

Connotations

A Journal for Critical Debate



Volume 12 (2002/2003) Numbers 2-3
Waxmann Münster / New York



Connotations: A Journal for Critical Debate

Published by *Connotations: Society for Critical Debate*

EDITORS

Inge Leimberg (Münster) and Matthias Bauer (Tübingen)

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Lothar Černý, Michael Steppat, Burkhard Niederhoff, and Christiane Lang
Secretary: Uli Fries

Editorial Assistants: Angelika Zirker / Carmen Adam

EDITORIAL ADDRESS

Professor Matthias Bauer, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen,
Department of English, Wilhelmstr. 50, 72074 Tübingen, Germany
Email: editors@connotations.de <http://www.connotations.de>

EDITORIAL BOARD

M. H. Abrams, Cornell University

Christiane Bimberg, Universität Dortmund

John Russell Brown, Middlesex University

Ursula Brumm, Freie Universität Berlin

Paul Budra, Simon Fraser University

Eleanor Cook, University of Toronto

Elizabeth Story Donno, The Huntington Library

Judith Dundas, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

William E. Engel, Nashville, Tennessee

A. C. Hamilton, Queen's University, Ontario

John P. Hermann, University of Alabama

John Hollander, Yale University

Lothar Hönnighausen, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

Arthur F. Kinney, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Frances M. Malpezzi, Arkansas State University

J. Hillis Miller, University of California, Irvine

Martin Procházka, Charles University, Prague

Dale B. J. Randall, Duke University

Alan Rudrum, Simon Fraser University

John M. Steadman, The Huntington Library

Leona Toker, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

John Whalen-Bridge, National University of Singapore

Joseph Wiesenfarth, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Waxmann Münster / New York



Connotations wants to encourage scholarly communication in the field of English Literature (from the Middle English period to the present), as well as American and other Literatures in English. It focuses on the semantic and stylistic energy of the language of literature in a historical perspective and aims to represent different approaches.

Each issue consists of articles and a forum for discussion. The forum presents, for instance, research in progress, critical hypotheses, responses to articles published in *Connotations* and elsewhere, as well as to recent books. As a rule, contributions will be published within five months after submission so that discussion can begin without delay.

Articles and responses should be forwarded to the editors. Articles should not exceed 12,000 words and follow the MLA Handbook. Responses should be limited to 4,000 words. If possible, all contributions should be submitted by e-mail or on diskette (preferably in a Windows format), accompanied by a hard copy; they should be in English and must be proofread before submission. Manuscripts and disks will not be returned.

Connotations is published three times a year. Private subscribers are welcome to join the *Connotations Society for Critical Debate*. Members receive the journal as well as invitations to the *Connotations* symposia. The suggested annual fee is € 40; reduced rate (e.g. for students) € 20. Please write to: *Connotations*, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Department of English, Wilhelmstr. 50, 72074 Tübingen, Germany. Email: editors@connotations.de. Libraries and other institutional subscribers write to: Waxmann Verlag, Steinfurter Str. 555, 48159 Münster, Germany; or: Waxmann Publishing Co., P.O. Box 1318, New York, NY 10028, U.S.A. Email: connotations@waxmann.com. Annual subscriptions are in Europe € 40, in the U.S. and all other countries \$ 60, including postage.

A selection of articles and responses is freely available on the internet (<http://www.connotations.de>).

© Waxmann Verlag GmbH, Münster/New York 2004

All Rights Reserved

Printed in Germany

ISSN 0939-5482

Connotations is a member of the Council of Editors of Learned Journals. Contributions are indexed, for example, in the *MLA Bibliography*, the *World Shakespeare Bibliography* and the *IBZ/IBR*.

Connotations

A Journal for Critical Debate

Volume 12 (2002/2003) Numbers 2-3

Sympathetic Parody (II)

Shakespeare's Falstaff as Parody

ARTHUR F. KINNEY

105

Parody, Satire and Sympathy

in *Don Quixote* and *Gulliver's Travels*

DAVID FISHELOV

126

Parody as Cultural Memory

in Richard Powers's *Galatea 2.2*

ANCA ROSU

139

Other ARTICLES and RESPONSES

"The most important subject that can possibly be":

A Reply to E. A. J. Honigmann

HILDEGARD HAMMERSCHMIDT-HUMMEL

155

"Grace beyond a curled lock:" Further Thoughts on

Henry Vaughan's "Isaac's Marriage"

GLYN PURSGLOVE

167

| | |
|---|-----|
| Unsexig Austen: A Response to Leona Toker AMANPAL GARCHA | 183 |
| <i>Wuthering Heights</i> and <i>The Secret Garden</i> : A Response to Susan E. James ANNA KRUGOVOY SILVER | 194 |
| The Making of a Goddess: Hardy, Lawrence and Persephone ANDREW RADFORD | 202 |
| <i>Dracula</i> and the Cultural Construction of Europe JASON DITTMER | 233 |
| From Lone Monkey to Family Man: Wittman's Evolving Inclusion in <i>Tripmaster Monkey</i> LARA NARCISI | 249 |
| "It's wanting to know that makes us matter": Scepticism or Affirmation in Tom Stoppard's <i>Arcadia</i> . A Response to Burkhard Niederhoff ANJA MÜLLER-MUTH | 281 |
| (Un)tying a Firm Knot of Ideas: Reading Yang Mu's <i>The Skeptic</i> LISA WONG | 292 |

Shakespeare's Falstaff as Parody

ARTHUR F. KINNEY

I

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *parody* as "a composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects; an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled on the original, but so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect." Arguably the most complex and dramatic parody of the English Renaissance is Shakespeare's *King Henry IV, Part 1*, with its central portrait of Falstaff, published in 1598 in a quarto now only a fragment (Q0 or Q1) and—in that same year—Q2, followed by Q3 in 1599; Q4 in 1604; Q5 in 1608; Q6 in the year of Shakespeare's death, 1613, as if in tribute to him, and Q7, possibly a second tribute, a year before the grand First Folio of 1623. In print—and likely on the stage as well—it was one of Shakespeare's first big hits, challenged only by *Richard III*.

For this, Falstaff must be given much of the credit; "No character in all drama has seemed so much a creature of real flesh and blood as this figment of a man's imagination," the play's editor, P. H. Davison, tells us.¹ His effect on audiences, and on us, is immense. He is, for instance, Harold Bloom's favorite character in the whole corpus of Shakespeare except for his rival Hamlet, and he surpasses Hamlet for Bloom in this: "The sage of Eastcheap inhabits Shakespearean histories but treats them like [has the power to transform them into] come-

For debates inspired by this article, please check the Connotations website at <http://www.connotations.de/debkinney01223.htm>.

dies."² Scorned by Price Hal in their opening lines together, his sheer vitality and wit make him Harry's equal and sustain the scene:

Indeed you come near me now, Hal, for we that take purses go by the moon and the seven stars, and not 'By Phoebus, he, that wand'ring knight so fair.'³ And I prithee, sweet wag, when thou art a king, as God save thy grace—'majesty' I should say, for grace thou wilt have none—[...]. Marry then, sweet wag, when thou art king let not us that are squires of the night's body be called thieves of the day's beauty. Let us be 'Diana's foresters', 'gentlemen of the shade', 'minions of the moon', and let men say we be men of good government, being governed, as the sea is, by our noble and chaste mistress the moon, under whose countenance we steal. (1.2.11-15; 20-26)⁴

His quick repartee is heavily grounded in alliteration, repetition, and classical allusion that characterized euphuism, the sophisticated language of an earlier Elizabethan court; from the start, he is parodic.

Such forceful, clever talent will, however, come to a sad end. While he is a center of *1 Henry IV*, balancing the heroic Hotspur as a choice between serviceable action and indulgent sloth as directions for Prince Harry, he will see young Harry only twice in all of *2 Henry IV* and, by *Henry V*, be pushed offstage altogether, his death reported in the earthy London dialect of an Eastcheap hostess, Mistress Quickly:

He's in Arthur's bosom, if ever men went to Arthur's bosom. A made a finer end, and went away an it had been any christom child. A parted ev'n just between twelve and one, ev'n at the turning o'th'tide—for after I saw him fumble with the sheets, and play with flowers, and smile upon his finger's end, I knew there was but one way. For his nose was as sharp as a pen, and a babbled of green fields. 'How now, Sir John?' quoth I. 'What, man! Be o' good cheer.' So a cried out, 'God, God, God', three or four times. Now I, to comfort him, bid him a should not think of God; I hoped there was no need to trouble himself with any such thoughts yet. So a bade me lay more clothes on his feet. I put my hand into the bed and felt them, and they were as cold as any stone. Then I felt to his knees, and so up'ard and up'ard, and all was as cold as any stone. (H5 2.3.9-23)

Falstaff's death has inspired her too to alliteration and repetition and an allusion to the pseudo-classical King Arthur, but the speech is euphuism flattened out, a paltry imitation, a parody, of Falstaff's. Still

it is superior in depth of feeling and insight to Falstaff's later epitaph, provided on the French battlefield when the Welsh captain Fluellen says to the English captain Gower in a derogatory comparison to Cleitus, the friend of Alexander the Great, that "Harry Monmouth, being in his right wits and his good judgements, turned away the fat knight with the great-belly doublet—he was full of jests and gipes and knaveries and mocks—I have forgot his name" (*H5* 4.7.38-42). Mockery (or parody) has reduced the knight who was once the prince's own companion to solipsism. I want to trace how this happens.

II

To begin, we need to recognize that the name and character of Prince Hal's fat knight Sir John Fall/staff—what some critics have thought to be a pun on Shake/spear⁵—is a parody of the historic English past. In the English chronicles, a Sir John Falstolfe is erroneously portrayed as a cowardly commander in the French wars as in Shakespeare's *Henry VI, Part 1*, where his flight results in the wounding and capture of the brave Talbot (1.1.130-40). Even more importantly—and more tellingly—textual traces, such as a reference to Falstaff as "my old lad of the castle" (1 *Henry IV*, 1.2.37), strongly suggest that in an earlier version of the play, the character we know as Falstaff was named Sir John Oldcastle. The historic, authentic Oldcastle (c. 1378-1417), High Sheriff of Herefordshire made Lord Cobham in 1409, was a knight who served Henry IV in war against France and against Wales; according to Holinshed, he was "A valiant capteine and a hardie gentleman" who was "highly in the king's favour."⁶ But he was also a Lollard, part of a splinter religious group seen as forerunners to English Protestantism and advocates of a vernacular Bible and therefore critics of Henry's Catholic church. Although Henry IV treated Oldcastle at first with tolerance, he later sent him to the Tower of London where he was condemned as a heretic by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Subsequently, Oldcastle escaped and was thought to be leading

his own forces against Henry when he was captured and, in 1417, hanged in chains and then burned on the gallows.⁷

Oldcastle's reputation long outlived the man, although it developed along two opposing paths of tradition. The path of anti-Wycliffite orthodoxy was hostile, promulgated by the poet Hoccleve,⁸ in popular political verses, and in chronicles from that of Walsingham to that of Polydore Vergil. According to this line of thought, Oldcastle was frequently absent from Henry's wars and thought a coward; his Lollardism was seen as presumptuous and even diabolical, and his friendship with the King restricted to Henry's unregenerate early years.⁹ One of Falstaff's best-known speeches, his self-defense of counterfeit death on the battlefield to protect himself against further attack, can be seen as a direct parody of the Lollard Oldcastle's reputed cowardice:

Embowelled? If thou embowel me today, I'll give you leave to powder me, and eat me too, tomorrow. 'Sblood, 'twas time to counterfeit, or that hot termagant Scot had paid me, scot and lot [in full] too. Counterfeit? I lie, I am no counterfeit. To die is to be a counterfeit, for he is but the counterfeit of a man who hath not the life of a man. But to counterfeit dying when a man thereby liveth is to be no counterfeit, but the true and perfect image of life indeed. The better part of valour is discretion, in the which better part I have saved my life. Zounds, I am afraid of this gunpowder Percy, though he be dead. How if he should counterfeit too, and rise? By my faith, I am afraid he would prove the better counterfeit. Therefore I'll make him sure; yea, and I'll swear I killed him. Why may not he rise as well as I? Nothing confutes me but eyes, and nobody sees me. Therefore, sirrah, [stabbing HOTSPUR] with a new wound in your thigh, come you along with me. (1H4, 5.4.110-25)

Falstaff's choice here of religious oaths—"Sblood," "By my faith," referring to the blood and wound of Christ on the cross—is carried out of the common lexicon of oaths into the vision of the resurrection not of Christ but of Hotspur and, as a consequence, Falstaff will stab him in the thigh, much as Christ was wounded on the Cross. The parodic character Falstaff, that is, uses parodic religious language common to Lollards. Since the Lollard faith was opposed to that of the Catholic church, the formulary they use can be seen as religious par-

ody of the dominant faith as well as a part of their own. So a parody of the Catholic tradition is linked to Oldcastle.

The Protestant tradition, though, was more favorable. According to the Tudor Protestant view of Oldcastle, he was an early martyr to their cause. This is the position promulgated by John Bale in his *Brefe Chronycke Concernynge* [. . .] *Syr Iohn Oldcastell* (1544), followed by the chronicler Edward Hall and reprinted nearly verbatim by John Foxe in his *Actes and Monuments* which came eventually to include a long "Defence of the Lord Cobham" and became the basis for a play by Anthony Munday, Michael Drayton, Robert Wilson, and Richard Hathaway. Here Oldcastle becomes a hero, a constant servant of God, a scholar of philosophy and theology and a popular and virtuous leader; and while "his youth was full of wanton wildness before he knew the scriptures," according to Bale, his conversion made him a candidate for martyrdom.¹⁰ In Shakespeare, it is Falstaff who makes himself a 'martyr'—alongside his trickery on the battlefield, first feigning death and then taking credit for killing the dead Hotspur whom Prince Hal has already slain. Falstaff as mocker, but also Falstaff as Shakespeare's agent for parody, is thus sufficiently complex that he can serve to parody both of the traditions assigned in Shakespeare's own day to the historic Oldcastle.

But this extended parody is more complicated still. *1 Henry IV* was first staged in 1596 when William Brooke, the seventh Lord Cobham, served Elizabeth I as her Lord Chamberlain¹¹ and, until his death in 1597, was not only the Queen's overseer of court activity but the patron of Shakespeare's company, the Lord Chamberlain's Men. Why might Shakespeare initially, at any rate, cut so close to the past quarrels over Cobham's ancestors? We could argue that it was precisely the Lord Chamberlain's presence that first suggested itself to Shakespeare as a possible parodic choice within his English chronicle history plays, and that he insisted that this remain apparent when he added the line about "my old lad of the castle" in the first moments of Falstaff and Prince Hal on stage. It is after all, a most peculiar line, for the setting is a tavern in Eastcheap, not a castle, and the topic of con-

versation, highway robbery, hardly the custom of castle conversation. Such a line, with its resonances for any alert reader, moreover, is retained for the first quarto printing in 1598, a year after Lord Cobham's death. Yet it might have been no safer but just as deliciously parodic in 1598, since Brooke's son Sir Henry is joined to Falstaff in a private letter from the Earl of Essex in February of that year when young Harry Cobham, of the same given name, is referred to as "S' Io. Falstaff."¹² Much of the real comedy of the *Henry IV* plays, then, what Harold Bloom sees as its successful marker, is a deliberate, and fairly open, result of Shakespearean parody.

III

The early framing of Falstaff within Oldcastle is important, for it contains the various strands of parodic development that multiply as the two-part play of *Henry IV* progresses. Tightly interwoven, these strands are just what makes Falstaff so robustly comic and universal, yet so pointedly individual, as he is also made a particular representative of a broader political and social commentary of Tudor England through various literary traditions. One such tradition is that of the *miles gloriosus*, the Plautine braggart soldier that Elizabethans traced back to Plautine farce:

There is Percy. If your father will do me any honour, so; if not, let him kill the next Percy himself. I look to be either earl or duke, I can assure you, (5.4.135-37)

Falstaff tells Prince Hal plainly at the conclusion of the battle of Shrewsbury. Hal is not only incredulous, but plainly corrective. "Why, Percy I killed myself," he tells Fat Jack, "and saw thee dead." The exposure of counterfeiting and, in turn, Falstaff's cowardice, might bring confession from most soldiers, but it hardly penetrates a literary braggart soldier: "Didst thou?" Falstaff replies scornfully.

Didst thou? Lord, Lord, how this world is given to lying! I grant you I was down and out of breath, and so was he; but we rose both at an instant, and fought a long hour by Shrewsbury clock. If I may be believed, so; if not, let them that should reward valour bear the sin upon their own heads. I'll take't on my death I gave him this wound in the thigh. If the man were alive and would deny it, zounds, I would make him eat a piece of my sword. (5.4.135-46)

Falstaff, unlike the traditional braggart (who brags), claims the other person is lying (not part of the braggart convention). Such a brazen retort, which attempts to turn lying away from the liar, can thus be seen as a parody of the braggart soldier's pronouncements. Shakespeare shows the barrenness of Falstaff's denial by giving him the same language he has already used—the wound in the thigh, the expletive “zounds”—so that he displays not only his continual acts of betrayal but also his ignorance of what he says and thus his actual limitation in conceptualization and in language. Falstaff as braggart soldier is given the customary come-uppance through parody of the act and the language that embodies it.

This literary parody is broadened into social commentary. It is an observation J. Dover Wilson made back in 1944 in his justly famous book *The Fortunes of Falstaff*.

He is the Old Soldier on the make, or in a state of perpetual repair, and Shakespeare exhibits him busy upon a number of disreputable devices for raising money, which were attributed, in whispers, or even at times in printed books, to old soldiers in Elizabeth's reign, most of them connected with the recruitment of troops. For, there being neither standing army nor professional soldiery, an officer of those days, that is a gentlemen bearing Her Majesty's commission, had to impress his company before he could command it.¹³

Falstaff is more than a gentleman in *1 Henry IV*; he is a landed knight. When he is asked to recruit troops, he will see it as an opportunity to pocket money for himself even as he seems to aid the King's cause against the rebellious Percies. His actions begin, however, as a literary parody, for he repeats and mocks an earlier scene, in which Poin-

teaches Falstaff how to combine recruitment and robbery as he sets forth his plan to steal from luckless—and innocent—people performing their well-intentioned religious and commercial duties. “My lads,” Poins says,

tomorrow morning by four o’clock early, at Gads Hill, there are pilgrims going to Canterbury with rich offering, and traders riding to London with fat purses. I have visors for you all; you have horses for yourselves. Gadshill lies tonight in Rochester. I have bespoke supper tomorrow night in Eastcheap. We may do it as secure as sleep. If you will go, I will stuff your purses full of crowns; if you will not, tarry at home and be hanged. (1.2.111-18)

Falstaff is the first eagerly to rise to the bait. “Hear ye, Edward, if I tarry at home and go not, I’ll hang you for going” (1.2.119-20). Robbing for food and drink exposes Falstaff’s self-indulgence as well as his demeaned sense of an adventure, even a campaign, and this should be made clear to him the following morning when Poins and Prince Hal reveal that they have stolen from the thieves, turning those who would steal into those who are stolen from: confidence men to be unconfident, criminals turned into victims.

In this way Falstaff is defeated. But only temporarily. Later he converts Poins’s escapade with Hal into a caper of his own choosing, gathering his own troops for the more serious war through actions that reach out to parody Elizabethan practice. As Wilson puts it, “the favorite way for a captain to make money, one notorious enough to receive special mention in an act of Parliament passed in 1557, was to enroll well-to-do men, known to be reluctant to serve, and then allow them to buy themselves out at the highest price they could be induced to pay” (84-85). Falstaff does precisely this en route to Shrewsbury, but in a language that allows Shakespeare to parody both military language by deflating it and Falstaff’s knightly purpose by deflating that:

If I be not ashamed of my soldiers, I am a soused gurnet [pickled fish]. I have misused the King’s press damnably. I have got in exchange of one hun-

dred and fifty soldiers three hundred and odd pounds. I press me none but good householders, yeomen's sons, enquire me out contracted [engaged to be wed] bachelors, such as had been asked twice on the banns, such a commodity of warm slaves as had as lief hear the devil as a drum, such as fear the report of a caliver worse than a struck fowl or a hurt wild duck. I pressed me none but such toasts and butter [such weaklings], with hearts in their bellies no bigger than pins' heads, and they have bought out their services; and now my whole charge consists of ensigns, corporals, lieutenants, gentlemen of companies—slaves as ragged as Lazarus in the painted cloth, where the glutton's dogs licked his sores—and such as indeed were never soldiers, but discarded unjust servingmen, younger sons to younger brothers, revolted tapsters, and ostlers trade-fallen, the cankers of a calm world and a long peace, ten times more dishonourable-ragged than an old feazed ensign, and such have I to fill up the rooms of them as have bought out their services, that you would think that I had a hundred and fifty tattered prodigals lately come from swine-keeping, from eating draff and husks. A mad fellow met me on the way and told me I had unloaded all the gibbets and pressed the dead bodies. No eye hath seen such scarecrows. (4.2.11-34)

This speech parodies religious thought and belief once again: "damnable"; "as ragged as Lazarus"; "prodigals lately come from swine-keeping"; "No eye hath seen." It not only parodies the Christian life militant but mocks and satirizes the religious-minded Lollard Oldcastle who betrayed (and then early on departed from) his King Henry. That Oldcastle may be redefined here as a braggart soldier continues when later Falstaff is so cowardly that he fears danger to his own life while not caring at all for his recruits. On the fields of Shrewsbury, he acknowledges to himself that

Though I could scape shot-free at London, I fear the shot here. Here's no scoring but upon the pate.—Soft, who are you?—Sir Walter Blunt. There's honour for you. Here's no vanity. I am as hot as molten lead, and as heavy too. God keep lead out of me; I need no more weight than mine own bowels. I have led my ragamuffins where they are peppered; there's not three of my hundred and fifty left alive, and they are for the town's end, to beg during life. (5.3.30-37)

Joining the name "Blunt" and the personal trait of "honour" in an oxymoronic fashion, Falstaff echoes an earlier scene where *honor* is not contrasted to *vanity*, as here—"Vanity of vanities, saith the

Lord"—but is, rather, made willfully dialogic in such a way as to confirm his cowardice through parodying catechism:

What need I be so forward with him that calls not on me? Well, 'tis no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on? How then? Can honour set-to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word 'honour'? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. 'Tis insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon. And so end my catechism. (5.1.128-39)

The sutcheon or heraldic shield of honour is reduced from its aristocratic and military significance to an empty word—a word arguably misused, at that—just as the word *honor* is reduced through a parody of humanist debate into insignificance much like the humanists' earlier—and still famous—praise and dispraise of folly written by Erasmus, a wellspring of humanism, of humanist form and humanistic linguistic study. It is a speech that would appeal especially to students at the Inns of Court in their debates and plays, lending it still more parodic significance, while all the time redounding on Oldcastle and on the truth, record and interpretation of chronicle history and its translation through the language of drama and play.

IV

"Falstaff is indeed a rich amalgam, a world of comic ingredients," A. R. Humphreys writes in his New Arden edition of *1 Henry IV*; "Of these the most important is the morality Vice, the ensnarer of youth."¹⁴ He cites references to the morality play idiom—"iniquity, ruffian, vanity in years" (xlii)—and sees in Falstaff three of the seven deadly sins that often accompanied the morality plays so popular in the Tudor England of Shakespeare's youth: "gluttony, idleness, and lechery" (xlii). It is in this tradition which Shakespeare parodies through Falstaff that we see Fat Jack following a line of predecessors

of note: he brags like Sensual Appetyte, or Ambidexter in *Cambises* (1569), or Huanebango in George Peele's *Old Wives Tale*; he resembles Lust, Sturdiness, and Inclination in *The Trial of Treasure*; he shares features of Incontinence in *The Longer Thou Livest*; and he has both the greed and cowardly instincts of Dericke in *The Famous Victories of Henry V*, a popular anonymous play of the 1580s (xli). But it is the Vice of greed that most characterizes Falstaff, and characterizes him most often, in which the literary joke—itsself a kind of parody—is that he tempts not Prince Hal but, and repeatedly, himself.

Falstaff's natural habitat is significant: it is not only Boars Head Tavern, where greed, drunkenness, and lechery seem the order of the day (and night), but Eastcheap, best known to Shakespeare's audience as the place for meat and drink, what Wilson calls "the London centre at once of butchers and cookshops" (26). He cites as evidence the poet John Lydgate, "writing in the reign of Henry V" the poem *London Lyckpenny*:

Then I hyed me into Estchepe;
 One cryes 'rybbes of befe and many a pye';
 Pewter pots they clattered on a heap;
 There was a harp, pype, and minstrelsy. (26)

When the play's geography expands, at least by allusion, it still rings this single chord. Hal calls Falstaff a "Manningtree ox with the pudding in his belly," an ox that is roasted whole with sausage stuffing, a custom at the annual fairs held at Manningtree, Essex. Poinc extends allusion to Sir John's broad (and insatiable) girth by marking the calender: "How doth the Martlemas, your master?" he asks Bardolph.¹⁵

Martlemas, the feast of St. Martin, celebrated on November 11, was at the time of year, fodder being scarce, when fattened beasts were killed off and salted down for the winter, the season of huge banquets. "In calling [Falstaff] a 'Martlemas,'" Wilson notes, "Poinc is at once likening [his] enormous proportions to the prodigality of fresh-killed meat which the feast brought, and acclaiming his identity with

Riot and Festivity in general" (30). Thus Vice slides through parody into a deadly sin and on into the topsy-turvy world of Carnival, Riot at its most extreme in Shakespeare's culture, a time, Jean E. Howard reminds us, when "rulers are temporarily displaced and the body's pleasures (eating, drinking, breaking wind, having sex) are celebrated before the arrival of abstemious Lent."¹⁶ Prince Hal would go much farther. He sees Falstaff enjoying Carnival throughout the day and throughout the year. It is the focus of the first lines in the play: "Thou art so fat-witted with drinking of old sack, and unbuttoning thee after supper, and sleeping upon benches after noon," he remarks even as they first come on stage,

that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping-houses [brothels], and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-coloured taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of the day. (1.2.2-10)

The question had seemed a simple one that the Prince is answering—"Now, Hal, what time of day is it, lad?" (1.2.1)—and it may be this very coziness of the request that prompts Hal's disdain. But Hal is also ascribing to Falstaff the sins of gluttony and sloth in instructive ways that the knight fails to see but, as audience, we should. By giving Falstaff a seductive rhetoric, Shakespeare is able to extend his complicated parody with undeniable vitality and charm that, in turn, can erode the audience's sense of right and wrong before Poins clarifies matters by inviting Falstaff to contemplate the Gads Hill robbery the better to feed his ever-present appetite.

Even when the robber Falstaff is robbed in turn by Hal and Poins in disguise, his urgent gluttony remains, transformed into a third deadly sin of pride.

PRINCE HARRY What's the matter?

FALSTAFF What's the matter? There be four of us here have ta'en a thousand pound this day morning.

PRINCE HARRY Where is it, Jack, where is it?

FALSTAFF Where is it? Taken from us it is. A hundred upon poor four of us.

PRINCE HARRY What, a hundred, man?

FALSTAFF I am a rogue if I were not at half-sword [dueling closely] with a dozen of them, two hours together. I have scaped by miracle. I am eight times thrust through the doublet, four through the hose, my buckler cut through and through, my sword hacked like a handsaw. *Ecce signum* [Behold the evidence]. I never dealt better since I was a man. All would not do. A plague of all cowards. (2.5.143-56)

The pride of the Vice is what even permits Falstaff to pretend to be King Henry IV—to parody a ruler in meting out justice (on himself) and in advising Hal (in another topsy-turvy act of carnival), excusing and then eulogizing himself as

A goodly, portly man, i'faith, and a corpulent; of a cheerful look, a pleasing eye, and a most noble carriage; and, as I think, his age some fifty, or, by'r Lady, inclining to threescore. And now I remember me, his name is Falstaff. If that man should be lewdly given, he deceiveth me; for, Harry, I see virtue in his looks. If, then, the tree may be known by the fruit, as the fruit by the tree, then peremptorily I speak it—there is virtue in that Falstaff. Him keep with; the rest banish. (2.5.384-91)

Falstaff is tempted to this modulation of euphuism because he buries his ambition in language which, if not always royal, is always identified with the upper class, and might have suggested the aristocratic, courtly language of the original Oldcastle.

V

Braggart, Vice, Sin, Carnival: such literary parodies pave the way for the most encompassing literary parody in which Falstaff stars: that on the prodigal son play, the reduction of the morality play by sixteenth-century Tudor humanists into moral interlude. Wilson cites as typical of this form of literature an early specimen, the play *Youth* written around 1520.

The plot, if plot it can be called, is simplicity itself. The little play opens with a dialogue between Youth and Charity. The young man, heir to his father's

land, gives insolent expression to his self-confidence, lustihood, and contempt for spiritual things. Whereupon Charity leaves him, and he is joined by Riot, that is to say wantonness, who presently introduces him to Pride and Lechery. The dialogue then becomes boisterous, and continues in that vein for some time, much no doubt to the enjoyment of the audience. Yet, in the end, Charity reappears with Humility; Youth repents; and the interlude terminates in the most seemly fashion imaginable. (18)

Wilson finds in these lines of Riot "the very note of Falstaff's gaiety":

Huffa! Huffa! who calleth after me?
I am Riot full of jollity.
My heart is as light as the wind,
And all on riot is my mind,
Wheresoever I go. (18)

In this play Riot has the quick wit, and quick tongue, of the later Falstaff; he also commits highway robbery; he jests about the deed and invites a young friend to a tavern to enjoy the spoils: "Thou shalt haue a wench to kysse Whansoeuer thou wilte" (19). It is meeting up with Good Counsel that saves Youth at the critical moment, just as it is Prince Hal who attempts (but fruitlessly) to transform Falstaff.

Poins introduces the idea of repentance in 1 *Henry IV* when he meets Falstaff for the first time in the play—

What says Monsieur Remorse? What says Sir John, sack-and-sugar Jack?
How agrees the devil and thee about thy soul, that thou soldest him on
Good Friday last, for a cup of Madeira and a cold capon's leg? (1.2.99-103)—

and it is but a short time later, after he has been exposed in his cowardice at Gads Hill, Kent, and given another chance when he is asked, as a knight, to muster a company of men and prepares them for the Battle of Shrewsbury, that he first admits a sense of guilt:

Bardolph, am I not fallen away vilely since this last action? Do I not bate? Do I not dwindle? Why, my skin hangs about me like an old lady's loose gown. I am withered like an old apple-john. Well, I'll repent, and that suddenly, while I am in some liking. I shall be out of heart shortly, and then I shall have no strength to repent. An[d] I have not forgotten what the inside of a

church is made of, I am a peppercorn, a brewer's horse—the inside of a church! Company, villainous company, hath been the spoil of me. (3.3.1-9)

But the sheer exuberance of this rhetoric of repentance, and its early association with the need for and absence of sufficient food and drink makes the whole speech suspect. It is, clearly, a parody of repentance. And so it is, predictably, a repentance short-lived.

BARDOLPH Sir John, you are so fretful you cannot live long.

FALSTAFF Why, there is it. Come, sing me a bawdy song, make me merry. (3.3.10-12)

It is matched by the false repentance that concludes his part in the play, after Hal has forgiven his lie on the battlefield concerning the death of Hotspur. Alone as he exits, he is considerably more honest with himself and simultaneously more parodic of the repentance play of the humanists:

I'll follow, as they say, for reward. He that rewards me, God reward him. If I do grow great, I'll grow less; for I'll purge, and leave sack, and live cleanly, as a nobleman should do. (5.4.155-157)

Repentance is finally forced on Falstaff; it is not a normal choice, but a legal (and seemingly just) imperative, given by the Lord Chief Justice who, following him, at first admonishes him—"Have you your wits? Know you what 'tis you speak?"—and then sentences him—"Go carry Sir John Falstaff to the Fleet [prison]" (2H4 5.5.43-44; 84-85). Yet, like boxes within boxes, this too is parodied by the Epilogue that immediately follows, in which the actor playing Falstaff, Will Kemp, mocks both the literary practice of epilogue and the particular portrayal of Falstaff:

If you look for a good speech now, you undo me; for what I have to say is of mine own making, and what indeed I should say will, I doubt [fear], prove mine own marring [...]. Oldcastle died a martyr, and this is not the man. (Epilogue 3-6; 27)

Gulling Prince Hal at first, Falstaff in the Epilogue would gull the audience, would gull us. All of what he complexly parodies—braggart soldier, vice, sin, carnival, repentant—he puts back into the framework of Oldcastle, even as he denies it. By recalling Oldcastle, he makes himself, as literary parody, into a historical parody, and the whole exercise of chronicle history plays subject to parody, too.

VI

As if in summary of all such parodying, Harold Bloom claims to have seen Falstaff staged as “a cowardly braggart, a sly instigator to vice, a fawner for the Prince’s favor, a besotted old scoundrel” (283). But this is only one of two possible kinds of parody. Matthias Bauer has written to me, electronically, that “There seem to be basically two kinds of parodies, even though the individual text may very well be a mixture: on the one hand, there are texts which look at their models with skepticism and hold them up to ridicule it with regard to its forms, its ideas, or intended effect,” as we have just seen. Referring to Margaret Rose’s work *Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-Modern*, he goes on to say “But then there are the other parodic texts [...] in which parody serves to praise or celebrate the model at least as much as to ridicule it.”¹⁷ Just so with Falstaff: the very passages we have cited as the first kind of parody are, for some critics at least, clearly parody of the second kind. Thus Anthony Burgess claims in his book on Shakespeare that

The Falstaffian spirit is a great sustainer of civilization. It disappears when the state is too powerful and when people worry too much about their souls [!]. [...] There is little of Falstaff’s substance in the world now, and, as the power of the state expands, what is left will be liquidated.¹⁸

Bloom agrees.

Falstaff’s irreverence is life-enhancing [...]. Falstaff’s festival of language cannot be reduced or melted down. Mind in the largest sense, more even

than wit, is Falstaff's greatest power; who can settle which is the more intelligent consciousness, Hamlet's or Falstaff's? For all its comprehensiveness, Shakespearean drama is ultimately a theater of mind and what matters most about Falstaff is his vitalization of the intellect, in direct contrast to Hamlet's conversion of the mind to the vision of annihilation. (282-83)

Indeed, his dynamism and his inventiveness are contagious. Falstaff's greatest champion, Maurice Morgann, wrote in the later eighteenth century a whole book to defend Falstaff as courageous rather than cowardly, but his strongest and most convincing argument rests not on Falstaff's actions but on his language:

To me [...] it appears that the leading quality in Falstaff's character, and that from which all the rest take their colour, is a high degree of wit and humour, accompanied with great natural vigour and alacrity of mind. [...] Laughter and approbation attend his greatest excesses; and, being governed visibly by no settled bad principle or ill design, fun and humour account for and cover all.¹⁹

Style, that is, can override substance. Serious ideas may be diminished or even erased if their examination is funny enough. Seen this way, parody is not a means of translating ideas but a means of overturning them. This is not a matter of means overcoming ends but of means becoming both means and ends, turning upside-down along the way the cherished beliefs in language taught by the humanists who, posing that language should be transparently related to substance, nevertheless saw substance as moral, educative, and finally irrevocable.

