thou hast then, my Friend, an adequate Idea of Sophia. (156)

On the one hand the pronoun "whom" syntactically refers to the image in the author's heart, on the other hand it points, logically, to the object of the reader-friend's memory. This does not make much sense from the commonsensical point of view, but it makes perfectly good sense from a Platonic perspective. The reader who is also an understander[45] should be able to form an exact idea of her not because he has been told what it is like or because he derives it from abstraction and comparison—the rationalist steps to knowledge—but by looking into himself.

As it is in the heart that Fielding finds his true image, the reader can only participate by finding such an image in his own heart as well.

> ... how amiable soever the Picture of our Heroine will appear, as it is really a Copy from Nature, many of our fair Countrywomen will be found worthy to satisfy any Passion, and to answer any Idea of Female Perfection, which our Pencil will be able to raise. (IV.i.154)

The reader is not led to an ecstatic vision of the idea of beauty. On the contrary, Fielding introduces the passage with an ironical comment at the expense of his readers: "Indeed we would, for certain Causes, advise those of our Male Readers who have any Hearts, to read no farther" (154). Nevertheless, he assures his readers that everyone is able to find his own image of "Female Perfection."[46] In other words, everybody can remember the image that can never depart from his breast.[47] Here, Platonic anamnesis takes the form of a sentimental memory.

In terms of contemporary ideas Fielding seems to side with those who claim that it is possible to arrive at the knowledge of abstract ideas through sense perception: "If thou hast seen all these without knowing what Beauty is, thou hast no Eyes; if without feeling its Power, thou hast no Heart" (IV.ii.156). For the artist, however, the different interpretations of sense perception which Locke and Berkeley debate are rather irrelevant. True knowledge lies in the heart, and without it there is only Lord Rochester's answer "to a Man, who had seen many Things" (IV.ii.155-56)—which is rude.[48] Nevertheless Fielding is not engaging in an epistemological battle. His interest lies with his "Creation" and its effect. Whether one or the other philosopher is right remains unimportant, because in a work of art it is the author who makes the recipient

form an idea. Even his very personal experience, which is implied by Fielding's reference to the image in his breast, is not what the reader can draw on. The reader receives the ideas the author wants to convey in the work itself, in the "history" and is, therefore, enabled to form his own image and judgment. To quote again:

> But as there are no Perfections of the Mind which do not discover themselves, in that perfect Intimacy, to which we intend to introduce our Reader, with this charming young Creature; so it is needless to mention them here: Nay, it is a Kind of tacit Affront to our Reader's Understanding, and may also rob him of that Pleasure which he will receive in forming his own Judgment of her Character. (IV.ii.157)

The intimate acquaintance which Fielding promises to the reader is identical with the kind of reading Fielding wants the reader to practice. In that case communication between author and reader does not take place on the level of rational demonstration, as Fielding implies in this chapter, but in a more immediate way. Fielding makes concrete ideas arise in the minds of his readers. Already in his "Dedication" he points out that the most effective method of communicating his intention ("to recommend Goodness and Innocence") will not be based on didactic preaching—though he will also appeal to his readers' "true Interest"—but on the immediacy of examples which are "a Kind of Picture"(7). In these "Virtue becomes as it were an Object of Sight, and strikes us with an Idea of that Loveliness, which Plato asserts there is in her naked Charms"(7). The narrative method suited to arrive at such objects of sight can hardly be the naming of an idea, which would be a rationalist understanding of the idea as an abstraction. This fear of abstract rationalism may be the reason why Fielding frequently makes use of periphrasis, in other words expresses his meaning by indirection,[49] as though he distrusted the words.[50] This would mean that communication works even beyond the level of denotative words when a sympathetic link has been established, in this case between author and reader.

Fielding, accordingly, is less interested in stimulating the reader to fill in gaps than in making him aware of the pitfalls of language, of clichés and hollow rhetoric, outright lies and linguistic insufficiency,

as well as hypocrisy. The relationship between words and meaning is just as dialectical as that between reason and sentiment. Meaning is conveyed as well as veiled by words. Fielding's irony is as much an indication of this as the hypocrisy he satirizes.[51] Even in the case of an exemplary character like Mr. Allworthy words and meaning seem to be drifting apart when he starts "preaching," i.e. when he indulges in a fatal over-confidence in the affirmative effect of words.[52] Inversely, Fielding's sympathy is with those characters who are discreet in their use of words, above all Sophia. She is not only reticent about disclosing her own true feelings but also puts more trust in Tom's goodness than in his protestations of love. It is only his goodness which finally convinces her of his love and makes her forgive him.

The problematical link between words and meaning reflects a certain distrust of words, but above all a trust in an indirect communcication based on empathy. Certainly, Mr. Allworthy's rationalist beliefs are constantly proven wrong, just as his administration of justice is open to criticism and his long-winded speeches are ineffective. Yet he is the most positive figure and carries his name for the very good reason that he exemplifies what Fielding regards as necessary for true understanding, i.e. empathy and emotional identification. He practises solidarity from the very beginning when he takes in the foundling child. For Fielding feeling (and why shouldn't he have been aware of that paronomasia?) and doing are more important than rhetorical accomplishments or even the perfect administration of formal justice.

Fielding's exemplary characters show a sense of altruism, what he calls benevolence or what Square finally attributes to Tom, "Generosity of Heart . . . Capacity for Friendship . . . Integrity" (XVIII.4.927). These characters obviously are not followers of pure rationality,[53] but this does not mean that the basis of their thinking and acting is irrational.[54] If benevolence and feeling are emphasized here as central to Fielding's ethical ideal, it has to be emphasized, too, that Fielding is surely not putting forward an ideal of mere irrationality and sentimentality. This can hardly be expected from an author who is so fond of intellectual teasing and whose favourite rhetorical strategy is irony. His exemplary characters are guided by reason, which, though not an end in itself, is necessary as a means to an end. But it is insufficient as a final aim, as

is most clearly expressed by the converted Square in his final letter from his death-bed (XVIII.4).

Sophia symbolizes the true aim and ideal of wisdom in which reason and heart are united; that is to say, Fielding does not simply exchange the absolute rule of reason with that of sentimentality. Just as he expresses his belief in a dialectical unity of erotic love and charity, he equally looks to the unity of reason and feeling in wisdom. This is indicated by the great arguers in *Tom Jones* coming to naught or ending infamously, while those who think with the heart are rewarded. Tom himself is the best example that neither goodness of heart nor the impulses of feeling alone are a sufficient guide for getting safely through life, but he can be redeemed by the acquisition of wisdom, while his counterpart Blifil who affects reason and copy book virtue is left to his own corruption.

The kind of behaviour and communication realized in the novel mirrors Fielding's intentions with regard to the reader. He acknowledges that only on a common ground his aim of laughing his readers "out of their favourite Follies and Vices" may be achieved. Absolutely bad characters neither change for the better in his novels nor does he excpect this to happen in real life. If there were not a vestige, at least, of altruism, benevolence, and charity he could not convey "ideas" like Sophia's virtuous beauty or Parson Adams' excessive joy about the rescue of his son.[55] What Fielding wants to "inculcate" in his readers is not so much an abstract ethical principle, but rather a basis on which he is able to communciate with them.

This shows that, in a moral sense, subject and object are not opposites but one and the same thing, in other words, *esse est percipi*. A corrupted heart cannot understand. This is what Fielding held against the utilitarian philosophers, the followers of Hobbes and Mandeville. To him, their negative view of mankind reflected "the nastiest of all Places, A BAD MIND" (VI.i.269).

Fielding, to conclude, does not replace Richardsonian didacticism with empty spaces for the reader to practice his intellectual faculty, nor does he advocate a sentimental ethic. Directly or indirectly, the author always guides the reader in a process of communication which achieves a fusion of irony and satire with empathy and charity. The participation

of the reader thus turns out to be a moral condition and an intellectual challenge, just as Fielding's epistemology proves to be inseparable from his ethics.

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NOTES

[1]I am referring to Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (1972; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974), especially "The Role of the Reader in Fielding's *Joseph Andrews* and *Tom Jones*" 29-56. See also his earlier *Die Appellstruktur der Texte: Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer Prosa* (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1970); *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); *Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989).

[2]All quotations refer to the Wesleyan Edition of the Works of Henry Fielding, *The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling*, ed. Fredson Bowers, introd. and commentary Martin C. Battestin, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), and *Joseph Andrews*, ed. Martin C. Battestin (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967).

[3]Iser seems to have derived the idea of "Leerstellen" from the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. See Iser, *Die Appellstruktur der Texte* 36; *The Implied Reader* 40.

[4]*The Implied Reader* 30: "The reader has to be stimulated into certain activities, which may be guided by rhetorical signposts, but which lead to a process that is not merely rhetorical."

[5]*The Implied Reader* 32. Iser also speaks of "explicit guidance of the reader" (47). "This imaginary dialogue refrains from prescribing norms of judgment for the reader but it continually gives him guidelines as to how he is to view the proceedings" (46-47).

[6]"Fielding rightly considered this process [the principle of contrast] to be 'a new vein of knowledge'" (*The Implied Reader* 48).

[7]John Preston, *The Created Self: The Reader's Role in Eighteenth Century Fiction* (London: Heinemann, 1970) 114. According to Preston, Fielding "is actually trying to school the reader, to induce him to attend more closely and to judge well" (116). Other studies of the topic include Arthur Sherbo, *Studies in the Eighteenth-Century Novel* (East-Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1969); John Ross Baker, "From Imitation to Rhetoric: The Chicago Critics, Wayne C. Booth and *Tom Jones*," *Novel* 6 (1973): 197-217; James J. Lynch, "Moral Sense and the Narrator of *Tom Jones*," *SEL* 25 (1985): 599-614; Eric Rothstein, "Virtues of Authority in *Tom Jones*," *The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation* 28 (1987): 99-126; Nicholas Hudson, "Fielding's Hierarchy of Dialogue: 'Meta-Response' and the Reader of *Tom Jones*," *PQ* 68 (1989): 177-94. For an interpretation of the author-reader relationship in an ideological and political context, see John Richetti, "The Old Order and the New Novel of the Mid-Eighteenth

Century: Narrative Authority in Fielding and Smollett," *Eighteenth-Century Fiction* 2 (1990): 183-96.

⁸*The Implied Reader* 51.

⁹Iser, on his part, criticized Ingarden for interpreting such constructions as trivial exercises. See *The Act of Reading* 176f.

¹⁰See, however, Iser's view: " . . . the written text furnishes it [the reader's imagination] with indications which enable it to conjure up what the text does not reveal." (*The Implied Reader* 31).

¹¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, introd. Bertrand Russell, trans. C. K. Ogden (1922; rpt. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 189.

¹²Again Iser does not appear to be aware of Fielding's irony, since he regards this passage as an instruction to the reader: "The consequence of this for the reader, in his role as observer, is that he thereby learns to distinguish between motive and action" (*The Implied Reader* 52).

¹³See W. Iser, "Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response," *Aspects of Narrative*, ed. J. Hillis Miller, English Institute Essays (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 1-45. ". . . between the 'schematized views' there is a no-man's-land of indeterminacy, which results precisely from the determinacy of the sequence of each individual view. Gaps are bound to open up, and offer a free play of interpretation from the specific way in which the various views can be connected with one another . . . It is quite impossible for the text itself to fill in the gaps" (11).