It must seem peculiar to us, if not downright wrong, to give to parody such potency. It must seem to others, too, for their ways of justifying their own responses openly display a kind of nervous wriggling. Algernon Charles Swinburne, for instance, sees a morality of the heart and of the imagination, which he assigns to Falstaff, as superior to mere social—and one must read religious—morality when dealing with Falstaff.²⁰ Harold Bloom excuses Falstaff's magnificent rhetoric because "his magnificent language [fails] to persuade anyone of anything" and so is essentially good harmless fun (275). For the Victorian critic John Bailey, Falstaff's humour "dissolve[s] morality"

and, furthermore, teaches us through his amoral wit which makes him a mirror of ourselves: "Not a man of us but is conscious in himself of some seed that might have grown into Falstaff's joyous and victorious pleasure in the life of the senses. There we feel, but for the grace of God, and but for our own inherent weakness and stupidity, go we,"²¹ and so his educative effect excuses him. As for A. C. Bradley, the leading Shakespearean critic in the first part of the twentieth century, whom Bloom would revive as such in the first part of the twenty-first, Falstaff

will make truth appear absurd by solemn statements, which he utters with perfect gravity and which he expects nobody to believe; and honour, by demonstrating that it cannot set a leg, and that neither the living nor the dead can possess it; and law, by evading all the attacks of its highest representative and almost forcing him to laugh at his own defeat; and patriotism, by filling his pockets with the bribes offered by competent soldiers who want to escape service, while he takes in their stead the halt and maimed and gaolbirds; and duty, by showing how he labours in his vocation—of thieving; and courage, alike by mocking at his own capture of Coleville and gravely claiming to have killed Hotspur; and war, by offering the Prince his bottle of sack when he is asked for a sword; and religion, by amusing himself with remorse at odd times when he has nothing else to do; and the fear of death, by maintaining perfectly untouched, in the face of immanent peril and even while he feels the fear of death, the very same power of dissolving it in persiflage that he shows when he sits at ease in his inn. These are the wonderful achievements which he performs, not with the sourness of a cynic, but with the gaiety of a boy. And therefore, we praise him, we laud him, for he offends none but the virtuous, and denies that life is real or life is earnest, and delivers us from the oppression of such nightmares, and lifts us into the atmosphere of perfect freedom.²²

Bradley casts such a wide net in collecting Falstaff's humour that he fails to note what gives force to his remarks and fascination to his role: Falstaff's chief rhetorical technique, like his singularly seductive character, depends on his ingenuity, his resilience. Nowhere is this more evident than when Hal confronts Falstaff with hard evidence that undermines his rhetoric about danger, heroism, and suffering at Gads Hill.

PRINCE HARRY We two saw you four set on four, and bound them, and were masters of their wealth.—Mark now how a plain tale shall put you down.—Then did we two set on you four, and, with a word, outfaced you from your prize, and have it; yea, and can show it you here in the house. And Falstaff, you carried your guts away as nimbly, with as quick dexterity, and roared for mercy, and still run and roared, as ever I heard bull-calf. What a slave art thou, to hack thy sword as thou hast done, and then say it was in fight! What trick, what device, what starting-hole canst thou now find out to hide thee from this open and apparent shame?

POINS Come, let's hear, Jack; what trick hast thou now?

FALSTAFF By the Lord, I knew ye as well as he that made ye. Why, hear you, my masters. Was it for me to kill the heir-apparent? Should I turn upon the true prince? Why, thou knowest I am as valiant as Hercules; but beware instinct. The lion will not touch the true prince—instinct is a great matter. I was now a coward on instinct. I shall think the better of myself and thee during my life—I for a valiant lion, and thou for a true prince. (2.5.234-53)

This particular passage, Wilson recalls, reminded Samuel Johnson in a conversation with Boswell about the comic actor Samuel Foote to remark that "One species of wit he has in an eminent degree, that of escape. You drive him into a corner with both hands; but he's gone, Sir, when you are thinking you have got him—like an animal that jumps over your head." Wilson comments, "This exactly describes the kind of wit in which Falstaff excelled, and the game which the Prince and Poins play time and again with him. The quarry always succeeds in evading them; but never does he put his escape-wit to more adroit use than on this occasion. To them the crowning lie is completely unexpected and quite unanswerable" (56). The adroitness must be admired, it is true; there is some cause for seeing initial sentimentality. But a good hard look will show that Falstaff's wit subscribes not merely to inventiveness but, finally, pays allegiance to solipsism. It is wit which relies on the dictum not of Tudor humanists but of the latter-day Humpty Dumpty: "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean."²³ Such solipsism may seem to be its own reward; but it is also its own stark limitation. When denotative words can be

scrambled into any number of connotative meanings, language ceases to function in any reliable way.

Left to his own device, Falstaff is solipsistic. Shakespeare is not; and what prevents him is the reliance on parody. Parody provides a resource against which a statement (or speech or trait or event) may not merely be comprehended but against which it may be measured. It ties social communication to shared understanding. It gives to the speaker relational significance and definition. Remove such bases for language, and shaping forces—in thought, character, and event as well as in language—become indefinable. This is what captain Fluellen sees and passes along in his conversation with Captain Gower. The “fat knight [who is] full of jests and gipes and knaveries and mocks” slips into solipsism, playing with linguistic signifiers, but in the creation of Falstaff, Shakespeare realizes that parody signifies. It is the underside of parody that renders a character, a speech, utterly blank and useless. The many literary parodies in the *Henry IV* plays, like the framework of Sir John Oldcastle, are really what has made these plays endure.

University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

NOTES

¹P. H. Davidson, “Introduction” to William Shakespeare, *The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) 31.

²Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998) 276.

³Presumably a line from a contemporary ballad or romance.

⁴Citations and quotations are from *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: Norton, 1997).

⁵Bloom 273.

⁶Raphael Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotlande, and Irelande* (1577), III, 62, quoted in the introduction to *The First Part of Henry IV*, ed. A. R. Humphreys (London: Routledge, 1960) xxxix. Sections of Holinshed, Foxe, and the play by Drayton et al. dealing with Sir John Oldcastle are reprinted most conveniently in

The First Part of King Henry the Fourth: Texts and Contexts, ed. Barabara Hodgdon (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997) 360-91. Subsequent comments and quotations are from Humphreys.

⁷Jean E. Howard in *The Norton Shakespeare* 1153.

⁸See Hoccleve, "Address to Sir John Oldcastle," *Works I: The Minor Poems*, EETS, Extra Series lxi (1892) 8-24, as cited in Humphreys xxxix.

⁹Humphreys xxxix-xl.

¹⁰Humphreys xl.

¹¹Howard in *The Norton Shakespeare* 1152-53.

¹²Humphreys xii.

¹³J. Dover Wilson, *The Fortunes of Falstaff* (Cambridge: CUP, 1944) 84.

¹⁴Humphreys xli.

¹⁵Both examples and definitions are from Wilson 30.

¹⁶Howard in *The Norton Shakespeare* 1154.

¹⁷Matthias Bauer to Arthur Kinney May 28, 2003.

¹⁸Anthony Burgess quoted in Bloom 282.

¹⁹Maurice Morgann, *An Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir John Falstaff* (London: T. Boys, 1820) 18, 20.

²⁰Cited in Bloom 281.

²¹Quoted in Wilson 9.

²²Quoted by Bloom 297.

²³Quoted by Bloom 299.

Parody, Satire and Sympathy in *Don Quixote* and *Gulliver's Travels*¹

DAVID FISHELOV

Introduction

The notion that parody and satire are, among other things, related to sympathy may sound strange. After all, parody is intended to expose certain texts as superficial and cliché-ridden, to unbind the assumed “natural” connection between style and content in semiotic objects, and satire is supposed to arouse a mocking attitude in readers (or listeners or spectators) towards certain social habits, norms and values.² Mockery, like any other kind of laughter, is based on psychological detachment whereas sympathy involves the activating of compassion.³ Still, looking at our reading experience, sympathy does seem to play an important role in many parodies and satires. How can we describe this role? One possibility would be to argue that it is just a matter of proportion and changing hierarchy—when sympathy is aroused towards a person or a text or a social institution, parody and satire subside—and vice versa. Another way to account for the co-existence of the two opposing attitudes would suggest a somewhat mechanistic solution: sympathy could dominate in some parts (e.g. chapters) of the work, whereas parody and satire in others. These two suggestions may indeed explain some cases.

Still, I would like to propose a more fundamental explanation for the way these two seemingly contradictory forces may function, and even complement and reinforce each other. To consider the way sympathy and mockery co-function within a fictional literary work, I suggest distinguishing between two dimensions. (1) The texts or literary conventions or social norms at which the parody and satire

aim their criticism; and (2) a character within the fictive world who is strongly influenced by texts, literary conventions or illusionary, fictive worlds. Towards the naiveté, illusions and gullible attitudes of such a character, sympathy may be evoked.

Don Quixote – the Paradigmatic Case of Parody and Sympathy⁴

This dual attitude—mocking certain texts or literary conventions and sympathizing with a naive character—may be argued to mark some of the greatest parodies. In fact, one of the literary masterpieces of all time—Cervantes' *Don Quixote*—is based precisely on this dual principle: the conventions of the chivalric romance are exposed, but our hearts ache for Don Quixote. In *Don Quixote*, the novel, the connection between a critical attitude towards the conventions of a literary genre and sympathy towards the deluded human being is very intimate. The more the person is entangled in the imaginary web of the genre and loses touch with reality, the more he arouses sympathy for his plight. At the same time, the stronger our sympathy swells for hallucinating Don Quixote the sharper our critical attitude towards the literary conventions becomes. Our mental syllogism seems to work thus: if excessive reading of chivalric romance brings someone like Don Quixote to the point of losing his mind, there must be something inherently wrong with this literature itself.

Cervantes' attitude is conveyed at the very beginning of the novel:

The reader must know, then, that this gentleman, in the times when he had nothing to do—as was the case for most of the year—gave himself up to the reading of books of knight errantry; which he loved and enjoyed so much that he almost entirely forgot his hunting, and even the care of his estate. So odd and foolish, indeed, did he grow on this subject that he sold many acres of corn-land to buy these books of chivalry to read, and in this way brought home every one he could get. And of them all he considered none so good as the words of the famous Feliciano de Silva. For his brilliant style and those complicated sentences seemed to him very pearls, especially when he came upon those love-passages and challenges frequently written in the manner

of: 'The reason for the unreason with which you treat my reason, so weakens my reason that with reason I complain of your beauty'; and also when he read: 'The high heavens that with their stars divinely fortify you in your divinity and make you deserving of the desert that your greatness deserves.'⁵

Cervantes builds up our sympathy for Don Quixote: he is by no means a wrongdoer. On the contrary, he is full of good intentions; he wants to promote noble causes. His only problem seems to be that he, foolishly, takes his reading habits, his "hobby," too seriously. Now being an over-diligent reader may describe the problem of some of us—especially among such an honorable audience of literary scholars. We, however, unlike Don Quixote, invest our time and money in serious, respectable books (written in many cases by our colleagues, of course). Don Quixote invests his time and energy in rubbish. Cervantes makes this clear by the short, brilliant parody provided in the quotes that give us an idea of Don Quixote's literary taste. The tortuous, pompous style of the chivalric romance is presented as a mixture of pretentiousness, forced word play and cliché: "the reason for the unreason with which you treat my reason, so weakens my reason that with reason I complain of your beauty [...]. The high heavens that with their stars divinely fortify you in your divinity and make you deserving of the desert that your greatness deserves." How can a sane mind be enchanted by such conglomerations, we may well ask ourselves. And, indeed, the next step for Don Quixote is to "translate" these nonsensical writings into reality and to embark on a search of adventures, "following in every way the practice of the knights errant he had read of" (33). Cervantes is here suggesting that when a person's imagination is so fatally captured by such mechanical, pretentious conventions of thought and behavior, he may be treading on a slippery road, leading him on to folly and to bizarre corners of human experience.

Throughout the work the ratio between invoking our sympathy for Don Quixote and arousing our critical attitude towards the conventions of the chivalric romance may shift. Sometimes the dosage of sympathy is increased, at other times critical parody gains the upper

hand. But the division of labor is always the same: the delusional person attracts our sympathy, and the mechanical literary conventions are critically exposed.

It is interesting to note that what I describe here as a synchronic co-existence of satire and sympathy in Cervantes' novel was already suggested in English criticism—but on the diachronic level. The novel was first described as a satirical work and Don Quixote was treated as part of the satire, until, in the eighteenth century, he was increasingly treated as a sympathetic character. For Addison (in *Spectator* No. 249) the novel is a "burlesque" and Don Quixote is merely the object of satire. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the prevailing attitude had begun to change and Hazlitt, for instance, argues that Cervantes creates in Don Quixote "an enthusiast of the most amiable kind; of a nature equally open, gentle, and generous; a lover of truth and justice."⁶ Until, in mid twentieth century, Don Quixote becomes for Erich Auerbach a symbol of a noble illusionist: "de tout noble illusionnisme chez les hommes, de la grandeur et de la vanité de la vie humaine."⁷

Going back to the synchronic co-existence of the two attitudes—of sympathy for Don Quixote and of criticism towards the literary conventions—one should note that they are not necessarily maintained in a pure state. Sometimes, we are critical of Don Quixote, and our attitude towards the chivalric romance is not only a critical one. Our occasional objections to Don Quixote's behavior are based not only on rational grounds (he is unrealistic, he is detached from reality) but also on moral ones. This is especially true where he brings harm not only on himself but also on people around him—such as Sancho Panza or some of the needy persons he intends to rescue. His first attempt to save the oppressed—where he intervenes with the countryman flogging the boy Andrew (Andres), Book I, chapter 4—ends in bringing a more painful flogging on the victim. Don Quixote is convinced, of course, that he emerges from this adventure as a great savior, not realizing that he has in fact only exacerbated the situation. When Don Quixote meets Andrew again on the road (Book I, chapter

31), he encourages the boy to tell the company his brave deeds. To his surprise, Andrew tells the misfortunes that befell him because of Don Quixote's intervention, and before he departs, he angrily says: "For God's sake, sir Knight Errant, don't come to my help if you meet me again, even though you see me being cut to pieces. But leave me to my troubles, for they can't be so bad that the results of your worship's help won't be worse" (276).

Thus, there are times where we are far from feeling sympathy for Don Quixote. But even in such cases, we may still find mitigating circumstances in the fact that he acts in good faith and with the best of intentions.

When it comes to the other side of the equation—the conventions of the chivalric romance—the rhetorical situation is not a simple one. True, the chivalric romance is exposed, both in stylistic details and in the overall story line as pompous, ridiculous and even dangerous. But at the same time we have to admit that part of the attraction we find as readers of Cervantes' work lies precisely in the series of chivalric-like fantastic adventures. When we become deeply engaged in reading the novel, at least part of our enjoyment is drawn from psychological layers similar to these in the make-up of any reader of chivalric romance, including of course its most famous reader—Don Quixote.⁸

Satire and Sympathy in *Gulliver's Travels*

Let us now go on to discuss the dual structure of mockery and sympathy in Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*. Whereas Swift's work is first and foremost a satire, criticizing certain social norms and human modes of behavior, he also sends his critical arrows towards a specific literary and philosophical tradition, that of utopias. I will focus primarily on the fourth book, the land of the Houyhnhnms and discuss its relation to More's classical *Utopia*.⁹ It seems to me that Swift is here mocking the genre of utopia, especially some of its underlying optimistic ideological assumptions concerning human nature. At the same time, our

sympathy towards Gulliver is aroused when he becomes entranced with the horses' "utopia."

The relevance of utopian literature in reading the fourth book of *Gulliver's Travels* is evident both in the overall structure and in some specific details. To begin with, the *Travels* share a narrative structure with some exemplary utopias, especially More's *Utopia*. In both works we meet a traveler—Raphael in More, Gulliver in Swift—leaving Europe, arriving in an unknown country in a remote part of the earth. In this "no place" (the etymology of "utopia") the traveler discovers a developed, structured society. The most conspicuous characteristic of that society is that it lacks most of the follies, shortcomings and degradations of existing human societies. The traveler inquires into the nature of that society, and conducts discussions with the inhabitants and, as a result, becomes an admirer of the habits and principles governing utopian society. At the same time and by the same token, he develops a harshly critical attitude towards regular human society.

In addition to the analogies between the overall narrative line, one can also find some specific parallel details in *Gulliver's Travels*' fourth book and More's *Utopia*. One of the most conspicuous elements characterizing the debased human race is greed and avarice, especially the thirst for gold. In that respect, both More and Swift follow Christian doctrine. Thus it is not surprising to discover that an important characteristic of utopian inhabitants is their negative attitude towards money, silver and gold. They attempt to adhere to a "truer" and a more "natural" set of values: "Without iron human life is simply impossible, just as it is without fire or water—but we could easily do without silver and gold, if it weren't for the idiotic concept of scarcity-value."¹⁰

In a deliberately provocative ploy, More describes the use the citizens of Utopia make of gold, intended to counter any (human) tendency to cherish these precious metals:

But silver and gold are the normal materials, in private houses as well as communal dining-halls, for the humblest items of domestic equipment, such as chamber pots. They also use chains and fetters of solid gold to immobilize

slaves, and anyone who commits a really shameful crime is forced to go about with gold rings on his ears and fingers, a gold necklace round his neck, and a crown of gold on his head. (86-87)

These Utopian procedures seem to have succeeded beyond measure in Swift's land of the horses. Swift takes the model he is parodying a step further.¹¹ The Houyhnhnms do not use money, nor do they cherish gold or silver. In the land of the Houyhnhnms the Yahoos—Swift's debased, animal-like version of the human race—are those that fancy precious stones. Gulliver's master the horse tells him:

That in some fields of his country there are certain shining stones of several colours, whereof the Yahoos are violently fond, and when part of these stones are fixed in the earth, as it sometimes happeneth, they will dig with their claws for whole days to get them out, carry them away, and hide them by heaps in their kennels; but still looking round with great caution, for fear their comrades should find out their treasure. (210)

Swift seems to follow, in an exaggerated, grotesque manner, the model set up by More in *Utopia*. The horses are "immune" to human weaknesses, and avarice belongs solely to creatures left out of rational (and natural) society.

Then perhaps Swift is also writing a serious, unequivocal utopia, and the horses' society represents a desirable ideal? I think a careful reading of the fourth book shows that Swift, unlike Gulliver, does not embrace indiscriminately the model presented by the horses.¹² In fact, on more than one occasion and in many respects he makes sure to distance himself from this supposedly ideal society. To begin with, he favors a playful effect regarding their language. When Gulliver first encounters the horses he dwells on the sounds they produce: "Then the bay tried me with a second word, much harder to be pronounced; but reducing it to the English orthography, may be spelt thus, Houyhnhnm. I did not succeed in this so well as the former, but after two or three farther trials, I had better fortune; and they both appeared amazed at my capacity" (184). The reader cannot help but be amused by the actual sounds of neighing produced here.

The peculiar nature of the horses' language, however, is not the only target of Swift's comic purpose. It seems to me that Swift suggests the horses are stupid. This statement may sound strange to those of us who are used to perceive the horses as representatives of Rationalism, as *ratio* incarnate. But an impartial reading of book four leads to the conclusion that the horses are simply not intelligent. This is most evident in the way they try to understand and categorize the newcomer—Gulliver—is he or is he not a Yahoo? In classifying Gulliver as a Yahoo (after finding out that he is wearing clothes) they reveal a mixture of cognitive and moral blindness. From a cognitive point of view, their categorizing system is highly deficient if it cannot distinguish Gulliver from the Yahoos, while from a moral viewpoint, they betray their most ardent supporter when they decide to send him away.

To accentuate the inherent cruelty of these "elevated" creatures, Swift tells us that during the horses' general assembly, in which they discuss the solution to the Yahoo "problem," a proposal is made to castrate the Yahoos. This idea is not originally theirs. In fact, it was Gulliver who put this "modest proposal" into their heads: "I mentioned a custom we had of castrating Houyhnhnms when they were young, in order to render them tame; that the operation was easy and safe" (220).¹³ Usually the horses are very hostile towards any idea expressed by Gulliver. But when it comes to this appalling notion of castration, they suddenly listen and become receptive.

Another indication of Swift's reservations about the "ideal" nature of the horses can be found in the etymology given for their name: "The word *Houyhnhnms*, in their tongue, signifies a *horse*, and in its etymology, the perfection of nature" (190). This arrogant etymology sounds all too familiar; it is nothing but a horsy version of the human claim to be the "crown of creation." Swift suggests an analogy between the horses' version of *hubris* and the original human version. This *hubris* adds on to other repulsive characteristics of their society. They lack any sense of compassion, their society is all too organized and their mating and breeding customs are racist:

In their marriages they are exactly careful to choose such colours as will not make any disagreeable mixture in the breed. Strength is chiefly valued in the male, and comeliness in the female, not upon the account of love, but to preserve the race from degenerating. (216)

When one takes these traits into account, one realizes that in Swift's world the horses do not represent ideal creatures, and their society is by no means a desirable utopia. Understanding that the horses do not represent a desirable ideal does not imply that Swift rejects *in toto* everything they stand for. When the horses expose certain human shortcomings—avarice, corruption, cruelty, stupidity, futile disputes—Swift joins them; when they “overdo” their rejection of humanity, especially when they become prideful and inhumane, Swift distances himself from them. Whereas Swift's rhetorical attitude is complex, sometimes even confusing,¹⁴ Gulliver's own attitude is quite unequivocal: for him, the horses are the epitome of the ideal society. He is so fascinated with what they represent that he begins to imitate their way of living in a pathetic attempt to literally become one of them. While reading Book IV, we should always remember Monk's insistence that Gulliver “is NOT Jonathan Swift. The meaning of the book is wholly distorted if we identify the Gulliver of the last voyage with his creator, and lay Gulliver's misanthropy at Swift's door.”¹⁵

After returning to England Gulliver finds himself totally alienated from his fellow human beings. By identifying himself with the Houyhnhnms, by adopting their worldview according to which any human being equals a despicable Yahoo, he is caught in a tragic quandary where he despises himself and those mostly close to him, but cannot actually align himself with what he cherishes. At the end of the book, when Gulliver is repulsed by the very physical presence of his wife and children and finds solace in conversing with “two young stone-horses” (234), no reader can remain indifferent. He is ridiculous, to be sure, and Swift loves to elaborate on the ludicrous and grotesque aspects of his behavior.¹⁶ But when we think of his deep and bitter alienation from those closest to him he arouses our sympathy. And by the same token we criticize the madness of falling in love with fantas-

tic utopias. Utopia is treated by parody; the human being made captive by the vision gets, at least partially, our sympathy.

Concluding Remarks

Both Cervantes and Swift invented a protagonist enchanted by an imaginary, fictive, literary world and this enchantment leads the character to depart from normality. Don Quixote became a demented individual who actually saw giants in windmills. Gulliver evolved into a misanthrope, repelled by his own wife and children, enjoying conversing with horses. In Cervantes, the "spell" falls on Don Quixote through excessive, uncritical reading of chivalric romances; Don Quixote blurs the line between literary allusion and mental delusion. We may all imagine giants in windmills, as we may imagine elephants in clouds. But when we actually see such giants in windmills and begin to act as if these were real giants, we cross the line separating aesthetic illusion from pathological delusion. Don Quixote attempts to make reality comply with patterns of fiction (or alternatively, to force a fictive, fantastic world onto reality).

The relationship between fiction and reality is different in *Gulliver's Travels*. Excessive reading does not excite Gulliver's imagination. In fact, Lemuel Gulliver is portrayed as an average Englishman and there is no indication that he had even read More's *Utopia* or any other work pertaining to the tradition of literary utopias (e.g. Bacon's *New Atlantis*). His imagination is stimulated not by books but by a possible realization of a perfected society. If Cervantes had created an imaginary world in which giants and magicians truly existed and Don Quixote was fascinated by the conduct of such characters in such a world, we would get something like the situation presented by Swift.

There are thus some differences between the two works and the way they situate their protagonists vis-à-vis an imaginary ideal world. In both cases we develop a critical attitude towards the construction of elevated, fictive ideals—the chivalric code detached from real hu-

man existence in Cervantes, the social rationalism devoid of true human sentiments in Swift. Our sympathy is reserved for those human beings—like Don Quixote and Gulliver—who are drawn in by such ideals.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

NOTES

¹The first version of this article was read in the 7th International *Connotations* Symposium on "Sympathetic Parody"—and I benefitted from the participants' discussion and comments. I also owe special thanks to Matthias Bauer, the editor of *Connotations*, and to the readers of my article, Josef Haslag and Inge Leimberg, for their many valuable suggestions that helped to put my arguments in a broader critical perspective.

²On the structure and functions of parody, see the classical work of the Russian formalist Jurji Tynjanov, "Destruction, Parodie," *Change* 2 (1969): 67-76. For recent surveys and theories of parody, see Gerard Genette, *Palimpsestes: La Littérature au second degré* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982); Linda Hutcheon, *A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms* (London: Methuen, 1985) and Simon Dentith, *Parody* (London: Routledge, 2000). For the forms and functions of satire, see the classical article of Northrop Frye, "The Nature of Satire," *The University of Toronto Quarterly* 14 (1944): 75-89. See also Alvin B. Kernan, *The Plot of Satire* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1965) and the opening chapter of Sheldon Sacks, *Fiction and the Shape of Belief* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1964). For the possible inter-relations between parody and satire—the two neighboring but still distinct genres—see Ziva Ben-Porat, "Method in Madness: Notes on the Structure of Parody Based on MAD TV Satires," *Poetics Today* 1 (1979): 245-72.

³It was Henri Bergson, in his *Le Rire* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1920), who suggested that an emotional detachment is a prerequisite for laughter and mockery.

⁴For the importance of paradigmatic cases in understanding and describing literary genres, see chapter 3 of my *Metaphors of Genre: The Role of Analogies in Genre Theory* (University Park: Penn State UP, 1993).

⁵Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, *The Adventures of Don Quixote*, trans. J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1950) 31-32.

⁶These quotes are taken from Stuart Tave's illuminating presentation of the development in the perception of the novel and of its protagonist in *The Amiable Humorist* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1960) 153, 163 (for Hazlitt's views on *Don Quixote*, see also 234-35).

⁷Erich Auerbach, *Introduction aux études de philologie romane* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949) 171.

⁸Simon Dentith (see note 2 above) points out the "paradoxical effect of preserving the very text that it [parody] seeks to destroy [...]. Thus the classic parody of *Don Quixote* [...] preserves the very chivalric romances that it attacks—with the unexpected result that for much of its history the novel has been read as a celebration of misplaced idealism rather than a satire of it" (36).

⁹John Traugott points out the close similarities between More's *Utopia* and Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, to emphasize Swift's serious intentions. His analysis can be found in "A Voyage to Nowhere with Thomas More and Jonathan Swift: *Utopia* and *The Voyage to the Houyhnhmns*," *Swift: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Ernest Tuveson (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964) 143-69, and in his "The Yahoo in the Doll's House: *Gulliver's Travels* the Children's Classic," *English Satire and the Satiric Tradition*, ed. Claude Rawson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 127-50. For the affinities between More's and Swift's works, see also Brian Vickers, "The Satiric Structure of *Gulliver's Travels* and More's *Utopia*," in a collection of essays edited by the author: *The World of Jonathan Swift* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1968) 233-57.

¹⁰Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. and intro. Paul Turner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961) 86.

¹¹Swift's deep appreciation of More's work is reflected in the fact that More is the only modern writer mentioned in Book Three of *Gulliver's Travels*, as one of six noble sages "to which all the ages of the world cannot add a seventh." See Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings*, ed. Louis A. Landa (Boston: Riverside Editions, 1960) 159.

¹²Such a reading could also take into account certain parallels between the horses' society and that of the Lilliputians, especially some of their cruel, insensitive aspects. For a reading emphasizing the playful, ironic and satirical attitude of Swift towards the horses' "utopia," see Kathleen Williams, *Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise* (Lawrence, KS: The U of Kansas P, 1958) 179-209; see also my "Satura Contra Utopiam: Satirical Distortions of Utopian Ideas," *Revue de littérature comparée* 268 (1993): 463-71.

¹³There is an interesting analogy between the horses who adopt the suggestion of castration and the Lilliputians who metaphorically suggest castrating Gulliver (literally: blinding him) as an "elegant" way to get rid of him (Book I, chapter 7). It seems to me that through this analogy Swift suggests that the noble horses act in some cases like the Orwellian small creatures.

¹⁴The fourth book has received many, sometimes conflicting interpretations of Swift's "true" attitude towards the horses. As I argue in this section, Swift ultimately rejects the horses' society as a model for emulation, but sometimes one is enticed to believe that their society is indeed attractive and harmonious. In an interesting argument Allan Bloom, for example, presents the horses' society as a desirable "ancient" model, coupled with the Brobdingnags' attractively simple society in Book II (and opposed to the corrupt "modern" societies of the Lillipu-

tians in Book I and the crazy scientific societies of Book III). See his "An Outline of *Gulliver's Travels*," Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*, A Norton Critical Edition, ed. Robert A. Greenberg (New York: Norton, 1970) 297-311.

¹⁵Samuel Holt Monk, "The Pride of Lemuel Gulliver," Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*, ed. Greenberg 318. Monk's article, which first appeared in *The Sewanee Review* in 1955, highlights the ironic distance between author and narrator-character in *Gulliver's Travels*. A similar emphasis has already been suggested in the early forties by John F. Ross, *Swift and Defoe* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1941) 79-92. See also Kathleen Williams, *Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise* (Lawrence: U of Kansas P, 1958).

¹⁶In his tendency to linger on the grotesque aspects of human behavior and to unleash bitter, sardonic satire, Swift is undoubtedly in the tradition of Juvenal (it is no accident that the Struldbrugs scene in Book III echoes Juvenal's *Satire 10*). But in the midst of the satirical invective and vehement diatribe, one can detect some tender cords, stemming from Swift's affirmation of "the dignity and worth of human kind" (Monk 330). And, to use Williams' astute analysis, Swift is able to recognize man's "goodness of love, pity, gratitude, kindness, which makes life bearable in man's fallen world" (Williams 192).

Parody as Cultural Memory in Richard Powers's *Galatea 2.2*

ANCA ROSU

Linda Hutcheon reminds us that the prefix *para-* in parody actually has two meanings: against and beside. Parody, then, is not always a form of satire, and it can often be a form of sympathy. While satirical parody aims at ridiculing the work it mimics, the kinder imitation of sympathetic parody opens up the possibility of a subtler commentary, whose import can go beyond the work being imitated. Richard Powers's novel *Galatea 2.2* nicely illustrates this possibility: by gently parodying the Pygmalion myth, it builds up a critique of the state of literary studies in the late twentieth century and their long-standing quarrel with the sciences.

Literary studies are in a crisis, whose causes are frequently held to be the rise of theory and the attacks against the canon.¹ Powers, however, joins the few critics who see the impasse of literary scholarship as part of a larger crisis of knowledge in the age of information. In addition to supporting this broader perspective, he makes us see that, for a long time now, literary studies have had a problem where the very definition of knowledge is concerned. His question is, 'what does it mean to know literature?' and the answer is far from simple. By mocking literary studies, the novel exposes the fragmentary nature of such knowledge, but at the same time it uses parody as an integrative force. For while the parody's satirical darts seem to take down the whole literary enterprise, the way in which it is achieved, mostly through quotation, works to preserve and revitalize that which it criticizes.

The novel does not only rework the myth of Pygmalion as the title suggests, but also its other famous literary parody written by Bernard

For debates inspired by this article, please check the Connotations website at <http://www.connotations.de/debrosu01223.htm>.

Shaw. The double target partly accounts for the two protagonists: the scientist, Philip Lentz, a modern day Pygmalion, who wants to breathe life into an artifact, and Richard Powers himself, a writer and literary scholar, who assumes Professor Higgins's role of teaching the unlikely subject to speak. Even more ambitious than Higgins, Powers wants to teach the network to read literature as well. Galatea/Eliza is called Helen in the novel, and she is neither a work of art nor a flower-girl with higher aspirations, but a computer network designed to simulate the human mind. As in Shaw's play, there is a bet: Lentz will build the network, and with Powers's help, teach it literature in ten months. The test will be a comprehensive Master's exam in English literature, and the network will compete with an actual student. The scientists betting against Lentz will have to determine which response came from the human subject and which came from the machine.²

Parody defines itself through a difference from the original, which ensures its critical distance, and Powers's substitution of a computer network for the work of art in the myth seems to direct the critique at technical progress. However, the network also replaces the human being who in Shaw's satire offers herself as material for Higgins's doubtful art. The correspondence of the network to Shaw's human character enables Powers to turn his critique to the humanistic endeavor of teaching literature without losing focus on technology. On the contrary, the technical challenge reveals the set of problems overwhelming literary studies.

Teaching literature starts with teaching the language, a task which may prove as difficult for the computer network as it was for the very human Eliza in Shaw's play. In this case, Powers's imagination does not stretch reality too much. Since mastering language appeared to be the highest function of the mind, the attempts to simulate human intelligence, starting in the 1950s, focused on various linguistic theories.³ The analogy between humans and machines implied in these efforts has been haunting science fiction ever since creating intelligent machines became a possibility.⁴ In *Galatea 2.2*, the analogy brings to

the surface the dichotomy between an affective and a scientific approach to literature, which in turn can be traced to the split between humanities and sciences.

The doubling of the hero also helps Powers illustrate this division, which C. P. Snow had diagnosed in his lecture "The Two Cultures."⁵ Like C. P. Snow, Richard Powers is both a writer and a scientist. In the novel, however, he defends the humanities against Lentz's scientific views. Their initial theoretical discussions reveal not only the basics of the split but also the inner divisiveness of literary criticism. Lentz indulges the scientist's disdain for the humanities, when he asks Powers: "What passes for knowledge in your so-called discipline? What does a student in English have to do to demonstrate acceptable reading comprehension?" (43). Lentz's attitude is in itself parodic: he fairly approximates the prejudice that science is useful, whereas humanities are superfluous disciplines, unable to define themselves.⁶ Powers responds in kind, with the self-consciousness of the humanist caught peddling fraudulent knowledge: "Not a whole hell of a lot. Take some classes. Write some papers" (43). Of course, this self-deprecation also implies a sense of superiority, which surfaces in the next discussion.

Lentz continues to put down literary studies, partly because he wants to minimize his task, partly because he wants to irritate Powers, and Powers continues to underestimate the "engineer's" capacity to grasp literary matters: "'What do literary theorists say about reading books these days?'" asks Lentz. And Powers comments silently: "As if I could paraphrase for him, in an afternoon. As if, armed with my paraphrase, he might tack on a couple of preprocessing, feed-forward subsystem nets that would address any conceivable problem" (91). Later discussions follow the same pattern. Powers is uneasy with Lentz's way of solving problems, because for him, the problem of literature cannot really be summed up by any theory. And although he rejects Lentz's theories of human intelligence, because they seem reductive, he agrees with him that current approaches to literature are reductive as well. To Lentz's query, he responds with a par-

ody of a theoretical lecture: "Well, let's see. The sign is public property, the signifier is in small-claims court, and signification is a total land grab. Meaning doesn't circulate. Nobody's going to jailbreak the prison house of language" (91). The mixture of linguistic and economic terms here, together with the hardly veiled allusion to Frederic Jameson, pokes fun at the way literary theory distances itself from its object. Warped by economic and social considerations, and inflated with linguistic terminology that degenerates into jargon, the talk about literature becomes easy to mimic, as Lentz is quick to point out, speaking about their project: "We just have to push 'privilege' and 'reify' up to the middle of the verb frequency lists and retrain. The freer the associations on the front end, the more profound they're going to seem upon output" (91). Indeed, many students of literature push "privilege" and "reify" to the middle of their verb frequency lists and free-associate with the result of seeming profound upon output.⁷ Such approaches amount to a set of gimmicks, as easy to simulate in a computer as they are to parody.⁸

In the course of teaching Helen literature, however, Powers is confronted with all the difficulties inherent in the task. For literature does not make sense automatically, in the way the bits of information do for Lentz. Literature takes language to the second power. If clarity is a utopian ideal approximated by computer programs, in literary language, as Powers puts it paraphrasing Hamlet, "readiness [is] context and context [is] all" (174). Context extends beyond language in the social and corporeal life of the people who speak it, and this extension beyond the strictly intellectual domain is the source of literary complexity. While Lentz thinks he already owns the formula for human cognition, Powers is overwhelmed by his task:

Suppose we read it the line 'He clasps the crag with crooked hands' [...] Then we would have to tell it about mountains, silhouettes, eagles, aeries. The difference between clasping and gripping and grasping and gasping. The difference between crags and cliffs and chasms. Wings, flight. The fact that eagles don't *have* hands. The fact that the poem is not really *about* an eagle. We'll have to teach it isolation, loneliness... [...] ...how a metaphor

works. How nineteenth-century England worked. How Romanticism didn't work. All about imperialism, pathetic projection, trochees.... (85-86)

Here, Powers deliberately collapses all kinds of approaches to literature together in order to create a rather exaggerated image of his task and to counter Lentz's prediction that, for the network, "[k]nowledge will be a by-product of the shape its weight-landscape takes" (86). While Lentz thinks that the brain is a glorified Turing machine,⁹ and "comprehension and appropriate response are often more on the order of buckshot" (86), Powers considers the complexity of knowledge, the relatedness of anything to everything, and he arrives at the inevitable conclusion that, in order to know anything at all, one must necessarily know everything. The total quality of "knowledge," he believes, surfaces in the mere attempt to understand the one line in a poem by Tennyson.