¹⁴W. Iser, "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach," *NLH* 3 (1972): 288.

¹⁵"The Reading Process" 280.

¹⁶Iser, "The Reading Process" 293 quotes from Dewey's *Art as Experience* the following sentence: "But with the perceiver as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the work consciously experienced." I am doubtful whether this describes the process which Iser renders in this way: "We look forward, we look back, we decide, we change our decisions, we form expectations, we are shocked by their nonfulfilment, we question, we muse, we accept, we reject; this is the dynamic process of recreation."

¹⁷"The Reading Process" 287.

¹⁸*The Implied Reader* 31-32.

¹⁹"The reader, then, must apply the author's remarks to his novel . . . " (*The Implied Reader* 35). Cf. also: "This technique mobilizes the reader's imagination, not only in order to bring the narrative itself to life but also—and even more essentially—to sharpen his sense of discernment" (39).

²⁰If another proof were needed, Fielding's comment on Squire Western would settle the matter: "The Squire ended his Speech with some Compliments to his own Sagacity" (XVIII.ix.957).

²¹John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) Bk. IV, ch. ii, § 3, 532. Dr. Johnson in his *Dictionary*, s.v. "sagacity" 2., also stresses the rational aspect, "Acuteness of discovery," and quotes Locke's *Essay* for a definition (*A Dictionary of the English Language*, vol. 2. (London, 1755; rpt. New York: AMS, 1967).

[22]Locke's indebtedness to Descartes in this respect becomes obvious if one compares Descartes' *Regulae*, esp. 2 and 3, where he discusses intuition and deduction as methods to arrive at knowledge.

[23]*Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher*, vol. 3 of *The Works of George Berkely, Bishop of Cloyne*, eds. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Nelson, 1950) 138.

[24]Cf. A. Sherbo, "'Inside' and 'Outside' Readers in Fielding's Novels," *Studies in the Eighteenth Century English Novel* (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1969) 35-57.

[25]All this also shows Fielding's consciousness of the imagery of the world as theatre, a topos which he quotes explicitly in the initial chapter of Book VII, "A Comparison between the World and the Stage."

[26]The numerous critical discussions of the reader's role nearly always disregard the traditional context of author, work, and reader. See, as an exception, Battestin's comments on *Tom Jones* X.i.524.

[27]See R. M. Durling, *The Figure of the Poet in Renaissance Epic* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1965). It is significant that Fielding does not use the metaphor of the author-creator to justify his deviations from verisimilitude (like Sidney, e.g.) but to reaffirm his narrative control, in other words, the probable. Fielding thus departs from the view of some contemporaries who saw creativity in "non-realistic inventions" (M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* [New York: Oxford UP] 275).

[28]See E. N. Tigerstedt, "The Poet as Creator: Origins of a Metaphor," *CLS* 5 (1968): 445-48, and R. M. Durling, *The Figure of the Poet in Renaissance Epic* 123.

[29]Cf. *Joseph Andrews* III.i, where Fielding defines his notion of "history" and of the major authors of this genre whom he cites as authorities, among them Cervantes. If Fielding is creating something new, it is a recreation of a lost tradition in the English language, as his remarks in the opening paragraphs of his preface show.

[30]See Berkeley's variation of the *deus artifex* topos in terms of Fielding : " . . . not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor . . .," *Alciphron* 160.

[31]Claude Rawson, "Gulliver and the Gentle Reader," *Modern Essays on Eighteenth Century Literature*, ed. Leopold Damrosch (Oxford: OUP, 1988) 46-81 discusses Swifts comparable technique of "parodic intrusions" and sees a continuity of "self-conscious forms of parody and self-parody" (47) even in contemporaries like Norman Mailer. The following quotation shows that Mailer's self-parody can claim Fielding as an ancestor as well: "Like many another literary fraud, the writer has been known on occasion to read the Preface of a book instead of a book, and bearing this vice in mind, he tried to make the advertisement more readable than the rest of his pages" (Norman Mailer, *Advertisements for Myself* [London: Panther Books, 1970] 7).

[32]*The Implied Reader* 48.

[33]*Discours de la Méthode*, chronologie et préface par Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (Paris: GF, 1966) IV.60.

[34]Cf. the discussion in Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit*, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (1922; rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974) 491-92: "In jedem tatsächlichen Denkakt ist nicht nur das Bewußtsein eines denkenden Ich, sondern auch das Bewußtsein eines Etwas, das gedacht wird, eingeschlossen." (In every genuine act of reflection there is not only the consciousness of an individual reflecting , but also the consciousness of that which is the object of reflection).

[35]There is no certainty of any object without an act of judgment or reasoning. Cf. Descartes, *Meditationes* II.13; *Discours de la méthode* IV.3.

[36]*Essay* Bk. IV, ch. 2, § 1, 530-31. See ch. 17 "Of Reason," esp. §§ 15-18.

[37]See Hans Blumenberg, "Das Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit," *Studium Generale* 10 (1957): 432-47.

[38]Cf. the chapter on Bayle in Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem*, vol. 1, 589-90.

[39]For the whole question of Locke and eighteenth-century literature see Kenneth MacLean, *John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1936).

[40]See Douglas Brooks, *Number and Pattern in the Eighteenth-century Novel: Defoe, Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

[41]Bernard Harrison, *Henry Fielding: The Novelist as Moral Philosopher* (London: Sussex UP, 1975) 115.

[42]*Miscellanies by Henry Fielding, Esq.*, ed. Henry Knight Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) 158.

[43]Locke, *Essay* Bk. III, ch. iv, § 11, 165.

[44]This particular type of negative description is discussed by Iser under the heading of "schematised views" in *The Implied Reader* 38 and again in a wider context in *The Act of Reading* 143-44. "However, what is not formulated does arise out of what *is* formulated, and so the written text must employ certain modes in order to bring about and simultaneously guide the conceivability of the unwritten" (147).

[45]See Defoe's expectations of the reader in his preface to *Moll Flanders*: ". . . this Work is chiefly recommended to those who know how to Read it, and how to make the good Uses of it, which the Story all along recommends to them; . . . " (*The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders, &c.*, ed. and introd. G. A. Starr [London: Oxford UP, 1971] 2).

[46]Cf. *Tom Jones* IV.i.154.

[47]The Platonic idea of remembering the image in someone else's mind is, implicitly, commented on in Berkeley's *Alciphron*, cf. 154.

[48]Cf. *Tom Jones* IV.ii.155n5.

[49]Cf. Iser's position in *The Act of Reading* 148: ". . . the imaginary object is to be built up . . . for the purpose of fulfilling the intention of the novel itself . . . it manifests itself in the scene as an 'empty' reference, which thus motivates subsequent images. The act of image-building is therefore a polysynthetic one . . . ."

[50]This topic is discussed in the context of the theory of signs and language in N. Hudson, "Signs, Interpretation, and the Collapse of Meaning in *Tom Jones* and *Amelia*," *English Studies in Canada* 16 (1990): 17-34.

[51]G. Hatfield, *Henry Fielding and the Language of Irony* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) discusses Fielding's theoretical statements on language signs and his concern with abuses of language.

[52]Fielding underlines Mr Allworthy's longwindedness, e.g. XVIII.ix.957: ". . . *Allworthy*, after a formal Preface, acquainted him . . . "; or: "*Allworthy* now made a long Speech" (958).

[53]James J. Lynch, "Moral Sense and the Narrator of Tom Jones," *SEL* 25 (1985): 599-614 connects this feeling with Francis Hutcheson's "moral sense." His main

argument is that Fielding addresses the reader on the rational or critical and the sentimental level at the same time.

[54]See Fielding's passage from "An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men" quoted above, p.14 (n42).

[55]*Joseph Andrews* IV.8.310: "No, Reader, he felt the Ebullitions, the Overflowings of a full, honest, open Heart, towards the Person who had conferred a real Obligation, and of which if thou canst not conceive an Idea within, I will not vainly endeavour to assist thee."

A Response to F. J. Sypher[*]

ANTHONY BRIAN TAYLOR

In the course of his article, F. J. Sypher makes incidental reference to
my interpretation of several of Golding's names for Ovid's dogs, and
raises questions which require attention. He queries "Ladon" challenging
the explanation that, given his known aversion to Greek and distaste
for Micyllus, Golding did not bother to read the latter's note where
"Ladon" is explained in terms of the Greek verb, "ladomai" ("to take,
seize, or catch"), preferring the notion that he preserved the name
because it carries nuances of "larone" (or "ladrone") ("thief") or even
of "lay on" (56). He also rejects the established view that translator has
confused the Greek "labros" ("gluttonous") with the Latin "labrosus"
("with large lips") in describing "Jollyboy" as "a great and large flewd
hound," and again seeking nuances, suggests that the phrase shows "a
kind of punning inspiration" (57).[1] Yet all this in the face of a general
lack of expertise in Greek which made Golding follow Regius' Latin
explanations of the Greek names for Actaeon's dogs in Ovid's text *even
when they are inaccurate*. Moreover, Sypher also rejects the explanation
that Golding mistranslated "Laelaps" ("Hurricane") as "Spring" because,
working at speed, like other translators of the fifteen sixties, he paused
only long enough to read the opening of Regius' note which begins "a
velocitate atque *impetu* sic est appellata" (italics mine); "Spring," he
argues, is not unrelated to "spring forward and catch suddenly" like
a whirlwind (57), but the connexion is tortuous while that to the

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beginning of the note with its notion of speed ("velocitate") and violent sudden assault ("impetu") is clear.

He appears to be on solid ground, however, when challenging details of my reading of "Wight, Bowman, Royster, beautie faire and white as winters snow" for "Tigris, & Alce / Et niveis Leucon . . . vilis." Because precision is not Golding's way and he does not preserve Ovid's exact order in dealing with Actaeon's dogs, I took "Wight" to represent "niveis Leucon . . . vilis" ("White with snowy hairs"), and also suggested that, thoroughly enjoying himself, he translates this name twice, thereby adding an extra dog to Ovid's pack in the shape of "beautie faire and white as winters snow." Sypher rightly points out that the *OED* records the word "wight" as an archaic term for "strong," thus making it a possible translation for the dog "Alce" ("Might") (56). However, the *OED* also points out that "wight" is an archaic form of "white," and as the use of "whyght" in the first line of Polyphemus' song quoted by Martindale and Brown shows, Golding's spelling of that word could fluctuate.[2]

But the conviction that "Alce" and not "Leucon" is "Wight" leads Sypher to maintain that three and not four dogs are represented by "Wight, Bowman, Royster, beautie faire and white as winters snow." According to such a reading, the third dog becomes the somewhat awkward "Royster, beautie faire and white as winters snow"; this also involves the obvious difficulty of explaining how "Royster," a word meaning "ruffian," comes to represent a white dog and Sypher has to resort to the suggestion that the word contains an echo of "the white colour of the inside of an *oyster* shell." We know, however, that Elizabethan readers of Golding did not take "Royster" as a translation for "Leucon," Ovid's white dog. Both Higgins and John Rider take "Royster" as I do, as a translation for "Alce" ("Might"); moreover, neither lists "Wight" as a possible translation for the name.[3] As for the issue of whether there are three or four dogs here and whether, in fact, "beautie faire and white as winters snow," with its lower case, should be taken for a dog's name, this was resolved by Golding himself when he briefly and cursorily revised his Ovid for a second edition in 1575. He replaced the attractive, but ambivalent, lower-case "beautie" with the equally attractive, unambivalent, upper-case "Blaunche,"[4] thereby

confirming the addition of an extra dog to the pack, the emended line reading:

Wight, Bowman, Royster, Blaunche faire and white as winters snow.