The utopian notion of total and integrated knowledge is stronger in the domain of literature than it is in the sciences. Not surprisingly, the most salient expression of the knowledge crisis discussed in so many theoretical books on postmodernism is the curriculum war waged in the domain of literature.¹⁰ The decline of interest in literature as an object of study is painfully obvious to everyone, but the reasons for it elude most commentators. In a book suggestively titled *Who Killed Shakespeare?* Patrick Brantlinger attempts to examine all the possible reasons why teaching English literature has changed in recent decades. While previous commentators, like E. D. Hirsch or Allan Bloom, put the blame for what they perceive as the decline of humanistic studies on the opening of the canon and the rise of theory, Brantlinger realizes that the crisis of literature is part of a larger one:

The argument that cultural studies are becoming hegemonic in higher education pales before the emergence of two interconnected interdisciplinary enterprises, "cognitive science" and "informatics." At my university over the last couple of decades, a high-powered group of computer scientists, psychologists, philosophers, linguists, and mathematicians have united around work on artificial intelligence. (156)

Brantlinger represents a new trend in the debates around literary studies' loss of currency, which finally recognizes the importance of technology in this process. For the emergence of departments of "informatics" in various universities is only the by-product of the dominance computers have achieved, not only in the technical and economic domain, but also in culture as a whole. Because the possibility of building artificial intelligence questions the very definition of knowledge, it touches upon all the domains of intellectual activity. As Jean François Lyotard points out, "[t]he scenario of the computerization in the most highly developed societies allows us to spotlight (though with the risk of excessive magnification) certain aspects of the transformation of knowledge" (7). By "scenario of computerization" Lyotard means the penetration of ideas developed by the relatively new science of cybernetics into all domains of cultural life. A general crisis of knowledge results from its transformation into a commodity called information. Literature, which sciences had long tried to discredit as irrelevant (if at all) knowledge, seems to be a natural victim in the triumph of information.

The diminishing importance of the humanities and the growing prestige of computer-oriented research debated by Brantlinger are central to Richard Powers's novel, and his choice of a computer network as a counterpart to Galatea/Eliza could well be motivated by his desire to show why literature lost its stature. His alter ego holds a position in a huge Center for cognitive science, where he is the token humanist. The description of the Center reveals the economic privilege of the science departments: "The Center possessed 1,200 works of art, the world's largest magnetic resonance imager, and elevators appointed in brass, teak, and marble. The English Building's stairs were patched in three shades of gray linoleum" (75). Materiality reflects ideology. In a culture where technology reigns supreme, a discipline that could do with even the most elementary tools becomes a poor relative tolerated out of charity.

The low-tech needs of literature defy the definition of knowledge promoted by techno-science. But the differences go deeper. Unlike the

sciences, which distinguish knowledge from its object, literature can function both as knowledge (a way to know) and as an object to be known (the knowable). The rise of theory is a response to the dismissal of literature by the dominant scientific orientation in matters of knowledge. Theory regards literature as a knowable object, much in the way science regards nature. In his book, Brantlinger reminds us that theory rose against the hegemony of New Criticism. But New Criticism itself was a theoretical platform that "offered literary scholars a united front, an intellectual hegemony with distinct disciplinary boundaries" (48). Literary scholars needed such a front in order to compete with scientific notions of knowledge. In spite of these developments though, literature resists its transformation into an object and persists in claiming its status as knowledge, hence the many controversies surrounding its teaching.

The dilemmas that Richard Powers faces when teaching literature to the artificial intelligence result thus from the questionable status of literature as knowledge. His basic question, 'what does it mean to know literature?' resurfaces at crucial moments in the development of the action. As the deadline of the test approaches, Powers "feeds" a large amount of reading into Helen's memory: "We gave her a small library on CD-ROM, six hundred scanned volumes she might curl up with. This constituted a form of cheating, I suppose. An open-book exam, where a human, in contrast, had to rely on memory alone" (246). Here, the difference between machine memory and human knowledge comes into play. Machine memory is inert, good only for retrieval: "Helen didn't *know* these texts. She just had a linear, digital array where she might go look them up. A kid with her own computer. A front-end index hasher helped her locate what she looked for. She could then place the complete text on her own input layers for mulling over" (246). While the digitized memory is at best a prosthetic, the "mulling over" is a type of active memorization, which, unlike the instant feeding of data, implies developing a complex network of associations, as well as cementing an affective bond. But

this is not exactly what theorists would mean by 'knowledge' of literature.

Powers's insistence on memory relates to his reluctance to look at literature as a knowable object, the way a scientific approach would, and harkens to a pre-theoretical age. His whole education actually pre-dates and precludes theory. A student in physics, Powers transfers to literature "because of one man, the incomparable Taylor" (64). His tie to Taylor is personal and emotional, and the latter teaches him to love rather than dissect literature. In a different way, and without claims at being a scholar, Powers's father also gives him an example of knowing literature by loving it. Though the father is interested in poetry that would be beneath the academic standard, he recites poems with such passion that he stirs feeling in his cultivated son. Even the department of English evokes sentiment, as Powers describes it in contrast with the cognitive science Center: "But the building left me edgy as well. The edginess of the erotic. The scent of those halls went down my throat like a tracheotomy tube. English light flushed me with desire, a desire awakened by the memory of itself, wanting nothing more desperate than to be put back to sleep" (75). In these musings, Powers reveals what for him is the essence of literature, its difference from any other types of knowledge, and its reason to exist. The medical imagery, probably intentional, demonstrates the impossibility of diagnosing love. When it comes to literature, feeling plays as large a part in the way to know as it does in the nature of the knowable.

This emotional power of literature relates to both oral recitation and memory. Powers admires his professor because, "*he* could recite the bulk of those pieces verbatim. In the dark" (142). His unsophisticated father shares the same capacity to recall the poems he loves. For Taylor, memory equals civilization: "Taylor could recite all the way back to the foundations. We would not be civilized until we could remember" (193). Memory is also the motor of emotion: "And everything Taylor had long ago alerted me to circled back on the primacy of narrative desire. Desire, he taught me, was the voicegram of memory"

(75). "Voicegram," although a technically sounding coinage, relates memory with presence and speech. The very production of emotion lies in oral re-actualization.

Literature has a quality different from other types of knowledge, because voice, emotion, and memory are therein intertwined. This is, of course, not Powers's discovery. In *Preface to Plato*, Eric A. Havelock (46-47) addresses precisely this intertwining, when he argues that it was the emotional power of oral recitation that made Plato banish the poets from the republic. For that nascent age of reason, emotion and memorization were the enemies. The emotionalism, the appeal of voice and memory, as well as the rhythm of recitation, Havelock argues, show that literature relates to the social body in a way no other kind of knowledge does.

Articulated language develops in relation to other people, and until the invention of writing, so does knowledge. Havelock's argument is that in pre-literate societies, what we now call literature served as a mnemonic device to preserve and perpetuate a common knowledge. This was *paideia* tribal knowledge—some practical, some philosophical—to be transmitted to the new generations through repeated cycles of learning. *Paideia* is literally transmitted through human interaction, through memorization and recitation, and it implies both a social and personal bond.

Powers witnesses the formation of *paideia* in Holland, where he had followed the woman he loved, and the episode is not without significance for his meditation on the role of literature as knowledge. For the inhabitants of the Dutch village,

Things meant what their telling let them. The war, the mines, the backbreak harvest, legendary weather, natural disasters, hardship's heraldry, comic come-uppance for village villains, names enshrined by their avoidance, five seconds' silence for the dead: the mind came down to narration or nothing. ... I was watching the growth of group worldliness, collective memory. (187-88)

As one who learned the language from "the weirdness of print," Powers is impressed by the live quality of the knowledge that is being

built under his eyes. "Where I came from," he remarks, "the very idea provoked puzzlement or political suspicion" (188). He speaks, of course, from the point of view of a culture of print, where collective beliefs are called 'mythology,' and where narrative is simply an object of study.

That the oral productions used once as mnemonic devices for the *paideia* should end up becoming literary works printed in books is a twist of history that also changed what we mean by knowledge. As Florian Brody points out, "In Western culture, books contain knowledge that can be shared, sold or bought. Information is a commodity, independent from man—a radical shift from the antique model that posited memory as the primary container of knowledge, inseparable from the human mind" (Brody 142). Unlike other commentators, who relate the shift from knowledge to information to the rise of computers, Brody places it at the beginning of print. The book was the first large-scale artificial memory, and the first means of separating knowledge (literature) from human interaction.

Dissociated from its traditional carrier—the mind of a human being—literature has arrived at a point of overload. The emerging consciousness that is Helen realizes that books are headed for disaster: "Always more books, each one read less. [...] The world will fill with unread print. Unless print dies" (291). While listening to the machine's comment, the inevitable conclusion that "history will collapse under its own accumulation" springs to Powers's mind, and this is a conclusion that applies to the situation of literature today. Its totality, if anyone ambioned to learn it, would break human memory, whether individual or collective.¹¹ Powers's father is able to recite his favorites, only because his list is very short. By contrast, Taylor 'knows' a lot more literature, but his way of both activating this knowledge and transmitting it is quotation. Although Powers declares that "[Taylor] had read all the books" (144), what he best remembers from Taylor's classes are selected quotations from what his professor considered the best works of literature.

Quotation becomes, for Powers, the way to 'know' literature. While reading, he actively seeks quotable passages. But as he scavenges his readings for great words to remember and writes them in a reading diary, something strange happens. He notices that all quotations are from the beginnings of books and ponders: "Perhaps writers everywhere crowded their immortal bits up toward the front of their books, like passengers clamoring to get off a bus. More likely, reading, for me, meant the cashing out of verbal eternity in favor of the story's forward motion. Trapping me in the plot, each passing line left me less able to reach for my notebook and fix the sentence in time" (96). Selecting quotations turns the work into fragments and spoils its total effect. Literature resists this fragmentation, but carving out the passages remains the reader's only way to 'fix them in eternity,' or at least in his personal memory. If it is possible to learn literature at all, quotation is the way.

Quotation is also the way to 'teach' literature. Richard Powers delivers literature to his unwitting pupil in the form of an impressive number of unrelated passages from various authors. The only entire works that Helen 'learns' are those fed wholesale from CD ROM. Powers is aware that quoting reduces the body of literature-as-knowledge to fragments. More painfully, perhaps, he knows that the process of fragmentation had started long before him, for he often sneers at the scientists, who are able to quote from obscure Renaissance poems, simply because they read the lines quoted at the beginning of a scientific paper. He mentions Bartlett's *Dictionary of Familiar Quotations* several times to suggest that the non-literati have no knowledge of the actual works. On the other hand, the novel itself looks like a Bartlett's without a key. Although Powers seems to see the quoting as a sad compromise, he has no other alternative in his own attempt to teach literature to both Helen and his readers.

There are some obvious reasons for Powers to use quotations. First, the narrator is a writer and scholar of literature, for whom speaking naturally includes the words of other writers. Here is how he contemplates his depression after he finished writing a book: "after I paid my

Pied Piper account, nothing waited for me on the far side of the story's gaping mountain. Nothing but the irremediable Things as They Are" (10). While the first sentence alludes to his book, *Operation Wandering Soul*, which is itself full of allusions, the afterthought following it falls into the formulaic subtitle of William Godwin's novel *The Adventures of Caleb Williams*, which does not fail to resonate with the familiar refrain of Wallace Stevens's *The Man with the Blue Guitar*. The unmarked words are not only an indication of the author's intimacy with other texts but also an invitation to see quotation as part of the fabric of language. It is as if Powers could not express himself beyond literary allusion. For instance, when deciding to call Helen's contestant, he says: "I forced the moment to its crisis" (300). He is indeed in the same situation as Prufrock, because he is infatuated with the student in question, but he is using the poem's words as if there was no other way to express what he feels. Not surprisingly, Helen also expresses herself through quotation. After a bomb scare that threatens to destroy the whole network, Lentz asks the smart machine: "Were you frightened yesterday, Helen?" And Helen answers with a line from *Antony and Cleopatra*, "Frightened out of fear." Whether this proves the artificial intelligence can match the human or that human intelligence is, in Lentz's words, "not that bright" is up to the reader to decide. One can read the quotations as either marks of erudition or as signs of linguistic poverty, but one can also easily ignore them since, coming as naturally as they do out of the characters' mouths (or microphones), they are engulfed by the context, as it were.

Some quotations do appear without any relation to the context, on the many occasions when the group of scientists involved in the bet quiz each other on literary knowledge. Recognizing a quotation, Powers explains to Lentz, is what examinations in literature are about: "We'd do two hours of IDs. You know. 'Hand in hand with wandering steps and slow...' Name the author, work, location, and significance" (43). This use of quotation has parodic value, since it mimics and mocks the way literature is taught and popularly understood.

The same parody of pedagogy appears in the quotations that Powers reads to Helen. As any conscientious literature professor, Powers tries to explain the machine the higher meanings of the works, but he is always amazed by the lower level misunderstandings. For instance, when he reads her a fragment of a Rossetti poem, Helen asks what "Sing no sad songs for me" means. After the many explanations Powers comes up with, Helen asks her real question: "How do you sing?" (198). We may wonder, how many times, when teaching students the complicated metaphysical sense of some literary work, we may leave them still puzzled, because they had no experience of what may appear to us as a trivial detail.

But there is a subtler kind of parody in the unmarked quotations used as ordinary words or paraphrased to fit the context of the novel. Most often, and in keeping with the main line of the parody, which makes the machine play the role of a human being, Powers uses famous quotations in modified form to explain or perhaps to understand technical details: "A network should not seem but be" (196), or "silicon was such stuff as dreams might be made on" (246) are examples where the literary meets the technical. The fragmentation of the quotation is double: it is not only taken out of its initial context, but its very fabric is pierced by the adjusting touches that fit it into the new one. In this artifice, we may see an integration of the humanities with techno-science on the level of the smallest linguistic particles.

The changed, but still recognizable, quotations create parodic and ironic effects. Here is how Powers describes Lentz's efforts, for instance: "He'd wanted the whole simulation to be self-generating, self-modifying, self-delighting, self-allaying, self-affrighting" (153). The line from Yeats follows naturally, and without introduction, adding a tinge of irony to the emotional power of the original poem. Yeats' words are not changed in any way, but the recontextualization creates a parodic effect. From the technical "self-generating, self-modifying," the sentence jumps to the very human "self-delighting, self-allaying, self affrighting" with the entire spiritual and metaphysical load that Yeats gave it. Its irony consists precisely in the closeness

of the two otherwise opposite registers, the machine so very close to being human.

Linda Hutcheon mentions that quotation is “probably the most frequently suggested analogue to modern parody” (40). It is therefore not surprising to see the parodic effect of Powers’s use of so many fragments of other works. But the fragment also has the virtue of evoking the whole, and by quoting, Powers connects us to that impossible-to-reach totality of knowledge-as-literature. The reason why a line is quoted is that one reader has found in it something that spoke to him or her in a particular way. This openness to the reader’s interpretation enables the quotation to survive its wrenching from the original context. It is true that the new context is parodic and the effect of quoting is parody as well, but the stability of the novel’s context integrates the fragments and makes them significant. If our age’s fate is to perpetuate literature in fragments, then parody has the distinct honor of being the great preserver. The subtle layering of parodies, as well as the way they relate to each other in Powers’s novel, achieves thus a purpose contrary to his overt critique of literary studies. For in spite of the tragic end (the network shuts itself down because it cannot deal with the horror of being human), Powers offers us a means to preserve, study, and love literature in parodies like his own *Galatea 2.2*.

DeVry University
North Brunswick, NJ

NOTES

¹The most famous commentaries on the state of education in the US made by E. D. Hirsch (146-215) and Allan Bloom (243-98; 336-82) found that the canon of “great books” was in danger because of the emphasis on cultural diversity.

²The model for this contest is the Turing test. Alan Turing (1912-54), a British mathematician, devised a blind test in which a person would ask questions and receive answers in writing. If a computer managed to fool the person into thinking the answers came from a human being, then it could be declared intelligent.

³*The Handbook of Artificial Intelligence* gives the following definition: “Artificial Intelligence is the part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent

computer systems, that is, systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelligence in human behavior--understanding language, learning, reasoning, solving problems, and so on" (Barr 3).

Among the linguists cited in cybernetics are Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, J. Katz, and others. Often the linguistics spills into philosophical issues related to cognition and representation. John Searle started a whole controversial new trend in thinking about language by opposing the idea that it can be computerized.

⁴For a full study of this analogy, see N. Katherine Hayles.

⁵C. P. Snow's lecture on the two cultures was delivered in 1959 when the Cold War was still raging. In the lecture, he deplored the separation between the humanities and the sciences. He found the ignorance of science by the literary intellectuals and the ignorance of culture by the scientists equally damaging to education and society in general. Later the lecture was published in a book together with a follow up essay.

⁶Following a conversation with a scientist, Wendy Steiner infers that "most scientists see the dilemmas of literary critics in this post-post-structuralist moment as irrelevant to their practice, and, finally, as intellectually embarrassing. But we in the business are still hopeful that our academic discipline can continue, even if its practitioners agree on virtually nothing" (78).

⁷In an instance of live criticism imitating its own parody, only a year after the publication of *Galatea 2.2*, Frank Lentricchia declared that, "what is now called criticism is a form of Xeroxing" (66).

⁸One can take note that this parody directed at what Lentz calls "lit-critters" is less sympathetic. In an ultimate act of subversion of lit-crit, Powers makes himself a character in the novel lending not only his name but also his biography to this figment of his own imagination. Most critics have a hard time speaking of character/narrator and author. N. Katherine Hayles (261) decides to call the hero Rick and refer to the author as Richard Powers, ignoring the possibility that the collapse of the difference may be intentionally directed at those who have only too easily accepted "the death of the author."

⁹See note 2.

¹⁰Powers is aware of the disputes surrounding the literary canon and carefully chooses characters to represent all sides. As a character in his own novel, he represents the old fashioned faction, who has been taught according to a comprehensive list of books similar to the one E. D. Hirsch made up. The rival he chooses for Helen, a graduate student, is a product of a new kind of education in literature, where theory reigns supreme. Helen herself may represent the naïve student who does not quite know what she is being taught. There are also the scientists involved in the project, whose various ways of knowing and appreciating literature and language become significant.

¹¹Wendy Steiner confesses as much about herself and her colleagues: "The list of canonic texts from which doctoral students in English at my university select

fifty for their oral examinations has expanded to five hundred. After some faculty members pled for a reduction on the grounds that they had not read all of this purportedly essential canon, our students agreed to reduce the number to four hundred. None of us has yet read them all" (85).

WORKS CITED

- Barr, Avron and Edward Feigenbaum. *The Handbook of Artificial Intelligence*. Los Altos: Kaufmann, 1981.
- Bloom, Allan. *The Closing of the American Mind*. 2nd ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
- Brantlinger, Patrick. *Who Killed Shakespeare? What's Happened to English since the Radical Sixties*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Brody, Florian. "The Medium Is the Memory." *The Digital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media*. Ed. Peter Lunenfeld. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 2000. 130-49.
- Havelock, Eric A. *Preface to Plato*. 3rd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1982.
- Hayles, N. Katherine. *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999.
- Hirsch, E. D. *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know*. New York: Vintage, 1988.
- Hutcheon, Linda. *A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth Century Art Forms*. New York: Methuen, 1985.
- Lentricchia, Frank. "Last Will and Testament of a Literary Critic." *Lingua Franca* Sept.-Oct. 1996: 59-67.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. 1979. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
- Powers, Richard. *Galatea 2.2*. New York: Harper Collins, 1996.
- Snow, C. P. *The Two Cultures*. Cambridge: CUP, 1993.
- Steiner, Wendy. "Practice without Principle." *The American Scholar* 68 (Summer 1999): 77-87.

"The most important subject that can possibly be": A Reply to E. A. J. Honigmann*

HILDEGARD HAMMERSCHMIDT-HUMMEL

E. A. J. Honigmann has taken the trouble to express an opinion of my Shakespeare biography *William Shakespeare: Seine Zeit—Seine Leben—Sein Werk*. For this I am very grateful to him. I am also grateful for his clear definition of his own position with regard to a "Catholic Shakespeare" and for his comparative description of the differing standpoints of the author and reviewer.

Honigmann criticizes in general that I offered "a tidy interpretation of the evidence, where every detail fits in with [... the] main thesis", whereas he himself "prefer[red] to leave gaps and uncertainties when clear-cut evidence is lacking" (54). But since "clear-cut evidence" for Shakespeare's Catholicism is not at all lacking but to be found in abundance (as will be demonstrated below), I may well take Honigmann's general criticism as a compliment.

His basic criticism of my Shakespeare biography is that it puts too much stress on the significance of Shakespeare's Catholicism. In response to this, all I can say is: my general thesis fits in with the 'Konfessionalisierungsthese,' a theory that has been debated for some time among distinguished historians of the early modern era and is now fully accepted. According to this thesis religion played a central role in the life of every individual at that time.¹ Shakespeare's contemporaries were fully aware of this. For example, Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), who is known to have exerted a strong influence on

*Reference: E. A. J. Honigmann, "Catholic Shakespeare? A Response to Hildegard Hammerschmidt-Hummel," *Connotations* 12.1 (2002/03): 52-60; Hildegard Hammerschmidt-Hummel, *William Shakespeare: Seine Zeit—Sein Leben—Sein Werk* (Mainz: von Zabern, 2003).

Shakespeare, remarked: "I have, since I was borne, seene those of our neighbours, the English-men, changed and re-changed three or foure times, not only in politike subjects [...], but in the most important subject that possibly can be, that is to say, in religion [...]"²

After long and thorough study of the historical sources and the discovery of new (or newly interpreted) contemporary textual and pictorial evidence (in the evaluation of which numerous experts of other disciplines assisted), I have come to the conclusion that Shakespeare was a Catholic and that his religion is the key to understanding his life and work. Nevertheless, I am inviting criticism and am waiting for counterarguments.

In his comparative description of the differing standpoints of reviewer and author Honigmann writes:

Like Hammerschmidt-Hummel I favour a Catholic Shakespeare, though with a difference: her Shakespeare studied at the English College Rheims [...], visited the English College in Rome [...], which, with much else, follows from her certainty that his parents were Catholics. My Shakespeare was probably (but by no means certainly) brought up as a Catholic, probably continued as a Catholic in his "lost years," and possibly returned to his Catholic faith on his death-bed, after (probably) converting to the Church of England when or soon after he started his career in the theatre. Even though it seems incredible that a writer so curious about other nations should never visit any, I know of no hard evidence that he did—which is not to say that he could not have done so. (54)

Honigmann attempts to reduce Shakespeare's Catholicism to just a few phases in the dramatist's life—childhood, adolescence, the lost years and the final phase. But even these he questions: "What is the evidence for this 'Catholic Shakespeare'?" The "Catholic Shakespeare," he says, can only be established on the basis of two kinds of circumstantial evidence: (1) the known or presumed "Catholic sympathies" of the dramatist's family, friends and patrons and (2) the "Catholic attitudes" embedded in the plays (52-53).

(1) "Catholic sympathies" of the dramatist's family, friends and patrons?

Contrary to Honigmann's assumption there is definite proof of the strict Catholicism of the dramatist's parents, eldest daughter, relatives, friends, teachers, first employer and patron. His mother, Mary Arden, came from the collateral line of a family of arch-Catholic gentry that was involved in a Catholic plot.³ The dramatist's father, John Shakespeare, possessed a so-called Borromeo, or Jesuit testament, a personal written profession of the Catholic faith,⁴ each paragraph of which contained his name.⁵ The possession of a Jesuit testament was sufficient for a charge of high treason and condemnation by the courts. John Shakespeare concealed his copy in the rafters of his house in Henley Street, where it was discovered by chance around 250 years later.⁶ Honigmann remains silent about this decisive piece of evidence, which clearly contradicts his assumption that Shakespeare's family only had "Catholic sympathies." Nor does he mention that treasurer John Shakespeare paid salaries to illegal (evidently Catholic) teachers, among them one William Allen, presumably identical with the founder of the Catholic College in Douai/Rheims (Collegium Anglicum). And he does not refer to the fact that both the dramatist's father and his eldest daughter (Susanna) were on the list of Catholic recusants, who refused Anglican services, especially holy communion.⁷

Honigmann considers it "very likely" (56) that the young Shakespeare was taught by the Catholic schoolmaster Simon Hunt. But it can, in fact, be taken for granted that Hunt, who was schoolmaster in Stratford from 1571 to 1575, taught Shakespeare because John Shakespeare, who became mayor of the town in 1568 and a justice of the peace, would, of course, have sent his eldest son to the local grammar school (refounded in 1553). The sons of the English bourgeoisie were already attending the new grammar schools since the beginning of the sixteenth century. They became theologians, lawyers, doctors, teachers or writers. As early as 1516 the humanist Richard Pace exhorted

Pace exhorted England's aristocracy not to "leave the study of literature to 'the sons of peasants.'"⁸ It is thus hard to understand why Honigsmann should be so intent on casting doubt on Shakespeare's schooling at Stratford.

Honigsmann mentions that Hunt fled to Douai in 1575 and later became a Jesuit (56), but he does not mention that Shakespeare's teacher had a successful career as a Jesuit priest at Rome, becoming English penitentiary (confessor) at the Holy See, in succession to Robert Parsons, one of the leading minds among English Catholics in exile and an arch-enemy of the English crown. Schoolmaster Hunt, an influential Catholic personality from the dramatist's Stratford environment, took one of his pupils with him: Robert Debdale from Shotton, Shakespeare's schoolmate and a neighbour of Anne Hathaway, who became the poet's wife in 1582. In 1585, when a further rigorous anti-Catholic penal law came into force, Debdale died a martyr's death in England. In the same year Simon Hunt died in Rome. The whole historical context suggests that Shakespeare was bound up in the network of English Catholics in exile.

Shakespeare left his home town of Stratford abruptly in February 1585. I am convinced that he travelled to the Continent and to Rome. The evidence for this I discovered in the ancient pilgrims' book (number 282—from 1580 to 1640) of the Venerable English College in Rome in October 2000.⁹ In April 1585 there is an entry for one "Arthurus Stratfordus"¹⁰ at the hospice. Further entries are to be found between 1585 and 1592 and again in 1613 (for example "Gulielmus Clerkue Stratfordiensis" [1589], Latin for "William, Clerk of Stratford"). Like other Catholics, who had to fear the government's almost perfect espionage network on the Continent, especially in Italy and Rome, the poet could have used the name of his home town as a pseudonym. 1585 was a crisis year, when war broke out with Spain, and English Catholics met in Rome to work out strategies for winning England back to Rome (for example the Armada project).

Honigsmann does mention these findings in passing, but he plays down their significance and conceals the fact that, in the period from

Shakespeare's "lost years" (1585-92) and then once again in 1613. He ignores that the name "Stratfordus" very clearly points to Shakespeare. For 1591 I did not find the pseudonym (as Honigmann claims), but only a damaged place where a name had (later) been carefully scratched out.¹¹ In 1613, when Shakespeare concluded his literary career, he must have travelled to Rome once more. This time he again used the name of his home town—and with it the Christian name of his brother Richard, who had died in February 1613. The entry thus reads "Ricardus Stratfordus."

My assumption that Shakespeare must have been educated at a Catholic college Honigmann calls "wishful thinking" (57). But the poet's academic education is apparent from the knowledge contained in his works (cf. *As You Like It* 3.3.5-29; 5.1.35-41, and *The Taming of the Shrew* 1.1.27-38). Some of his characters talk about rhetoric, philosophy, logic, music, poetry, mathematics and metaphysics. There are, in fact, numerous indications that the young Shakespeare received a basic academic education at the Jesuit-oriented Collegium Anglicum at Douai/Rheims. It was a typical feature of the careers of young English Catholics to avail themselves of this Catholic college, as they avoided Oxford and Cambridge on account of the compulsory Oath of Supremacy. And at that time it was the only Catholic college for young English Catholics. It enjoyed immense popularity and rapidly increased the number of its pupils within a very short time.¹² In *The Taming of the Shrew* (2.1.80-82) the dramatist expressly mentions Rheims as a seat of learning.¹³ When William reached college age in 1578, the Shakespeares mortgaged a considerable part of their property¹⁴—presumably to finance their son's expensive studies. The Douai diaries contain partly erased entries (1578 "[Guilielmus erased]", 1580 "[26 erased]" and 1587 "[Guilielmus erased]")¹⁵ that also suggest Shakespeare's presence. Furthermore, as is apparent from certain passages in his plays, Shakespeare was familiar with the nomenclature of the classes at the Collegium Anglicum: Rhetoric, Poetry, Syntax, Grammar and Rudiments.¹⁶

That Shakespeare was educated at a Catholic college is also apparent from the well-known record that he had been a schoolmaster in the country in his youth. It was Honigmann who in *Shakespeare: The "Lost Years"*¹⁷ took up the schoolmaster claim again and convincingly substantiated it. In William Shakeshafte, repeatedly singled out for positive mention in the 1581 will of Alexander de Hoghton, a Catholic, Honigmann saw the young teacher (and musician) William Shakespeare. It was Honigmann who first recorded in print that Sir Bernard de Hoghton, a Catholic and current owner of Hoghton Tower, had spoken to him of an oral family tradition according to which Shakespeare had lived in the aristocratic Catholic household of his ancestors for two years.¹⁸ One is thus bound to ask how Honigmann views his own research findings.

It is, in fact, astonishing that no one should hitherto have come up with the obvious idea that the Shakespeares, too, could have chosen for their son's education the (among Catholics) very popular Collegium Anglicum. The reason for this might be that in mainstream English historiography the view had predominated that the college had served exclusively to train priests, but this was not the case.

The young Shakespeare may have obtained his post as an illegal teacher (and musician) in the aristocratic Catholic household at Hoghton Tower through close contacts that existed between William Allen and Sir Thomas de Hoghton. Sir Thomas, who went into exile in Flanders, had helped Allen to found the college.

Alexander de Hoghton's will (1581) is puzzling. At a certain point Honigmann capitulated: "As I see it, the will is unclear and eccentric [...] and could have caused all kinds of trouble."¹⁹ It was there that I succeeded in revealing a secret organization (with precise rankings and payment) that was founded for a particular good purpose. This purpose, however, is nowhere clearly described. In his review Honigmann mentions neither my decoding nor my interpretation that—a year after the beginning of the Jesuit mission in England, when a further rigorous anti-Catholic penal law had come into force—the testator's primary concern was probably to protect the

mission priests known to have been at Hoghton Tower. They were hunted as traitors. It is certain that the Jesuit priest and subsequent martyr Edmund Campion, once celebrated at Oxford as "England's Cicero," preached at Hoghton Tower in the summer of 1580, when the young Shakespeare was probably already employed there.

This extremely valuable historical document gives us information not only about Shakespeare's first—illegal—employment but also about his involvement in the Catholic underground. For he was in the first rank of de Hoghton's secret organization and was paid for life. Honigmann makes no mention of these significant circumstances or of the fact that Shakespeare was possibly the author of a moving lament on the martyrdom of Edmund Campion.²⁰

One of the most important pieces of evidence of the poet's active involvement in the illegal Catholic scene of his day is a document confirming his purchase of the eastern gatehouse at Blackfriars in London in 1613. This gatehouse was the secret meeting place for fugitive Catholics. Legally protected by a trust deed (similar to that of Alexander de Hoghton), the specific use of the gatehouse was safeguarded for the time after Shakespeare's death. This new knowledge was gained with the help of experts in other disciplines. It fits in perfectly with the general context of Elizabethan politics and religion but is unfortunately ignored by Honigmann, who, instead, criticizes the fact that it does not conform with Schoenbaum's version of the Blackfriars Gatehouse conveyance (56). But Schoenbaum's view is that the purchase was purely an investment, which is not at all convincing. For the astounding degree of complexity in this trust arrangement, which contains stipulations that extend far beyond Shakespeare's lifetime,²¹ shows that Shakespeare was making a considerable personal contribution to the survival of the old religion.

As regards the dramatist's patrons (Lord Strange and the Earl of Southampton), Honigmann doubts whether they were "pillars of Catholicism" (53). It does seem plausible that Strange, influenced by his training at court, should have inclined towards the new religion and consequently come into conflict with his arch-Catholic family (especially his father), as demonstrated by Park Honan.²² But it must

not be forgotten that the English Catholics in exile, under the leadership of Sir William Stanley, considered him to be a Catholic and on this basis, and because he was closely related to the royal line, offered him the English crown.²³ The Earl of Southampton, too, came from a staunchly Catholic family. His father had been imprisoned in the Tower for his Catholic faith, and at both his country seat of Titchfield Abbey and his London residence priests came and went and were concealed. Southampton, Shakespeare's patron, friend and rival, was indeed one of the pillars of Catholicism—at least until, a few years after the accession of James I, he became a protestant, at the urging of the king and much to the annoyance of English Catholics.

(2) "Catholic attitudes" embedded in the plays ?

Honigmann's view that the dramatist's works contain only "Catholic attitudes" and that Shakespeare had possibly become a protestant when he commenced his theatrical career in London (54), is simply not tenable. Shakespeare's plays, especially *Romeo and Juliet* and *Measure for Measure*, are particularly rich in Catholic thought, Catholic rituals, strikingly positive depictions of priests and monks, and invocations of the Virgin Mary and numerous saints. There are many metaphorical references to pilgrimages. Since the nineteenth century this has led many scholars to suppose that Shakespeare must have been Catholic. The late Cardinal Josef Frings of Cologne, for many years a patron of the Deutsche Shakespeare-Gesellschaft, devoted a chapter of his autobiography to this question, and once said in a lecture that it could be demonstrated with a fair degree of certainty from Shakespeare's works that he was very sympathetic towards things Catholic, in particular monasticism.²⁴ But one could not actually prove Shakespeare's Catholicism this way. The newly discovered external historical sources now provide hard evidence for the poet's Catholic faith. This proves to be—as mentioned above—the key to understanding his life and work.

Mention should also be made of the fact that in my Shakespeare biography I present two new pieces of evidence that confirm Shakespeare's links with the Catholic underground, his travels on the Continent and his use of Catholic institutions. Unfortunately, Honigmann has overlooked both.

The one is Robert Greene's autobiographical prose tract *Groats-worth of witte, bought with a million of Repentance* (1592), where a self-assured young actor, who as a country author has also written (morality) plays and has just arrived in London, must be Shakespeare, as had already been observed by the English historian A. L. Rowse.²⁵ Re-examining this source, I noticed that the stranger tells us—in coded form—something about the nature of his activities in the period from 1585 to 1592 (identical with the 'lost years'), saying that he "for seven years was absolute Interpreter of the puppets."²⁶ "Puppets" reminds one of the "players" in Alexander Hoghton's will. If both terms are references to priests, the new arrival (Shakespeare) is saying that for the previous seven years he was a mediator or translator for the priests ("puppets").²⁷ We thus have additional written evidence that in the seven lost years the dramatist played an important but extremely dangerous role as a mediator in the Catholic underground. Honigmann has unfortunately confused this crucial, highly informative, less familiar passage with the better-known one in *Groats-worth of witte*, where Robert Greene roundly abuses Shakespeare as an "vpstart Crow" and where the actors ("puppets") are not spared either. He mistakenly claims that I interpreted "puppets"—here quite clearly used to mean actors—as meaning priests, and reacts with irritation: "'puppets' means 'priests,' a point repeated again and again, we may ask why, if this is correct, Greene [...] did not call them priests" (59).

The second piece of written evidence newly interpreted by me but overlooked by Honigmann is *L'Envoy to Narcissus* (1595) by Thomas Edwardes.²⁸ There it is said that the poet "differs much from men" and was "Tilting under Frieries." Monasteries had previously been a prominent feature in English landscapes and towns, but in Shake-

speare's day there were none left in England. Under Henry VIII they had been dissolved, destroyed or rebuilt as homes for the nobility or gentry. Thus Shakespeare can only have stayed at monasteries on the Continent.

Conclusions

It should be clear from the above that Honigmann's contentions are untenable and that he in many cases clings to a state of research that has been superseded by new findings. The reviewer ignores historical evidence, such as John Shakespeare's Borromeo or Jesuit testament or William Shakespeare's purchase of a building which gave shelter to hunted priests, helped them to escape to the Continent and which was thus a considerable contribution to enabling Catholicism to survive in England. Since Honigmann has not come up with sound and well-founded counterarguments, I unreservedly maintain my contention that Shakespeare was a Catholic and that his Catholic faith is the key to understanding his life and work.

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz

NOTES

¹See the conference proceedings of the interdisciplinary international colloquium "Religion and Culture in Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" at Mainz (24-27 March 2003), ed. Peter Claus Hartmann, due to be published shortly, and the author's lecture "Catholic Minority Culture in England from 1580 to 1650 with Particular Reference to Shakespeare."

²De Montaigne, Michel Eyquem. "An Apologie of Raymond Sebond." *Montaigne's Essays: Renaissance Editions, Book II*. Trans. John Florio. Appleton: Lawrence U. 3 August 2004 <<http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/montaigne/2xii.htm>>.

³Edward Arden of Parkhall, the head of the family, was hanged as a traitor in 1583.

⁴The preformulated text was the work of the cardinal of Milan, Carlo Borromeo (1538-84), who gave copies to the leaders of the Jesuit mission, Father Edmund

Campion and Father Robert Parsons. Campion und Parsons distributed large numbers of these testaments to English Catholics.

⁵William Shakespeare, *Plays and Poems*, ed. Edmond Malone (1790), vol. I, pt. 2, 162-166 and 330-331. Reproduced in Samuel Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare: A Documentary Life* (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1975) 41-43.

⁶Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare* 41.

⁷John Shakespeare: Public Record Office, State Papers Domestic Elizabeth I, S.P. 12/243, no. 76. Susanna Shakespeare: Kent County Archives Office, Maidstone, Sackville MSS, ref. U269 Q22, 37 and 39. Reproduced in Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare* 39 and 235.

⁸P. J. Helm, *England under the Yorkist and Tudors 1471-1603* (London: Bell, 1972) 341.

⁹I published these findings for the first time in the epilogue of my book *Die verborgene Existenz des William Shakespeare: Dichter und Rebell im katholischen Untergrund* (Freiburg i. Breisgau: Herder, 2001).

¹⁰Reproduced in *William Shakespeare: Seine Zeit—Sein Leben—Sein Werk* 73, fig. 63 a.

¹¹Reproduced in *William Shakespeare: Seine Zeit—Sein Leben—Sein Werk* 73, fig. 63 b.

¹²See *Die verborgene Existenz des William Shakespeare* 71ff.

¹³This must have been an allusion to the Collegium Anglicum and not to the university. In *Notes & Queries* (5 March 1938) Richard H. Perkinson pointed out that Rheims in the age of Shakespeare (because of the English College that had been transferred to the French city from 1578 to 1593) would have been "recognized as the most important source of Catholic activity in England rather than as a seat of general culture." See also The Arden Edition of *The Taming of the Shrew*, ed. Brian Morris (London: Methuen, 1981) 201.

¹⁴See Schoenbaum, *William Shakespeare* 37.

¹⁵*The First and Second Diaries of the English College, Douay, and an Appendix of Unpublished Documents*, ed. Fathers of the Congregation of the London Oratory, with an historical intr. by T. F. Knox. (London: D. Nutt, 1878) 8, 9 and 14.

¹⁶This is discussed in full length in *Die verborgene Existenz* 76-90.

¹⁷(Manchester: MUP, 1985, repr. 1998). With this book Honigmann created an international stir among scholars. However, English Shakespeare experts remained reticent. The book received hardly any mention. While Katherine Duncan-Jones has four entries for the name Honigmann in the index to *Ungentle Shakespeare: Scenes from his Life* (London: Thomson Learning, 2001), though in each case in connection with other works by him, the index to *Shakespeare: For All Time* by Stanley Wells (London: Macmillan, 2002) makes no mention of him at all. During a long telephone conversation in early April 2003 Honigmann told the author he was a *persona non grata* in Stratford-upon-Avon. In the course of the summer of

2003, however, contact with Stratford was resumed. Honigmann's review "Catholic Shakespeare? [...]" appeared in *Connotations* in December 2003.

¹⁸See Honigmann, *Shakespeare: The "Lost Years"* 28-30. Sir Bernard confirmed this to me by telephone in November 2002.

¹⁹Honigmann, *Shakespeare* 26.

²⁰The lines are: "The scowling skies did storm and puff apace, / They could not bear the wrongs that malice wrought; / The sun drew in his shining purple face; / The moistened clouds shed brinish tears for thought; / The river Thames awhile astonished stood / To count the drops of Campion's sacred blood. // Nature with teares bewailed her heavy loss; / Honesty feared herself should shortly die; / Religion saw her champion on the cross; / Angels and saints desired leave to cry; / E'en heresy, the eldest child of hell, / Began to blush, and thought she did not well." Reprinted in *Die verborgene Existenz* 32-35, from Henry Foley, *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus*. 7 vols. (London, 1877-1883, repr. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966) vol. 3, "George Gilbert," 658-704, 623.

²¹See chapter D: "The catastrophe of Blackfriars" in *Die verborgene Existenz* 145, where this complicated set of agreements is discussed in detail.

²²*Shakespeare: A Life* (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 66-67.

²³"[...] in September 1592, Hesketh was commissioned by Sir William Stanley and the jesuit Father Holt to encourage the earl's son and successor, Ferdinando, lord Strange, to lay claim to the succession to the crown after the death of Elizabeth, on the ground that the Stanleys 'were next in propinquity of blood' to the queen." *DNB*, s.v. "Hesketh, Richard (1562-1593)."

²⁴See Carsten Greiwe (ngz-online, *Neuss-Grevenbroicher Zeitung*) (updated 12 August 2003). Greiwe is summarizing a review by Lothar Bleeker of *Die verborgene Existenz des William Shakespeare*, which appeared in *Carbones* [Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe der Kardinal-Frings-Gesellschaft—a scholarly series of works published by the Kardinal-Frings-Gesellschaft]. Greiwe quotes: "Die These stellt sicherlich eine der wenigen echten Sensationen in der Geschichte der Shakespeareforschung dar" ["The thesis is certainly one of the few genuine sensations in the history of Shakespeare research"].

²⁵See A. L. Rowse, *Shakespeare the Man* (New York: Harper Row, 1973) 59-60.

²⁶Quoted from Rowse, *Shakespeare the Man* 60.

²⁷See the detailed discussion in *William Shakespeare: Seine Zeit—Sein Leben—Sein Werk* 68-71.

²⁸Peterborough Cathedral Library. Repr. W. E. Buckley for the Roxburghe Club (1878) 61-62.

"Grace beyond a curled lock:" Further Thoughts on Henry Vaughan's "Isaac's Marriage"

GLYN PURSGLOVE

Such attention as Henry Vaughan's poem "Isaac's Marriage" has attracted has largely been due to the fact that it is the only poem from the 1650 edition of *Silex Scintillans* to have been revised on publication in the 1655 edition. It was gratifying, therefore, that the first sustained discussion of the poem should have been so assured—and informed—a piece as that by Alan Rudrum in an earlier issue of *Connotations*. Professor Rudrum's discussion responds to earlier considerations of the poem by Barbara K. Lewalski, Donald R. Dickson and Philip West,¹ and proceeds to a very persuasive demonstration of some of the implications which Vaughan's poem would have had for alert readers amongst his contemporaries, pointing out that

In religio-political terms, Vaughan chose the marriage which was held to typify the marriage of Christ and the Church: a marriage which was later held by the Roman Catholics to impart to all Christian marriages the nature of a sacrament. It is evident throughout his religious writings that Vaughan made little effort to distance himself from the imputation of crypto-Catholicism frequently levelled at Laudian Anglicans during this period; not because he was a crypto-Catholic but because he saw himself as a member of the historic Church to whom the early Fathers were as important as post-Reformation divines. [...] The flaunting of banners his opponents thought Papistical was a kind of defiance likely to encourage readers whose sympathies were with the faithful remnant of Laudian Anglicans.²

Rudrum's characteristically learned piece makes very clear the range of ways in which Isaac was understood as a type of Christ and his marriage interpreted as a type of the marriage of Christ to his Church.

*Reference: Alan Rudrum, "Narrative, Typology and Politics in Henry Vaughan's 'Isaac's Marriage,'" *Connotations* 11.1 (2001/2002): 78-90.

For the original article as well as all contributions to this debate, please check the Connotations website at <<http://www.connotations.de/debrudrum01101.htm>>.

Rudrum is particularly helpful on what Vaughan has used, and what he has ignored, from the biblical account of Isaac's marriage. Building on traditional typologies, Rudrum provides an astute analysis of the poem's religio-political significance. What he doesn't do—since it is not to his purpose—is fully engage with how "Isaac's Marriage" actually functions *as a poem*. In what follows I have chosen, rather than relating the text to the different traditions, of biblical commentary and exegesis, of Reformation meditational theory and practice, to concentrate on workings of the language within the poem itself. Where I relate it to other texts it is to other poems that I try to establish links.

One of the most remarkable things about the poem seems to me its assured control of tone, the way in which Vaughan effects transitions between very different registers of language in an entirely seamless way while maintaining and developing an altogether convincing sense of a controlling voice and sensibility. The fluctuations and alternations of register are, of course, part of a conscious rhetorical strategy, a sophisticated exploitation of the inherited resources of the rhetorical tradition. The poem's moments of simplicity and seeming naiveté are as intricately constructed as any of its more obviously sophisticated passages. It is on these terms that the poem finds room for the delightful colloquial rhythms and ironies of the opening's simulated air of surprise:

Praying! And to be married! It was rare,
But now 'tis monstrous;

Or lines 13-16:

Hadst ne'er an oath, nor compliment? thou wert
An odd dull suitor; hadst thou but the art
Of these our days, thou couldst have coined thee twenty
New several oaths, and compliments (too) plenty;

But also, very differently, for the complex and beautiful imagery of what is, in effect, an epic simile embedded in a lyric, occupying lines 53-62:

So from *Lahai-roi's* well some spicy cloud
Woody by the Sun swells up to be his shroud,
And from his moist womb weeps a fragrant shower,
Which, scattered in a thousand pearls, each flower
And herb partakes, where having stood awhile
And something cooled the parched, and thirsty isle,
The thankful Earth unlocks her self, and blends,
A thousand odours, which (all mixed,) she sends
Up in one cloud, and so returns the skies
That dew they lent, a breathing sacrifice.

These contrasts of language are part of a larger structure of complementary antitheses that underpins the whole poem: between Heaven and Earth, Past and Present, Innocence and Experience, Naturalness and Artificiality—to mention just a few.

As Vaughan's editors have pointed out, the poet has made a significant choice in the epigraph affixed to the poem, from Genesis Chapter 24, Verse 63:

And Isaac went out to pray in the field at the even-tide, and he lift up his eyes, and behold the camels are coming.

Vaughan's text is taken, it seems, from the Authorised Version, save that he substitutes the word "pray" (which is found in the Geneva translation) for the word "meditate" which appears in the Authorised Version text. And it is this substituted word that provides the opening word for Vaughan's poem. These opening lines tempt one to imagine two possible speakers for them—so heavily ironic are they:

Praying! And to be married? It was rare,
But now 'tis monstrous; and that pious care
Though of our selves, is so much out of date,
That to renew't were to degenerate.

We might imagine a putatively unironic speaker amazed at the mental picture presented to him. Such a speaker finds it inconceivable that praying and marrying should be regarded as activities between which there could be any possible connection. His astonishment is, in part, due to his sense of the great difference between then and now, be-

tween his own time and Old Testament times of Isaac and Rebekah. The ironies grow complex in the use of the word "degenerate" in line 4. We are faced with the paradox that renewal would be degeneration; as Alan Rudrum points out in his edition of Vaughan's poems,³ there was a rare sense of the verb that simply meant "to show an alteration *from* a normal type, without implying debasement." Yet, read unironically, the statement suggests that a return to such acts of "pious care, though of our selves" would involve a loss of the kind of sophistication which characterises the implicitly un-pious and selfish society in which the unironic speaker, as I have called him, lives and with which he seems to be quite happy. Such attitudes, and such a speaker are, of course, being judged by the poet's irony. And so, too, is the society in which the poet, like the speaker, lives. In a passage beginning at line 11, the contrasts between then and now are made more explicit:

But being for a bride, prayer was such
 A decried course, sure it prevailed not much.
 Hadst ne'er an oath, nor compliment? thou wert
 An odd dull suitor; hadst thou but the art
 Of these our days, thou couldst have coined thee twenty
 New several oaths, and compliments (too) plenty;
 O sad, and wild excess! And happy those
 White days, that durst no impious mirth expose!
 When Conscience by lewd use had not lost sense,
 Nor bold faced custom banished Innocence[.]

The language used here to intensify the contrast is interesting. Isaac is said to lack "the art / Of these our days," to lack oaths and compliments, which nowadays are easily "coined." The speaker recognises and acknowledges (in a familiar rhetorical trope), the "sad, and wild excess" of modern times, longing himself for "those / White days [...] / When Conscience by lewd use had not lost sense, / Nor bold-faced custom banished Innocence." I have drawn attention to these last lines in particular, because I find in them reminders of another poem of Vaughan's, "The Retreat," and because the connections seem to me to throw interesting light on "Isaac's Marriage." "The Retreat" opens thus:

Happy those early days! when I
Shined in my Angel-Infancy.
Before I understood this place
Appointed for my second race,
Or taught my soul to fancy aught
But a white, celestial thought [...]

A later passage (lines 15 to 18) reads as follows:

Before I taught my tongue to wound
My conscience with a sinful sound,
Or had the black art to dispense
A several sin to every sense.

It may be worth noting that line 19 of "Isaac's Marriage" originally read, in the 1650 printing of *Silex Scintillans*, "When sin, by sinning oft, had not lost sense." "The Retreat" is, to put it over-simply, about how (to quote once more from "Isaac's Marriage") "bold-faced custom banished Innocence." The speaker of "The Retreat" longs to return, "to travel back / And tread again that ancient track," a longing which must remain unfulfilled. What I have called the unironic speaker of "Isaac's Marriage" seems, without perhaps being fully conscious of them, to have similar longings. In Isaac he finds an enduring emblem of the happiness of those "[w]hite days," a young man who remains unmarked, one might say unstained, by experience. If the subject matter of "The Retreat" is paradise lost, that of "Isaac's Marriage" is paradise retained. Isaac's enduring innocence is attributed to the way in which, as a child, he was offered as a sacrifice (lines 5-10):

[...] thou a chosen sacrifice wert given,
And offered up so early unto heaven
Thy flames could not be out; Religion was
Rayed into thee, like beams into a glass,
Where, as thou grew'st, it multiplied and shined
The sacred constellation of thy mind.

("Shined" is again an arresting choice of word). The use of "[r]ayed" is especially striking, in its emphatic position at the beginning of line

8—an emphasis perhaps increased by its admittedly distant but very definite rhyme with “[p]raying” in its similarly emphatic position at the beginning of line 1 (in both cases beginning an iambic pentameter with a heavy trochaic foot). This seems to be the only use of ‘ray’ as a verb in Vaughan’s poetry. The verb is a rare one generally, but employed with *relative* frequency, on the evidence of the *OED*, by some of the religious poets of the seventeenth century, such as Henry More and Francis Quarles. Vaughan may have borrowed its use from Owen Felltham. Here it forms part of a wonderful and beautiful image of divine energy intensely focused, “like beams into a glass.” This powerful image of energy and light descending, effectively balances the upward movement that will dominate the second part of the poem.

For Isaac, retaining innocence means avoiding entrance into a world of pretence and deception, a world demarcated by much of the vocabulary Vaughan uses to evoke the seventeenth century world that stands in contrast to that of Isaac. Here and now, courtship is a matter of lewdness (19) and “impious mirth” (18). Now the suitor presents himself with a “pompous train,” with an “*antic* crowd / Of young, gay swearers, with their needless, loud / Retinue” (21-23).⁴ (There is, surely, another echo in that last phrase: against this “needless, loud Retinue” we might poise the “liquid, loose retinue” of Vaughan’s “The Water-fall,” emblematic of the waters of baptism.) Courtship now is a matter of the “[s]pruce, supple cringe, or studied look put on” (23). Isaac, whose bride is chosen by his father’s servant and the choice sanctioned by God, has neither desire nor need to indulge in such artificialities or pretences. His bride, Rebekah is also characterised by Vaughan in terms of her naturalness and innocence (lines 33-38):

[...] nor did she come
 In *rolls* and *curls*, mincing and stately dumb,
 But in a virgin’s native blush and fears
 Fresh as those roses, which the day-spring wears.
 O sweet divine simplicity! O grace
 Beyond a curled lock, or painted face!

Those last two lines are particularly interesting. One clear echo is of the kind of language which informs such poems of George Herbert's as "A Wreath" and "Jordan (I)." In "A Wreath" (a beautiful example of the rhetorical figure of *reduplicatio* or *anadiplosis*) the speaker creates a complex affirmation of the virtues of simplicity, much as Vaughan here does. Both, in a sense, are playing particularly subtle games with those instincts (both aesthetic and moral) to which Cicero more than once addresses himself, as explaining choices both stylistic and ethical: "his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia, simplicitia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, periurium, malitiam, inuriam."⁵ But the last two lines of Vaughan's poem set up another, less expected, allusion. No contemporary of Vaughan's, I suspect, could have failed to recognise the echo of one of Ben Jonson's most popular songs. (Vaughan, one might remember, had earlier praised Jonson in poems such as his commendatory verses to the collection of Fletcher's plays, published in 1647, or "To my Ingenuous Friend, R.W." where visitors to the Elysian fields are promised that

First, in the shade of his own bays ,
Great BEN they'll see, whose sacred lays,
The learned ghosts admire, and throng,
To catch the subject of his song. [29-32]

The particular lines echoed by Vaughan, as noted by Alan Rudrum in his edition, run as follows:

Give me a look, give me a face,
That makes simplicity a grace. (93-94)

But this is more than just a matter of verbal borrowing. This is made clear if one puts Jonson's lines back into context. The song from which the lines come is sung in Act One Scene One of Jonson's play *Epicoene: or the Silent Woman*. Two fashionable gentlemen, Truewit and Clerimont (the name an echo of French *clairement*, plainly or clearly), are talking and Truewit reports on the existence of "a new foundation [...] of ladies [...] that live from their husbands and give entertain-

ment to all the Wits and Braveries o' the time, as they call 'em, cry down or up what they like or dislike in a brain or a fashion, with most masculine or rather hermaphroditical authority, and every day gain to their college some new probationer." "Who is the president?" asks Clerimont. "The grave and youthful matron, the Lady Haughty" replies Truewit. Clerimont strongly disapproves of that lady's employment of precisely the kind of fashionable arts which are of no interest to Rebekah. His disapproval, indeed, is such that he has written a poem, a song, about it.

CLERIMONT

A pox on her autumnal, her pieced beauty! There's no man can be admitted till she be ready nowadays, till she has painted and perfumed and washed and scoured, but the boy here, and him she wipes her oiled lips upon like a sponge. I have made a song. I pray thee hear it, o' the subject.

[BOY *sings*]

SONG

Still to be neat, still to be dressed,
As you were going to a feast;
Still to be powdered, still perfumed:
Lady, it is to be presumed,
Though art's hid causes are not found,
All is not sweet, all is not sound.

Give me a look, give me a face,
That makes simplicity a grace;
Robes loosely flowing, hair as free:
Such sweet neglect more taketh me
Than all th' adulteries of art:
They strike mine eyes, but not my heart. (81-98)⁶

Clerimont's song takes Lady Haughty as its subject; when the song appeared, divorced from its dramatic context, in the songbooks of the period it carried titles such as "On a Proud Lady" or "On a Gentlewoman that used to trick up her selfe over-curiously."⁷ It is, that is to say, addressed to and about precisely the sort of lady that Rebekah is not. Rebekah cultivates no "sweet neglect" nor are her robes in any

sense "loosely" flowing. Rebekah's hair is not elaborately coiffeured, the colour on her cheeks is the product of "a virgin's native blush" not make-up; she is free from "all th' adulteries of art." Above all she is neither "Lady Haughty" nor "A Proud Lady." Indeed, it is precisely her humility that Vaughan emphasises in the lines that immediately follow his allusion to Jonson's play:

*A pitcher too she had, nor thought it much
To carry that, which some would scorn to touch;
With which in mild, chaste language she did woo
To draw him drink, and for his camels too. (39-42)*

The reference is to the episode later in that same chapter of Genesis from which Vaughan has taken the epigraph of his poem. It is the very moment at which Abraham's servant Eliezer recognises Rebekah as the bride intended for Isaac by God (verses 42-46). It is Eliezer speaking:

And I came this day unto the well, and said, O Lord God of my master Abraham, if now thou do prosper my way which I go:
Behold, I stand by the well of water; and it shall come to pass, that when the virgin cometh forth to draw water, and I say to her, Give me, I pray thee, a little water of thy pitcher to drink:
And she say to me, Both drink thou, and I will also draw for thy camels: let the same be the woman whom the Lord hath appointed out for my master's son.
And before I had done speaking in my heart, behold, Rebekah came forth with her pitcher on her shoulder; and she went down unto the well, and drew water: and I said unto her, let me drink, I pray thee.
And she made haste, and let down her pitcher from her shoulder; and said, Drink, and I will give thy camels drink also: so I drank, and she made the camels drink also.

Vaughan's lines are more by way of allusion than paraphrase and, for all his omissions, he makes one significant addition—one that draws attention precisely to Rebekah's lack of pride:

*A pitcher too she had, nor thought it much
To carry that, which some would scorn to touch[.]*

The last line and a half have no source in Genesis. The introduction of the rhyme on "touch," in such close proximity to the word "pitcher," perhaps activates an almost submerged pun on those well known words in the Apocrypha "He that touches pitch shall be defiled therewith."⁸ She touches, carries, her pitcher, but is not defiled or debased by doing so. That is perhaps fanciful. But it is not, I think, fanciful to see an altogether more serious and important piece of wordplay in the passage. Those lines of Vaughan's which so clearly echo Jonson, so clearly echo, that is, one of the well known secular lyrics of Vaughan's own time:

O sweet divine simplicity! O grace
Beyond a curled lock, or painted face! (37-38)

transcend the claims, the aesthetic claims, as it were, of Jonson's lines by the addition of the word "divine" and by the serious pun on "grace." In Jonson's "Give me a look, give me a face, / That makes simplicity a grace" the word signifies beauty and charm, the possession of the kind of qualities bestowed by the Three Graces. In Vaughan's lines it means that, but it also registers the fact that for Isaac the arrival of Rebekah is, to quote from the *OED* "[a]n instance or manifesto of favour," "[t]he free favour of God," a pledge of "[t]he divine influence which operates in men to regenerate and sanctify, [...] and to impart strength to endure trial and resist temptation."⁹ Elsewhere Vaughan uses the word separately in both its secular and its theological senses. One of the early love poems ("An Elegy") ends thus:

I borrowed from the winds, the gentler wing
Of *Zephrus*, and soft souls of the spring:
And made (to air those cheeks with fresher grace)
The warm inspirers dwell upon thy face. (21-24)

As part of the language of complement (and as an oblique tribute to art), this *grace* (as the mention of *Zephrus* makes clear) is that for which Euphrosyne and her sisters stand as delightful emblems. On the other hand, in the closing lines of "The Sap," in which the meta-

phorical sap of the poem's title is celebrated, the word has its purely theological sense:

[...] humbly take
This balm for souls that ache,
And one who drank it thus, assures that you
Shall find a joy so true,
Such perfect ease, and such a lively sense
Of grace against all sins,
That you'll confess the comfort such, as even
Brings to, and comes from Heaven.

In "Isaac's Marriage," it seems to me, both senses of the word are realised. Not for the only time in his work, Vaughan takes the language of love and compliment and restores it to a greater weight of meaning. Rebekah does indeed embody a "grace / Beyond a curled lock, or painted face." Such serious puns on grace activate concerns very close to the heart of Vaughan's intellectual, aesthetic and theological position—though such a topic cannot be explored here, it is perhaps apposite to quote from Vaughan's older contemporary Francis Quarles (1592-1644), from his very popular and much reprinted *Divine Fancies*, the first edition of which appeared in 1632:

On the three Christian Graces

Faith

It is a Grace, that teacheth to deprave not
The goods we have; to have the goods we have not.

Hope

It is a Grace that keeps the Almighty blameless
In long delay: And Men (in begging) shameless.

Charity.

It is a Grace, or Art to get a Living,
By selling Land; and to grow rich, by giving.¹⁰

In the verse from Genesis that Vaughan employs as his epigraph, there is perhaps some ambiguity as to cause and effect, but a simple reading would see Rebekah's arrival as the consequence of Isaac's prayer. In Vaughan's poem, while Isaac may be at his prayers as early as the first word of the poem, it is only after Rebekah's arrival that his prayer takes flight, to use his own metaphor:

And now thou knewest her coming, it was time
 To get thee wings on, and devoutly climb
 Unto thy God, for marriage of all states
 Makes most unhappy or most fortunates;
 This brought thee forth, where now thou didst undress
 Thy soul, and with new pinions refresh
 Her wearied wings, which so restored did fly
 Above the stars [...]. (43-50)

Like most of Vaughan's best poems, "Isaac's Marriage" is full of implied movement. Tracing all the movement is rather like working out the directions for the eye's movements that are signalled by the compositional techniques of the great painters. In part one of the poem, the arrival of Rebekah effects a kind of horizontal movement, a movement along the surface of the earth; but since she is a "grace," a gift from God, she also marks a downward movement. Vaughan's retrospective allusion to the intended sacrifice of Isaac, on the mountain top, evokes an upward movement, more than balanced by the downward impulse of that marvellous image of "divinity [...] rayed" into Isaac, "like beams into a glass." In part two of the poem, the implied movements fulfil a neater pattern. The artificial "rolls and curls" alluded to in the first part are superseded by a more perfect circularity (already hinted at by the fact that the angels "wind" about Isaac), which, it should be noted, is presented as a completed act of sacrifice, unlike the interrupted, displaced sacrifice of the first part. The whole of this second part of the poem defines Isaac's prayer and does so, at greatest length, by seeing the upward movement of his soul as part of a kind of circulatory pattern of ascent and descent. What I earlier described as the epic simile of lines 53-62 is the key

passage:

So from *Lahai-roi's* well some spicy cloud
Woody by the Sun swells up to be his shroud,
And from his moist womb weeps a fragrant shower,
Which, scattered in a thousand pearls, each flower
And herb partakes, where having stood awhile
And something cooled the parched, and thirsty isle,
The thankful Earth unlocks her self, and blends,
A thousand odours, which (all mixed,) she sends
Up in one cloud, and so returns the skies
That dew they lent, a breathing sacrifice.

The density of image and meaning in these lines is quite remarkable—such as to defy any brief explication here. Vaughan draws, with a kind of inspired syncretism, on biblical and other traditions of symbolism in his network of references to, for example, the well and the womb, pearls, flowers and herbs, the Sun and the clouds, the Earth and the skies. Here it must suffice to point out how perfectly the schema of this extended simile, of interdependent ascents and descents, brings to perfection of meaning the seemingly disparate movements of part one, resolving all into the language of return and "breathing sacrifice." One might also point to the presence of a sequence of delicately sexual words and images that look forward, as it were, to the consummation of the marriage. The whole passage is a perfect exemplum of the kind of "rings, / And *hymning circulations*" of which Vaughan writes in "The Morning-Watch" or of the process which Vaughan presents rather more plainly in "The Charnel-House" when he writes of how "the elements by circulation pass / From one to the other, and that which first was / Is so again."

"Thus soared thy soul" begins the final part of the poem. "Thus" presumably functions both as a means to say that the immediately preceding lines have given an account of how Isaac's soul "soared," and also to say that the whole of the poem to this point has provided an account of *why* it "soared." All the way through the poem there has been a tension between the poem's espousal of simplicity as a revered value—its praise of "plain, modest truth" (33) and its suspicion of

"the art / Of these our days" (14-15) on the one hand and—on the other—its employment of sophisticated poetic techniques. This is not so much art concealing art as art decrying art, art ostensibly suspicious of art. It is the paradox and the dilemma which underlies poems such as "Jordan (I)" by Vaughan's master Herbert, another poem which very artfully extols the virtues of artless simplicity. Given Vaughan's inevitable awareness of such paradoxes, it is perhaps not surprising that the final movement of the poem brings in, for the first time, the terminology of a specific art, insofar as it relates to the problems of representation:

Others were timed and trained up to't but thou
 Didst thy swift years in piety out-grow,
 Age made them reverend, and a snowy head,
 But thou wert so, ere time his snow could shed;
 Then, who would truly limn thee out, must paint
 First, a *young Patriarch*, then a married *Saint*. (67-72)

We may remember that the Lady Haughty of Jonson's *Epicoene* was a "youthful matron." Truewit applied the paradoxical term to her because she sought by art to disguise the reality of her advancing age. Vaughan's "*young Patriarch*," on the other hand, is not a product of art's deceptions, rather is he a paradox difficult for art to represent, as well as a kind of sacred parody of Jonson's secular original. In him youth and age actually do co-exist, he is not simply one nor the other. Vaughan began his poem as if visualising Isaac at prayer; he ends it by considering how a painter might represent that scene.

Professor Rudrum explicates the poem primarily by reference to non-poetic traditions, especially those of biblical commentary (it depends, of course, on what you mean by "poetic"). I have sought, not to contradict anything that Rudrum has to say, but to supplement it by a more detailed examination of the poem's language (or, at any rate, some aspects of it) than he undertakes. Through that process "Isaac's Marriage" emerges as a subtle, allusive, occasionally elusive piece of writing; as a richly imaginative piece, as a poem with much to say about those questions of simplicity and art that necessarily posed

themselves to a seventeenth century writer of religious verse; as a text that meditates on the survival of innocence, in complement to Vaughan's poetic meditations elsewhere on its loss. As is so often the case with Vaughan, the more closely one looks at one of his poems the more one finds oneself admiring the poetic craftsmanship that has gone into its making.

University of Wales
Swansea

NOTES

¹Barbara K. Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton: PUP, 1979) 336-37; Donald R. Dickson, *The Fountain of Living Waters: The Typology of the Waters of Life in Herbert, Vaughan and Traherne* (Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1987) 151-52; Philip West, *Henry Vaughan's Silex Scintillans* (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 53-54.

²Rudrum 86-87.

³Henry Vaughan, *The Complete Poems* (London: Penguin, 1983) 541. All quotations from Vaughan are taken from this edition. *OED* sense 3: "To become or be altered in nature or character (without implying debasement); to change in kind; to show an alteration *from* a normal type." The illustrative quotations provided range in date from 1548 to 1600.

⁴Given the poem's clear echoing of the work of Jonson (as discussed later in this essay) it may not be irrelevant here to think, prompted by this phraseology, of the gatherings of wedding feasts in such plays as *Every Man in His Humour* and *Epicoene* as exemplars of the kind of thing the speaker has in mind.

⁵*De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, II.46. "This primary instinct leads us on to love all truth as such, that is, all that is trustworthy, simple and consistent, and to hate things insincere, false and deceptive, such as cheating, perjury, malice and injustice." Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, Loeb Classical Library, 40, trans. H. Rackham (Harvard: Harvard UP, 1994) 134-35.

⁶Text from Ben Jonson, *Epicoene*, ed. R. V. Holdsworth (London: Benn, 1979) 14-15.

⁷The poem appears under a variety of titles in verse miscellanies and songbooks of the period, e.g.: "On a spruce lady" (Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Ashmole 38, and Leeds Archives Department, MS 237); "To a curious lady" (Chetham's Library, Manchester, Mun. A4.15); "On a Gentlewoman that used to trick up her selfe over-curiously" (University of Nottingham, Portland MS PW V. 37); "On a Proud Lady" (Henry Lawes, *The Treasury of Musick*, 1669).

⁸Ecclesiasticus 13:1 (Authorised Version).

⁹OED "grace" n. 8., 11., 11.b.

¹⁰Francis Quarles, *Divine Fancies*, 8th ed. (London, 1687) 7.

Unsex-ing Austen: A Response to Leona Toker*

AMANPAL GARCHA

Leona Toker uses Thorstein Veblen's analysis of the leisure class to account for the economic and social dynamics within *Mansfield Park*. In so doing, Toker introduces a new term, "invidious sexuality," to bridge the gap between Veblen's theory and Austen's plot. Toker asserts that the most aggressive and assertive characters in the novel, Henry and Mary Crawford, attempt to gain status and esteem by competing "for sexual power, both inside and outside the marriage market" (232). According to Toker, the sexual behavior of Henry and Mary has all the marks of the primitive "predatory culture" (226) that, following Veblen's analysis, has characterized the actions of the privileged classes since the advent of modernity. Work, according to Veblen, has always been regarded as a mark of social and economic inferiority; thus, aristocrats and industrialists have cultivated an image of luxury and leisure, obsessively advertising their excessive wealth through their extravagant consumption of resources and their conspicuous avoidance of labor. Henry and Mary attempt to secure their superiority in an analogous way: they obsessively show off their excessive ability to attract the attentions and affections of the opposite sex to display their superior standing in the competition for mates that, in *Mansfield Park*, occupies almost all the characters.

In Henry's case, attracting women appears to be an end in itself, a performance of his expertise in the arts of flirtation at which others—Mr. Rushworth, for example—are pathetically inept. Mary, however, mobilizes her "conspicuous sexual charisma" in order to pursue a

*Reference: Leona Toker, "Conspicuous Leisure and Invidious Sexuality in Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*," *Connotations* 11.2-3 (2001/2002): 222-40.

For the original article as well as all contributions to this debate, please check the Connotations website at <<http://www.connotations.de/debtoker01123.htm>>.

more orthodox Veblenian aim (226). According to Toker, Mary wishes not only to showcase her comparatively superior attractions, but also to use those attractions to gain a politically and monetarily "advantageous" marriage. This kind of mercenary marriage is the one for which Mary becomes "the main and most unabashed spokesperson" in the novel, as she disregards the motives of love and companionship that drive Fanny and Edmund (231). Her aim to maximize her "sexual power" (232) thus coincides with her aims to gain the three assets that Veblen argues the leisure class most covets: increased status, increased regard, and increased wealth.

Toker makes it seem as if Mary has fully subordinated her sexual desire as well as any hopes for romance, affection, and emotional attachment to her quest for economic and social gain (230-31). The term "invidious sexuality," which Toker uses to describe the way Mary "extend[s] invidious emulation to the war of all against all in marriage matters," works to construct Mary's sexuality as merely a tool for accumulating status (232). This construction of sexuality derives from Veblen's theoretical framework, which Toker uses to analyze *Mansfield Park*. Veblen devotes a substantial amount of *The Theory of the Leisure Class* to the relation between the sexes, but within his *Theory*, Veblen asserts that the institution of marriage serves only one end: to help men increase their displays of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption. Wives, according to Veblen, are like servants and courtiers in that "being fed and countenanced by their patron they [become] indices of his rank and vicarious consumers of his superfluous wealth" (Veblen 77). Likewise, modern housewives direct their efforts "under the guidance of traditions that have been shaped by the law of conspicuously wasteful expenditure of time and substance" (Veblen 82). Veblen's analysis of marriage as an instrument of economic display and social status-making retains its bite as an account of gender relations both in the past and today, but it leaves little room for sexual desire as a primary impetus that drives those relations. In adopting Veblen's social theories, Toker thus also repeats Veblen's inability to see men and women's sexual relations in any

terms other than the "invidious emulation" that takes the form of the constant, mercenary striving for social status.

Many characters within *Mansfield Park*, and many within Jane Austen's whole corpus, indeed conceive of sexual relations as solely a vehicle for financial and social gain. In addition to Mary Crawford, Toker also points to Maria Bertram, who "eventually falls a victim to marriage in the service of Mammon" (231), and Sir Thomas Bertram, who although he married for love himself, pays constant and close attention to the economic and social implications of his dependents' romantic choices. Veblen's ideas about status competition explain the behavior of characters in other Austen novels as well; Toker mentions Lucy Steele, in *Sense and Sensibility*, who disregards her engagement to Edward Ferrars to make a more advantageous match with his brother Robert. Charlotte Lucas, William Collins, and Lady de Bourgh in *Pride and Prejudice* likewise participate in the marriage market as if status and wealth, not love, affection, or sex, were the only things at stake. The famous first sentence of that novel testifies to the relevance of Veblen's work for scholars of Austen, and Toker's article thoughtfully models how Veblen's analysis of the privileges and ambitions of the leisure class can be used to bring to the fore the status-consciousness and competitiveness that underlies the typical Austenian marriage plot.