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NOTES

[1]For discussion of Golding's confusion of "Labros" with "Labrosus," see T. W. Baldwin, "The Pedigree of Theseus' Pups: *Midsummer Night's Dream* IV, 1, 123-30," *ShJW* (1968): 111, and Niall Rudd, "Pyramus and Thisbe in Shakespeare and Ovid," *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature*, eds. D. West and T. Woodman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979) 175.

[2]"More whyght thou art then Primrose leaf my Lady *Galatee*" (13.930). See Charles Martindale and Sarah Annes Brown, "A Complementary Response to Anthony Brian Taylor," *Connotations* 2.1 (1992): 65.

[3]In Higgins, one finds "Alce; Stout, or royster"; in Rider, "Royster, or stoute. Alce." Reference is to *The Nomenclator or Remembrancer of Adrianus Junius Physician. Englished by John Higgins* (London, 1585), and Rider's *Bibliotheca Scholastica* (London, 1589).

[4]This is listed among the variants for the second edition in Rouse (*The xv. Bookes of P. Ouidius Naso, entytuled Metamorphosis, translated oute of Latin into English meeter, by Arthur Golding Gentleman* [London, 1567], ed. W. H. D. Rouse [1904; rpt. London: Centaur P, 1961]); see 317. Both Higgins (1585) and Rider (1589) pick up Golding's emendation, the former with "Leucon; Blanch, or whitecoat," the latter with "Blanche, or white-coate. Leucon."

Reflections in Response to Sandra Billington, *Mock Kings in Medieval Society and Renaissance Drama*

CLIFFORD DAVIDSON

While Renaissance drama has frequently been analyzed in terms of its connection in both form and content with late-medieval theatrical practice, Sandra Billington's *Mock Kings in Medieval Society and Renaissance Drama*[1] usefully demonstrates how a certain class of "games" that are not in fact fully developed drama—games which elevate a commoner to the status of a "king" or "queen" for the duration of a secular festival—are part of the heritage available to the playwrights of the age of Shakespeare. Such earlier popular forms could be extremely hardy and long lasting, and their structures also were, as Dr. Billington argues, of immense importance in forming certain features of design to be observed in Renaissance drama. There is, however, a further side to this chapter in theater history that I believe is worth careful analysis, and this involves opposition to the King Game as symptomatic of a frequent attitude of distrust of the actor and his craft—an anti-theatricalism that Shakespeare, for example, uses to good theatrical purpose in his art.[2]

In spite of a problem with terminology—the terms 'game' and 'play' were not distinguished from each other very clearly[3]—we may agree that the King Game stood somewhere between what today is considered pure game and full-scale drama. The popularity of this genre, as Dr. Billington proves, made people accustomed to seeing the establishment of a player king and/or queen who might pretend to power of rule over festivities or sports contests, and, as recent research for Records of Early English Drama has shown, such spectacles or events seem to have been widely popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At the same time, it is not surprising that moralists were suspicious of the mimetic element in popular entertainments of this kind, especially those which elevated a Lord of Misrule, while we learn also that the less obviously subversive

Summer Lord or Lady was likewise on occasion regarded with suspicion. Dr. Billington (57) cites Robert of Brunne's *Handlyng Synne* for an early condemnation of festivities specifically involving the Summer Queen as "a gaderyng for lecherye." At a later date, zealous Protestant reformers saw these customs, even in their more benign manifestations, as quite dangerous indeed, and there is no question that in many cases the Mock King or Lady tended to attract some hostility to himself or herself. Not surprisingly, therefore, leaders of rebellions would be seen in terms of Mock Kings, especially if they appeared to be motivated by pride and were believed to be attempting to substitute their own tyranny for the perceived or actual tyranny of the established ruler.[4]

Mock kings and rebels were both seen in some sense as *players*—the equivalent of actors whose profession was impersonation on stage—lacking in the authority of actual rulers but nevertheless superficially like them in appearance and gesture. On the Renaissance stage a prime example of a direct connection between a Mock King and a rebellious tyrant was Shakespeare's Macbeth, who is only mentioned (120) and not discussed by Dr. Billington. The play of *Macbeth* was created during the months immediately following the Gunpowder Plot when King James I appears to have enjoyed a brief period of genuine popularity; the drama itself is indicative of anxiety concerning the possibility of a *coup d'état* that might result in a ruling tyrant with all the characteristics of a Mock King at his worst. Like Holbein's drawing of the king wearing ill-fitting clothing in Erasmus' *Moriae Encomium* of 1515 (see Billington's fig. 12), Macbeth's royal clothes—emblematic of the royal authority to which he is a pretender—seem not to fit his body. Having stolen the accouterments of rule, he will "feel his title / Hang loose about him, like a giant's robe / Upon a dwarfish thief," and yet he must be feared because of his tyrannical power, which of course will ultimately be shown to be hollow. The principal achievement of his reign is to bring himself to despair—the "sickness unto death" of which Søren Kierkegaard was to write so perceptively in the nineteenth century—and to bring the kingdom to a diseased condition. Extending a metaphor favored by King James, Shakespeare depicts the spread to the *body* of the state of the infection or pollution that Macbeth has brought on himself as its *head*. In contrast with the health of England, which is ruled

by a legitimate and holy monarch, Edward the Confessor, Scotland becomes a topsy-turvy nation in which "Fair is foul, and foul is fair"—a projection of the evil represented by the weird sisters—and hence is a place identifiable in terms of the *world upside down* since the normal order of things has been overturned. Macbeth's rebellion, like the rule of a Mock King, is temporary, and his ascendancy is symbolically associated with darkness. The darkness will be dispelled at the conclusion of the play when real power reverts to the divinely chosen royal line.

Instead of representing class conflict insisted upon by Marxist critics (and inherited in modified form by many New Historicists) between peasants and aristocracy, between commoners and crown,[5] *Macbeth* is illustrative of a genuine urge to identify with the true king, who is understood as vital to the political health of the state. At the end of the play, the Mock King and agent of misrule thus will be overthrown; and his successor is depicted by Shakespeare as morally superior and as a genuine king who will return "wholesome days" to Scotland. Oddly, many critics have been sympathetic to Macbeth to the end beyond what the text warrants; in staging the play, I still believe that the original intent of the playwright (if we can still invoke such a concept) was to provoke the audience to change sides at the point where Macbeth becomes revealed as a mad killer who sends out his death squads to murder children—an echo also of Herod, a mad butcher and archetypal Mock King, whose boasting and homicidal acts against children in the Coventry Corpus Christi plays Shakespeare had presumably witnessed as a boy. The conclusion of the play seems to me to invoke the proverbial "sigh of relief" at the fall of the tyrant, under whom no thoughtful person would want to be subject.[6] In the final act of the play, Macbeth is depicted as a king who is effectively deserted, and those who continue to serve him do so only because of fear. The disease that he represents is like the bubonic plague, and hence as a source of pollution his power resides only in the *destructive* touch of his hand (in contrast to the *healing* hand of King Edward in England).[7] When transformed into a head of state, the Mock King becomes the embodiment of the very principle of subversion.

Macbeth is thus at once a representative of false kingship and a character who fails to achieve credibility even as a player king. This

Mock King reminds us of the Puritan William Prynne's identification of players, including of course player kings, as symbolic of insincerity, which is one of the symptoms of the presence of evil in Shakespeare's play. The term 'hypocrite,' Prynne insisted, signified 'stage player' in antiquity. Condemning the face painting and disguise of actors, Prynne insisted that God "enjoines all men at all times, to *be such in shew, as they are in truth: to seeme that outwardly which they are inwardly;* to act themselves, not others. . . ."[8] Dramatic spectacle must in his view be understood to be symbolic of human pride and of the desire to be what we are not. *Play,* which had been regarded as a symptom of the Fall of Man even in children by the Wycliffite treatise against the playing of miracles—"childres pleyinge witnessith ther fadirs sinnes before hem and ther owne original sinnes beforn and ther owne defaute of wisdum whanne they pleyen"[9]—would for Puritans like Prynne be seen as a source of pollution in the realm.

Yet it must be admitted that when actual players depict kings on stage, whether or not incompetent like Macbeth, they are of necessity not the "real thing." They thus share with the Mock King of medieval tradition a hollow core that may be imaginatively ignored or exploited for dramatic effect. While the Lord of Misrule, engaging in abusive behavior and encouraging acts regarded normally as inappropriate or wrong, appeared to those in authority as singularly subversive—a mock ruler whose false power claimed to sponsor the inversion of order—so too a hero-villain such as Macbeth was regarded as a representation of a character type whose outward show would only serve as a mask for hidden inward motives. Macbeth hence gathers to himself all of the suspicion that had attached itself to game and play in the centuries prior to Shakespeare's time.

Shakespeare, a professional man of the theater, thus harnessed antitheatrical prejudice, which he chose in the case of Macbeth to adapt in order to undermine his "Mock King," while at the same time he organized his dramatic material so that other kings in the play are guaranteed a different and positive audience response. It is also important to realize that Shakespeare and his contemporaries were much closer to actual examples of the King Game than we in the twentieth century can be.

We therefore know much less about the Mock King in the King Game or the Lord of Misrule than we know about the depiction of player kings that represent the usurpation of power or rule in the drama of the Renaissance. Late medieval and early modern folklore, including the so-called mummers' plays, is shrowded in considerable mystery, though on the basis of the evidence we can assume a large degree of differentiation with regard to customs in the various cities and villages of England. Whatever they were, such plays and games were not always appreciated. In 1634 Bishop Bridgeman's Visitation Articles included the question "whether hath your Church or Chappell, Church-yard, or Chappel-yard beene abused or profaned by any fighting, quarelling, chiding, brawling, or by any Plaies, Lords of Mis-rule, Summer Lords, Morris-dancers, Pedlers, Bowlers, Beare-wards, Feasts, Schooles, Temporall Courts, or Leets, Laie Juries, Musters, or other profane usage whatsoever?"[10] The concern here is with the desecration of the church and churchyard, not with utterly suppressing game and play, but when taking place in proscribed space—and, often, at proscribed times, during church services—these activities were proclaimed to be of the devil. Further, because he was inwardly not what he outwardly appeared to be and because he actively encouraged behavior otherwise regarded as inappropriate or wrong, the Lord of Misrule must have been regarded by some as singularly subversive and a threat to civic order. To the hostile Puritan William Prynne, however, all players, including of course player kings, are symbolic of insincerity, which is a symptom of the presence of evil.

The story which Dr. Billington tells thus may be linked to the progress of the antitheatricalism defined by Jonas Barish;[11] popular entertainments, rebellions led by leaders that commentators find reminiscent of Mock Kings, and roles such as that of Macbeth all point to attitudes which eventually in 1642 would achieve the closing of the London theaters. It is a sign of Shakespeare's genius that he could turn the antitheatrical prejudice to use as a playwright and could create a play as penetrating in its analysis of pride and tyranny as *Macbeth*.

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NOTES

[1]Oxford: Clarendon P, 1991.

[2]For the standard survey of anti-theatricalism, see Jonas Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1981).

[3]See John C. Coldewey, "Plays and 'Play' in Early English Drama," *Research Opportunities in Renaissance Drama* 28 (1985): 181-88.

[4]Quite remarkably, the leaders of urban gangs in decaying American cities display many of the same characteristics described as associated with tyranny and misrule in the late medieval and early modern periods.

[5]This is not to deny class differentiation in English municipalities—differentiation that could be extremely rigid and sustained by play and ceremonial, which also served simultaneously as a unifying ritual. See Charles Phythian-Adams, "Ceremony and the Citizen: The Communal Year at Coventry 1450-1550," in *Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500-1700*, eds. Peter Clark and Paul Slack (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1972) 57-85, and Mervyn James, "Ritual, Drama and Social Body in the Late Medieval English Town," *Past and Present* 98 (1983): 1-29.

[6]The point is one that I made more than two decades ago in *The Primrose Way: A Study of Shakespeare's* Macbeth (Conesville, Iowa: John Westburg and Associates, 1970); while I find my methodology in this earlier study to be flawed in many ways, I still find myself in agreement with my initial opinion concerning sympathy for Macbeth at the end of the drama.

[7]The hero-villain bears some resemblance to the person in the children's games which are related to Tag; the child who is "It" must be avoided by the other children and hence that person has power over the others. In games of this family, the person who is tagged by "It" exchanges roles and thus becomes "It." The pollution is transferred from the person who was "It" to the new child, who now must attempt to pass it on to another.

[8]William Prynne, *Histriomastix* (London, 1633) 159.

[9]*A Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge*, ed. Clifford Davidson (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, forthcoming) 113.

[10]David George, ed., *Lancaster*, Records of Early English Drama (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1992) 216.

[11]See Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice, passim.*

On *King John*: An Answer to Billington and Hobson*

ROY BATTENHOUSE

I am grateful for the measurable support of my interpretation of *King John* in the responses offered by Sandra Billington and Christopher Hobson. Both these colleagues bring scholarly equipment to their evaluations. Billington's book on mock kings in drama devotes part of a chapter to *King John*, and Hobson is the author of a long article that examined as a key to the play the Bastard's speech on Commodity. Kingly misrule in a world of politics biased by a devotion to self-advantage is indeed central in this play, and Billington is able to bring to it an Erasmian perspective on the folly of kings, while Hobson specifies commodity-seeking as the folly that structures John's actions and those of other panders of the times. Shakespeare is protraying in John, in Billington's view, a usurper-king of hollow virtue, and Hobson goes further to view the whole era as dominated by various oath-breakers and the swirl of disorder they cause. My own perspective agrees with those assessments but includes another dimension by calling attention to a factor of beneficial providence appearing initially in the person of the boy Arthur and continued in his convert Hubert and reinforced by Hubert's admirer the French Lord Melun—the ultimate result of which is the replacing of commodity-seeking with a peace based on a general return to "old right." In other words, I would contend that the play as a whole rests on a Christian view of history, which understands earthly disorder as a phenomenon caused by human cupidity, a biasing of ethical conduct which in the long run fails historically and can be superseded

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by the conversion of its advocates to a policy of mutual reconciliation. Regarding such a framework of providential meaning, Billington's response is to raise some objections, while Hobson feels that I have been "vague" in expounding the play's ending and asks me to clarify. I shall now answer with a full explanation.

Let me begin by speaking to Hobson's position, since his interpretation of the Bastard's words that end the play seems to me nearly adequate, and my essay neglected to expound their meaning. Hobson argues that the line, "If England to itself do rest but true" (5.5.118) carries a dual reference both to the nation and "to the person of the monarch," thus implicating John in England's wounding of itself. The conspicuous "if," he says, implies a moral criticism of the monarch as well as of the rebel nobles. Hobson at least verges on saying that the Bastard is voicing a commitment of obedience not absolutely to the monarch (the doctrine typical of the Tudor homilies) but rather to the true welfare of England, to which everyone is bound. I accept this interpretation, and would note further that it involves in the Bastard a significant adjustment of his earlier stated desire to commit his energies (and England's) to serving John by pursuing revenge against the Dauphin. That had been the Bastard's version of "mended faiths" in line 75, before he discoverd that this mode of patriotism has been replaced by a better, the peace being arranged by the returned rebels under the aegis of John's son, the young Henry III.

As I argued in my essay, the new leaders deflate the Bastard's "braves" and give him the cue to join them. At their invitation he abandons his earlier pretensions to leadership as John's servant and submits to the "sweet self" of young Henry. His stated wish that the new monarch may devote himself to "the lineal state and glory of the land" envisions a kingship that is surely no longer one of "wrested pomp" (the phrase he had used to characterize John's kingship in 4.3.154). And there is an evident analogy between the sweet boy-king and the innocent Arthur, whom the Bastard had referred to as "the life, the right, and truth" of England's realm (4.3.144). Must we not infer therefore that the Bastard himself has now "come home"—to a patriotism that obeys "old right"? We have seen obedience reconstituted by the action of the nobles in bringing to the dying John his morally untarnished son to "set a form

upon that indigest / Which [John] hath left so shapeless and so rude" (5.7.26-27). It is to such a kingship that they have "come home"; and the Bastard along with them becomes a returned prodigal when he phrases the meaning of "mended faiths" in terms of a traditional platitude regarding obedience to England's true self. Like others in the play who have been rashly voluntary servants of fashionable versions of honor, the Bastard ends up a convert to true conscience.

To understand this conversion we must recall that the Bastard has always been aware of the difference between honors of "face" and legitimate honor. Early in the play, when he consented to be knighted "Sir Richard and Plantagenet," he knew he was abandoning "country" manners for the "new-made honor" of "worshipful society" and in this respect he was being "a bastard to the times"; but he excused this devil-may-care decision as a way of mocking the fashionable practices of his courtly associates and at the same time promoting his own "rising" amid a society of moral bastards. In 2.1. when John boasts in witness of his kingship thousands of "hearts of English breed," the Bastard comments: "Bastards, and else" (line 276). A bit later, he speaks satirically of the "glory" of the slaughter achieved by "the rich blood of kings . . . set on fire" (line 350). Then in his soliloquy ending Act 2 he draws a clear distinction between the "armor conscience" worn by Philip of France when "zeal and charity" brought him to the field as God's soldier and the break-vow version of this practised by Philip when a vile-drawing bias of "tickling commodity" misled him by his outward eye's self-interest. In this soliloquy a conscientious denunciation of commodity-serving prefaces the Bastard's argument that his own worship of self-advantage is justified by the practices of kings. Hobson has well observed (in his essay in *Shakespeare Yearbook*) that the speech as a whole combines satire of false kingship with a self-exposure of the Bastard's own willingness to imitate it, and thus constitutes "a double-edged exposure of unprincipled action and the fallacious reasoning used to justify it" (96). The sophistry of the conclusion, Hobson has pointed out, results from a syllogistic reasoning that rests on an implied major premise that is no true universal but only a "seeming" one derived from an array of instances; but such wayward reasoning aptly defines a logic of action that develops in the play's major characters—while its fallacious major

premise leaves room for the later devaluation of it (though "evolution" is here Hobson's ambiguous term) by events in the plot (106).

The fallacious logic can be seen, for instance, in the action of the rebel lords. They denounce John's abandoning of conscience while at the same time they employ sophistic argument to justify a swallowing of their own scruples to serve a questionable version of "right." The internal contradiction is evident when Salisbury tells the Dauphin:

> . . . believe me, Prince,
> I am not glad that such a sore of time
> Should seek a plaster by contemn'd revolt
> And heal the inveterate canker of one wound
> By making many.   (5.2.11-15)

We notice here that Salisbury (in this respect like the Bastard) cites the condition of the times as his excuse. The point is then emphasized:

> But such is the infection of the time
> That for the health and physic of our right
> We cannot deal but with the very hand
> Of stern injustice and confused wrong. (20-23)

Injustice is thus justified in the name of "our right," which must use "wrong" in its service. The lurking inconsistency, however, creates a psychological anxiety—similar (let me suggest) to the classic case of the Pharisee Saul whose bravado in pursuing a supposed righteousness was a kicking "against the prick" of God's truth; and similar to Augustine's pre-conversion experience of being enbondaged by "two wills" in conflict within him until a child's voice relieved the burden. We are not really surprised to hear Salisbury say, later, that he "loves" the message Melun gives him, since now he can un-tread his false steps and leave "our irregular" course (5.4.49-54). A parallel to this, it seems to me, is the change in the Bastard's psychology from its warring tension at the end of Act 4, where he confesses to a feeling of losing his way "amid the thorns and dangers of this world" while yet determined to support John's "business," and the relief from this at the end of Act 5 when the returned lords point him to a new child-sponsored center of obedience.

Melun's confession is an evident instance of a break with the agenda of the Dauphin; and surely no reader can doubt that this act of political resistance to a monarch has Shakespeare's approval. Hence the play, as a whole, cannot be said to support a Tudor doctrine of unconditional obedience. Indeed, that was made evident in 4.1., where Hubert was moved by Arthur to resist John's agenda, and we were invited to admire Hubert's decision to undergo "much danger" for Arthur's sake. The link between this decision and Melun's later one is the motive of "love" that inspires both. Hubert was converted by Arthur's spirit of unconditional charity; Melun has his conscience awakened, he tells us, by "the love of Hubert," along with a remembering of blood-kinship with England through Melun's grandfather. A normative allegiance revives in Melun when death poses for him the need to choose something more lasting than commodity can offer:

> Why should I then be false, since it is true
> That I must die here and live hence by truth? (5.4.28-29)

The collapse of any gain to be had from devilry, we may say, furnished the negative factor while grace and nature together provided the positive factor in his homecoming to truth. Obedience to this truth he now realizes is a human being's only lasting stay and true ground of welfare.

I believe that this is also the Bastard's realization when he finds cut off any gain from his adhering to the "bias of the world" and discovers alongside this the grace of a better good offered through the "news" the converted nobles provide him. His service of John's "spirit" has failed to bring him any lasting benefit, whereas young Henry promises a good whose potential lives in the child's humility, worthy of being served "everlastingly" (5.7.105). A reader should recall, in this connection, the conclusion of Shakespeare's Sonnet 124, where the poet advocates a forsaking of "Policy, that heretic" who invites service to the fashions of Time and "short-numbered hours" and instead declares his determination to build on a "goodness" that stands "hugely politic." The renunciation in that sonnet of a "bastard" love seems to me exemplified in the concluding lines of King John. Those lines advocate a loyalty that is no longer a worship of devilish gain but is now

committed to a worship of truth, the "hugely politic" Good that gains life for everyman. The machiavellian impulse was a prodigal phase, which all its practitioners have discovered to be empty of real good, prompting them to "come home" to the "love" represented in Hubert and Melun and Henry III. Expediency has been redefined.