Yet as the first sentence of *Pride and Prejudice* also shows, Austen's novels do not concern themselves only with the pursuit of "good fortune"; they also concern themselves with the sexual desire that usually lies at the heart of what makes a man "want" a wife. Toker and Veblen imagine desire in only one way, as desire for power and distinction, a view that many characters in Austen's novels also put forth. But despite the fact that the relations between Mary and Edmund, Fanny and Edmund, and Maria and Henry in *Mansfield Park* remain steeped in conventionality, manners, and ideology, those relations are also replete with sexual desire. Mary certainly finds Edmund to be desirable for reasons that have nothing to do with the aims of predatory culture: "Without his being a man of the world or

an elder brother, without any of the arts of flattery or the gaities of small talk, he began to be agreeable to her. She felt it to be so, though she had not foreseen and could hardly understand it" (Austen 56). Schooled in judging a man solely in terms of whether he is a wealthy "elder brother" and a socially adept "man of the world," Mary's "felt" attraction to Edmund at this point remains illegible to her; it is an affect she can "hardly understand." Her desire for Edmund can neither be explained nor read in the worldly terms of status competition in which Mary usually comprehends her motivations and on which Toker focuses exclusively. Instead, her desire can only be registered in terms of an emotional drive that must be "felt" but cannot be immediately understood rationally.

Mary seems to continue to try to focus solely on her predatory aims as she goes on vigilantly trying to prevent herself from avowing her attraction to Edmund. Mary knows that her attachment to him cannot be aligned with her mercenary motives. She reacts to this knowledge, however, by attempting to guide her behavior by her motives, not her attachment. Her rational, mercenary impulses seem to express themselves most forcefully when Edmund's older brother, Tom, appears as if he is about to die from an illness. "Poor young man!" Mary writes in a letter to Fanny, "If he is to die, there will be *two* poor young men less in the world; and with a fearless face and bold voice would I say to any one, that wealth and consequence could fall into no hands more deserving of them" (Austen 358). Mary goes on to fantasize about Tom's death and Edmund's consequent elevation in rank and wealth, asking Fanny "whether 'Sir Edmund' would not do more good with all the Bertram property, than any other possible 'Sir'" (Austen 358).

Mary's fantasies here appear to prove Toker's point about the dominance within Mary's character of predatory impulses: Mary wishes Tom to die so that she can then marry a wealthy, entitled Edmund. Yet Mary's fantasies constitute the opposite of the rational, status-minded calculations that, according to Veblen, dominate in predatory culture. Her quasi-murderous desire in fact reveals the

almost insurmountable contradiction she feels between her predatory impulses and her affections. If she did not desire Edmund in his own right, she could easily give him up to focus on a wealthier eligible mate, yet cannot rid herself of her strong erotic attachment to Edmund. Instead, she can only hope that Tom dies so that her erotic desire and her calculations no longer have to stand in opposition to one another. The very inappropriateness and extremity of the quasi-murderous wish, moreover, signifies the irrational nature of this non-predatory affection. She possesses impulses that exceed the calculated and controlled motives by which Austen's characters so frequently conduct themselves, desires that, following Freud, constitute erotic drives possessing anarchic qualities and irrepressible strength.

With Elizabeth Bennet and her love for Darcy, Austen represents feminine sexuality in a way that shows a woman's potentially excessive erotic desires and her more mundane needs for income and status as, at least, mutually reinforcing drives if not completely and complexly entangled ones. Yet as the case of Mary suggests, sexual desire—the desire not just for money, but also for a particular erotic object—might stand as a central component for an understanding of the behavior of at least this one of Austen's characters. Toker compiles a list of the reactions Austen elicits, including phantasmatic nostalgia for ideological stability, aesthetic appreciation of her style and technique, simple antiquarian interest, and resentment towards her obsession with the concerns of the mannered leisure class. There are several reactions Toker leaves out, including recent critics' investment in the subversive or even revolutionary aspects of Austen's fiction, but the most obvious is also the most telling in terms of the blind spots in Toker's analysis: the reader's desire for a *romantic* narrative, one that shows characters flirting, attracting one another, refusing overtures and then acquiescing to them. According to Joseph Litvak, Austen's narratives create pleasures that exceed the satisfactions one gains from witnessing the main characters settling into a socially and economically acceptable marriage:

Novels such as *Sense and Sensibility* and *Emma* obviously have to conduct their heroines (and their readers) toward the triumphant genital heterosexuality enshrined in the institution of marriage, but, as critics have shown, the very plotting of that development through a progression of proto-Freudian "phases" at least affords their heroines (and their readers) variously perversely "pregenital" and/or nonprocreative excitations. (Litvak 24)

Austen's novels, through their marriage plots, represent and satirize the mercenary motives within a certain segment of the English upper class, but at the same time show the limitations of those motives by providing a variety of "excitations" of an altogether different nature.

In showing the attraction of the sexes in Austen's narratives as to some extent independent of the operations of predatory culture that Toker lays out, I do not mean to assert that sexuality, in Austen's novels, in other texts or in culture in general, stands outside the social and economic ideologies within which it articulates itself. Instead, I am resisting the particular theoretical construct Toker uses to analyze *Mansfield Park*, for it posits a social field in which only one drive exists: the drive to gain and conspicuously display one's advantages over others in terms of wealth, status, and regard. I am suggesting that interpreting Austen's work necessitates a more wide-ranging approach, or at least one that can account for the centrality of both the erotic and socioeconomic drives that motivate her narratives. Nancy Armstrong's *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel* articulates one such an approach. In her book, Armstrong argues that throughout its history, the English novel has used the figure of the desirable female to help construct a dominant middle-class identity and consolidate the middle-class's power.¹ While Veblen implies that erotic relations serve mainly as screens for optimizing individuals' social and economic power, Armstrong, following Michel Foucault, analyzes sexual desire as a primary human drive, albeit one that has always already been co-opted and directed by power. For Armstrong, sexuality cannot be analyzed as if it exists independent of ideology, yet sexuality can also not be *reduced* to ideology: it remains an inescapable aspect of human existence, although this very inescapability makes it an effective vehicle for ideology.

For Toker, Mary's aggressive desires signify only her aggressiveness within a predatory culture that pushes individuals constantly toward competitive and "invidious" behavior. Armstrong's conceptual framework, however, allows for a more complex interpretation of Mary's sexuality. Mary's conflicting erotic pulls—toward both the truly affectionate and morally upright person of Edmund and the riches and status she would like her husband to augment—indicate the way in which ideology, in Austen, follows the currents of sexual desire. Armstrong asserts that novels tended to promote a particular version of the "desirable female" as a mechanism to instill in readers the sense that middle-class values, such as truthfulness, modesty, economy, and efficiency, which were manifested by the heroines of many English novels, held a superior place in society to the aristocratic traits of display, luxury, and lavishness (Armstrong 3-27). While Armstrong focuses on the way that middle-class ideology used men's erotic attraction to women to help solidify a sense of middle-class identity as distinct from and opposed to a "degenerate" aristocratic culture, the case of Mary Crawford shows that *female* desire also could be made to serve similar purposes. Mary's conflict between her "good" attraction to Edmund as he is and her "bad" desire to make him into a wealthier, more prominent figure reflects the larger structure of the novel, which presents a conflict between the middle-class values embodied by Fanny and Edmund and the aristocratic sensibilities displayed by such characters as Henry, Tom, Yates, and Mary herself, when she is on her worst behavior.

As the love object of both Mary and Fanny, the two main female characters in the novel, Edmund becomes the focus of feminine desire. And the moral and social qualities he represents—qualities of honesty, sincerity, and uprightness, associated with the middle class—become desirable precisely because, embodied within him, they become objectified erotically. Toker argues that the "liberal" companionate love that the novel idealizes in Edmund and Fanny's marriage stands in part as a manifestation of the peaceable pursuits with which, according to Veblen, the industrious, workman-like

elements of society occupy themselves. Toker is thus concerned less with the "love," in any erotic sense, between Edmund and Fanny than with the couple's "attitudes toward labor and leisure" (231), since those attitudes differentiate the couple from the purely mercenary motives that drive the rest of the members of the leisure class in the novel. I certainly agree with Toker that, despite Austen's portrayal of mercenary marriages as problematically deviating from the ideal norm of companionate love, historically, it was Austen's norm that was in fact progressive and transgressive in an era in which the aristocratic political and financial maneuvering still dominated. Yet Toker, finally, sees relationships only according to the either "peaceable" or "invidious" modes of social organization Veblen analyzes; her vision leaves out the fact that the most important relationships in the novel present themselves as *primarily* erotic, no matter how disciplined and moderate that eroticism usually appears, and that social and political ideology must articulate itself, to use the Freudian term, through the medium of the characters' cathexes.

To clarify my point, I think it is useful to contextualize Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class* within the literary field of turn-of-the-century American literature. Veblen's depiction of a social world wholly and exclusively consumed with competitive, invidious behavior has perhaps its most powerful literary expression in the novels of Theodore Dreiser, who wrote his first novel, *Sister Carrie*, in 1900, a year after Veblen published his *Theory*. Toker's analysis of Mary Crawford could very well apply to the main character of Dreiser's novel, for Carrie's desires do indeed appear primarily to be for status and money. Carrie views marriage and sex first and foremost as a way of gaining, financially and socially. Like Veblen, Dreiser tends to marginalize the erotic as a primary drive within human society; his later novels, *The Financier* (1912) and *The Titan* (1914) take their titles from the world of corporations and high finance, not the domestic world associated with emotion and love. By contrast, Austen's novels concern themselves principally with those very domestic and romantic relations that, by 1900 in America, had begun to take on a somewhat

subordinate status within the literary field. By taking a theorist from the turn of the twentieth century and applying his ideas to Austen's novels, Toker constructs Austen in the image of a naturalist, distorting the dominant role played by erotic relationships in *Mansfield Park*.

I do not want to play down the fact that issues of economics and social status constitute a major theme in Austen's novels. Of course, economic concerns run throughout Austen's narratives; indeed, almost every novel from the rise of that form is concerned with the twin desires for money as well as sex. Yet it is also true that the roles that these two desires play within novels change between Austen's time and Veblen's. Veblen wrote *The Theory of the Leisure Class* at a moment when capitalism had succeeded in consolidating its power over American culture. Dreiser's novels, like those of, for example, Frank Norris, focused relentlessly on characters' consumption and attempts to amass wealth because those drives had come to dominate individuals' lives in an unprecedented way. While sexual relationships are ever present in these texts, naturalist novels direct themselves to subjects who had come to see themselves primarily engaged in the competitive struggle for economic resources and social status that Veblen analyzes in his *Theory* rather than in a quest for the perfect sexual mate. As the capitalist system took hold through the course of the nineteenth century, forcing people to understand themselves in terms of consumption, competitive advantage, and economic assets, the relative importance of sexuality, as a distinct, independent desire motivating subjects, declined within the texts that circulated within and represented that culture.

Austen wrote her novels in a very different social and economic world. The period of capitalist ascendancy that came to fruition by the end of the nineteenth century was in the process of decisively articulating itself against aristocratic power in the early 1800s. As Armstrong argues, Austen, like many novelists of her time, played a key role in the eventual success of capitalist, middle-class culture by constructing the values inherent to that culture's self-representation as appealing; at the time, these values included honesty, forthright-

ness, frugality, and scrupulous morality. Austen uses the currents of sexual desire in *Mansfield Park*, which eventually flow almost exclusively toward Edmund and Fanny, to make such values desirable. For Austen, in other words, erotic drives stand as the primary desires with which her audience can identify. Her texts direct themselves to an audience that recognizes sexual relationships as entwined with, but finally more cognitively important than, the competition and struggle that, at the time, characterized aristocratic power relations.

William Dean Howells famously saw Veblen's *Theory* as a commentary on contemporary American society that to some extent disguises itself as a more objective analysis of the socioeconomic history of Western civilization.² In her article, Toker does not seriously grapple with the possibility that Veblen wrote principally about and in response to the particular economic and social circumstances of turn-of-the-century America, instead taking at face value his argument that conspicuous consumption, conspicuous leisure, and invidious emulation have been the defining aspects of human society since it began. In so doing, she throws valuable light on the logic of status competition within Austen's texts, which does indeed follow closely along the lines Veblen draws. Yet by following Veblen, Toker also mirrors his blind spots, not leaving room in her analysis for the centrality of erotic drives within social relationships. Many texts no doubt exist in which sexuality only serves as a tool for invidious comparison, but no matter how status- and money-obsessed the characters within *Mansfield Park* appear, unlike in the novels of Veblen's contemporaries, sexual desire remains a more central drive than the pursuit of wealth and prominence. *Mansfield Park* is no *Sister Carrie* or *McTeague*; it does not either illustrate or expand on Veblen's thesis as well as those texts by Veblen's fellow naturalists. It is, after all, dominated by a marriage plot, not a plot of economic accumulation.

Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

NOTES

¹Armstrong writes: "In demonstrating that the rise of the novel hinged upon a struggle to say what made a woman desirable, then, I will be arguing that much more was at stake. I will consider this redefinition of desire as a decisive step in producing the densely interwoven fabric of common sense and sentimentality that even today ensures the ubiquity of middle-class power" (4-5).

²Howells writes that Veblen's theory best explains the "evolution of the American magnate," all but ignoring Veblen's attempt to analyze human society as a whole. For Howells, the narrative of status competition Veblen produces captures a distinctly American phenomenon: "it sums up and includes in itself the whole American story: the relentless will, the tireless force, the vague ideal, the inexorable destiny, the often bewildered acquiescence" (361).

WORKS CITED

- Armstrong, Nancy. *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel*. New York: OUP, 1987.
- Austen, Jane. *Mansfield Park*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1996.
- Howells, William Dean. "An Opportunity for American Fiction." Review of *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions* by Thorstein Veblen. *Literature: An International Gazette of Criticism* 28 Apr. 1899: 361-62.
- Litvak, Joseph. *Strange Gourmets: Sophistication, Theory, and the Novel*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997.
- Veblen, Thorstein. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Penguin, 1979.

Wuthering Heights and *The Secret Garden*: A Response to Susan E. James*

ANNA KRUGOVOY SILVER

The time was long overdue within literary and cultural criticism for a thorough comparison of Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847) with Frances Hodgson Burnett's classic novel for children, *The Secret Garden* (1911). Although I analyzed representations of motherhood in both texts in an earlier essay, Susan E. James has finally written an extended essay about the many ways that *The Secret Garden* echoes Brontë's work.¹ James's discussion of character development, setting, plot, and structure in *Wuthering Heights* and *The Secret Garden* conclusively demonstrates the depth of Burnett's debt to Brontë, as well as the many ways that Burnett "rewrites" the themes and concerns of her literary mentor, telling a new tale in addition to revising an older one. James makes a strong, even undeniable, case for *Wuthering Heights* as a sort of palimpsest over which Burnett wrote *The Secret Garden*, on the whole softening the harsher and more disturbing edges of Brontë's controversial novel. My response will offer some critiques of James's work, as well as some avenues for future scholarly exploration.

James several times alludes to nature in her essay and to its central role in *The Secret Garden*. She discusses at length the Yorkshire settings of both texts, noting that Burnett creates a "safer environment for her child readers" (61) than Brontë's moors by setting the action of her novel within a sheltered, enclosed garden. James contrasts the

*Reference: Susan E. James, "Wuthering Heights for Children: Frances Hodgson Burnett's *The Secret Garden*," *Connotations* 10.1 (2000/2001): 59-76; see also Lisa Tyler, "Brontë and Burnett: A Response to Susan E. James," *Connotations* 12.1 (2002/2003): 61-66.

"gloomy, glooming presence of the Yorkshire moors" in *Wuthering Heights* (a bit of a misreading, since Brontë does not *solely* represent the moors as gloomy; they are also sunny, full of birds and flowers) to the life-giving walled garden in which Mary and Colin play.² James views the garden, the symbolic heart of Burnett's work, as a refuge from the unpredictable and frightening natural world, a world with which Brontë was more familiar than Burnett and with which she sympathized more deeply. Though a longer discussion of nature was beyond the scope of James's essay, more could be done here in future work. How do the authors, implicitly, define "nature"? How do Burnett's and Brontë's visions of human nature differ? How are these conceptualizations of human goodness or evil reflected in the landscape; in other words, how do the authors conflate or distinguish "nature" from "human nature"? Phyllis Bixler explores the Romantic linkage, posited by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, between the growth of a child and the growth of a plant. In such a paradigm, "human nature" and "nature" are closely paralleled, and therefore the metaphors of the garden and the moor becomes central to the wider analysis of maturation, mothering and nurturance in both novels.³ As James indicates in her assertion that "Heathcliff mirrors the destructive aspects of nature" and Mary "the constructive aspects which nurture life," both Brontë and Burnett consistently conflate "human nature" and "nature" (63). Catherine describes Heathcliff, for instance, as "an arid wilderness of furze and whinstone."⁴ How, then, do Burnett and Brontë represent the child differently, and how is a particular child's maturation linked to his or her environment? These questions remain open for exploration.

James's comparison of characters in *The Secret Garden* and *Wuthering Heights* is illuminating of both texts. While she does not propose a rigid one-to-one correlation between specific characters in the two novels, James analyzes some striking parallels. For example, both Mary and Heathcliff begin the respective novels as orphans and outcasts, and both are selfish and passionate; however, Heathcliff, according to James, destroys the family that adopts him while Mary

brings unity to Misselthwaite Manor by helping to reunite her brooding and tormented uncle Archibald Craven with his son Colin. James also calls the reader's attention to similarities between Mary and Catherine Linton and between Colin and Linton Heathcliff. Mary and Catherine, for instance, share several characteristics, including a "sullen streak of stubbornness" and their attraction to the "nature boys" Dickon and Hareton, whom James describes as "rough illiterates at home on the moors" (64). Mary's and Catherine's cousins Colin and Linton, on the other hand, are both sickly, whining weaklings. Of course, the boys' fates are very different, as Colin thrives under Mary's and Dickon's care, while Linton grows more cruel and selfish under Heathcliff's mistreatment and eventually dies: Burnett clearly paints Colin's character affectionately, while Linton is perhaps the most irredeemable character in *Wuthering Heights*. Heathcliff's character finds echo also in Archibald Craven. Like the adult Heathcliff, bitter and friendless after Cathy's death in childbirth, Archibald mourns the death of his wife Lilies, unable to endure a relationship with the son who reminds him too much of his beloved wife, afraid in part that Colin will "become the same physical and emotional cripple that Craven fears himself to be" (65). James persuasively suggests that each of these characters echoes in some manner one or more characters in *Wuthering Heights*.

James's compelling analysis does, however, elide some key distinctions between characters in the two novels, and particularly in terms of social class. For example, James's comparison of the "nature boys" Dickon and Hareton does not take into consideration the important ways in which these characters differ, ways that reverberate throughout the plots of the novels. Dickon belongs to what could be called the rural poor; his mother, Mrs. Sowerby has "four places to put every penny."⁵ Dickon is clearly Mary and Colin's social inferior, although his knowledge of the ways of nature also make him, within the boundaries of the unkempt garden, a knowledgeable and respected authority. However, though Dickon is a likeable character—many readers and critics in fact find him much more appealing than Colin—

his class identity remains in tact throughout the novel, leading to the diminution of his role towards the end of the narrative. At the end of the novel, when Colin triumphantly meets his father, restored to full health, he declares proudly, "It's *my* garden now [...] Dickon and my cousin have made it come alive."⁶ Colin implies, nor does Burnett dispute elsewhere, that Dickon and the unnamed Mary have served and worked for Colin, but that Colin is, by virtue of his social class, the natural lord of the manor. Dickon's role in the second half of the novel becomes less important once Colin's health renders him inessential. In his essay on class in *The Secret Garden*, Jerry Phillips, after analyzing Dickon's role as Wordsworthian child of nature, concludes that

Far from being an independent spiritual hero, Dickon is a creature of a ruling elite fantasy, a secret desire of the more reactionary face of the British class system—a rank domestic subaltern. No master could ever find Dickon wanting; the 'common cottage boy' is the perfect trusty retainer, a mirror in which a master might find a fair reflection of himself, a prime worthy.⁷

Ultimately, Dickon is important to the narrative primarily in relation to Colin and, less so, to Mary. Moreover, although Burnett's novel is concerned only with her characters' childhood, the reader could assume (in distinction to Catherine and Hareton) that no future romance will take place between Mary and her friend. It is worth noting, in addition, that Colin also overshadows Mary's importance by the novel's end: U. C. Knoepfelmacher writes that Burnett "cedes the garden to her little Adam" and "suddenly becomes more interested in Colin's silly push-ups and acts of physical prowess than in Mary's instinctual need to actualize the imaginary gardens she had built in India."⁸ In short, the proper class and gender hierarchy has been restored with the return of Archibald Craven to Misselthwaite Manor and the recovery of the son who will one day take over its ownership.

While Burnett romanticizes rural poverty through figures like Dickon and the crusty but loyal and dependable Ben Weatherstaff, Brontë does not. The young Heathcliff and Hareton's poverty, lack of

education, and hard work are presented as examples of injustice and cruelty: in Heathcliff's case, after Hindley throws the boy out of the home, he "deprived him of the instructions of the curate, and insisted that he should labour out of doors instead, compelling him to do so, as hard as any other lad on the farm."⁹ Similarly, Hareton's illiteracy is a source of humiliation, evidence of his degradation by Heathcliff. Rather than admiring his ignorance, Cathy's first attempt at friendship consists of teaching him how to read and, shortly after Cathy and Hareton form their alliance, they together plan "an importation of plants from the Grange" at Wuthering Heights, indicating that they will humanize and "civilize" the now violent and asocial house.¹⁰ While it is true to some extent, then, that Hareton is a "man of the soil," he integrates his fondness for the moors with a very strong desire (seemingly not felt by Dickon) to educate himself by reading classic literature; he is not merely an unreflective "child of nature" (64, 69). Unlike Dickon, who is born into a poor family, Hareton is poor and uneducated only because Heathcliff deviously steals his inheritance. At the end of the novel, rather than being ignored and overshadowed, as Dickon is in *The Secret Garden*, Hareton takes center stage, becoming master of Wuthering Heights and eventually winning back his just birthright. Ultimately, as in Burnett's novel, proper social relations are reestablished at the end of *Wuthering Heights*, since Hareton (as evidenced by the name "Hareton Earnshaw" carved above the door) is its rightful owner. However, while Burnett minimizes Mary's role, Brontë does not erase Cathy at the end of the novel, emphasizing instead the partnership and equality between the two cousins.

In her essay, James assumes that Heathcliff is a Gypsy who speaks Romany, probably basing this assumption on Mrs. Earnshaw's comment that the newly-arrived Heathcliff is a "gipsy brat."¹¹ However, Heathcliff's genealogy is left unclear in the novel. Mr. Linton, for instance, refers to the boy Heathcliff as "that strange acquisition my late neighbour made in his journey to Liverpool—a little Lascar, or an American or Spanish castaway."¹² Later, Nelly comforts Heathcliff by

playfully suggesting that "Who knows, but your father was Emperor of China, and your mother an Indian queen."¹³ The reader knows that Heathcliff is dark and evidently not of Anglo descent; however, other than that, Brontë does not reveal his parentage. Perhaps an Irish immigrant, perhaps Creole or Spanish, Heathcliff's ambivalent ethnicity makes him from the outset of the novel a marginal figure in the Yorkshire Moors, immediately hated by the Earnshaw family even before he reveals, or develops, his personality.¹⁴ James claims that "Both [Mary and Heathcliff] speak words the locals cannot understand—Heathcliff, Romany and Mary, Hindi—although Mary has the advantage of speaking English as well" (62-63). Besides the fact that the reader does not know whether Heathcliff is initially speaking Romany or some other language, or merely speaking incomprehensibly (Nelly mentions only that he "repeated over and over again some gibberish that nobody could understand"), Heathcliff does speak English.¹⁵ Brontë notes that only "a few days afterwards," Heathcliff and Catherine are "now very thick," and although Heathcliff "said precious little," Nelly notes that he generally tells the truth.¹⁶ Finally, in terms of Heathcliff's character, James mentions that his "ungovernable passions" initiate the action in *Wuthering Heights*. This, too, seems to be a misreading of Heathcliff's character. While I agree wholeheartedly with James's reading of Heathcliff as destructive and violent (a reading that wisely counters earlier romanticized and overly-sympathetic readings of his character) Heathcliff's emotions are not wholly "ungovernable." Rather, from childhood, he displays a remarkable control over his emotions that Catherine and Mary do not. For example, shortly after he arrives, he reveals both his stoicism—"he would stand Hindley's blows without winking or shedding a tear, and my pinches moved him only to draw in a breath"—and, more importantly, his capacity for calmly and successfully manipulating others, as when he manages to blackmail Hindley to give him his new colt.¹⁷ I would contrast Heathcliff's behavior most clearly with Mary's. Mary has far less self-control than Heathcliff, for while Heathcliff is patient and quiet even in illness, Mary screams, throws temper

tantrums, and slaps servants' faces. In part, again, the differences in Heathcliff's and Mary's behaviors stem from power dynamics: though both children are outsiders, as James observes, Heathcliff is essentially a poor servant while Mary is kin to the Cravens and waited upon by servants. To conflate Heathcliff's and Mary's situations thus ignores some important differences in their social contexts.

James has written a fascinating essay that links two beloved books set in the Yorkshire moors. Readers of both texts will learn much from her research, and will better understand Burnett's children's novel when they consider it next to Brontë's text. Just as the ghost of Lillias calls Archibald Craven back to the garden in *The Secret Garden*, so does Burnett call her reader back to *Wuthering Heights*, asking us to revisit themes, images, and tropes that Brontë developed so masterfully in her novel.

Mercer University
Macon, Georgia

NOTES

¹Anna Krugovoy Silver, "Domesticating Brontë's Moors: Motherhood in *The Secret Garden*," *The Lion and the Unicorn: A Critical Journal of Children's Literature* 21.2 (1997): 193-203. For other literary influences on Burnett, see Juliet Dusinberre, *Alice to the Lighthouse* (London: Macmillan P, 1997). I would also recommend the following essay: Elizabeth Lennox Keyser, "'Quite Contrary': Frances Hodgson Burnett's *The Secret Garden*," *Children's Literature* 11 (1983): 1-13.

²James 61.

³See Phyllis Bixler, "Gardens, Houses, and Nurturant Power in *The Secret Garden*," *Romanticism and Children's Literature in Nineteenth-Century England*, ed. James Holt McGavran (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1991) 208-24. Bixler also discusses other literary influences on Burnett, including Dickens.

⁴Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights* (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 102.

⁵Frances Hodgson Burnett, *The Secret Garden* (New York: Apple, n.d.) 71.

⁶Burnett 199; emphasis mine.

⁷Jerry Phillips, "The Mem Sahib, the Worthy, the Rajah and His Minions: Some Reflections on the Class Politics of *The Secret Garden*," *The Lion and the Unicorn: A Critical Journal of Children's Literature* 17.2 (1993): 183-84.

⁸U. C. Knoepfelmacher, "Little Girls Without Their Curls: Female Aggression in Victorian Children's Literature," *Children's Literature* 11 (1983): 24-25.

⁹Brontë 44.

¹⁰Brontë 317. For good discussions, see Anita Levy, *Other Women* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991) and Linda Peterson, "A Critical History of *Wuthering Heights*," *Wuthering Heights: Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*, ed. Linda Peterson (Boston: St. Martin's P, 1992).

¹¹Brontë 35.

¹²Brontë 48.

¹³Brontë 56.

¹⁴Maggie Berg, *Wuthering Heights: The Writing in the Margin* (New York: Twayne, 1996) 6.

¹⁵Brontë 35.

¹⁶Brontë 36.

¹⁷Brontë 36.

The Making of a Goddess: Hardy, Lawrence and Persephone¹

ANDREW RADFORD

I

In the sunless fog preceding the dawn in Chapter 20 of Thomas Hardy's novel *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1890), Angel Clare mobilises the decorative rhetoric of late-Victorian Hellenic paganism to manufacture the eponymous heroine as "Artemis" and "Demeter":

The spectral, half-compounded, aqueous light which pervaded the open mead impressed them with a feeling of isolation, as if they were Adam and Eve. At this dim inceptive stage of the day Tess seemed to Clare to exhibit a dignified largeness both of disposition and physique, an almost regnant power—possibly because he knew that at that preternatural time hardly any woman so well-endowed in person as she was likely to be walking within the boundaries of his horizon [...]. The mixed, singular, luminous gloom in which they walked along together to the spot where the cows lay, often made him think of the Resurrection-hour. He little thought that the Magdalen might be at his side. Whilst all the landscape was in neutral shade, his companion's face, which was the focus of his eyes, rising above the mist-stratum, seemed to have a sort of phosphorescence upon it. She looked ghostly, as if she were merely a soul at large [...]. It was then [...] that she impressed him most deeply. She was no longer the milkmaid, but a visionary essence of woman—a whole sex condensed into one typical form. He called her Artemis, Demeter and other fanciful names, half-teasingly—which she did not like because she did not understand them. (*Tess* 134-35)

Richard Carpenter contends that this scene provides irrefutable evidence of Hardy fashioning Tess as a primitive fertility figure: "at Talbothays Hardy shows his heroine as sometimes much more impressive than a simple country lass ought by rights to be [...]. In her naturalness, in her unsophisticated simplicity, and in her innocence

[...] the peasant girl is at this point as complete an image of the archetypal earth-goddess as modern literature can show" (Carpenter 134-35). However, the opening extract does not comprise Hardy's unflinchingly honest appraisal, but rather the misleading impression attributed to Angel Clare, and it is far from being an example of "uneducated vision" (Krasner 97). If "the two lovers inhabit an Edenic world of unrestrained natural instincts" (Wright 113), it is one glibly fabricated by Clare himself, imposing a literary, counterfeit picture of god-like status on the protagonist (it is bitterly ironic that he calls her Artemis, the cold chaste deity of the hunt, who destroyed with her arrows men who attempted to rape her²). Demeter was also a goddess of chastity in some versions of the myth, but because of her ties with agriculture as a goddess of ripe grain, she was a fertility divinity too. Clare fancies in his casual love-play that Tess combines the unsullied innocence of Artemis with the exuberant fruitfulness of Demeter. As the very embodiment of "the great passionate pulse of existence" (*Tess* 161), Tess must be "fresh and virginal" like Artemis, but without losing the generous productiveness of Demeter.

Hardy implements a double perspective throughout this crucial episode: though the whimsical inventions mediated through Clare's perceiving consciousness are problematised, Tess's palpable presence is not. What this extract chronicles is the *breaking*, rather than *making* of an earth-goddess. This stems from Hardy's anguished awareness of a deep and genuine loss, or perversion, of what is natural. Angel Clare's trivializing dilettantism is disastrous: his visual strategies and recurrent posturing make it impossible to entertain traditional mythological representation as a means of invigorating a desiccated late-Victorian milieu. He converts Tess's sensuous reality into the abstract essence of a tritely mythologized Nature. *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* enacts the sacrifice of "a goddess figure of immense stature" (Stave 101) in whom exist genuinely profound and mysterious forces, mediated and glimpsed on occasions that involve a process akin to transfiguration. But from the moment Tess is distinguished by her white muslin dress at the May-time Marlott "Cerealia" until she is "unfurled" as a

black flag over Wintoncester gaol after her execution, Hardy's Persephone figure never transcends the traumatic consequences of her "underworld" experiences with Angel Clare and Alec d'Urberville:

The forests have departed, but some old customs of their shades remain. Many however linger only in a metamorphosed or disguised form. The May-Day dance [...] was to be discerned [...] in the guise of the club-revel, or 'club-walking', as it was there called. [...] Its singularity lay less in the retention of a custom of walking in procession and dancing on each anniversary than in the members being solely women [...]. The club of Marlott alone lived to uphold the local Cerealia. It had walked for hundreds of years, if not as benefit-club, as votive sisterhood of some sort; and it walked still. (*Tess* 18-19)

Both the title of *Tess's* First Phase, "The Maiden," suggesting Persephone's virginal status before her abduction by Pluto, and Hardy's description of the Marlott festivities as a "local Cerealia," referring to the Roman celebrations held in honour of Ceres during eight days in the month of April, alert us to a telling link between Tess and the figures of Demeter and Persephone. Although there is scant evidence to suggest Hardy scrutinised John Ruskin's principal work on mythology, *The Queen of the Air* (1869), the *Literary Notebooks* indicate that he did read the second part at least of Walter Pater's impressionistic account of "The Myth of Demeter and Persephone" (1876). An obstructive critical prejudice dismisses Hardy's mythological framework in *Tess* as little more than the faltering display of classical scholarship by a self-educated vulgarian.³ However, from the moment when Hardy modified the description of the Marlott club-walking from "Vestal rite" in the manuscript to "local Cerealia" for the *Graphic* serialization, he was convinced that the Demeter-Persephone myth, far from being an ornamental detail, would be seamlessly woven into the imaginative fabric of his narrative. With the replacement of the Roman goddess of fire, Vesta, by Ceres/Demeter, goddess of the corn-bearing earth, as the tutelary deity of the festivities, Hardy brings a more unsettling note into the "May-Day" event. His final substitution of "local Cerealia" for the earlier amendment may have

been connected to the stimulus provided by reading Frazer's *The Golden Bough* during the early months of 1891. A darkly prophetic undercurrent imbues the revised club-walk episode, foreshadowing the fierce polemical purpose of later chapters in which Hardy addresses the relationship between virginity, fecundity and purity; and life, death and rebirth. His placing of the mythological motif near the start of the novel creates an expectation that Tess, like Ceres the Italo-Roman goddess of agriculture identified with the Greek Demeter, will suffer traumatic loss and grief; and, like Persephone, in her overall aspect of unblemished maidenhood, will endure physical violation at the hands of a sexually predatory stranger (Alec d'Urberville), and make a symbolic visit to the underworld. From an early period of composition then, Hardy was using pointed and pungent allusions to the Demeter-Persephone story so as to craft an intricate network of symbolic correspondences.

Hardy was alert to the stinging ironies and incongruities he could use by an extended parallel between the traditional ballad narrative of the ruthless exploitation of female innocence and the abduction and rape of Persephone by Pluto, the Underworld Lord. His classical allusions underpin the searching social critique that becomes increasingly strident in the mature novels, which all brood over the legal and physical relations between the sexes. Hardy incorporates some of the emblems of Demeter and Persephone—flowers and a basket of fruit—to link his young heroine to the unified goddess. Tess's most distinctive trait is her "flower-like mouth," and she carries a "bunch of white flowers" (*Tess* 19) in her left hand during the Marlott procession. After visiting Alec d'Urberville she suddenly blushes at the spectacle of "roses at her breast; roses in her hat; roses and strawberries in her basket to the brim" (*Tess* 47). In most accounts of the abduction of Persephone, including Walter Pater's, the divine maiden is picking roses as well as poppies when Hades or Pluto transports her off to the Underworld. Hardy modifies this flower scene by having Alec take Tess to the "fruit-garden" where he feeds her strawberries of the "British Queen" variety and then adorns Tess's hat and basket of fruit

with roses. The "British Queen" strawberries symbolically doom Tess to return near the end of the novel as Alec's Queen, his paid mistress, at the meretricious Sandbourne resort, recalling the pomegranate seeds that Hades tricks Persephone into eating to guarantee that she will revisit the Underworld and rule as his 'Queen' for one-third of the year.

Despite the promise of a life to come implicit in Persephone's return from the underworld, Hardy is more interested in the myth's tragic implications. Acceptance of a sacrificial communion and the attainment of new vitality will not work in *Tess*, which signals the death of a figure traditionally associated with the blossoming organic fecundity of an agricultural milieu. This interpretation is borne out by Tess's capture at Stonehenge in the novel's memorable finale. The foreboding conceit of Hardy's Henge, its shape rendering the black sky blacker, offers no hint of enlightened change for it has crumbled and fossilized into the Hebraic orthodoxies against which *Jude the Obscure* rails with unprecedented and despairing satire. The arrest of Tess at the pagan temple of Stonehenge, once home to a religion older than almost any other, implies the ruined character of the mythical past in a contemporary society moving unalterably towards spiritual suicide. This feeling is accentuated by the fact that Tess receives sentence in a court not even represented in the narrative. Tess approximates to a Persephone figure that simultaneously incorporates two warring states of nature: asexual forces (which stop her joining the orgiastic Chaseborough dance) and sexual ones; the Christian and the pagan (her ancestor is called Pagan d'Urberville), the wantonly destructive (her murder of Alec d'Urberville) and the luxuriantly fecund. This combination is sacrificed at the ancient temple that recalls the Proserpine of Swinburne's *Poems and Ballads* (1866): a personification of nature as mortality and sleep. At sunrise Tess awakens to find herself surrounded on the altar stone by dark figures of the law who seem as if they are wearing ritual masks: "in the growing light, their faces and hands [...] were silvered, the remainder of their figures dark" (*Tess* 381). That Hardy refuses to offer any compensating vision

of redemption is underlined by Stonehenge, a forbidding image of stony circularity, a stark emblem of narrative closure.