I would hope that my fuller exposition may persuade Sandra Billington to withdraw the objection she raises in her response to my earlier essay. She grants my point that Arthur's religious qualities "reappear" in young Henry, but then she comments that these qualities promise to be "equally impractical" in the new king. She feels that his last lines—"I have a kind soul that would give thanks / And knows not how to do it but with tears" suggests he will be a "holy" man but a weak king. I would reply that Elizabethans such as Edmund Spenser regarded holiness as the first and principal virtue of a public servant, and that the point of Shakespeare's Sonnet 124 is that only a holy love can be practical in a lasting way. I would concede, of course, that perseverance in a holy love is not automatic: the Bible itself tells us that the love and faith of the young Isaac which converted his father Abraham underwent a lapse in old age when his eyes grew dim, making necessary then a practical intervention by his wise wife Rebecca. By analogy, young Henry's "kind soul" might lapse in the future from its present thankfulness and pity. But since Billington grants that Arthur's virtues parallel those of the young Isaac in Mystery play drama, I must question her proceeding to argue that Shakespeare's *King John* is not "ultimately concerned with religious piety" ("Response" 290). How can this be so when the religious piety of Arthur, Hubert, and Melun bring about the play's happy conclusion? Billington is perhaps under the influence of a 20th-century universal skepticism which doubts the value of all religious piety and supposes it irrelevant to secular life. I cannot agree with Billington's judgement that "the Prince Arthur of the *TR* has a better combination of morality and kingly authority than Shakespeare's boy price." The morality of the *TR* Arthur rests not on appeal to Hubert's love but (Puritanwise) on warning Hubert that "all the plagues of hell" will befall him if he commits murder. And kingly authority is exhibited by telling John to his face, "I am King / Of England though thou wear the diadem," thus provoking John to order death for him. This Arthur has

a boldness of rhetoric, not the Christian meekness of Shakespeare's
Arthur (which Billington apparently equates with moral weakness). Recall
St Paul's adage that his "power is made perfect in weakness" (2 Cor
12:9).

Billington would also question whether the peace at the end of the
play is "honorable." She regards it as "retrograde" since its intermediary
is Pandulph, whose earlier behavior I described as "bereft of any true
religion." Perhaps I should have stated more plainly that the providential
events which change the play's other commodity servers change
Pandulph also. The presumptuous dictator who boasted to John that
"My tongue shall hush again the storm of war" (5.1.20) has discovered
subsequently that his tongue was powerless, whereas what has made
a peace possible is the Dauphin's loss on the sands of all his ships
concurrent with the Bastard's loss of John's troops in the Lincoln
Washes—a double washout, followed by the double conversion to "old
right" by the French Melun and the English nobles. Thus Pandulph is
reduced to doing what he refused to do in Act 3, namely, act as a
"reverend father" committed to devising "some gentle order" whereby
both kings might join in a "blessed" friendship (3.1.250). A mediating
role is appropriate, since it accords with orthodox doctrine (going back
to the 5th-century Pope Gelasius) that church and state are ordained
to aid each other as mutually interdependent authorities. Pandulph's
behavior when cursing John, if measured by the norm of Arthur's piety,
can be seen as a defective version of piety, since it countered John's
impiety with a legalism equally pretentious and evasive of Christ's
command of charitable love—while at the same time it ignored the
widow Constance and the orphan Arthur, thus controverting true religion
as defined in James 1:27. Pandulph's distorted logic, we may say, was
like John's and like the Bastard's in choosing to fight "fire with fire,"
while himself lacking any mystical fire of a holy spirit. But when his
breath (unlike Arthur's) proved to be ultimately impotent, a deflated
Pandulph is brought home to a humble role by providential events
outside his power.

Divine Providence, according to Augustine, is a mysterious order of
justice that includes chance events within a larger design. In *King John*
we see the Bastard aware of such an order when he interprets the

tempest of war as Heaven's frowning upon the land (4.3.159). Similarly, he interprets as a divine judgment his loss of troops in the Washes, exclaiming, "Withhold thine indignation, mighty heaven, / And tempt us not to bear above our power." The temptation in the Bastard's case was to exploit his "Sir Richard" title into a bid for Hubert's political allegiance, but Hubert (because converted to charity by Arthur) nips in the bud this bastard ambition. Perhaps Hubert remembers the blame he got from John for countenancing temptation:

> Hads't thou but shook thy head or made a pause
> When I spake darkly what I purposed,
> Or turned an eye of doubt upon my face . . .
> Deep shame had struck me dumb, made me
>   break off. (4.2.31-35)

Those very lines are evidence that temporal gain from a superior's sin should be resisted and *not* obeyed. "Thou," John had complained, "made it no conscience to betray a prince" in order to be "endeared to a king." Hubert cannot have forgot that lesson providentially taught him by an unhappy sinner. So Hubert providentially curbs the inclination of his benefactor, the Bastard, and points him to the example of revised obedience arrived at by the repentant nobles, who will later complete the Bastard's conversion by the good turn they invite him to.

Sandra Billington fails to see any conversions because she reads every change of allegiance as an instance of faith-breaking. In her view Faulconbridge "betrays one vow with another in the space of thirty lines" at the play's end and thus "continues the devaluation" of fidelity which we have seen throughout the play ("Response" 291). In *Mock Kings*, similarly, she speaks of "no significant" improvement with the accession of Henry, saying further:

> Although the Bastard understands the need to keep faith with England's political destiny:
>
> > Nought shall make us rue
> > If England to itself do rest but true (5.7.117-18)

a doubt remains as to whether he or anyone in the court understands what
that means in terms of personal commitment. This makes the Shakespearian
text rather more challenging and dissenting than one might expect. It would
appear that the young playwright held some radical views . . . (134)

Hobson is less negative regarding the Bastard's final speech. One way
of reading it, he says (in *Shakespeare Yearbook* 107-08) is as an "embrace
of expediency that is then covered up (for the audience as well as the
characters) by truisms"; however, these truisms "can be" understood
as directed as much against royal misconduct as against rebellion" and
thus "should remind" the audience of John's culpability. Hobson's two-
sided reading is the result of his attempt to view the whole play as
satire—a logical outworking of the Bastard's double-sided satire of kings
and of himself in his Commodity speech. Like Billington, Hobson (in
his "Comment" 4) terms "unconvincing" my account of providential
events in the play—although (unlike Billington) he leaves the door open
by inviting me to discuss this matter more fully, since he senses that
the thrust of my essay supports his own hypothesis that the play
suggests "a conditional moral basis for obedience" by linking obedience
to just rule. I'm now explaining that the play does this, not simply by
warning us against the misconduct of John and the rebels alike, but by
showing us (among other things) several eventual conversions from
misconduct to beneficial conduct. The Bastard's final truisms are not
a "covering up" of a continuing worship of Commodity on his part or
by the nobles; they need to be seen rather as a covering over with
mortification of a mistaken and false worship that is now ended.
Replacing this is a "just" worship of Truth—the kind witnessed to by
the conscience of Melun in his declaration, "I must . . . live hence by
truth." That message, rather than simply Melun's news of the Dauphin's
perfidy, awaked the nobles to return to traditional "old right" (not
identical with "unconditional" obedience but rather conditioned by a
just love of England's welfare). And I would say further that Melun's
message amounts to a renewal of Arthur's freedom from love of
Commodity—described somewhat imprecisely by Hobson's reference
to Arthur's "sacrifice" as restoring dynastic legitimacy (4).

Tillyard viewed the scene of Arthur's pleading as merely "an exhibition of rhetoric" and complained that it "does not fit naturally into the play at all" (232). Further, his general judgment was that "Shakespeare huddles together and fails to motivate properly the events of the last third of his play" (215). Chakravorty replied that what Tillyard read as unmotivated huddling is actually Shakespeare's telescoping of events to produce evidence of Time's judgment on King John: the dramatist has motivated the end in his own moral way by connecting it with Heaven's revenge on "unreprievable condemned blood" (73, 78). I would extend this contention by saying that heaven's revenge includes visiting with mortification not only the person of John but also the ambitions of all the other Commodity-lovers in the play. The put-down of these, however, is accompanied by a grace manifested in Melun that rectifies their consciences and returns them to true obedience. My emphasis therefore is on a tracing of this grace back to the child Arthur and his convert Hubert. Christianity teaches that saving truth is revealed in time, and a classical adage tells us that truth is the daughter of time. Shakespeare mirrors this in his dramatizing of history.

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Hamlet's Last Moments: A Note on John Russell Brown[*]

DIETER MEHL

Though I am in almost complete agreement with John Russell Brown's close reading of Hamlet's dying words and with his contention that "Shakespeare chose, very positively, to provide a multiplicity of meanings at this crucial point" (30), I wonder whether his analysis, helpful as it is for an understanding of the text in the study, is equally valid in the theatre. If we were speaking of one of Shakespeare's sonnets I should find it much easier to believe in the co-existence of four or five distinct meanings, even if they "tend to cancel each other out" (27). In performance, however, we might find ourselves rather in the position of Jane Austen's "inferior young man" Mr. Rushworth, who "hardly knew what to do with so much meaning."[1] It is true that each actor will have to choose between a range of possible interpretations, as John Russell Brown says—and no-one knows it better!—, but it is also worth paying closer attention to the textual problem involved.

Thinking about Hamlet's last moments on the stage, I should like to make a plea for the Folio's reading, "The rest is silence. O, o, o, o."[2] The four letters following "silence" are easily one of the most neglected utterances in the canon, surprising enough in a play in which hardly a single punctuation mark has been left unscrutinized and uncommented on.[3] Most editions either ignore them completely or dismiss them as some actor's invention. An honourable early exception is the edition of Nicolaus Delius where he explains the Folio reading as "Hamlets Todesgestöhn."[4] The only modern edition I know to take this reading seriously is The Oxford Shakespeare. *The Complete Works*,[5] possibly for

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[*]Reference: John Russell Brown, "Multiplicity of Meaning in the Last Moments of *Hamlet*," *Connotations* 2.1 (1992): 16-33.

the first time in three centuries, faithfully reproduces the Folio at this point, whereas G. R. Hibbard in his single-volume edition translates the four letters into a stage direction: *"He gives a long sigh and dies."*[6] This seems to me rather too specific, but at least the editor recognises that the editors of the First Folio knew what they were doing.

John Russell Brown assumes, as many editors have done, that we owe the Folio's "addition" to James Burbage, and one must agree with him that "We have no idea what the four O's were intended to mean and still less notion of what Shakespeare thought about them" (28). Still, they are the earliest commentary on Hamlet's silence we have and they may well be part of Shakespeare's own revision of the play. Whatever their precise meaning, they confirm the impression that at this point in the play it is not so much "multiplicity of meanings" that is the issue, as the ultimate failure of language. Hamlet knows that as far as he is concerned the time for words has passed, that there is nothing but silence left to him. It is, of course, impossible to rule out that, for the more sophisticated, other meanings of "rest" may be present here and that they will also affect our sense of "silence"; but surely, in performance the primary meaning for the audience is that the moment has come when speech is cut off by death and anything that still needs to be said about Hamlet will have to be said by others. There are Shakespearean characters who die with a pun on their lips,[7] but I find it difficult to accept the suggestion that this is an instance of it. More relevant than the possible range of meanings and associations in Hamlet's last sentence seems to me the Folio's blunt statement that the wonderfully rich rhetoric of the Prince has faded into inarticulate sound before it is finally reduced to silence. The four O's have therefore as much right to stand in the text of *Hamlet* (unless the Folio is completely discarded) as any other addition in this version of the play.

"There is no more to say"[8] seems to be the final impression at the end of many Shakespearean tragedies, and in this general sense I agree with Brown that the closing lines of several plays have something of an authorial ring. Iago refuses to disclose the secret of his motives and Albany (or Edgar, according to which *Lear* we choose) knows likewise about the futility of words in the face of an experience beyond the

comprehension of bystanders and beyond the glib rhetoric of concluding couplets, of a Fortinbras, Lodovico, Albany or Malcolm.

Brown is absolutely right in stressing that our reaction to Hamlet's death and consequently our interpretation of his last words is largely dependent on the way he has been presented to us throughout the play and that the actor has an almost infinite number of options.[9] I would merely suggest that, as the Folio-text seems to indicate, the earliest Hamlet (and possibly his author) meant to emphasize above all the crude fact of the hero's death rather than offering an authoritative dying speech. Whether by Shakespeare, by Burbage or some other man of the theatre, Hamlet's last utterance, between speech and ultimate silence, must at least be taken into account as a "perceptive gloss on the part"[10] by one of his contemporaries, if not by his maker.

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NOTES

[1]*Mansfield Park* II.1., ed. with an introd. by Tony Tanner (1966; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986) 202.

[2]This is followed by the stage direction *"dies."* The Quarto of 1604-5 has only Hamlet's last words, "The rest is silence," with no stage direction. The "bad" Quarto of 1603, which sometimes seems to preserve revealing memories of a performance, has a completely different, rather improbable dying speech, ending in "Farewell *Horatio,* heuen receiue my soule" and the direction *"Ham. dies."*

[3]The most eloquent and persuasive defence I have seen is by Terence Hawkes: "If this is interpolation, give us excess of it." Cf. his "'That Shakespeherian Rag'," *Essays and Studies* 30 (1977): 22-38, rpt. in *That Shakespeherian Rag* (London: Methuen, 1986) 73-119.

[4]*Shakespere's Werke,* ed. Nicolaus Delius, 3rd rev. ed., vol. 2 (Elberfeld: R. L. Friderichs) 425. Jenkins, representing what seems to be the *communis opinio,* refers to "Hamlet's dying groans" as "theatrical accretions to Shakespeare's dialogue," Arden Edition (London: Methuen, 1982) 62. John Dover Wilson's note on Hamlet's silence is characteristically plain: "F1 ludicrously adds 'O, o, o, o.'" (Cambridge Edition, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964] 258).

[5]Eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1986).

[6](Oxford: Clarendon P, 1987). In support of his emendation, Hibbard quotes E. A. J. Honigmann's important article "Re-enter the Stage Direction: Shakespeare and Some Contemporaries," *Shakespeare Survey* 29 (1976): 117-25, esp. 123, and he states

that the Folio reading "has been the object of unjustified derision" (352). Honigmann's interesting article makes no direct reference to the *Hamlet* passage.

[7]See, for instance, Mercutio's "Ask for me tomorrow and you shall find me a grave man" (3.1.98-99; ed. Brian Gibbons, Arden Edition [London: Methuen, 1980]).

[8]*Troilus and Cressida* 5.10.22 (ed. Kenneth Palmer, Arden Edition [London: Methuen, 1982]).

[9]This is also emphasized in Marvin Rosenberg's stimulating study *The Masks of Hamlet* (Newark: U of Delaware P, 1992), who suggests a range of possible meanings even beyond John Russell Brown: "*Os* can be most eloquent. (Try them)" (924). It would be foolish to deny, though, that, for the actor at least, "the *Os* may indicate, apart from dying, something of the final mystery of Hamlet's last perception" (923).

[10]See Hawkes 22.

The Rest Is Not Silence:
A Reply to John Russell Brown*

MAURICE CHARNEY

It is not surprising that John Russell Brown's vigorous, witty, and energetic paper comes out of a symposium on paronomasia at the University of Münster in July 1992. The paper is strongly appropriate for that occasion, yet there are other ways of looking at the last moments of *Hamlet* that may not be so specifically related to paronomasia. Brown rather blurs the linguistic continuum leading from literal puns (homophonic use), to general wordplay, to multiple meanings, which have nothing to do with puns at all. His discussion of at least five meanings of "The rest is silence," which is at the heart of his paper, is a far cry from paronomasia. Yet all the verbal resources of *Hamlet* are marshalled significantly and intelligently. Brown is not only a subtle critic of language but also a skillful commentator on performance. He says that "Hamlet is creating a paronomasia of performance" (20) in his scene with Ophelia in 3.2., and he is everywhere sensitive to performance implications of language.

There is one assumption throughout that I find odd: that Hamlet has a secret that he never reveals and that "Wordplay allows him to escape without revealing his secret" (26). This seems to me a romantic and skewed interpretation, but Brown insists on it with a quantity of repetition that I find surprising. Hamlet has a "reluctance to tell all" (23), he practises "avoidance-tactics," "refusing to talk further" (24), and "the audience is encouraged to expect that the hero will unmask and everything will be clarified" (24), but this does not happen. What "single and simple message" (21) does the hero have that Brown is as

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*Reference: John Russell Brown, "Multiplicity of Meaning in the Last Moments of *Hamlet*," *Connotations* 2.1 (1992): 16-33.

unsuccessful as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in plucking out? I am baffled by this kind of pursuit, which violates the existential nature of Hamlet's engagement with the audience, which is also an engagement with himself. To say that, even in soliloquy, Hamlet "is not always in control" (21) seems to me to mistake the protagonist's relation to himself as well as to the spectators. For Hamlet to be "in control" of his discourse implies a purposiveness that is foreign to his character. Hamlet speaks in order to find out what he wants to say; he is one of the audiences to his own words, especially in soliloquy. Is Hamlet trying, imperfectly, to express his meanings, or, as Brown says, to use punning language and wordplay to conceal his meanings? This implies that there is another esoteric play behind the public play that will reveal itself only to the initiated. Criticism, therefore, becomes an act of piercing through Hamlet's (and Shakespeare's) concealments and masks.

Brown fixes his discussion on Hamlet's last words, "The rest is silence," to which he attributes at least five separate meanings. These lines "could be a joke, a profound searching of the unknown, a resignation to the fate of a sparrow, the voice of bitter despair, or a matter of fact" (32). I wonder why Brown chooses such relatively unambiguous lines to expend his energy on, except that these lines are connected with his idea of Hamlet's unrevealed mystery: "So he might speak of his failure to tell all, and die making an excuse for his rashness or ineffectuality" (26). But it is fairly conventional for the protagonist at his death to run out of time and to have a lot more to say than he can possibly fit in. This explains why characters such as Hotspur and Antony die in the middle of a sentence. Even the Ghost in *Hamlet* "could a tale unfold"—different from the tale he is actually telling—that would harrow up Hamlet's "soul, freeze thy young blood, / Make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres" (1.5.16-17). I cannot understand why Brown should single out "The rest is silence" to clinch his point about Hamlet's holding out on us "with such an 'ambiguous giving out,' in glancing, unreliable wordplay, at this crucial last moment" (27). This is not really wordplay at all in comparison with Hamlet's earlier, dazzling display of paronomasia.

Brown's fifth and final explanation of "The rest is silence" I find disappointing: that Shakespeare is speaking through the voice of his

protagonist, "telling the audience and the actor that he, the dramatist, would not, or could not, go a word further in the presentation of this, his most verbally brilliant and baffling hero" (27). Brown is at his most characteristic and extravagant moment here, insisting on a cutely paradoxical interposition of Shakespeare into his play. Shakespeare is brought on to tell us, confidentially, in place of Hamlet the character, that "he has 'no more to say,' still less any further mystery to disclose" (28). Brown is very self-consciously slipping back into the romantic mysteries of Sir Sidney Lee in the late nineteenth century, as if at certain crucial moments the dramatic character can't be trusted with enunciating points that have an important autobiographical clang.

Hamlet's last words are actually "O, o, o, o," which occur only in the Folio text, and which Harold Jenkins, the Arden editor, dismisses as an actor's interpolation by Richard Burbage, which has no authority in Shakespeare's authentic text. Presumably, Brown also rejects the O-groans because he says that "We have no idea what the four O's were intended to mean and still less notion of what Shakespeare thought about them" (28). But O-groans occur in *Othello, King Lear, Macbeth,* and in many Elizabethan and Jacobean plays. They were a fairly conventional emotional gesture in these plays, especially associated with death. We do not know precisely how the O-groans got into the Folio text of *Hamlet,* but one plausible suggestion is that they were part of Shakespeare's extensive revision of the earlier Quarto 2 version.

By the demands of logic, I have been betrayed into mounting a vigorous quarrel with an essay I greatly admire and with an author who has consistently titillated my intellectual curiosity in conversation, in lecture, and in print. Brown is creating his own original *Hamlet* for the occasion, and I think he is carried away with a passion to pluck out the heart of Hamlet's mystery and to bring on Shakespeare himself as the taunting author. This is an admirable enterprise, and I feel a sense of disloyalty in not being able to join it. I am inclined to accept Hamlet for what he is and not to probe his riddling discourse for secrets that he does not choose to reveal. Perhaps I believe in the Freudian unconscious more firmly than Brown does, which applies to dramatic characters as well as their creators. In other words, there is a certain stratum of literary and dramatic discourse that is hidden from both

character and author alike. There is no way of exercising the control and the deliberateness that Brown posits. This is especially true of *Hamlet*, where the protagonist is trying out roles and modes of discourse throughout the play.

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A Constructed Reading Self Replies[*]

THOMAS F. MERRILL

In his response to my essay concerning religious style in *Paradise Lost*, Harold Swardson clarifies our parting of the ways in terms of "what kind of reading Self" each of us has constructed in our reading of Milton's epic. His reading self, he confides, was forged under the tutelage of New Critics, who conditioned him to reject literary works which exhibit a so-called "sentimental style," that is, works that encouraged "satisfying emotional responses and discouraged inspection of what these responses were based on and how they were related to each other" (100). Sentimental style, in short, is the same as "contradictory response" or "wanting things 'two ways at once'" (99). It is only natural that such a reading self might complain that a Christian epic like *Paradise Lost*, with all its inherent paradoxes (nature and grace, natural and "right" reason, the eternal and temporal, the Word and the world) violates the principle of "non-contradiction." It is natural too that he should conclude that what I claim as the religiously salutary confusion of religious style is in fact mere sentimentality.

"What would make me call what I am responding to 'religious style' rather than 'sentimental style,' . . . ?" Swardson asks (101). He replies: "Only a demonstration that what I see is not an 'inconsistency' but really a fruitful ambiguity." Since my attempts to demonstrate the religious fruitfulness of the ambiguities in Milton's Hell in convincing enough fashion (Swardson fails to see "what is salutary in the confusion"), I propose a change of venue to cooler terrain—Eden.