II

To D. H. Lawrence, re-reading *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* prior to composing his *Study of Thomas Hardy* (1914), Hardy's bleak interpretation of the Demeter-Persephone myth was yet another glaring instance of his predecessor's unrelenting concentration on the intractability of loss and deprivation in the Wessex world.

[Hardy] cannot help himself, but must stand with the average against the exception, he must, in his ultimate judgement represent the interests of humanity, or the community as a whole, and rule out the individual interest.

To do this [Hardy] must go against himself. His private sympathy is always with the individual, against the community [...]. Therefore he will create a more or less blameless individual and, making him seek his own fulfilment [...] will show him destroyed by the community, or by that in himself which represents the community. (Lawrence, *Study of Thomas Hardy* 49)

Lawrence deplores Hardy's intensely pessimistic rendering of Tess Durbeyfield who, after the night of her rape/seduction under the "Druidical" oaks of The Chase, is unable to rise from the ashes of her ruined reputation. For Lawrence, the sacrifice of Tess Durbeyfield is seen not as a triumphant demonstration of a lingering pagan mythology, but as its deathstroke. Her execution by hanging marks the failure of a dignified conception of a natural divinity. And Angel Clare's facile imaginings of Tess at Talbothays as "Artemis" and "Demeter" only confirm the futility of trying to resurrect an authentic sense of primitive god-like potency. The *Study of Thomas Hardy*, offering a deeply personal and intuitive analysis of the Wessex Novels, contends with blustering verve that Hardy permits his moral "judgement" to outweigh his spirited support for venturesome characters like Tess, who fails to combat the corrosive cant of the wider "community." Tess, in Lawrence's opinion, "cannot separate" herself "from the mass

which bore" her, and so she becomes a "pathetic rather than tragic" figure (Lawrence, *Study* 45-46). In his review of *Georgian Poetry, 1911-12* Lawrence almost venomously positioned Hardy, along with Ibsen and Flaubert, as one of "the nihilists, the intellectual, hopeless people" who represent "a dream of demolition" (Lawrence, *Selected Literary Criticism* 72) from which his own war-ravaged generation must awake.

Whatever his reservations, Lawrence's highly-strung *Study of Thomas Hardy* reveals a deep appreciation for his predecessor's use of the Persephone tale as an imaginative "lens" through which to gauge late-Victorian England and its discontents. However, Lawrence's revisionist story of Persephone refuses to repeat Tess's grim fixation on the abridgement of women's control over their own words, bodies and destinies. Lawrence's most bracing riposte to Hardy's *Tess* is *The Lost Girl* (1920), a novel which illustrates how the Persephone myth, as a focus of the fractured but resurgent union of mother, daughter and the earth's prodigal fecundity, cannot be altogether effaced by the tale of brutish male dominance superimposed upon it. Lawrence's Alvina Houghton, encountering the Plutonic, undergoes a process of being mythicized; instead of studiously cultivating conscious social or personal identity, as in traditional novelistic treatment, she is divested of it, assuming the role of a primordial archetype.

Until very recently, seminal studies of Lawrence's fiction have passed over *The Lost Girl* in almost embarrassed silence. As Ann L. Ardis notes, "*The Lost Girl* has had the dubious distinction of being the lost text in Lawrence's canon, even though it is the only book for which Lawrence received a major award during his lifetime" (Ardis 80). That this novel should be a "lost text" is all the more surprising and unjust given the sophistication with which Lawrence employs the Persephone myth as a partially concealed pattern shaping his narrative into a ritual sequence (see Hyde; Donovan; Viinikka; Franks 29-44). Lawrence's sources for this interest in the goddess figure range from Dante Gabriel Rossetti's paintings of *Proserpine* to the turn-of-the-century studies of comparative religion by Sir James Frazer, Jane

Ellen Harrison and Gilbert Murray. Lawrence's first explicit references to the findings of this "Cambridge School" date from 1913. In a letter to Bertrand Russell on December 8, 1915, Lawrence remarked that he had been looking at both Frazer's *Golden Bough* and *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910). In the following year, he read Gilbert Murray and Frazer's distinguished mentor, E. B. Tylor. Lawrence reacted ebulliently to Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871), and its sober, stringent examination of the mythopoeic consciousness of archaic man. To two different correspondents he expressed his preference for it over *The Golden Bough*, with its tedious multiplication of examples and lack of a firm theoretical framework. Lawrence's ardent enthusiasm for Tylor's research convinced him that by exploring the elemental energies enshrined in the Persephone myth he could overhaul the hidebound, humourless conventions of his modern moment and refresh them with potencies drawn from a dateless past. In *The Lost Girl*, Lawrence employs an ancient story illustrating the seasonal decay and revival of vegetation to address the mysteries of identity and the phenomenon of war.

The Lost Girl exploits with mischievous relish the irony of Lawrence's central protagonist Alvina Houghton having to evade the stultifying conventionality of a Midlands town not by rising above it but by travelling below its thick, ugly crust of railways and roads. By delineating Alvina as a Persephone figure who stoically endures the unrelieved sterility of imaginative and intellectual life in her "wintry" provincial town and who journeys to the "springtime" of the Italian countryside, Lawrence implicitly demonstrates how Hardy's treatment of the myth fails to confront the positive aspects of the youthful goddess's return from the gloomy underworld. Although the crucial reference to Persephone towards the end of *The Lost Girl*'s first chapter is couched in terms of exultant ascent—"Dame Fortune would rise like Persephone out of the earth" (LG 17)—Lawrence is more excited by the concept of movement downwards into atavistic darkness so as to achieve sharpened consciousness or multiplied perception. In fashioning this notion of invigorating and fecund darkness, Lawrence

may have had in mind the remorseless logic of public entrapment exposed by Arnold Bennett's *Anna of the Five Towns* (1902), a novel *The Lost Girl* superficially resembles in its opening stages (see Norton 171-90):

But she [Anna] continued to think of Mynors. She envied him for his cheerfulness, his joy, his goodness, his dignity, his tact, his sex. She envied every man. Even in the sphere of religion, men were not fettered like women. No man, she thought, would acquiesce in the futility to which she had already half resigned; a man would either wring salvation from the heavenly powers or race gloriously to hell. Mynors—Mynors was a god! (*Anna* 75)

Alvina Houghton in *The Lost Girl* will not be choked by "envy" for the unfettered freedoms that her male counterparts blithely take for granted in her hometown of Woodhouse. Like the smug Sydney suburbia in Lawrence's Australian novel *Kangaroo* (1923), Woodhouse is "sprinkled on the surface of a darkness into which it never penetrated" (K 13); it is Alvina who will "race gloriously to hell" in order to savour the atavistic darkness that is a purgative release from crippling social constraint. This is in sharp contrast to Willa Cather's *A Lost Lady* (1923), whose Persephone figure, Mrs Forrester, dies defeated by the hypocritical and malicious pretences of a community that will not brook her youthful vivacity and poise: her ghost is invoked from the underworld of Niel Herbert's bitter memories:

He would like to call up the shade of the young Mrs. Forrester, as the Witch of Endor called up Samuel's, and challenge it, demand the secret of that ardour; ask her whether she had really found some ever-blooming, ever-burning, ever-piercing joy, or whether it was all fine play-acting. Probably she had found no more than another; but she had always the power of suggesting things much lovelier than herself, as the perfume of a single flower may call up the whole sweetness of spring. (Cather 175)

It is Lawrence's goal in *The Lost Girl* to illustrate with vivid detail how Alvina salvages a source of "ever-piercing joy" from her seemingly unpromising surroundings, while resisting "the elements of a young ladies' education" (LG 11).

Like Thomas Hardy and Arnold Bennett before him, Lawrence portrays the smothering of the creative by an intolerant urban bourgeoisie, whose crass manners and mores are the object of much satirical gusto in *The Lost Girl's* abrasively self-reflexive opening chapter (see Alcorn 78-89; Daleski 17-28; Ross 5-16):

In Woodhouse, there was a terrible crop of old maids among the [...] tradespeople and the clergy. The whole town of women, colliers' wives and all, held its breath as it saw a chance of one of these daughters of comfort and woe getting off. They flocked to the well-to-do weddings with an intoxication of relief. (LG 2)

Alvina and her father cannot fulfil their dreams of a more rewarding existence given that their Midlands neighbours are unapologetically Philistine and censorious. Nor can Alvina gain sustenance from her own mother Clariss Houghton, whom Lawrence depicts as a desperately enfeebled Demeter, a "heart-stricken nervous invalid" (LG 11) compelled to cede maternal control to the redoubtable governess Miss Frost. Clariss Houghton is a scalding contrast to the "Good Mother" described by Melanie Klein, "the omnipotent and generous dispenser of love, nourishment and plenitude" (Moi 115). She is banished to a shadowy back-bedroom in Manchester House—marginalized, querulous and tormented by neurotic dread:

At half-past six in the morning there was a clatter of feet and girls' excited tongues along the back-yard and up the wooden stairway outside the back wall. The poor invalid heard every clack and every vibration. Every morning alike, she felt an invasion of some enemy was breaking in on her. And all day long the low, steady rumble of sewing-machines overhead seemed like the low drumming of a bombardment upon her weak heart. To make matters worse, James Houghton decided that he must have his sewing-machines driven by some extra-human force. He installed another plant of machinery—acetylene or some such contrivance—which was intended to drive all the little machines from one big belt. Hence a further throbbing and shaking in *the upper regions*, truly terrible to endure. (LG 10; my italics)

Against the positive unfolding of selfhood and sudden expansion of sympathy that Alvina will achieve in Throttle-Ha'Penny coalmine,

Lawrence reveals here with a complex mixture of bitterly sardonic wit and genuine pathos, a "truly terrible" site of female disempowerment. The mystical resonances and reverberations so redemptive for the daughter in the mine are measured against the incessant din generated by the sewing-machine girls employed by James Houghton.

III

The Lost Girl differs markedly from Hardy's *Tess* in the degree to which it stresses the immeasurable worth of Alvina's subterranean experiences over the stifling social and moral prohibitions that worry her invalid mother. Unlike Tess Durbeyfield, who in Lawrence's opinion, ultimately "sided with the community's condemnation of her" (*Study* 46), Alvina will not allow herself to be "destroyed" by the pernicious mainstream majority, and she is liberated from the shackles of "herd-instinct." If we borrow Lawrence's terms in the *Study of Thomas Hardy*, Alvina is "individualist", "beyond the average"; she 'chooses to rule' her own life to her "own completion." In Sylvia Townsend Warner's novel *Lolly Willowes* (1926), Laura Willowes, with a shrug of weary resignation, accepts "the inevitable. Sooner or later she must be subdued into young-ladyhood" (Warner 18). But Alvina chafes against this dreary etiquette of "lady-like" submission to conventional decorum. She prefers the rich possibilities of relationship obscurely encoded in sensory and affective experience; ultimately evading the multiple pressures of place and history that Hardy presented so despairingly in *Tess*. Lawrence's vehement drive to portray a convention-breaking character, innately distrustful of attitudes that dictate presumptuously to experience, whose rebellion against the "community" largely succeeds, is indicated in the original working title *The Insurrection of Miss Houghton*. In *The Lost Girl*, the daily frustration of English middle-class living, epitomised by the "incarceration" of Clariss Houghton in the shop-soiled recesses of Manchester House, need not be an insurmountable obstacle to Alvina's ambitions.

Though, as one commentator observes, "for Hardy, Lawrence's sense of freedom would be delusion" (Kinkead-Weekes 102).

If, according to H. D. in *Bid Me to Live* (1960), the "past had been blasted to hell" in 1917 and "the old order was dead" (Doolittle 24), then Lawrence ensures that his references to Persephone are imbued with intimations of hopeful metamorphosis in *The Lost Girl*. He does not consider the danger of deploying timeless archetypes that may work to naturalize gender oppression, and he lacks H. D.'s thoroughly defined sense of the political implications of classical reference in relation to the contemporary woman question. Lawrence's primary concern is to convey Alvina progressing towards a keen apprehension of how awesome beauty and shocking violence form essential parts of the world she lives in. To know the comfortless grandeur of the "Plutonic earth," Lawrence implies, is to register it according to sensuous awareness, the "blood," or the unconscious. This awareness allows a resilient Alvina to keep her unique powers fresh in a moribund Midlands milieu, cutting against the prevailingly sombre and pensive tone of Hardy's *Tess*. This is exemplified in Chapter 4 of *The Lost Girl*.

When Alvina visits the Throttle-Ha'Penny pit operated by her quixotic father James, she registers for the first time the condition of "underneathness" as a creative augmentation of selfhood, with its manifold and elliptical promptings of feeling. Throttle-Ha'Penny represents that stratum of primitive energy normally overlaid by moral and social conditioning. A startling shift of perception takes place, from a grimly everyday mode to a much less definable and dislocating mode, free from the strictures of logic, in which Alvina is both dumbstruck onlooker and avid participant. The "downwardness" invokes a different, more dynamic form of temporality from the merely chronological, which it holds in abeyance. The pit and the colliers—a realm of male physical industrial work—give Alvina a sense of the currents flowing beneath the surface of her cheerless petit bourgeois life. Lawrence gains from the vitality of existing mythologies to make enigmatic and arresting myths of his own, evoking new "mysteries."

Lawrence captures a note of excited confusion as Alvina is immersed in an utterly unfamiliar element.

The working was low, you must stoop all the time. The roof and the timbered sides of the way seemed to press on you. It was as if she were in her tomb forever, like the dead and everlasting Egyptians. She was frightened, but fascinated. The collier kept on talking to her, stretching his bare, grey-black, hairy arm across her vision, and pointing with his knotted hand. The thick-wicked tallow candles guttered and smelled. There was a thickness in the air, a sense of dark, fluid presence in the thick atmosphere, the dark, fluid, viscous voice of the collier making a broad-vowelled, clapping sound in her ear. He seemed to linger near as if he knew—as if he knew—what? Something forever unknowable and inadmissible, something that belonged purely to the underground: to the slaves who work underground: knowledge humiliated, subjected, but ponderous and inevitable. (LG 47)

This scene reassesses the “darkness” of mere moral and intellectual bewilderment that assails Tess on the night of her rape/seduction among the primeval oaks of “The Chase.” When a collier stretches “his bare, grey-black, hairy arm across her vision” a sensual energy impinges on Alvina’s consciousness. By granting her chthonic surroundings precedence over the unsmiling custodians of demure gentility in the upper world, Alvina finds herself caught deliriously between fear and fascination, pleasure and pain, liberation and suffocation. Her initiatory ordeal is into a secret knowledge of occult significance that all the colliers apparently share. The adroit mixture of Alvina’s breathlessly rapt perspective (“you must stoop all the time”), and the coolly objective point of view (“It was as if she were in her tomb forever”), makes the “you” involve the reader’s sense in this richly textured imaginative descent. Lawrence also exploits the multiple meanings of “purely”, recalling Hardy’s controversial subtitle to *Tess* that defiantly declares his ‘Pure Woman’ is “faithfully presented.” That “something forever unknowable and inadmissible,” belonging “purely to the underground,” Lawrence links to Alvina’s shocked rediscovery of the primal roots of her being.

Roger Fowler argues that the pit and the colliers offer Alvina “a sexual awakening” (Fowler 63). But Fowler’s interpretation oversim-

plifies Alvina's multi-faceted reaction to the seemingly oppressive environment. It is difficult to reconcile Fowler's notion with Alvina feeling entombed like "the dead and everlasting Egyptians." The instinctual life, with all its excitations and commotions of feeling, glimpsed by Alvina in the second-rate mine cannot thrive in the mechanised English setting of *The Lost Girl*. She is trapped among social beings whose lives are consecrated to upholding an ideology of decorous conduct that demands joyless abstention from worldly pleasure. Alvina's urgent struggle against the toils of high-mindedness is provided with an absurdly comic counterpoint: her father's persistent efforts to make his commercial ventures profitable in a town whose inhabitants are generally myopic, mundane and bigoted. That Alvina inherits some of her father's haughty aloofness shows in her unwavering opposition to the precepts of the community that has reared her. This is Lawrence's pointed response to what he judges as Hardy's abject negativity in his use of the Persephone myth in *Tess*.

Throttle-Ha'Penny is for Alvina a bizarre mode of emancipation from the severely restricting ideology of Woodhouse gentility. She yields to the chthonic powers of the netherworld by temporarily surrendering lucid self-awareness. This is Alvina's first step towards merging with a series of cosmic and elemental locations so that "Hades" can be viewed both as a chthonic deity and as a specific, scrupulously realised physical locale:

And still his voice went on clapping in her ear, and still his presence edged near her, and seemed to impinge on her—a smallish, semi-grotesque, grey-obscure figure with a naked brandished forearm: not human: a creature of the subterranean world, melted out like a bat, fluid. She felt herself melting out also, to become a mere vocal ghost, a presence in the thick atmosphere. (LG 47)

Alvina consorts with the unseemly troupers of James Houghton's vaudeville theatre, thus *sinking* to the bottom of "polite" society—a movement that mirrors her exhilarated descent into the mine. Yet she maintains a peculiar gift: "her ancient sapience went deep, deeper

than Woodhouse could fathom. The young men did not like her for it" (LG 35). She repudiates all the suitors who would be considered appropriate and offends the sanctimonious superiority of her neighbours by marrying the obtuse Italian peasant Ciccio Marasca. Her insurgency against the inflexible protocol and expectations of Woodhouse existence is a far cry from the sense of parochial inevitability which Lawrence finds so disheartening in Hardy's *Tess*, where finer feelings are repeatedly subject to crushing extinction on the part of social custom. Indeed, Lawrence records in the *Study of Thomas Hardy*: "This is the theme of novel after novel: [...] be passionate, individual, wilful, you will find the security of the convention a walled prison, you will escape, and you will die" (Lawrence, *Study* 43).

Alvina's subterranean trial shows how it is feasible, in a moment of unguarded rapture, to apprehend the rich darkness flowing beneath the "walled prison" of Woodhouse mediocrity. Alvina's selfhood fuses with the environment as she melts bat-like into the thick, vital atmosphere. Her perceptions are greatly accentuated when she emerges from the pit, out of her "swoon":

She blinked and peered at the world in amazement. What a pretty, luminous place it was, carved in substantial luminosity. What a strange and lovely place, bubbling iridescent-golden on the surface of the underworld. Iridescent-golden—could anything be more fascinating! Like lovely glancing surface on fluid pitch. But a velvet surface. A velvet surface of golden light, velvet-pile of gold and pale luminosity, and strange beautiful elevations of houses and trees, and depressions of fields and roads, all golden and floating like atmospheric majolica. Never had the common ugliness of Woodhouse seemed so entrancing [...]. It was like a vision. Perhaps gnomes and subterranean workers, enslaved in the era of light, see with such eyes. (LG 47-48)

Alvina's epiphany clashes with Mrs Moore's experience of the Marabar Caves in *A Passage to India* (1924) where Forster depicts the fragility of the social self when assailed by unconscious impulses. In the Caves Mrs Moore might be seen as a Demeter figure engulfed by an apocalyptic vision when searching for the pallid, passionless Per-

sephone Adela Quested. But whereas Mrs Moore cannot cope with the crisis of identity that the cave induces—she loses all sense of metaphysical unity underlying the phenomenal world—Alvina is almost painfully alert to what is happening to her in the subterranean realm. She begins to rediscover her true identity through a willed, even exultant surrender to the instinctual self.

Alvina's descent into and return from the Woodhouse "underworld" is of an altogether more enabling intensity than that described by Forster in the Marabar Caves. Our sense of the "human" (Alvina and the colliers) is replaced first by the "animal" (bats), then by the striking colour and shapes of tangible objects. The forlorn contours of the industrial landscape—which normally choke and enervate Alvina—are now suffused with a shimmering haze of golden light. She unlocks the sensuous realities of a region in which the natural and the artificial ("velvet-pile of gold") have coalesced beautifully. Alvina, unlike Tess Durbeyfield and Forster's Mrs Moore, preserves vitality in the underworld and brings it back to the surface, creating a dynamic and dazzling new locale. "Bubbling," "glancing," "elevations," "floating" catches the exuberant buoyancy felt in Lawrence's memorable scene. To the habitually dreary Woodhouse topography Alvina donates a visionary force discovered in the drugged absorption of the darkness below. Tess cannot achieve the same effect when labouring on the bleakly inhospitable Flintcomb-Ash farm (the name suggesting burnt-out matter). Flintcomb-Ash, with its barren soil and machines that obliterate human identity, becomes for Tess "pandaemonium" (Tess 324), the location of all demons and the capital of Hell in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Tess languishes at Flintcomb-Ash but Alvina, by contrast, apprehends the fecundity within herself. Her ability to metamorphose her wintry landscape is a type of quickening, underlined by the fact that Alvina's name is related to the Italian *alvo*, which can be used to designate "the womb."

In the next paragraph Lawrence elaborates the notion of the colliers as the devitalised and warped descendants of timeless chthonic powers:

Slaves of the underworld! She watched the swing of the grey colliers along the pavement with a new fascination, hypnotized by a new vision. Slaves—the underground trolls and iron-workers, magic, mischievous, and enslaved, of the ancient stories. But tall—the miners seemed to her to loom tall and grey, in their enslaved magic. Slaves who would cause the superimposed day-order to fall. Not because, individually, they wanted to. But because, collectively, something bubbled up in them, the force of darkness which had no master and no control. It would bubble and stir in them as earthquakes stir the earth. It would be simply disastrous, because it had no master. There was no dark master in the world. The puerile world went on crying out for a new Jesus, another Saviour from the sky, another heavenly superman. When what was wanted was a Dark master from the underworld. (LG 48)

The passage is the deadly *reverse* of the creative *obverse* when Alvina emerges from Throttle-Ha'Penny and bequeaths new potency to the shabby, unfinished uniformity of her Midlands town. Now she images an apocalyptic eruption of the suppressed underworld force. Lawrence's version of the Plutonic "Dark master" (contrasting with the "Plutonic master" (*Tess* 315-16) of the steam-threshing machine at Flintcomb-Ash), located in the realm of wisdom that is intuitive and instinctual, embodies a subversive element whose tremors threaten to shatter the uncomprehending upper world, the debased "day-order." The passage shows Alvina in a place of "gnomes" and "underground trolls," deftly shifting emphasis from Classical to Nordic legend and myth. When Alvina travels to Italy, a more unnerving experience of self-dispossession envelops her, without any consoling reference to quaint, fey images of fairytale creatures. Her first subterranean adventure is revised into a more brutal and bruising encounter in the Italian section of *The Lost Girl*; the facile gnomes become frightening Lemures and Furies.

Alvina's response to the grey colliers streaming past her is termed "nostalgia," which modulates into an unconsciously sexual "craving": "As it always comes to its children, the nostalgia of the repulsive, heavy-footed Midlands came over her again [...] the [...] dark, inexplicable and yet insatiable craving—as if for an earthquake" (LG 48). Lawrence repeats "nostalgia" once Alvina has settled in Italy: "The terror, the agony, the nostalgia of the heathen past was a constant

torture to her mediumistic soul" (LG 315). Alvina's capacity to grasp things not with her intellectual faculties, but with her instinctual awareness, has outlasted the Midlands tedium and the imposition of rationality. Nevertheless, her intricately developed sensual responsiveness requires the highly charged atmosphere of southern Italy, a locale sufficiently removed from the modern tendencies of mechanical industrialisation. That these traits damage the human gift for potentially joyous, involuntary and unconscious activities of thought is stressed by Lawrence's caustic description of the "alternative" underworld: James Houghton's "Pleasure Palace" (LG 105), a rickety picture-house and the last of his breathtakingly botched business ventures (Cowan 95-114). This nickelodeon vaudeville theatre, featuring both short films and music hall "turns," is an abortive effort on Houghton's part to replicate for a paying public Alvina's subterranean episode in Throttle-Ha'Penny. The Palace provides a threadbare form of 'darkness' in which bizarre celluloid "visions" flicker to the clattering accompaniment of a second-rate piano: "The lamps go out: gurglings and kissings—and then the dither on the screen: 'The Human Bird,' in awful shivery letters. It's not a very good machine, and Mr May is not a very good operator. Audience distinctly critical" (LG 110). Houghton's ramshackle picture-house duplicates the mine adventure only in its 'red-velvet seats' at the front (LG 106): an impish glance at the "velvet-pile" on the surface of Alvina's underworld (LG 47-48).

IV

The resources of explosive aggression suggested by Lawrence's depiction of the "Dark master" in *The Lost Girl's* Chapter 4 also infuse Francesco Marasca (whose surname means "bitter cherry"—or to the heroine "dark poison fruit" evoking the pomegranate seeds given to Persephone). Ciccio is a member of the Natcha-Kee-Tawaras, a group of continental troupers, and functions in the intricate schema of the

novel as Pluto to Alvina's Persephone. However, this strand of analogy is complicated by Lawrence's refusal to be confined within the limits of a single myth. Ciccio's physical attributes suggest not only Pluto but Dionysus, the Greek god of wine, agriculture and corn (the Roman Bacchus), also associated with the underworld. According to Frazer,

Dionysus was believed to have died a violent death, but to have been brought back to life again; and his sufferings, death, and resurrection were enacted in his sacred rites. His tragic story is thus told by the poet Nonnus. Zeus in the form of a serpent visited Persephone, and she bore him Zagreus, that is, Dionysus, a horned infant. (Frazer 397)

Dionysus, whose "tragic story" reflected the yearly dissolution and renewal of vegetation, was a late addition to the rites of another Greek deity, Demeter. That Lawrence reveals Ciccio's malevolent energies by repeatedly comparing him to animals is significant: "one met the yellow pupils, sulphurous and remote. It was like meeting a lion" (LG 160); "there was a certain dark, leopard-like pride in the air about him" (LG 289); "his long, cat-like look" (LG 173); his "eyes watched her as a cat watches a bird, but without the white gleam of ferocity" (LG 211). "A feature in the mythical character of Dionysus," Frazer explains, "which at first sight appears inconsistent with his nature as a deity of vegetation, is that he was often [...] represented in animal shape" (Frazer 399). The Italian's inscrutable black eyes denote cruel remoteness and predatory acquisitiveness. Ciccio is feline: not only does he possess the sensuous beauty of the cat but also its elusive dexterity and fiercely independent nature. Furtive and inaccessible, the Italian represents a figure of atavistic energy. This atavism is treated not so much as a virtue but as a subjugating force by Mrs Tuke: "'Why not *be* atavistic if you *can* be, and follow at a man's heel just because he's a man. Be like barbarous women, a slave.'" (LG 286) Alvina dwells on Mrs Tuke's words: "Was it atavism, this sinking into extinction under the spell of Ciccio? Was it atavism, this strange, sleep-like submission to his being? [...] Would she ever wake out of her dark, warm coma?" (LG 288). Ciccio is treated like a traditional

vagabond among the Natcha-Kee-Tawaras troupe and his role in the elaborate dance with Kishwegin (LG 141) is that of torturer and killer.

Even as *The Lost Girl* insists on Ciccio's volatility, his character is complicated by Lawrence's celebration of his subtle, sinewy, flower-like embodiment of Italy's seductive beauty, "extraordinarily velvety and alive" (LG 140). Even wearing his "terrifying war-paint" for the pre-show procession, he is "like a flower on its stem" (LG 141). Alvina first notices his "long, beautiful lashes" (LG 125), "slender wrists" (LG 128) and "frail-seeming hands" (LG 129). Despite the male chauvinism of Ciccio's opinions, Lawrence implies, the Italian is more like one of the flowers Persephone stoops to pick rather than a bullying and wilfully perverse patriarch. It is quiet recognition of his "passional vulnerability" that moves Alvina to devotion (LG 291) when she notices that "his face was open like a flower right to the depths of his soul, a dark, lovely translucency, vulnerable to the deep quick of his soul" (LG 291). The images of fluid darkness, sacrificial suffering and enslavement connected with Alvina's revelatory vision during and immediately after her visit to the coalmine are evoked again when she succumbs to Ciccio. Lawrence reinvents the rape of Persephone by Pluto:

The sense of the unknown beauty of him weighed her down like some force. If for one moment she could have escaped from that black spell of his beauty, she would have been free. If only she could, for one second, have seen him ugly, he would not have killed her and made her his slave as he did. But the spell was on her, of his darkness [...]. And he killed her. He simply took her and assassinated her. How she suffered no one can tell. Yet all this time, this lustrous dark beauty, unbearable. (LG 202)

In Chapter 4, Alvina had regarded the colliers as "slaves of the underworld [...] tall and grey in their enslaved magic" (LG 47); now she acknowledges that the Italian intended her to be "his slave" (LG 203). While she has by no means been raped, she is placed in this extreme position by her helpless erotic attachment to Ciccio. And her subjugation in other areas of life is distinctly forced upon her. The final sentences move seamlessly into Alvina's perspective to convey the radi-

cal ambivalence of her visionary episode, which maintains a delicate equipoise between the sumptuously productive and violently destructive. "Black spell" recalls Alvina's "Egyptian tomb" episode in *Throttle-Ha'Penny*, and anticipates the "downslope into Orcus" that Somers craves in *Kangaroo*, that "sacred darkness, where one was enveloped into the greater god as in an Egyptian darkness. He would meet there or nowhere" (K 143). The seismic intensity of these subterranean settings Lawrence transfers to Ciccio; but his elliptical presence is even more destabilising—Alvina is subjected to, and surreptitiously relishes, boorishly unsympathetic sexual behaviour. Lawrence's version of Persephone's ravishment attaches more significance to its vivid religious meaning than to any social debate on the chilling implications of abduction and forced submission.

Alvina's immersion in the underworld atmosphere of Ciccio's presence is a more problematic encounter than Alec d'Urberville's abduction of Tess/Persephone in Hardy's novel. The "thick darkness" (*Tess* 76) that engulfs Tess on this night implies The Chase is a version of the Frazerian underworld, a "gloomy subterranean realm" (Frazer 406), to which Hades forcibly transports Persephone. This event is rehearsed when Alec carries an apprehensive and frightened Tess—again dressed in white—off to his residence, appropriately called "The Slopes," in a manner that grotesquely parodies Hades's seizing of the unwilling Persephone and bearing her away in his chariot to the Underworld. But instead of the Underworld god's "golden car" (Frazer 406), Alec ironically possesses—in a sly allusion to the old anagrammatic reversal of "god" as "dog"—a "dog-cart" (*Tess* 57). Hardy never lets us forget the bitterly incongruous images of a Demeter who in the myth, once realizing that her daughter has been stolen, embarks on a frantic search and does everything in her power to rescue her, including laying waste the upper world which brings humanity to the verge of extinction, and Joan Durbeyfield who actively engineers the union between her daughter and the supposed relative of wealth. Like Pluto, whose name the Romans often translated into *Dis*, the Latin word for "riches," Alec has sufficient funds

(derived from his father's commercial success in the industrialized North) to purchase his pleasure and capitalize on Tess's deep sense of obligation towards her impecunious family. As he drives the heroine downhill, the ground seems to open up like the chasm out of which Hades suddenly arose: "The aspect of the straight road enlarged with their advance, the two banks dividing like a splitting stick" (*Tess* 57). Hardy stresses descent: "Down, down they sped, the wheels humming like a top." Unlike Alec in *Tess* who ruthlessly exploits then spurns Tess, Ciccio is the instrument of Alvina's further development; he releases her from a staid bourgeois life that denies not only passion, but the free expression of individual imagination.

Though Lawrence views Alvina's "abduction" as necessary, even cathartic, this is not a consistent strategy in his fiction. In Lawrence's first novel *The White Peacock* (1911), Lettie and George clearly need each other but Lettie aspires to move "upward" through the social hierarchy into what she regards as more elegantly refined "higher" society, not downward into the vivid immediacy of George's farm setting, and she is thus sardonically termed "Persephone": "Lettie was on in front, flitting darkly across the field, bending over the flowers, stooping to the earth like a sable Persephone come into freedom" (*WP* 143). Another "Proserpine" in the same novel is, on the other hand, no socially mobile and emotionally complex modern young woman like Alvina but a "big, prolific woman" (*WP* 135), a coarse matron who is preferred by her gamekeeper husband over the high-society "peacock" who had once toyed with the prospect of marrying him. The opposites so strikingly elaborated in *The Lost Girl* singularly fail to harmonise in *The White Peacock*. In his edgier portraits of the Persephone and Pluto figures in his fiction, Lawrence implies the marriage of opposites can generate more instability and dissension than benefit. So in *Sons and Lovers* (1913), the mother Gertrude Morel proudly polices the boundaries of what she regards as the rarefied standards of "enlightened" culture, which merely goads the father Walter Morel to ever more savage hostility after labouring manually all day in the gloomy "underworld" of the Bestwood mine.

With regard to Ciccio's Plutonic power in *The Lost Girl*, Lawrence deliberately makes it difficult for us to distinguish between the darkness as vibrant source of regeneration, and the gloom of merciless annihilation. Ciccio's "terrible" passion provides for emotional re-birth, yet even this salvation is rendered with a sustained ambiguity. At her new home in the Abruzzi Mountains, Alvina is assaulted by more terrifying currents of primeval activity than she could ever have envisaged in the bowels of the English earth. Life with Ciccio means loss of caste, months of solitariness and the penury of peasant Italy; under Italian marriage law Alvina effectively becomes her husband's property. She is distinctly subjugated: Ciccio and one of his male relatives seem to be "threatening her with surveillance and subjection" (LG 329). His relatives will not discuss with any woman religious issues, political controversies or any other topic that would feature in Alvina's topical conversation within her more cultivated English coterie of friends. In spite of this dismissive treatment, she is, paradoxically, almost revered as a radiant opposite to the surly, taciturn men of her new home who see in her "a fairness, a luminousness" of soul, "something free, touched with divinity" (LG 325). This divinity, we realise, is that of the daylight Persephone, however attenuated in her present circumstances.

In Chapter 15, "The Journey Across," Alvina leaves dismal, dead England behind her. Indeed, it is swept away as an unreal vision, and from the boat it resembles a slowly sinking coffin:

England, beyond the water, rising with ash-grey, corpse-grey cliffs, and streaks of snow on the downs above. England, like a long, ash-grey coffin slowly submerging. She watched it, fascinated and terrified. It seemed to repudiate the sunshine, to remain unilluminated, long and ash-grey and dead, with streaks of snow like cerements. That was England! Her thoughts flew to Woodhouse, the grey centre of it all. (LG 294)

The passage conflicts with the shimmering vision of Woodhouse after Alvina's emergence from the pit: "What a strange and lovely place, bubbling iridescent-golden [...] a velvet surface of golden light" (LG 64-65). The colourful, living landscape in Chapter 4 is now an ash-

grey coffin that repudiates "the sunshine, to remain unilluminated" (LG 329). Alvina, like her creator, abandons the real and symbolic Old Country, disenchanted by the grim constrictions of bourgeois life, for a supposedly undefiled land. In *The Lost Girl*, Italy signifies both the largely unmapped hinterland of the psyche, and a terrestrial New World of reborn possibilities for Alvina. Approaching Italy in the train, she feels "vaster influences spreading around, the Past was greater, more magnificent [...]. For the first time the nostalgia of the vast Roman and classic world took possession of her" (LG 297). Alvina's rapt response betrays a touristic tweeness of which she will be disabused by the tough peasant life awaiting her. Lawrence does not glibly sentimentalise the region to which Alvina is taken by her husband. She feels vulnerable in "the darkness of the savage little mountain town" (LG 305). The hill-peasants are "watchful, venomous, dangerous" (LG 324); and Alvina, to survive, "must avoid the *inside* of it" (LG 325), just as she avoided being ensnared by the Victorian-English centre of Woodhouse.