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[*]Reference: Thomas F. Merrill, "The Language of Hell," *Connotations* 1.3 (1991): 244-57; Harold R. Swardson, "One Constructed Reading Self after Another (A Response to Thomas F. Merrill," *Connotations* 2.1 (1992): 98-102.

The particular Edenic ambiguity I have in mind occurs in Book IX of *Paradise Lost*. Eve has eaten the apple and Adam must choose between sharing her fate or maintaining his obedience to God. One whose "reading Self" fundamentally resembles Swardson's, A. J. A. Waldock, charged a number of years ago that Milton erred in depicting this episode by presenting us with a situation which evokes contradictory responses (in his words, "an unbearable collision of values"). We are asked, Waldock explains, to set aside "one of the highest, and really one of the oldest, of all human values: selflessness in love . . . [for] the mere doctrine that God must be obeyed."[1] Waldock insinuates that Milton himself, although "not in a position to admit it," felt that Adam was doing a "worthy thing" by eating the apple and joining Eve in sin. The resultant conflict, as Waldock describes it, is that the "poem asks from us, at one and the same time, two incompatible responses. It requires us, not tentatively, not half-heartedly (for there can be no place really for half-heartedness here) but with the full weight of our minds to believe that he did wrong."

Waldock restricts his eye for "sentimentality" to purely literary issues. He reads *Paradise Lost*, as I suspect Swardson does too, as though it were a drama, and applies the traditional standards of dramatic decorum to the scene. My disappointment is that he ignores the fact that Milton's epic has a religious as well as a literary vocation and that more often than not, Milton took great pains to assure that his religious goals took precedence over mere narrative consistency. Indeed, Milton's religious goals invariably demanded that the rational complacency of the world be subverted by a radically different sacred order. Thus, Waldock, in rendering a non-religious account of a religious enterprise, is disturbed by the way Milton confuses secular and sacred values and deems it "sentimentality." The incompatibility of the inconsistent values as they converge on Adam "is so critical," he says, that it pulls the reader "in two ways" and cheats him of the "full-hearted response that a great tragic theme allows and compels."

The issue, then, is clear: is being "pulled in two ways" a sentimental contradiction or a religiously fruitful ambiguity, consciously engineered by Milton according to the dictates of religious style?

Let me see if I can demonstrate to Swardson what is "salutary in this confusion" without forcing him to "abandon reason and 'the common sense point of view'" for which he feels reproached (101).

Some seventeenth-century "common sense" is afforded by the famous casuist William Perkins who adjudicates this case of conscience: when "God commaunds one thing & the magistrate commaundes the flat contrarie; in this case . . . the latter must give place to the former, and the former alone in this case must be obeyed: Act. 4, 19 *Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God, judge ye*."[2] With Milton's epic before us we do not need Perkins to tell us that "love and honor to God must be valued, painful as it seems, above love and honor to one's wife," because Milton forces us to share this "unbearable collision of values" along with Adam. Of course "we are pulled in two ways" as we read this episode. Milton intended us to be. Adam's dilemma forces us, perhaps as we cannot force ourselves, to experience the claim of sacred obligation, to work through to the awareness that it is the more worthy thing that Adam love and obey God than that he covet, however gallantly, Eve. To be sure we may feel that a morally reprehensible duty is required of Adam, but that is the point. This is not a "typical tragic conflict" but a religiously-stylized case of conscience—one incidentally that exactly parallels the biblical rendering of the story of Abraham and Isaac: that the love of God must be set above all other loves—even those of wife or son.

I am not at all sure the issue here is totally one of disparate "reading Selves"—that is, looking at identical textual evidence and drawing different conclusions because of differing belief systems. As Stanley Fish and others relentlessly illustrate, *Paradise Lost* is suffused with situations where Milton clearly would have us "surprised by sin," and such surprises, I would contend, are the very essence of religious style. No, the sort of patterns I refer to as religious style in *Paradise Lost* and other Christian literary texts are there, and, as John Wisdom suggests, "Wrongheadedness or wrongheartedness in a situation, blindness to what is there or seeing what is not, does not arise merely from mismanagement of language but is more due to connections which are not mishandled in language, for the reason that they are not put into language at all."[3] The restoration of missing connections is usually the

concern of historical criticism, but Wisdom's concern is not the historical but the religious "replacement" of connections, and he may have had in mind when he speaks of "unspoken connections," the "gaps," "lacunae," and "mysterious omissions" which, according to Erich Auerbach, characterize the style of the Bible.[4] Such missing connections, Wisdom observes, are often "operative but not presented in language," and it is obvious that here is a prime source of interpretive blunder, particularly in cases where a relatively secular culture assays to understand the sacred literature of an older religious one, ignorant of its unspoken connections.

As for my particular reading self, I cannot claim any privileged status. I boast no antennae of faith enabling me to see patterns that Swardson cannot, and I confess that my constructed reading self was first fashioned (like Swardson's, I assume) by that classic New Critical text: Brooks and Warrens's *Understanding Poetry*. Neither New Criticism nor the possession of belief or non-belief should define our differences over *Paradise Lost* in my opinion. The real issue is the essential nature of the poem that Milton wrote. Is it a poetic theodicy *about* the Christian experience or *of* it? This is the foundation upon which our reading selves are constructed. To me it seems that Swardson reads a *Paradise Lost* that is (to use his words) "constructed on the model of Socrates" (99), a text that should be expected to respond to the decorum of a well-made poem. But if the poem fails to meet those Socratic expectations, are we forbidden to apply more plausible Christian ones?

Mr. Swardson's remarks remind me of the "constructed reading self"of another "classicist," T. S. Eliot, who, in the course of faulting John Donne for a lack of a proper *"gout pour la vie spirituelle"* because "there is always the something else, the 'baffling'" in his preaching, found more profit in Lancelot Andrewes because "reading Andrewes . . . is like listening to a great Hellenist expounding a text of the *Posterior Analytics*."[5]

Granted, one is less likely to find "sentimental" violations of "the law of non-contradiction" in the *Posterior Analytics* than in the Bible or, I would argue, *Paradise Lost*, but this requires one's "reading Self" to bow

to a decorum which forbids the intrusion of the very inconsistent and contradictory stuff that life is made of, be it spiritual or literary.

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NOTES

[1] A. J. A. Waldock, *Paradise Lost and its Critics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966) 55-56.

[2] *William Perkins: 1558-1602,* ed. Thomas F. Merrill (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1966) 11.

[3] John Wisdom, "Gods," *Logic and Language (First Series)* ed. Antony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955) 200.

[4] See Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature,* trans. Willard Trask (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1953) 4-19.

[5] See "Lancelot Andrewes," *Selected Essays,* 2nd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1934) 342-43.

A Response to Alan Rosen, "Plague, Fire, and Typology in Defoe's *A Journal of the Plague Year*"*

JOSEF HASLAG

> . . . ut per omnia referret supremam illam exustionem . . .

The inscription on the Monument, erected to commemorate the Great Fire of London, emphatically confirms Alan Rosen's contention that the Great Fire was considered the typological counterpart of the biblical destruction of the world by fire. In a comment on some of the aspects of his contribution, it may be useful to recall that "typology," as used by Rosen, is synonymous with "the broadened typology" discussed in J. Paul Hunter's influential book on Defoe's emblematic method (1966).[1] In two studies of Defoe Zimmerman followed Hunter in claiming that to the dissenters "biblical types could be prefigurations not only of later biblical events, but also of later history."[2] As the subject and the concept were given due attention in Paul Korshin's important analysis of typologies in England (Rosen 273-75),[3] typololgy became a recognized topic in Defoe criticism.

I

Alan Rosen attempts a detailed analysis of the seventeenth century typological interpretation of disasters such as the plague of 1665 and the Great Fire of 1666. On the level of biblical referents, the flood and the fire, marking the beginning and the end of history, were of great importance. Especially the destruction of the world by fire was, as it

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*Reference: Alan Rosen, "Plague, Fire, and Typology in Defoe's *A Journal of the Plague Year*," *Connotations* 1.3 (1991): 258-82.

seems, a kind of mythic type which was held to correspond to the Great Fire of London.

The Great Fire, however, if viewed in a homiletic or a more strictly typological context, was not consistently linked to the "suprema exustio." Despite the examples quoted by Rosen the underlying type was not necessarily "the paradigmatic destruction by fire in the heralded future" (262). Some doubts, therefore, may be raised as to the strength of the teleological meaning of the Fire, which is at the core of Rosen's argument. The religious interpretation of the Great Fire indeed took on different shapes and forms. Having, in support of Rosen's view, mentioned the Monument, it seems appropriate not to forget the little statue which reminds us of the Great Fire at the corner of Cock Lane, in Smithfield. It marks the place where the fire was said to have stopped, and represents a surprisingly fat boy. Judging from the contemporary legend inscribed on the statue, the boy is an emblematic embodiment of sin. It was "Put up for the Late Fire of London Occasion'd by the Sin of Gluttony, 1666." So the Great Fire was, to the simple dissenter of the day, an instance of divine retribution, as it was to the much more sophisticated Thomas Vincent,[4] who is Rosen's major witness. An acute sense of the dealings of God—here and now—with a sinful world pervades his panoramic view of the Great Fire, and it accounts for the metamorphosis of the typological emblem he uses:

> The burning then was in the fashion of a bow, a dreadful bow it was, such as mine eyes never before had seen: a bow which had God's arrow in it with a flaming point. It was a shining bow, not like that in the cloud which brings water with it and withal signifies God's covenant not to destroy the world any more with water, but it was a bow which had fire in it, which signified God's anger and his intention to destroy London with fire.[5]

It should be noted that Vincent, in the passage here quoted, in order to make his point, adapts to the present a type originally referring to the past (Genesis 9:13-16).

Even before 1666, Puritan preachers had made good use of fire as God's punishment for the sinful. As early as 1658 one Walter Costelo was a typologist before the event:

Oh London! London! Sinful as Sodom and Gomorrah! The decree is gone out. Repent, or burn, as Sodom, as Gomorrah![6]

As the typological referents of the fire differ, I hesitate to promote a single one to the rank of paradigm, to the detriment, as it were, of the others, and to attribute to the "paradigmatic fire, located in the future" (263) the dominant role it plays in Rosen's theory. Although I admire Rosen's systematizing, I take the view that the fire may correspond to several types, all of which have scriptural authority, and therefore deserve to be called "paradigms."

II

In Rosen's analysis of the typological groundwork of history, there is an assumption of what I may be allowed to call "a hierarchy of disasters." He argues that "in contrast to the decided emphasis on the place of flood and fire at the extremes of the historical continuum, the plague can seemingly occur at any point along the way" (264). As a consequence, a pairing of fire and plague is seen as potentially "activating a conventional typological schema" (264), whereas Defoe's "circumvention of the Great Fire" actually "deactivated the conventional typological schema" (265). In this view, the Great Fire becomes a kind of catalyst bringing about, in addition, the typological meaning of the plague. So, by deliberately keeping at arm's lenght and even disregarding the potent fire, Defoe pursues a strategy of "selective omission" (280n8), which constitutes the *Journal's* "polemic against typology" (275), thus paving the way for Defoe's realism (275) and his "tragic mode" (279).

Attractive as this line of thought may be, it should not make us lose sight of other reasons which may explain Defoe's focus. Defoe's selection of subject was in more ways than one related to the specific background of the 1720s. The Great Fire of 1666, as seen in retrospection, was a crisis long since overcome. It had destroyed London's old timber houses, which had been replaced by brick buildings lining widened streets.[7] With all its speedy destruction, it had, within less than a week, made thousands

homeless, yet it killed only a very few. It was even said to have been "erga vitas innocuum."[8] By 1720, the two disasters of 1665 and 1666 were certainly not on a par, for no reason could be given to minimize the dangers of the plague, which, lasting virtually nine months in 1665, had cost the lives of as many as 110,000 people.[9] Defoe, when writing his *Journal*, even believed that England was threatened with a new outbreak of the epidemic. Reports on the progress of the plague on the Continent had appeared in London newspapers since 1719,[10] and ever since 1720 Defoe himself had frequently dealt with the matter in *Applebee's Weekly Journal* and elsewhere (Backscheider 218-25).[11] In 1720, between forty and sixty thousand people had died of the plague in Marseilles alone (Backscheider ix).

Thus, apart from typological consideratons, Defoe's choices and omissions of subject suggest a wide range of motives, including above all the topicality of the plague.

Yet, even the typological background of the plague would have deserved a larger canvas in the article under review. In dealing with the plague, Defoe was faced with a chorus of traditional voices to whom a typological view of the plague had always made solid good sense. Comparable to the fire in this respect, it had behind it the rich tradition of what Louis A. Landa calls "the wrath of God theory" (Backscheider 274). The cliché, it seems, was frequently referred to in 1665 as well as in the early 1720s. Nathaniel Hodges, mentioned in Defoe's *Journal*, is quoted as giving a list of the corresponding biblical imagery: the plague is the rod of the Almighty, who may "draw the Sword, bend the Bow, or shoot the Arrows of Death" (Backscheider 275).

If read in the light of Rosen's article, Landa's materials lead to the conclusion that the typology of the plague was a well-established and autonomous subject, which in order to preserve its momentum, hardly stood in need of the typological fire. In his analysis of the mockery episode, Rosen, wishing to emphasize the blasphemous wickedness of the mockers, rather surprisingly, states the matter himself:

> . . . H. F. indicates that they stand outside his account of the plague which, fire or no fire, has its own typololgical bearings: the plague in itself is a manifestation of divine judgement. (270)

III

In conclusion, I may add a remark on the relation between typology and realism (275). As Landa points out, physicians such as Sir Richard Blackmore and the earlier Nathaniel Hodges,[12] while claiming that the plague came from God, moved at the same time to the realistic position of the medical scientist (Backscheider 276). Similarly, in the *Journal*, Defoe refers both to the appointment of Providence and to the natural causes of the plague. So the eclipse of typological patterns, which, according to Rosen, seems based on Defoe's arrangement of subjects, may be more immediately due to the impact of rationalism on typology in general, or, as G. A. Starr puts it, in *Defoe and Casuistry*, to Defoe's attitude "at once rational and religious."[13]

Neither should Defoe's attitude take us by surprise. In preparing this reply to Alan Rosen's contribution, I came across the verdict of the parliamentary report on the causes of the Great Fire, summed up in a pregnant phrase: "The hand of God upon us, a great wind, and a season so very dry."[14]

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NOTES

[1]J. Paul Hunter, *The Reluctant Pilgim: Defoe's Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1966) 101.

[2]Everett Zimmerman, "H. F.'s Meditations: *A Journal of the Plague Year*," *PMLA* 87 (1972): 420-21, and *Defoe and the Novel* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1975) 119. As identified in Defoe's *Journal*, however, typological interpretation may create some perplexities. Towards the end of the *Journal*, there is a passage whose "prophetic tone," according to Zimmerman, "suggests the apocalyptic": "But the Time was not fully come, that the City was to be purg'd by Fire, nor was it far off; for within Nine Months more I saw it all lying in Ashes" ("H. F.'s Meditations" 421). These lines seem to have suggested to Zimmerman precisely the typological referent which Defoe, in Rosen's view, has deactivated by refusing "to grant the Great Fire the status it has in his sources" (265).

[3]Paul Korshin, *Typologies in England 1650-1820* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982).

[4]The traditional view that Thomas Vincent, *God's Terrible Voice in the City* (London, 1667) is to be numbered among Defoe's sources, in the technical sense of the term, has been rejected by F. Bastian, "Defoe's *Journal of the Plague Year* Reconsidered," *RES* 16 (1965): "There do not seem to be enough examples of possible borrowings to establish Vincent's book as a probable source" (163).

[5]See Gustav Milne, *The Great Fire of London* (Austin, TX: Historical Publications, 1986; rpt. New Barnet, 1990) 37.

[6]Milne (22-23) on the "Prophets of Doom."

[7]Milne 82.

[8]Inscription on the Monument.

[9]Modern estimate. See the *Museum of London* exhibits and comments on the Plague and the Great Fire.

[10]Paula R. Backscheider, preface, *A Journal of the Plague Year*, by Daniel Defoe (New York: Norton Critical Edition, 1992) ix. All subsequent references are to this edition ("Backscheider").

[11]See Louis A. Landa on the idea of plague as "an abiding fact" in Defoe's consciousness (Backscheider 270), as also his discussion of Defoe's *Due Preparations for the Plague, as well for Soul as Body*, which appeared about a month before the *Journal* (Backscheider 271). The references are to Louis A. Landa, introduction, *A Journal of the Plague Year*, by Daniel Defoe (London: Oxford UP, 1969), rpt. as "Religion, Science and Medicine in *A Journal of the Plague Year*," Backscheider 269-85.

[12]Sir Richard Blackmore, *A Discourse upon the Plague* (London, 1721). Hodges' Latin treatise on the plague of 1665 had been published in translation in 1720, recommending itself to the reader as it contained "precautionary Directions against the like Contagion" (Rosen 280, where no mention, however, is made of the prevalent fear of a new outbreak around 1720). Throughout the *Journal*, Defoe's narrator makes comments such as: "I cannot but remember to leave this Admonition upon Record, if ever such another dreadful Visitation should happen in this City" (Backscheider 97).

[13]G. A. Starr, *Defoe and Casuistry* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971) 80.

[14]See the *Museum of London* exhibits and comments on the Great Fire.

In Reply to Eleanor Cook,
"From Etymology to Paranomasia"*

ANTHONY HECHT

Eleanor Cook's fine essay on paronomasia pleased me enormously. It covers a great deal of ground, under the modest pretext of writing only about Stevens and Bishop. Stevens, it may parenthetically be observed, is often a multi-lingual punster, especially where French and English words coincide. Take, for example, his ingeniously varied use of the word "machine" in "Sea Surface Full of Clouds." As the inventor of the metrical form of the Double Dactyl, I have taken special notice of paronomastic matters as they relate to Eliot:

> Higgledy-Piggledy
> Thomas Sterns Eliot
> Wrote dirty limericks
> Under the rose,
>
> Using synechdoches,
> Paronomasias,
> Zeugmas and rhymes he de-
> Plored in his prose.[1]

Richard Wilbur seems to me one of the most elegant and seemingly effortless employers of paronomasia among poets now writing. His work is filled with subtle and delicate examples of the sort of double-meaning too often dismissed as "trifling quibbles," especially when they crop up, as they so frequently do, in Shakespeare, and cause impossible problems for translators, especially the French ones. In Wilbur's "Altitudes" he describes a "race" of people (or possibly angels) inhabiting

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*Reference: Eleanor Cook, "From Etymology to Paranomasia: Wallace Stevens, Elizabeth Bishop, and Others," *Connotations* 2.1 (1992): 34-51.

the lit dome of a baroque church, and looking down upon the worshipers below. One stanza, referring to those glamorous persons aloft, goes,

> For all they cannot share,
> All that the world cannot in fact afford,
> Their lofty premises are floored
> With the massed voices of continual prayer.[2]

"Premises" here means both a proposition on which an argument is based, and a building, its lands and foundation. "Floored" means both grounded and non-plussed. "Massed" means both assembled and partakers of a liturgy. The poem ends with a description of a man who does not happen to see the reflected brilliance of the sun in a dormer window in Amherst, Massachusetts. Of him it is said that he "no doubt, / Will before long be coming out / To pace about his garden, lost in thought." There is enormous and wonderful compression here. "Lost in thought" is a common idiom for one who is preoccupied. But this man is lost in failing to see the light, his own subjective thoughts distracting him from the brilliance of the visible world. Moreover, he is pacing about "his garden, lost in thought," which means the garden itself is lost upon him, and we are thus reminded of *Paradise Lost*. What so delights about this verbal density is that it is accomplished without any show of ostentatious cleverness or violent word-play.

I was made suspiciously alert by Ms. Cook's claim that ". . . in the nineteenth century, though puns were immensely popular, their presence in poetry was another matter" (34). One is immediately prompted to search for exceptions (over and above the obvious ones of Lear and Carroll that Ms. Cook acknowledges). In fact, in the course of her article she goes on to mention a few others, Coleridge and Byron among them. I would want to add, famously (or infamously) Thomas Hood. But far more seriously, Blake, Emily Dickinson (a very great and important riddler) and Hardy. In a fine, short poem written from the point of view of a rabbit, Hardy writes in the last stanza of "The Milestone by the Rabbit-Burrow,"

> Do signs on its face
> Declare how far
> Feet have to trace
> Before they gain
> Some blest champaign
> Where no gins are?[3]

This is full of charm. The two beverages represent two social classes, which in turn represent salvation (the rabbit-heaven of an open field) and damnation (an animal trap). I think it could plausibly be argued that Empson's *Seven Types of Ambiguity* is in some ways nothing more than an extended survey of paronomasia, with examples drawn from (to confine myself simply to the nineteenth century) Tennyson, Shelley, Keats and Swinburne.

As for more or less contemporary poets, Empson cannot be solely responsible for making the pun more "respectable" than is usually allowed. Hopkins and Wilbur both delight in them; and they are buried in many Shakespeare passages that employ words which, though now pronounced quite differently from one another, were homonyms in Elizabethan times. Apparently, for example, "goats" and "Goths" were indistinguishable, as when, in *As You Like It*, Touchstone says to Audrey, "I am here with thee and thy goats, as the most capricious poet, honest Ovid, was among the Goths" (3.3.5-6). (There is, of course, the nice addition of "capricious" to link the goats and Goths.) Finally, let me note that Auden, who is himself a cunning employer of paronomasia, provides the following in his *A Certain World*.

> M. Denis de Rougemont told me of this dedication by a French authoress to her publisher. I have, unfortunately, forgotten her name.

> *Je méditerai,*
> *Tu m'éditeras.*[4]

Washington, D.C.

NOTES

[1] Anthony Hecht and John Hollander, eds., *Jiggery Pokery: A Compendium of Double Dactyls* (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

[2] "Altitudes" I, ll.13-16, *Poems 1943-1956* (London: Faber & Faber, 1957) 89.

[3] "The Milestone by the Rabbit-Burrow" ll.13-18, *The Complete Poetical Works of Thomas Hardy*, ed. Samuel Hynes, vol.2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 456.

[4] "Puns," *A Certain World: A Commonplace Book* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971) 312.