Alvina's journey, part spiritual and part sexual, is towards the excavation of the pagan elements within, an exposure of unconscious "chords." The austere contours of her new home are both bewitching and deeply distressing. Terror need not exclude the beatific: "she was [...] stunned with the strangeness of it all: startled, half-enraptured with the terrific beauty of the place, half-horrified by its savage annihilation of her" (LG 314). This vision of Italy is much crueller than the darker side of her overwhelming experience in the pit. Throttle-Ha'Penny displayed the colliers as victims; now Alvina is the victim, assailed by forces that reach the deepest ground of her being. Her existence has radically shifted from the rigours of high-mindedness to the vitality of spontaneous communion with the cosmos, her newly opened senses energised by elemental natural forces. This metamorphosis is reflected in the verbal texture of the novel, which begins as a carefully calibrated study of manners reminiscent of Arnold Bennett's *Anna of the Five Towns* (1902), and ends bordering on lurid gothic melodrama.

V

In *The Lost Girl's* Chapter 15, Alvina is stirred by "the grand pagan twilight" of the Italian valleys, "savage, cold, with a sense of ancient gods who knew the right for human sacrifice."

It stole away the soul of Alvina. She felt transfigured in it, clairvoyant in another mystery of life. A savage hardness came in her heart. The gods who had demanded human sacrifice were quite right, immutably right. The fierce, savage gods who dipped their lips in blood, these were the true gods. (LG 315)

In Hardy's *Tess* the protagonist also experiences an individual moment of "transfiguration" when she baptizes her illegitimate child with the help of her younger brothers and sisters. However, Tess does not discover within herself enough potency to prevent the death of her baby, who is born in the spring, the time when Persephone returns to Demeter, and is buried in August during the harvest, when the Romans commemorated Persephone's disappearance. In this dramatically stylized picture of the girl-mother Hardy does not imply any development of Tess's individual thought-patterns. She does not seem aware that she has been invested with a preternatural strength. But Lawrence's Alvina *feels herself* "transfigured" and "clairvoyant in another mystery of life," able to apprehend matters beyond the range of ordinary perception. The writing gains special force from the context of the Great War against which it is played. Ciccio is called up in the final pages, leaving Alvina with grave doubts about her future. The Great War touches, and is touched by, every reference to human sacrifice, annihilation and the spellbinding but merciless chthonic deities in *The Lost Girl*. What is most arresting about the later chapters is how the Persephone myth connects with this cataclysmic event. Persephone was understood to symbolise the seed corn that must descend into the earth so that from apparent death new life may germinate. The Italian section of *The Lost Girl* enables Lawrence to move beyond any superficial use of a sentimentally encouraging myth. There are implications to Alvina unconsciously embracing the

"fierce gods" as she embraces the "assassination" inflicted by Ciccio. The gods who demand human sacrifice, who dip "their lips in blood," are to her "immutably right" (LG 315).

Human sacrifice of one kind or another occurs in Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent* and "The Woman Who Rode Away." Yet Alvina's experience is unusual. That the Great War should be endorsed as *necessary* destruction from which a new order may emerge is not perhaps Lawrence's explicit intention. However, in Chapter 14, the England Alvina disavows is likened to a "long, ash-grey coffin, *winter*, slowly submerging in the seas" (my italics). Lawrence may have been anxious that his de-sentimentalised Persephone myth was open to misinterpretation. Alvina, living in an "isolate" state of wonder, imagines what it would be like to turn to the fierce, dark gods as spring gets under way. In this season of overflowing abundance, she finds herself worshipped by Ciccio because she is pregnant. March in the Italian hills brings a "real flowering": the scent of wild narcissus is "powerful and magical" to her (LG 335), there are "white and blue violets," "sprays of almond blossom," "peach and apricot," rose-red gladioli and black-purple irises (LG 335). Frazer records how magenta anemones, indigo grape hyacinths, rose cyclamens, lavender crocuses, rose-red gladioli and black-purple irises are emblematic of rites of protection against malignant spirits or of ancient fertility deities such as Persephone (Frazer 346). In this riot of natural colour, Alvina "felt like going down on her knees and bending her forehead to the earth in an oriental submission, they were so royal, so lovely, so supreme" (LG 335). She seems to blend with her vibrant setting, divested of the incubus of socially constructed, rather than essential, selfhood; even her modern time metamorphoses backwards into mythic time.

Although the "outside world" is "so fair," with corn and maize "growing green and silken" (LG 333), Alvina recoils from the hyacinths, which remind her "of the many-breasted Artemis, a picture of whom, or of whose statue, she had seen somewhere. Artemis with her clusters of breasts was horrible to her, now she had come south: nauseating beyond words" (LG 333). The ambivalence of Artemis is sig-

nalled by her link here with childbirth, as well as being the chaste goddess of the hunt in Angel Clare's account of Tess at Talbothays. "Nauseating" indicates the psychological complexity of the pregnant Alvina's state: she is frightened, fretful and depressed; yet she longs to see her child. Her fluctuations of mood are a crucial element in the psychological truth of these closing chapters. The figure of Artemis, covered all over with breasts, sickens Alvina because it recalls her fraught encounter with Mrs Tuke in travail, who felt she was being "torn to pieces by Forces" (LG 334). This image clashes with Angel Clare's facetious evocation of Tess as Artemis or "a visionary essence of woman" (Tess 134-35) in the pre-dawn light of Hardy's novel. Lawrence works against Clare's destructive dilettantism by showing the elemental potencies assailing Alvina as genuinely hostile and jarring.

Alvina's retirement from civilised society brings rapport with a rugged natural world that would be alien to Angel Clare's fanciful imaginings of a lush pastoral paradise populated by gallant swains and coy milkmaids. Alvina can throw off "the burden of intensive mental consciousness" (LG 238) and enter into the nonhuman world. Alert to the ancient land upon which a new one is being laid, Alvina uncovers a full-bodied presence imbuing the surrounding void: an immense embodiment of unconscious energy. Alvina possesses a tense modernity combined with acute receptiveness to a landscape heavy with the debris of its ancient forebears; she becomes a metaphysical voyager, questioning the moralities and social verities of her cultural heritage, and debunking the orthodox attitudes which inhibit spontaneity and personal growth. Alvina yearns for rapt immersion in the Italian terrain, to be a participant in some larger nonhuman drama. But her withdrawal is not by any means simply life-enhancing. Alvina's regression to the primitive releases inhuman terrors: vestigial remnants of a violent, non-Christian past. Lawrence ruthlessly redefines the "nostalgia" Alvina felt in Woodhouse to exclude any hint of soothing sentimentality. To land, sea and sky she has the ability to respond lyrically, but the site, if it implies an untapped repository of a

primitive unconscious state, causes almost a Gothic shudder:

She seemed to feel in the air strange Furies, Lemures, things that had haunted her with their tomb-frenzied vindictiveness since she was a child and had pored over the illustrated Classical Dictionary. Black and cruel presences were in the under-air. They were furtive and slinking. They bewitched you with loveliness, and lurked with fangs to hurt you afterwards. There it was: the fangs sheathed in beauty—the beauty first, and then, horribly, inevitably, the fangs. (LG 333-34)

To Alvina these entrancing but vengefully destructive spirits are powerfully present. Clipped sentences and clauses, organized to show an emphatic, personal, awed intonation ("They were furtive and slinking"), convey Alvina's awed awareness of a locality "which savagely and triumphantly" refuses "our living culture" (LG 370-71). When she is languishing in the Midlands, Lawrence suggests that she possesses "ancient sapience" (LG 35) which on the Continent evolves into a "mediumistic" capacity, the exquisite torture of the "neuralgia" in her "very soul" (LG 315). Her "clairvoyant" mode of perception, exposing her in Throttle-Ha'Penny to "underground trolls" and various "figures of fairy-lore" (LG 65-66), now uncovers the "tomb-frenzied vindictiveness" of Furies and Lemures. Darkness, in large measure a glamorous symbol of metamorphosis in the English section of *The Lost Girl*, acquires a fiendishness and menace as Alvina travels to Italy.

The Lost Girl attests Lawrence's courage in addressing what appalled Hardy, in attempting to excavate a vitalizing force, a fecund darkness, in that perception of man divorced from the rhythms governing seasonal change and natural fruition. Lawrence rescues the Persephone figure from the repressive rubble of Hardy's late-Victorian culture and makes the myth resonant again in an era of profound cultural and social ferment. He invokes the ancient tale to illustrate in an increasingly uncompromising way Alvina's reaction to the deep forces of the elemental world and her preservation of their creative and illuminating power in the bitter darkness of her waiting. But Lawrence does not provide a straightforwardly optimistic and

august account of the Persephone myth. As Alvina becomes immersed in the pagan twilight of her Italian home, she feels utterly abandoned and alone, given that Ciccio is called up to serve in the Great War. In the final pages, this "New Woman" as Persephone ponders whether she might make a brief return to the surface world of genteel English manners: "She was always making little plans in her mind—how she could get out of that cruel valley and escape to Rome, to English people" (LG 336). She becomes "mute, powerless [...] like a lump of darkness, in that doomed Italian kitchen" as "death and eternity were settled down on her" (LG 338). And thus she is left in a version of "Hades." It is a measure of Lawrence's sophistication that *The Lost Girl* ends with this edgy awareness not only of the value but also the cost of Alvina's Plutonic adventures.

University of Glasgow
Glasgow, Scotland

NOTES

¹The title is taken from Chapter VI of feminist classicist Jane Ellen Harrison's seminal study of ancient matriarchal goddesses such as Demeter and Persephone in *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903).

²See Nancy Barrineau, "Explanatory Notes" to the Oxford World's Classics Edition of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*: "Artemis, [...] the chaste goddess of the hunt, often slew with her arrows men who tried to rape her" (393).

³See, for example, Millgate, *Thomas Hardy*, which surveys, and convincingly rebuts, many of the reductive scholarly assessments of Hardy's classical erudition. See also Wright, *Thomas Hardy*, which also registers Hardy's detailed knowledge of classical literature.

WORKS CITED

- Alcorn, John. *The Nature Novel from Hardy to Lawrence*. London: Macmillan, 1977.
 Ardis, Ann L. *Modernism and Cultural Conflict*. Cambridge: CUP, 2002.
 Bennett, Arnold. *Anna of the Five Towns*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972.
 Bernstein, Susan. "Confessing and Editing: The Politics of Purity in Hardy's *Tess*." *Virginal Sexuality and Textuality in Victorian Literature*. Ed. Lloyd S. Davis. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1993. 159-78.

- Carlson, Kathie. *Life's Daughter/Death's Bride: Inner Transformations through the Goddess Demeter/Persephone*. Boston: Shambhala, 1997.
- Carpenter, Richard. *Thomas Hardy*. New York: Twayne, 1964.
- Cather, Willa. *A Lost Lady*. London: Virago, 1990.
- Cowan, James C. "Lawrence and the Movies: *The Lost Girl* and After." D. H. Lawrence and the Trembling Balance. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1990. 95-114.
- Daleski, H. M. "The Encoding of *The Lost Girl*." D. H. Lawrence Review 30.1 (2001): 17-28.
- Donovan, Josephine. *After the Fall: The Demeter-Persephone Myth in Wharton, Cather, and Glasgow*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1989.
- Doolittle, Hilda. *Bid Me To Live: A Madrigal*. 1960. Redding Ridge, Conn.: Black Swan Books, 1983.
- Fowler, Roger. "The Lost Girl: Discourse and Focalization." *Rethinking Lawrence*. Ed. Keith Brown. Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1990. 53-66.
- Franks, Jill. "Myth and Biography in *Where Angels Fear to Tread* and *The Lost Girl*." D. H. Lawrence Review 30.1 (2001): 29-44.
- Frazer, James. *The Golden Bough: An Abridgement from the First and Second Editions*. Ed. with introd. Robert Fraser. Oxford: The World's Classics, 1994.
- Gibson, James. *Thomas Hardy: A Literary Life*. London: Macmillan, 1996.
- Guirand, Felix, ed. *The Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology*. Introd. Robert Graves. London: Paul Hamlyn, 1966.
- Hardy, Thomas. *The Literary Notebooks of Thomas Hardy*. Ed. Lennart A. Bjork. 2 vols. New York: New York UP, 1985.
- . *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*. Ed. with introd. Juliet Grindle and Simon Gatrell. Explanatory notes by Nancy Barrineau. Oxford: The World's Classics, 1988.
- Harrison, Jane Ellen. *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. 1903. Repr. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991.
- Hyde, Virginia. "'Lost Girls': D. H. Lawrence's Versions of Persephone." *Images of Persephone: The Persephone Myth in Western Literature*. Ed. Elizabeth T. Hayes. Florida: U of Florida P, 1992. 99-119.
- Kalikoff, Beth. "The Execution of Tess d'Urberville at Wintonchester." *Executions and the British Experience from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century: A Collection of Essays*. Ed. William B. Thesing. New York: McFarland & Co., 1990. 111-21.
- Kinckad-Weekes, Mark. "Lawrence on Hardy." *Thomas Hardy After Fifty Years*. Ed. Lance St. John Butler. London: Macmillan, 1977. 90-103.
- Krasner, James. *The Entangled Eye: Visual Perception and the Representation of Nature in Post-Darwinian Narrative*. Oxford: OUP, 1992.
- Lawrence, D. H. *Kangaroo*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.
- . *Sons and Lovers*. Ed. Helen Baron and Carl Baron. Cambridge: CUP, 1992.
- . *The Lost Girl*. Ed. John Worthen. Cambridge: CUP, 1981.
- . *The White Peacock*. Ed. Andrew Robertson. Cambridge: CUP, 1983.

- . "Review of *Georgian Poetry, 1911-1912*." *Selected Literary Criticism*. Ed. Anthony Beal. London: Heinemann, 1973. 71-78.
- . *Selected Literary Criticism*. Ed. Anthony Beal. London: Heinemann, 1973.
- . *Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays*. Ed. Bruce Steele. Cambridge: CUP, 1986.
- Millgate, Michael. "Hardy's Fiction: Some Comments on the Present State of Criticism." *English Literature in Transition* 14 (1971): 230-38.
- . *Thomas Hardy: His Career as a Novelist*. London: Bodley Head, 1975.
- Moi, Tori. *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Nicholson, Sarah. "The Woman Pays: Death and the Ambivalence of Providence in Hardy's Novels." *Literature and Theology* 16.1 (March 2002): 27-39.
- Norton, David. "Lawrence, Wells, and Bennett: Influence and Tradition." *Journal of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association* 54 (1980): 171-90.
- Pater, Walter. "The Myth of Demeter and Persephone." *Greek Studies: A Series of Essays*. London: Macmillan, 1910. 81-151.
- Ross, Michael L. "Losing the Old National Hat: Lawrence's *The Lost Girl*." *D. H. Lawrence Review* 30.1 (2001): 5-16.
- Ruskin, John. *The Queen of the Air: Being a Study of the Greek Myths of Cloud and Storm*. Kent: George Allen, 1887.
- Stave, Shirley A. *The Decline of the Goddess: Nature, Culture, and Women in Thomas Hardy's Fiction*. London: Greenwood P, 1995.
- Viinikka, Anja. *From Persephone to Pan: D. H. Lawrence's Mythopoeic Vision of the Integrated Personality*. Turku, Finland: Turun Yliopisto Julkaisu, 1988.
- Warner, Sylvia Townsend. *Lolly Willowses or The Loving Huntsman*. 1926. Repr. London: Virago, 1995.
- Wickens, Glen. "Hardy and the Aesthetic Mythographers: The Myth of Demeter and Persephone in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*." *University of Toronto Quarterly* 53.1 (Fall 1983): 85-106.
- Wright, T. R. *Hardy and the Erotic*. London: Macmillan, 1992.
- . *Thomas Hardy and History*. London: Macmillan, 1974.
- Zuntz, Gunther. *Persephone: Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1971.

Dracula and the Cultural Construction of Europe*

JASON DITTMER

Professors Coundouriotis and Senf have written truly innovative articles regarding Bram Stoker's *Dracula* because of the focus that they have put on the importance of place to the novel. However, it is possible to go even further down the path that they have blazed and situate geography at the absolute center of the novel rather than just on the periphery. The purpose of this paper is not so much to disagree with Professor Coundouriotis, but instead to build on and alter her argument, in which I believe she is too concerned with specifics that are not entirely substantiated (as pointed out by Professor Senf in her reply). I do not believe that it was necessary for Stoker to know much about the historical Vlad (as argued by Miller 182), because instead of tapping into historical specifics, Stoker is tapping into a larger geographic construct (Eastern Europe) which has a series of meanings already attached to it.

Since it is impossible to adequately paraphrase Professor Coundouriotis' detailed and substantial argument, I will focus on a few of her major points. She, for the first time, puts *Dracula* in the historical and geographic context in which it was written by foregrounding the importance of the Eastern Question to Britain, and by extension, European identity. In this, I wholeheartedly agree. Furthermore, she claims that *Dracula* represents the Ottoman influence in Eastern Europe: "a source of history that 'logically' (but also anxiously) needs to be silenced" (144). To this, though, I must demur and posit another

*Reference: Eleni Coundouriotis, "*Dracula* and the Idea of Europe," *Connotations* 9.2 (1999/2000): 143-59; Carol A. Senf, "A Response to '*Dracula* and the Idea of Europe,'" *Connotations* 10.1 (2000/2001): 47-58.

For the original article as well as all contributions to this debate, please check the Connotations website at <<http://www.connotations.de/debcoundouriotis00902.htm>>.

possible reading in which *Dracula* represents not just the Ottoman influence and threat, but instead all of Eastern Europe, more extensive than the former Turkish areas. The important issue is less the Eastern Question than it is the cultural construction of Europe itself. To understand this position, one must pull back from the specific text of *Dracula* and instead look at the genre of travel literature during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a body of literature that *Dracula* imitates through its heavy use of journal entries and letters from abroad. Indeed, one must also pull back from the specific politics associated with the Eastern Question and instead look at the politics associated with the construction of "the East" *within* Europe itself.

Travel Literature and the Enlightenment

Larry Wolff (4) attributes the construction of an Eastern Europe that is separate from the "civilized" portions of Western Europe to Enlightenment philosophers (in particular, Voltaire and Rousseau) who perpetuated and mythologized each other's accounts of a backward and barbaric homogenous region (some of them despite never actually going there). For example, Voltaire's *History of Charles XII* (1731) was critical in mapping Eastern Europe in the popular imagination by describing Charles' march through Eastern Europe. This book was written in the first person and instilled a fantasy-filled image of Eastern Europe that later travelers would bring with them to Eastern Europe, inserting a lens of preconceptions in their imagination. We know that the book was extremely influential because it had several printings and translations, and its effect was far-reaching and long lasting. Later Voltaire would write a history of the Russian Empire under the rule of Peter the Great (1759) and he used the now popular image of Peter as a "modernizer" to paint Russia as innately backwards and in need of Europeanization (a representation of the Russian executive that was still dominant in the Western media during the more recent reign of Boris Yeltsin). Later correspondence between

Voltaire and Catherine the Great (which was all published at the time) further established Russia as a “backward” land in the minds of readers. Rousseau played a similar role in the cultural construction of Poland, constructing Poland and its neighbors as chaotic, despotic, or both:

Poland is a large state surrounded by even more considerable states which, by reason of their despotism and military discipline, have great offensive power. Herself weakened by anarchy, she is, in spite of Polish valor, exposed to all their insults [...]. No economic organization; few or no troops; no military discipline, no order, no subordination; ever divided within, ever menaced from without, she has no intrinsic stability, and depends on the caprice of her neighbors. (2: 431)

In addition to this representation from philosophers who may or may not actually have been to Eastern Europe there were similar depictions available to the public from completely fictional travelers, such as those of Baron Munchausen (Wolff 100-06). While there was a real Baron Munchausen who did travel through Eastern Europe, the stories published about his namesake were tall tales written by Rudolf Raspe that portrayed Eastern Europe as a ridiculous and fantastic place. This representation became fashionable just as travel to the region increased, which is interesting as evidence supporting the cliché “familiarity breeds contempt” because Southwest Asia and East Asia received a much more romantic image, perhaps because of their inaccessibility for most Europeans at the time. Similarly, Goldsworthy notes: “the Gothic plot [as of *Dracula*] requires a setting which is sufficiently close to the reader to appear threatening, while nevertheless being alien enough to house all the exotic paraphernalia—the castles, the convents, the caverns, the dark forests at midnight, the mysterious villains and the howling specters” (75). Todorova outlines a similar process of “discovery” for the Balkans, where diplomats and other travelers to the region came back with stories and descriptions that were rich in detail and description, especially of the beauty of the women and the “crudeness” of the men. Thus, Jonathan Harker’s journal entries must be viewed as they would have been viewed at the

time they were written—as a throwback to a not-so-distant literary era, when Eastern Europe came to be known as a magical, timeless place, and *Dracula* serves as a part of that same politico-geographic project whereby Eastern Europe was constructed as something entirely different than the West.

The Cultural Construction of Eastern Europe

Built on a foundation of Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Lewis and Wigen have drawn in vivid colors this historical geography of the West and its polar opposite, the East. They note that although there are many cognitive boundaries that have been used as the East/West border, one of the most entrenched in the Western mental map is the frontier that marks the maximum sphere of Ottoman influence, which is seemingly the boundary that is being crossed by Jonathan Harker when he writes his "crossing over" journal entry: "The impression I had was that we were leaving the West and entering the East; the most western of splendid bridges over the Danube, which is here of noble width and depth, took us among the traditions of Turkish rule" (Stoker 1). These "crossing over" journal entries were common in the travel literature of the Enlightenment (Wolff 19).

The boundary line between the West and the East is commonly perceived to be somewhere in Europe, even if different people put it in different places (McNeill 513-14). This division has taken on a life of its own, reified by everyone from academics to policymakers. Many scholars have noted that the Cold War and its image of the "Iron Curtain" resonated so strongly because they reinforced an already dominant spatialization of Europe's regions. Take for example this quote from historian Thomas W. Simons, Jr. regarding the fall of the Iron Curtain, noting both the reification and the othering of the East:

The first scenario, as we all remember, was euphoric, in both West and East. It projected that the East would simply *become* the West, in short order and at practically no cost, because it has always been the West, and had been

prevented from being the West by the artificial Communist system [...]. But that scenario has had its day; it has run up against the creeping realization that the East is different from the West, that it will not simply become the West, and that efforts on both sides to harmonize structures and interests will be politically costly. (Quoted in Lampe and Nelson 8)

Larry Wolff goes on to relate his view that the East/West division of Europe stemmed from the economic differentiation that was becoming more visible between the two halves of Europe during the Industrial Revolution (8). The Enlightenment belief in teleological "progress" imputed a moral difference because Eastern Europe was "lagging" behind in industrial capacity and social relations. This "lagging" was ascribed to any number of "Eastern" influences, including irrationality, laziness, or superstition. In addition, by creating an underdeveloped and stagnant East, it was possible to ignore the formal delineation of the Europe/Asia border at the Ural Mountains. This continental boundary was a standard imposed by Peter the Great's geographer, Vassily Tatishchev (and later amended by Philipp-Johann von Strahlenberg), in the 1690s to enlarge Europe to the east, highlight the European nature of the Russian core, and construct the vastness of Siberia as an Asian space fit for colonial expansion (Lewis and Wigen 27). The Asian/European border could now be moved west to wherever the Enlightenment "ended" and the alleged stagnation began. This schism of Europe was not the first intellectual project of this sort; in fact it replaced the previously dominant view of two Europes, north and south. Until the Renaissance it had been in vogue in the West to contrast classical southern Europe with barbarian Germanic Europe to the north. However, with the development of the Northern Renaissance followed soon after by the Enlightenment, it was no longer plausible to maintain this division. In addition, it should be noted that the dialectic of Southern Europe/Northern Europe was nested within the larger Eastern Europe/Western Europe schism. For much of the medieval era the East was constructed by Byzantine elites as ascendant, while the West (both northern and southern parts) was the pejorative region, synonymous with "barbar-

ity and crudeness" (Todorova 11). In return, the West constructed itself as being morally superior (if less affluent) in comparison to the corrupt East, represented by the Byzantine Empire (McNeill 516).

In any event, the construction of an informal meridian of difference between East and West has influenced Western policy makers and academics for centuries. In particular the Iron Curtain embodied the policies influenced by the East/West cultural dichotomy. It is incredibly easy for the Western observer to imagine Eastern Europe as living behind a curtain, with the flame of Enlightenment knowledge having been extinguished and the people having submitted to the free reign of cunning Slavic/Oriental despots. Oriental despotism is a common representation of "the East" that typically stemmed from the environmentally deterministic view that Asian society was despotic because of the necessity of centralized control over irrigation. This now discredited idea nevertheless spawned the stereotype of the East as a place that requires dictatorship, or is unfit for democracy. For example, although Eastern European agriculture requires no more irrigation than Western European agriculture, the region was nevertheless viewed as a territory fit for despotism (Lewis and Wigen 75-76). Historian Tony Judt perhaps best states the Cold War political ramifications of this "hydraulic authoritarian" paradigm in the context of Yalta:

In the Western intellectual and political imagination, reconstructing Europe after 1945 became synonymous with creating economic and diplomatic cohesion among the Western allies and the reconstructed countries of Western Europe [...]. The 'lands between' entered into cultural limbo and Russian political tutelage. (Quoted in Graubard 26)

Most relevant in this quote is the casting of Eastern Europe as "the lands between" the West and the Soviet Union, almost devoid of spatial reference.

The Geographic Context of Dracula

It is this construction of Eastern Europe as “the lands between” that is central to the geographic interpretation of *Dracula*. Professor Coundouriotis writes:

I want to argue that Stoker is setting in motion a delegitimation of the Ottoman history of Eastern Europe through the figure of the vampire, whose hybrid identification (a result of his history) as both Christian and Ottoman, makes him monstrous and ultimately incoherent, a source of history that “logically” (but also anxiously) needs to be silenced. (144)

I am arguing that the hybrid identity of Eastern Europe is less decided in favor of a “delegitimation of the Ottoman History of Eastern Europe” than it is a *reaffirmation* of that Ottoman history as a way of distancing Western Europe from Eastern Europe. Professor Coundouriotis notes, quite rightly, the historical context of the Eastern Question in which the novel was written. With new Balkan states gaining independence, Western Europe was indeed forced to make a decision—how to identify these liminal spaces on the edge of Europe? These states were Christian and within the boundaries of Europe as they were commonly understood—yet this territory had been abandoned by the Enlightenment as uncivilized, Oriental spaces fit to be ignored or treated as a *Tabula Rasa* by the West. A stark choice had to be made. The two alternatives were to shift to a larger conceptualization of Europe that included the new Southeastern European states, or instead to continue to represent them as “the East,” beyond the bounds of European civilization.

Thus, *Dracula* can be seen as the geographic disciplining of these new Eastern European states. Instead of being allowed into “Europe,” they have instead been driven back into “the Orient.” If Count Dracula is understood to represent the new Balkan states, this theme is mirrored in *Dracula* by the Count’s desire to move to London—leaving Old Europe behind and joining the dynamic New Europe. Instead, Dracula is repulsed and driven back to Eastern Europe by the representatives of the West—Van Helsing the Dutchman, Harker the

Englishman, and Morris the Texan. Thus, the new Balkan states are disallowed admission into Europe by representatives from the West.

Furthermore, the story's main action can be seen not just as a disciplining of Eastern Europe, but also reciprocally as a disciplining of the West. Because many of the "exotic" features of Eastern identity, such as lust, pain, sexuality, and violence, are seen as both tempting and contemptible in Western society, it is necessary not only to exclude actual "Easterners" (i.e., Dracula and the new Balkan states) but also the Eastern lifestyle in order to protect Western identity from "contamination." The story of *Dracula* not only constructs a spatial order in Europe but also reminds Western readers of the justice that is meted out to those who are corrupted by the East.

The claim on the new Balkan states to Europeanness is, like Dracula's claim on Europe, based on history. As Professor Coundouriotis notes, Dracula's professed history is not so much the history of an individual, but of a people (148). This elision creates a free-floating association between the figure and the region. Dracula notes the debt that Europe owes to his people: "to us was trusted the guarding of the frontier of Turkey-land" (30). Therefore, the very Ottoman influence in the Balkan states that is held against them by the West *is* their claim on Europe—they were the front lines against the Turk; they suffered to protect Europe. However, the West's reason for excluding the Balkan states, and by extension the Count, is rooted in ontology. As Professor Coundouriotis has noted, Van Helsing delegitimizes Dracula's history by using it as a weapon against him (148). To Van Helsing, and by extension the West, Dracula's *history* is not a justification for admittance to the New Europe and therefore its delegitimation is a necessary act. Instead, Dracula's *characteristics* are the inescapable bonds that tie him to the Orient. Thus, Dracula's claim is based on what he *was*, while Van Helsing's exclusionary action is based on what Dracula *is*.

The Asserted Ontology of East and West

This section will show the method by which Van Helsing, and by extension, Western Europe, have characterized Dracula and Eastern Europe as fundamentally different in order to make the exclusionary argument cited above. It will draw on the original thoughts of many distinguished scholars and put their insights into a new framework. In *Dracula*, as in other literature of the time, Western Europe and Eastern Europe are portrayed as opposing spaces, which together embody a series of dichotomous relationships. As mentioned prior, this process of othering was rendered invisible by Western Europe's hegemonic economic and cultural power. Professor Senf alludes to some of these dichotomies, but the importance of them to the constitution of Eastern Europe is not recognized (24, 37). The first of these dichotomies is Western Europe's *civilization* versus Eastern Europe's *barbarism*. This opposition is one of historic importance, as "civilization" is a value-laden statement that originally meant simply a settled, non-nomadic existence but has since come to be associated with good manners, ethical decision-making, distinguished culture, and other normative goods. Barbarian, in its original formulation (by the ancient Greeks—see McNeill), simply meant "one who does not speak Greek," but has since become associated with all that is un-civilized: poor hygiene and appearance, cruelty to enemies, a lack of distinguished culture, and a lack of attachment to place. This normative geography is inscribed in *Dracula's* text, as Transylvania and the Count himself are portrayed as barbarian. For instance, Jonathan Harker writes this in his journal on the way to Transylvania:

The strangest figures we saw were the Slovaks, who were more barbarian than the rest, with their big cow-boy hats, great baggy dirty-white trousers, white linen shirts, and enormous heavy leather belts, nearly a foot wide, all studded over with brass nails [...]. On the stage they would be set down at once as some old Oriental band of brigands. (3)

According to this, not only the Slovaks are "barbarian," but so is

everyone else in Eastern Europe. In addition, they are clearly inscribed as "Oriental."

The next dichotomy between East and West on display in *Dracula* is that of Western Europe's *mind* versus Eastern Europe's *body*. This opposition is perhaps best embodied in the character of Renfield. Renfield, a representative of the West, is converted to Dracula's cult of personality, which is interpreted in London as insanity. Thus, he is committed to an asylum, despite the fact that he essentially has incorporated the truth as embodied by Dracula: "My homicidal maniac is of a peculiar kind. I shall have to invent a new classification for him, and call him a zoophagous (life-eating) maniac. What he desires is to absorb as many lives as he can, and he has laid himself out to achieve it in a cumulative way" (74-75). The West interprets Renfield's commitment to Dracula's Eastern ideology as irrationality. Later, after continued treatment in a Western asylum, Renfield casts out his Eastern influence and chooses to take sides with the West when he turns on the Count to try to protect Mina. Furthermore, as Professor Coundouriotis has noted, the story is told in large part through a series of journal entries (145-46)—a style that is immediately acceptable to Western audiences as authentic despite its obvious epistemological flaws. The journal entries, because rational Western actors have made them, are acceptable in a way that the narrative from the East (carried by Renfield) is not.

The *rationality* of Western Europe is contrasted with the *carnality* of Eastern Europe. Although Bram Stoker's Count is less sexualized than later incarnations of Dracula, Transylvania is infused by both sexuality and violence. This is most obvious in the scene with the female vampires:

There was something about them that made me uneasy, some longing and at the same time some deadly fear [...]. One said, "Go on! You are first, and we shall follow. Yours' [sic] is the right to begin." The other added, "He is young and strong. There are kisses for us all." I lay quiet, looking out from under my eyelashes in an agony of delightful anticipation. The fair girl advanced and bent over me till I could feel the movement of her breath upon

me. Sweet it was in one sense, honey-sweet, and sent the same tingling through the nerves as her voice, but with a bitter underlying the sweet, a bitter offensiveness, as one smells in blood. (39)

This blending of pleasure and pain helps to construct Eastern Europe as a place of physicality and desire that is easily contrasted to Western Europe. This is not the first time that Eastern Europe has been portrayed in this way. Larry Wolff quotes Casanova in his autobiography, *The Story of My Life*,¹ discussing with a Russian army officer how to purchase a 13 year-old girl from the girl's father:

"Suppose I were willing to give the hundred rubles?"

"Then you would have her in your service and you would have the right to go to bed with her."

"And if she did not want it?"

"Oh, that never happens. You would have the right to beat her." (51)

While Casanova's amorous exploits throughout Europe were famous, it was only in Russia that he was confronted with societal mores such as this, where violence, power, and sexual relations were so intimately interrelated. This equation of sensuality and passivity is not merely an artifact of the past—instead it is a longstanding portrayal of the East. This can be seen in a simple search on the World Wide Web for "Russian Wives." There are a plethora of services for arranged marriages available, each advertising a connection with a woman who "expects to be treated as a lady, she is the *weaker* gender and knows it. The Russian woman has not been exposed to the world of rampant feminism that asserts it's [sic] rights in America."² Thus, *Dracula* partakes in a long-standing cliché-ridden tradition of representing Eastern Europe as a place of sexualized violence where power informs every romantic relationship.

In a manner similar to the distinction made between Western *mind* and Eastern *body*, Stoker's novel maintains a historical distinction between Western *science* and Eastern *magic*. This is easily seen in the latter parts of the book, when Dracula is fleeing back to his home in Eastern Europe and the Westerners are chasing him. Dracula's power

is elemental, with his seemingly magical control of the weather propelling his ship east. The counterpoint is the mechanical power of his pursuers, who use the (in 1897) innovative technology of the locomotive to race across Europe in an effort to beat Dracula back to his castle. In addition, the Westerners' knowledge of the Count's plans comes from psychology (in particular, hypnosis), a rapidly advancing scientific field of the time. Van Helsing in particular serves as the icon of learning and reason:

He stepped over and sat down beside me, and went on, "You are a clever man, friend John. You reason well, and your wit is bold, but you are too prejudiced. You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your daily life is not of account to you [...] Ah, it is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all, and if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain." (200)

Van Helsing is promoting a pure scientific method—one that is not prejudiced against phenomena that it has not yet explained. Thus, Western Europe is portrayed as a space of rationality and scientific advance.

In contrast, Transylvania (and by extension, Eastern Europe) is portrayed as a place of magic. Dracula greets Harker to his castle with this comment: "We are in Transylvania, and Transylvania is not England. Our ways are not your ways, and there shall be to you many strange things. Nay, from what you have told me of your experiences already, you know something of what strange things there may be" (28). Harker has this verified for him via experience and he writes about it in his journal:

But my very feelings changed to repulsion and terror when I saw the whole man slowly emerge from the window and begin to crawl down the castle wall over the dreadful abyss, face down with his cloak spreading out around him like great wings. At first I could not believe my eyes. I thought it was some trick of the moonlight, some weird effect of shadow, but I kept looking, and it could be no delusion. I saw the fingers and toes grasp the corners of the stones, worn clear of the mortar by the stress of years, and by thus using every projection and inequality move downwards with considerable speed, just as a lizard moves along a wall. (35)

That Eastern Europe is a place of fantasy and magic is a long-held truism in travel literature. This is a fundamental theme of Baron Munchausen's travelogue. For example, the Baron's journal includes this fable:

A frightful wolf rushed upon me so suddenly, and so close, that I could do nothing but follow mechanical instinct, and thrust my fist into his open mouth. For safety's sake I pushed on and on, till my arm was fairly in up to the shoulder. How should I disengage myself? I was not much pleased with my awkward situation—with a wolf face to face; our ogling was not of the most pleasant kind. If I withdrew my arm, then the animal would fly the more furiously upon me; that I saw in his flaming eyes. In short, I laid hold of his tail, turned him inside out like a glove, and flung him to the ground, where I left him. (Quoted in Wolff 102)

Both the Baron's experience and the Count's lizard-like mode of transportation are only comprehensible within the bounds of Eastern Europe—a space that is defined by its connection to the unexplainable and irrational.

Furthermore, Eastern Europe is portrayed as a place eternally of the past, with London (and all of Western Europe) portrayed as the dynamic source of change and innovation. Professor Senf argues a point that directly ties into this dichotomy: "I suggest that readers also look at *Dracula* as a remnant of a primitive and warlike past that was being replaced during Stoker's lifetime with something more scientific and democratic" (51). This obviously ties into the representation of Western Europe as the home of science, but it goes further than that. It is an explicit connection between the spatial and the temporal; anything in *Dracula*'s castle is literally hundreds of years old, including the Count himself. *Dracula* is, of course, aristocracy—a symbol of Europe's socio-economic past. In contrast, Harker, Van Helsing, and Mina Murray are all middle-class and self-made, symbols of the modern Europe. Mina gives further evidence of the rapid pace of social change in Western Europe in this journal entry: "Some of the 'New Women' writers will some day start an idea that men and women should be allowed to see each other asleep before proposing or accepting. But I suppose the 'New Woman' won't condescend in future

to accept. She will do the proposing herself. And a nice job she will make of it too!" It would be easy to think that the forces of modernity were preordained (out of sheer teleological necessity) to defeat the forces of the past; but Harker realizes that this is not so: "And yet, unless my senses deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere 'modernity' cannot kill" (37).

To further differentiate between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, travel literature from the West often called into question the Christian credentials of the Eastern Europeans, and *Dracula* is no different. However, Dracula's religious role is definitely problematic and is not categorically defined as we have seen in the earlier dichotomies. The Count served, as he reminds the reader, at the front line in the defense of Christendom against the Muslim Turks. Nevertheless, at the time of the novel's action, Dracula is decidedly non-practicing. This ambiguity is expressed in the travel literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For a region as closely linked to Christendom as Europe was, a journal entry like this one from the Count d' Hauterive acted as a marker of East/West difference: "The imams and priests always have the same indulgence for alliances between the faithful of the two religions. It is not at all rare to see turbans and images sheltered under the same roof, and the Koran and the Gospel one upon the other" (quoted in Wolff 118). This hybridity of religion marks the East as less pure than the West, simultaneously Christian and not Christian; since Christendom is also linked to the idea of Europe, it therefore marks Eastern Europe as something separate from, yet linked to, the larger idea of Europe.

Conclusions

This formulation of Eastern Europe as something neither Asian nor fully European is the ontological assertion that Van Helsing, Harker, and the rest of the Western coterie make regarding the Count, and by extension Eastern Europe. The persecution of the Count, based on his

characteristics (barbaric, pagan, dangerous), parallels the cognitive distance that Western Europe has imposed between itself and Eastern Europe, which is also based on Eastern Europe's characteristics as attributed by the West (uncivilized, pagan, etc.). Thus, *Dracula* must be seen in its full literary and historical context. The Count *must* be from Eastern Europe for the story to have its maximum cultural resonance; the story is as horrifying as it is because Dracula is this emblem of Eastern European danger threatening the West. *Dracula* is not the only novel to take advantage of this geographic imaginary—Goldsworthy notes that "Typically, because of the need for a dichotomy between the familiar and the exotic, Gothic locations are on the edges of a particular geographical area, in its remote corners and on its borderlands" (76).

Dracula is part of a larger literary politico-geographic project that constructs difference between Eastern and Western Europe, spanning such varied genres as the travel literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Enlightenment philosophy, and the Gothic horror novel. This project has vast political and cultural ramifications, as it helps to structure the geographic imagination of the reader. Most readers of this literature will never travel to Eastern Europe and as a result will gain their perceptions of that place from the literature cited above (or media influenced by that literature). *Dracula*, as part of this project, is particularly important because of its literary longevity and its role as the inspiration for an entire genre of books and movies, as well as a sub-culture, each of which reconstructs the division of Europe into east and west and makes it more of a taken-for-granted fact of life.

Georgia Southern University
Statesboro, Georgia

NOTES

¹This book could also fall into the category of travel literature—Casanova's life story is told in a very geographic fashion.

²From <http://www.chanceforlove.com> (accessed 9/22/03); emphasis added by author.

WORKS CITED

- Goldsworthy, Vesna. *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998.
- Graubard, Stephen R. *Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
- Lampe, John R. and Daniel N. Nelson. *East European Security Reconsidered*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993.
- Lewis, Martin W. and Karen E. Wigen. *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997.
- McNeill, William H. "What We Mean By The West." *Orbis* 41.4 (1997): 513-24.
- Miller, Elizabeth. *Dracula: Sense and Nonsense*. Westcliff-on-Sea: Desert Island Books Ltd, 2000.
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques. *The Political Writings*. Ed. C. E. Vaughan. 2 vols. 1915. Repr. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962.
- Senf, Carol. *Dracula: Between Tradition and Modernism*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998.
- Stoker, Bram. *Dracula*. 1897. New York: Bantam Books, 1981.
- Todorova, Maria. *Imagining The Balkans*. New York: OUP, 1997.
- Voltaire, M. de. *History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*. Trans. Winifred Todhunter. New York: E. P. Hutton Publishers, 1908.
- . *Voltaire and Catherine the Great: Selected Correspondence*. Trans. Antony Lentin. Cambridge: Oriental Research Partners, 1974.
- . *Russia under Peter the Great*. Trans. M. F. O. Jenkins. Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson UP, 1984.
- Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994.

From Lone Monkey to Family Man: Wittman's Evolving Inclusion in *Tripmaster Monkey*

LARA NARCISI

I. Introduction

Upon reading the opening of *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book*, it would be difficult to call Wittman Ah Sing well-adjusted. Suicide fantasies plague him from the opening pages, and throughout the novel self-consciousness and anxiety threaten to tear this lone monkey apart. This isolated mentality eventually cedes, however, to a generously expansive viewpoint consonant with the novel's rapid-fire, highly allusive, pastiche style. *Tripmaster* thus charts its protagonist's progression toward the creation of the very multivocal art the text itself embodies, detailing Wittman's struggle to break out of the comfortable form of monologue and into more inclusive communication. Indeed, it is an entirely reformed Wittman that we find in Kingston's 2003 *Fifth Book of Peace*, a hybrid work that includes, along with various essays, a novella-postscript to *Tripmaster*. The Wittman of *Fifth Book*, with wife and child in tow, pleasantly absorbs all the Hawaiian islands have to offer, experiencing a blissful harmony with his new community. Although *Tripmaster's* conclusion is inconclusive, I contend that Wittman's progression from isolated paranoid to family man is visible within the pages of the earlier work.

Tripmaster is a complex voyage through the mind of Wittman as he pursues daily activities—partying, flirting, working, evading work—all of which culminate in a final monologue and play. My reading therefore follows Irma Maini's in viewing the novel as a *Künstlerroman*, emphasizing Wittman's pursuit of his own artistic voice. Maini places Wittman within a certain genre of ethnic writers who resist

typical artistic alienation in favor of inclusion and mainstreaming. I would suggest rather that Wittman initially aligns himself with a host of individualistic, separatist literary role models of multiple races and nationalities; explicitly, these include Rilke, Eliot, and Joyce (exemplars of the misunderstood and alienated); implicitly, there are the racial ranters such as Malcolm X, Amiri Baraka, and Frank Chin.¹ The novel represents Wittman's transition from a univocalist in this established tradition to a multivocalist of his own newly-created tradition. Ultimately the text plots Wittman's attempts to appropriately appropriate the lessons of his famed namesake, discovering how to make his "song of myself" large enough to "contain multitudes."

As an all-American protagonist down to his namesake, Wittman's struggle to reconcile the battling binaries of individual and communal subjectivity also highlights problems endemic to the issue of racial identity in contemporary American society. Throughout the narrative Wittman oscillates between a Chinese-identified self-concept and an American-identified one, between Chinese heritage and American nationality. Saddled with paranoia and self-doubt, he shifts uncertainly between his roles as lone monkey and community leader, the isolated and the integrated. These antonyms reach harmonic resolution only through Wittman's final production in which the additional voices of myriad textual participants enable him to create an artistically synthesized whole. This narrative is in turn framed and contained by that of an omniscient third-person narrator, who interrupts Wittman's solipsistic soliloquies with congenial remarks and invitations directed toward the reader. Kingston's text thus snowballs as it progresses, continually accruing a greater mass of narrative participants. In this emphasis on collaborative work, art is made possible only through the contribution of others. At the end of the novel Kingston emphasizes her indebtedness to myriad authors and acquaintances for the production of *Tripmaster* itself; appropriately, she uses her final page to express gratitude towards all those who provided stories, narratives, and fragments now interwoven in her text.

A central question I would like to address is why multivocality has

such transcendent artistic import for both author and protagonist in *Tripmaster*. While the incorporation of multiple voices often serves a mimetic purpose for American writers, Kingston does not appear to view American society as an exemplum of the successful multivocal integration present in her novel. Her work constantly highlights the failure of American voices to successfully harmonize, foregrounding instead the constant fragmentation of our frequently divisive society. Through art, specifically the forms of prose and drama, this utopian ideal can achieve at least partial realization. I therefore see Kingston's multivocal writing as an end in itself, rather than as a mimetic representation of American society. Through this multivocal text Kingston demonstrates a particular preoccupation with certain dilemmas of American identity, such as the population's inherent plurality, and the culture's push toward uniformity. Her work creates an alternative, reconstructed reality that never claims to reflect America as it is or even as it was several decades ago; in fact, she consciously eschews any attempt at a singular "factual" narrative. Kingston subtly mocks mimetic art in her description of the statue Taña and Wittman see outside Sutro's park:²

Near the entrance, a true-to-life sculpture of a Japanese man stood almost naked, holding a hand mirror and looking itself in the eyes. Self-portrait. According to the plaque, the artist had used his own human hair for the hair on his statue. [...]

'It's exact, and it ought to be beautiful.' [said Wittman to Taña]

'But isn't.'

'But isn't.' (166)

This artwork, complete with bizarrely affixed human hair, is horrific in its very attempt to simulate normalcy, paralleling Kingston's fundamental disregard for the boundary lines between reality and art. Rather than offering a blueprint for an envisioned Utopia, her narrative, sliding as fluidly as it does between time, place, character, and even reality, provides instead its own blueprint for the potential of the literary.

The primacy of the text renders multivocality all the more signifi-

cant; if it is only through artistic production that true unity is possible, then the successful integration of myriad voices becomes crucial in maintaining Kingston's egalitarian construct. Like Wittman himself, the text progresses from univocal to multivocal, from a narrow focus on its protagonist to a larger perspective encompassing the entire community. Through multiple contributions, both text and protagonist achieve a gradual reconciliation of the previously sharply demarcated binaries of self and other, Chinese and American. *Tripmaster* both demonstrates the tremendous significance of the text as the locus for otherwise unlikely integration, and reveals the challenging process involved in shifting from monologue to dialogue to complete script. Wittman's artistic evolution is sometimes unwitting, and often unwilling, but the conclusion leaves him equipped with a barrage of participants and a temporary relief from the compulsion to choose a singular identity.

II. *Tripmaster's* Postmodernism: It's Not a Philosophy, Just a Life-Style

Oh god, the cosmic nature of puns. (85)

There are those of us right here who can no longer speak in pre-educated accents even among old friends and relatives unless stoned out of our minds. (133)

Like Kingston's earlier autobiographical works, *Tripmaster Monkey* remakes former myths and renders old stories new in their retelling. This integration of past narratives with present ones, as well as the novel's consistent metatextuality, provide evidence for many to read the novel through the lens of postmodern criticism.³ Kingston's liberal incorporation of all styles and forms, her sense of creating the new from a reworking of the old, and her consistent emphasis on the textual, fit easily into the postmodern aesthetic. While it would be impossible to ignore Kingston's stylistic affinities to postmodernism, these critiques threaten to reduce the novel to a mere collection of puns and word plays that merely question the form without propos-

ing any substantive solutions. Critics too easily distracted by the novel's playfulness miss its equally significant sense of its own substantiality; *Tripmaster* articulates not the failure of art but its importance as the only possible form and forum for resolving questions of identity and community. One such critic, Jeanne Smith, writes:

In picaresque trickster fashion, the novel resists linear development with its loose anecdotal construction and frequent talk-story forays. The reader must give up a search for plot in a narration whose very substance is interruptions, sidetrips, and verbal fireworks to be enjoyed for their own sake, even as their abundance threatens to overshadow those who relay them. (52)

Smith provides an apt description of the novel's style; however, Kingston's prose is not mere fireworks, and should not be reduced to a form of linguistic cotton candy spun for the consumption of idle-minded pleasure-seekers. Smith's reading takes Kingston as a face-value postmodernist, reducing all substantive content to linguistic play and rhetorical conceits. For Kingston, however, the style is never far removed from the essential content, as the incorporation of myriad forms has a highly specific meaning in the context of her perception of American identity. Our protagonist Wittman is specifically a "fifth-generation native Californian" (41) and therefore a fully American narrator, despite his own anxieties to the contrary, and his style aptly incorporates the full multiplicity he seeks to embody. This is postmodernism with a purpose, a directed use of eclecticism and *pastiche* to create an ideally multivocal community feasible only via artistic representation.

Another difficulty in categorizing *Tripmaster* as postmodern lies in the typical assumption of postmodern theorists that it is impossible to create anything new. Fredric Jameson's well-known categorization is appropriate:

With the collapse of the high-modernist ideology of style—what is as unique and unmistakable as your own fingerprints, as incomparable as your own body—the producers of culture had nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a now global culture. (18)

In *Tripmaster*, Kingston's most abundant and linguistically complex undertaking, such distinctions become all but untenable as Wittman freely manipulates fact into fiction rather than attempting historical preservation. This is not to diminish the significance of original creation in the work, however. In her postmodern reading of the text, Patricia Lin observes, "Wittman is less a signifier of human typology than a locus for the recovery of prior texts, codes, and representations [...] [his] fate is not to invent but to retell stories" (338-9). While Wittman certainly becomes a crucible for the distillation and recombination of myriad past forms, Lin's reading elides the fundamentally creative aspect of his authorship. It is this very ability to act as the authorial ringmaster, the single maestro combining disparate acts into one orchestrated if chaotic show, that provides Wittman with a potential answer to the plaguing problems of racial identity. While Lin reads the text as evidence of the "impossibility of the new" (339), and the whole novel as the "fake book" of its subtitle which serves only as a "repetition and a catalogue" (ibid.) of other constructs, the success of Wittman's concluding play belies this reductive vision of art's impotence. This artistic creation serves as a self-contained moment of ideal synthesis and connection between human beings, rather than evidence of the "tentative status of artists and their creations" (341) that Lin perceives.

The play is therefore significant not only for its creative value to Wittman, but also for its metatextual commentary on the function of art for Kingston. We are invited to the play by the narrating storyteller, who guides the reader through the novel with enticements to "go on to the next chapter" (65) and "travel on with our monkey for the next while" (268), constantly reminding us of the text's textuality. Indeed, the narrator's very identity can only be uncovered through further reading and research; when Kingston reveals her to be Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, in an interview with Marilyn Chin, she admits, "Nobody's gotten it" (60).⁴ Such subtle allusiveness is in keeping with Kingston's nearly incessant references to literature and literary works, from Homer to Shakespeare to Rilke to Joyce. We see

metatextuality and allusions in the courtship of Wittman and Taña; as they exchange lines of poetry, the narrator observes, "Our fool for literature is utterly impressed by her allusiveness. He poeticated her in return" (128). Romantic interplay between two literary characters through the words of other literary characters reminds the reader that there is always a master puppeteer pulling the textual strings. Consequently, Wittman's artistic success is also Kingston's; his ability to create a fully multivocal moment through his play indicates her ability to do the same on the printed page.

Kingston's use of *pastiche* and metatextuality therefore emphasize her vision of art's potential rather than commenting on the failure of novelty in the contemporary age. Through these techniques, Kingston uses *Tripmaster Monkey*—as Wittman uses his play—to resolve conflicts endemic to 1980's America. Kingston does not propose these artistic representations as legitimate solutions to the tensions inherent in a heterogeneous society, nor explicitly as models for a utopian future, but rather offers them as temporary methods of uniting communities both within and through art. The text, in the midst of its own postmodernist *mêlée*, comes to embrace the artistic form as a potential resolution for conflicts of race, identity, and communalism.

III. Conflicts between Unity and Identity

'Of course, I like *Jules et Jim*. Everyone likes *Jules et Jim*. That's everyone's favorite movie.'

'No, it's not. Everyone's favorite movie is *The Treasure of the Sierra Madre*.'

'My favorite movie is *Ugetsu*.'

'*Children of Paradise*.'

'Yes, *Children of Paradise*.' (86)

The above excerpt offers one of the many multivocal preludes to Wittman's play, in which the participation of various voices enables a resolution to the struggle between unity and identity. Here, party guests debate the feasibility of a single movie maintaining universal appeal while simultaneously voicing their own distinctive prefer-

ences. Ironically, however, the quotes are detached from their speakers, and thus no opinion is individuated from any other. The choral mode enables endless possible opinions of endless possible favorite films.

Before Wittman embraces the full potential of such multivocality through his own artistic vision, this conflict between unity and identity beleaguers him through an inescapable paranoid uncertainty and self-doubt. Desperate at first to stand out from the crowd, our protagonist begins the novel univocally asserting his own sense of difference; hubristically narrating for himself, Wittman notes that Wittman "was more interesting than most, stood out" (12). Later he muses that "He was not like most people" (155) and "There had been no other playwright [at Berkeley with him]. Of whatever color. He was the only one" (19). Implicitly aligning himself with a tradition of ethnic "rant" poets, Wittman's early artistic production is entirely self-oriented, stressing his individualism and isolation. Rather than functioning as a tool of communication, Wittman's poetry initially acts only as a potential lure for the ladies. Nanci appears to be a ready listener, but upon bringing her to his apartment Wittman immediately regrets that he has not chosen a more impressive, showier art form such as painting. As he searches for the poem that "made him feel like a genius when he made it" (29), we realize that his poetry is really a love song from Wittman to Wittman, and Nanci is purely ancillary. Passionate to perform for Nanci, Wittman is nonetheless incapable of tolerating her appraisal of his work when she observes that he sounds "like a Black poet" (32).

Not fully prepared to be the lone renegade, Wittman seeks fellow rebels to form a new community of outsiders. This underlying quest for a collective of nonconformists makes Kingston's 1960's setting particularly appropriate. Despite his outsider status, Wittman is very much in line with the rest of his *Zeitgeist* as embodied by all the other "left-wing fanatics" (90) he encounters, be they the draft-dodging minister of the Universal Life Church, the pot-smoking drop-out Yale Younger Poet, or the earnest elephant-rights activist. Wittman has

some difficulty stomaching the paradoxical fact that his desire to set himself apart from the crowd is precisely what makes him one with the crowd, but through a growing recognition of his place in a larger community he is finally capable of listening to opposing voices. The participation of these variegated voices, interacting with his own in strophe and antistrophe, enables Wittman's final theatrical performance to transcend the previous parameters of his solipsistic selfhood. Thus one of Wittman's first steps towards artistic success is his ability to realize that the individual and the community are not mutually exclusive, but rather symbiotic.

Wittman stridently resists this revelation due to his persistent fear of a communal identity subsuming his own individuality. This perspective can help to explain the opening suicide fantasy, which might at first appear a sensationalist trick as Wittman never suffers from such self-abnegating despair thereafter. The scene is significant, however, in that it indicates precisely this fear that he will cease to exist as himself, and will become nothing more than an inarticulate mouth still attempting to speak his blown-apart mind. Wittman is therefore searching for a community that will harbor his uniqueness without blowing it to shreds; or, as A. Noelle Williams aptly states, "He is not interested in the kind of community that dictates individual identity but in a unity without uniformity" (330). Two particular scenes highlight Wittman's struggle to progress towards this "unity without uniformity," located at a party and an unemployment office respectively. Both become transitional moments for Wittman, as the first initiates his progress towards a less isolated subjectivity, and the second tests the reality of his newly communal self-projection.

A raging party hosted by his sometimes-best-friend Lance Kamiyama provides Wittman with his first opportunity to attempt a disappearance into the social matrix. Upon entering the bacchanal, Wittman realizes the impossibility of distinguishing the costumed from the uncostumed, as no one can tell a genuine business suit from an ironic one: "Awareness is all, on the part of the clothes-wearer, and on the part of the beholder. A costume either disguises or reveals. One or

the other. No way out of the bag" (85). This scene introduces the reader to both the party and the principal questions of selfhood and identity that mark this chapter in Wittman's epic progression. Initially the situation challenges Wittman to resist his impulse to form snap judgments based on external criteria. He is instinctively unsettled by the impossibility of facile categorization: he dons his cut-up tie as a supposed signifier of his anti-authoritarianism, yet his fellow beatniks are disguised as the working stiffs they mock. Always hypersensitive to racial stereotyping, Wittman is forced to confront his own hypocrisy and reevaluate his surface-based conclusions. However, the party also substantiates Wittman's anxiety by affirming the difficulties inherent in abrogating difference through uniforms or uniformity. After all, parody too close to reality ceases to be parody, morphing into that which it opposes.

The host himself provides an appropriate example, blending parody and reality so perfectly that even his best friend cannot tell the difference. Fluent in his own presumably-ironic self-deprecating rhetoric, Lance seamlessly switches personae: Young Millionaire and Mocker of Young Millionaires, devoted spouse and college Cool Guy, friend and foe. A wealthy young professional, Lance plays his role and derides it simultaneously, much to Wittman's consternation: "[Lance said] 'Circulate. Mix.' He burst out laughing at how there are hosts who'll say, 'Go Mix'" (83). Wittman's take on this situation is that Lance is "probably a sociopath"—but his uneasiness is blatantly self-reflective, given his tremendous concerns about internal and projected identity. Self-conscious and paranoid, Wittman's *modus operandi* is to constantly watch others and watch others watch him. The people-packed party forces his self/other conflicts to their crisis; no longer capable of escaping into his solipsistic shell, Wittman is thrust into a realm of necessitated interaction with the uncategorizable multitudes.

As the festivities progress Wittman gradually and tentatively acclimates to this myriad morass of interacting individuals. Drifting in and out of divers (and diverse) party conversations, he slowly permits other narratives to permeate his own. No longer the lone speaker

reading Rilke aloud on the bus and turning a deaf ear to the women he encounters, Wittman begins to make his previously stated resolution to "let it all come in" (4) a reality rather than an empty verbal gesture. Although he is not yet fully capable of integrating his own text with that of others, he begins to revel in the multivocal narratives of all the "Twisters and Shouters" (67) he overhears. The conversation is so varied as to be nearly all-encompassing; as Wittman muses, "the margins didn't disappear—there aren't any margins" (88). It seems that no one and nothing is excluded from discussion; in fact, one woman berates our narrow-minded preference for our own species as contemptible anthropocentrism: "You must've noticed, there's a lot of anti-elephant propaganda. The movies are brainwashing us against non-human species" (89).⁵ Despite the evident hyperbole of this particular narrator, the debate she instigates helps Wittman recognize the necessity of incorporating alternative voices into his own extant narrative.

While absorbing these multiple trips of multiple partygoers, Wittman suddenly overhears his own internal conflict concisely expressed by an acid-tripping guest: "How do you reconcile unity and identity?" (105). Despite his delight at this phrase, the incorporation of both terms into one sentence does not imply their fluid incorporation into Wittman's sentience. While the party leaves him several clues as to the feasible resolution of his conflict, he has not yet sufficiently reconciled self and other. The hedonistic dance sequence should represent the ideal opportunity for Wittman to finally lose himself in the crowd, yet only results in his increased self-consciousness. He attempts to merge with the flux and flow of partygoers, envisioning a true coalescence of identities:

My substantial body likewise—disappears and re-appears ... That hand or foot could be yours, it could be mine... I'm dancing with her and her and nobody and everybody [...] Heart booms to bass. My pulse, its pulse. Its pulse, my pulse. Ears, eyes, feet, heart, myself and all these people, my partners all. In sync. All synchronized. A ballet dancer and an m.s. spastic—no different—O democratic light. Innards at one with the rest of the world. (108, 110)

As promising as this experience is, Wittman's first attempts are unsuccessful; even as he begins to lose himself in the masses he is self-aware and self-conscious at every moment. The physical unity implied by the dance fades in the face of the consistent sense of separatism haunting Wittman's mind. The party scene ends inconclusively, with Wittman both together and apart, still struggling to reconcile his "me" with the "universe." His narrative has already begun to subtly alter, however, as the characters he meets at the party and its aftermath gradually contribute their own voices to his text, rupturing its previous self-absorbed integrity.

With the multivocal participation of the party guests, his family, and especially Taña, Wittman gradually alters his self-conception from lone ranter to communal playwright. Reflecting on the sundry promises he has made to his various companions in the two days following the party, he defensively concludes that "he did too have a philosophy of life: Do the right thing by whoever crosses your path. These coincidental people are your people" (223). Armed with this manifesto, Wittman soon finds his principles tested as he moves from party to the unemployment office, from concerns of play to concerns of work. The question then is whether or not Wittman can apply his newly inclusive ideals to life as well as to art.

Life and art subsequently become closely intertwined for Wittman; not only does his artwork serve as a potential model for his real life interactions, but his experiences in real life provide material for his art. Although Wittman's anti-authoritarian instincts lead him to revile the government workers, they too act as unexpected guides on his epic quest. With the aid of these myriad helpers, this insecure individual can therefore become the Tripmaster of the communal play at the novel's conclusion. The first, a clerk at the unemployment agency, asks Wittman for his ID after rejecting his proffered social security card as inadequate. Offended, Wittman objects, "I'm the only one in the world with this number, right?" (227). This automatic response indicates Wittman's continuing reliance on individuality, and inhibits him from properly understanding the clerk's question. What she

demands, in essence, is confirmation that Wittman is who he claims to be; in other words, she confronts him with the question of whether his image matches his reality. Obsessed with his own self-constructed image, Wittman misses the lesson entirely. To be whom he claims to be specifically entails relinquishing his previous instinct towards univocality and monologue, a step that he takes only tentatively and with frequent reversals. As the clerk warns, he must be prepared to verify that this asserted self corresponds with his real self, that he lives indeed by his own manifestos.

His test comes in the form of a new stranger/guide, a fellow applicant for unemployment funding named Mrs. Chew. Instantly abrogating his previously stated "philosophy of life," Wittman grumbles internally: "See what you have to put up with if you want to have a community? Any old Chinese lady comes along, she takes your day, you have to do her beckoning. The hippy-dippies don't know what they're in for. They couldn't take *Communitas*" (231). It is Wittman, however, who is having difficulty taking the *Communitas* he espoused earlier, still favoring his own running internal monologue to the contributions of others. But once again his guide offers assistance; asking only his time (of which he, unemployed, has an abundance) she takes over the narrative and offers him the gift of a story detailing her immigration process on Angel Island. Wittman thereby receives both a brief moment of personal connection, and material for his play. His interaction with Mrs. Chew forces Wittman to become the communal player he claims to be, and forces him to show true identification.

Mrs. Chew serves an additional role in the text by assisting Wittman in reevaluating his constricting, self-imposed system of binaries. Despite Wittman's detailed explanations, Mrs. Chew sees no reason why she cannot apply for both worker's compensation and unemployment. The reality of the situation is that Wittman's binary categorization is inadequate; she does inhabit a liminal state between the two categories, as she is both wounded from working, and still anxious to work again. After much deliberation, Wittman inscribes a final

"yes" over the many erased yeses and nos on her form, affirming the potential for possibility: both/and rather than either/or. Mrs. Chew in turn instructs Wittman on how to correctly say "no" to a question phrased in a complicated negative, thus representing affirmation through the denial of negation. Through this small gesture our hero fulfills one of his earlier promises for self-reformation: "The way to make a life: say Yes more often than No" (164). He must again prove that he is who he claimed to be, that he is indeed prepared to write "yes" instead of, over, and above, the "no." Through these acts Mrs. Chew both contributes to and becomes a participant in his final creative production, his ultimate realization of the potential to embrace all possibilities without negation.

IV. Racial Identification: Chinese / American

An American stands alone. Alienated, tribeless, individual. To be a successful American, leave your tribe, your caravan, your gang, your partner, your village cousins, your refugee family that you're making the money for, leave them behind. Do not bring back-up. (246)

Wittman's racial paranoia permeates the text and provides the focus for the majority of critical writing on the novel,⁶ from studies of his racially-based emasculation to explorations of the nature of a hyphenate identity. I read Wittman's overwhelming concern about his Chinese American/Chinese-American identity as another manifestation of his struggle to reconcile individuality and communalism, and to locate his own voice within and amongst the throng. In this Wittman follows Fanon's concept of the three stages of the evolution of minority literature, transitioning from assimilation (in his obsession with white authors such as Joyce and Rilke), to a consciously-contrived separatist voice (what Nanci calls his "Black" poetry), to an "awakening" consciousness of the self within a dominant society (his final play). Wittman's art makes a meandering rather than linear progression through Fanon's stages, struggling to achieve a desirable balance

of assimilation and separatism. Acting as the Monkey warrior throughout much of the novel, Wittman battles prejudice both fantasized and real; by permitting other voices to penetrate his monologue, he at last escapes his own ongoing mental war and locates a comfortable position in the both/and of racial possibility. His ultimate transformation into a pacifist indicates an internal peace rather than a political one, a resolution of his self-concept rather than one of his global politics.

Before discussing Wittman's racial identity issues, I want to focus briefly on a larger theme of language and communication. Kingston observed in her "Personal Statement" that *Woman Warrior* was only partially written to communicate to her readership at large, and possessed various subsets for those privy to her linguistic clues: "There are puns for Chinese speakers only, and I do not point them out for non-Chinese speakers. There are some visual puns best appreciated by those who write Chinese. I've written jokes in that book so private, only I can get them" (Amirthanayagam 65).⁷ *Tripmaster's* conclusion fully embraces the communicative potential of multiple languages, although it takes Wittman some time before he relinquishes the temptation to use his bilingualism as a tool for isolating less polyglot linguists. After previously deriding Nanci for not being sufficiently Chinese, he says to her, "'Huh? Monkey see, Monkey do?'" and internally notes that this phrase "sounds much uglier if you know Chinese" (32), thus emphasizing the language gap separating him from both his listener and any Anglophone reader. Later he speaks for keeping Chinese names untranslated in his play, asserting his ambition to "let the gringo Anglos do some hard hearing for a change" (138). Non-Chinese-speaking readers confront a double challenge, both through language and through textuality; for although Kingston inscribes the names in this case ("Hoong Ngoak, Fa Moke Lan, Ku San the Intelligent" [138]), the supposedly ugly sounds are mere mute letters to the untrained speaker. Often Wittman chooses to provide no translation at all, limiting his listener/reader to either the Chinese or the English exclusively. This topic provides another instance in which

Wittman's asserted multivocal self fails to correspond with his true univocal one, as his purported valorization of open communication conflicts with his desire for a private and perhaps impenetrable discourse. At one moment he asserts that "one shouldn't speak a foreign language in front of people who don't understand it, especially when talking about them" (182), while in the next he introduces Taña to his mother as his "pahng yow," hoping his Anglo bride will believe it means "wife" instead of "friend." For much of the novel Wittman continues to use language in this binary fashion, preaching Esperanto but all the while creating his own Tower of Babel.

While Wittman is initially quite conflicted over this issue of linguistic communication, Kingston detects potential rather than limitation in the proliferation of multiple tongues.⁸ She suggests, both in the novel and in interviews, that her solution is not to attempt ubiquitous translation, but rather to play with the natural tendency of language to appropriate foreign words, always pushing and expanding her readers' multilingualism. Describing her alternative to exclusive language, she states, "With a lot of perceptions that English is not my language, there is a lot of leaving me out of this culture. So a lot of my work is appropriation. I'm going to appropriate this job and these books and this language—the American language. I'm going to appropriate this country" (Skenazy 144). Divergent languages can thwart communication, but they can also enhance it by offering an exponentially expanded vocabulary. When Charley shouts a seemingly-mock-Japanese "Hai!" in a rehearsal, the narrator informs us that it "could mean 'Cunt!' or 'Crab!' or 'Yeah!' or 'Look!' or 'Hello there!' or it was just a noise" (143). The juxtaposition of the word and its translation enables the reader to experience the increased possibilities of the multilingual. Never one to be limited by mere binaries, Kingston stuffs her text with Japanese, Spanish, and French phrases as well, celebrating the possibilities of adding an ever-increasing number of words to one's arsenal. She provides an eloquent example of this perspective in Wittman's cross-generational and multilingual conversation with his so-called grandmother:

Wittman's English better than his Chinese, and PoPo's Chinese better than her English, you would think they weren't understanding each other. But the best way to talk to someone of another language is at the top of your intelligence, not to slow down or to shout or to talk babytalk. You say more than enough, o.d. your listener, give her plenty to choose from. She will get more out of it than you can say. (267)

While this passage seems a consummately Kingstonian statement of purpose, it represents a shift for Wittman towards his author's appreciation of multilingual communication, and thus towards a greater resolution of his racial identity conflicts. In his final theatrical performance, Wittman's multilingualism converges with Kingston's, and all language becomes translated and translatable, forming a true vehicle for communicative possibilities.

Wittman's ongoing struggle with language parallels his struggle with the dichotomies of Chinese/American and Self/Community. In the opening of the novel Wittman idealistically envisions a non-racialized nation where all distinctions evaporate. He tells the Yale Younger Poet, "I'm including everything that is being left out and everybody who has no place. My idea for the Civil Rights movement is that we integrate jobs, schools, buses, housing, lunch counters, yes, and we also integrate theaters and parties" (52). This statement echoes Kingston's own views on the subject, as stated in this 1991 interview with Donna Perry: "When I say 'my people' or 'our people,' I mean everybody. And I watch other people think that I mean Chinese people or Chinese American people or Asian American people or women. But, more and more, I'm spreading the meaning to mean every human being on earth" (21). This multicultural ideal is complicated in *Tripmaster* by the persistent question, inherent in Wittman's paranoia, of whether such inclusion necessitates an erasure of all individual distinctions. Always a consumer as well as a producer of art, Wittman first demonstrates his inveterate fear of assimilation through his antipathetic reaction to *West Side Story* at the beginning of the novel. Despite the film's supposedly universalist message, Wittman notes that this is in reality a mere farce of inclusion, art masquerading as multicultural while incorporating only various permutations of white.

Russ Tamblyn's "kinky hair" only "indicates blackness," the "interracial" couple are both Caucasians, and Wittman wonders how one can differentiate the two gangs at all when "not a face up there was darker than Pancake #11" (71). This negative artistic example inspires Wittman to later create an artwork rooted in reality as well as theory, including as many actors as members of the community in a completely egalitarian representation.

In addition to motivating Wittman to create a performance that is true integration and not its mere simulacrum, *West Side Story* forces him to confront his conflicting views on racial communities. Watching the Jets' enviable cultural brotherhood but deplorable exclusivity, Wittman perceives a mirror of his own internalized questions about racial identity. Such questions consume him, to the point that he defensively rationalizes his preoccupation:

The dumb part of himself that eats Fritos and goes to movies was avidly interested in race, a topic unworthy of a great mind. Low-karma shit. Baby-talk. Stuck at A,B,C. Can't get to Q. Crybaby. Race—a stupid soul-narrowing topic, like women's rights, like sociology, easy for low-I.Q. people to feel like they're thinking. (75)

Recalling Gertrude here rather than his typical alter-ego, Hamlet, our protagonist protests too much. He obsesses about racial and national distinctions, and particularly over the dilemma of how one can be both American and Chinese; which, to Wittman, ultimately becomes a question of whether one can deny all racial differences and simultaneously form a race-based community.

Wittman begins as an assimilationist, maintaining a concept of "American" that abrogates all racial distinction and erases any traits that might be regarded as overly Chinese, even if they are natural and genuine ones.⁹ Stridently asserting his position as an American, Wittman mocks the FOB's (Fresh off the Boats) for sticking out so much: spitting seeds, walking kung-fu style, attiring themselves inappropriately. His initial conception of America is one of the melting pot rather than the mosaic: a place that absorbs other nationalities rather than permitting individual cultural distinctions.¹⁰ Confronting those

who appear too-Chinese evokes self-loathing sentiments, as is the case when a homely stranger approaches him on the bus: "he wished she weren't Chinese, the kind who works hard and doesn't fix herself up" (73). Wittman is antagonized by the fire-duck smell of her parcel, by the way she pronounces "Oak Lun," by the very fact that this stranger has singled him out on the basis of their shared ethnicity. As a result, he consciously fends off all her attempts at forging a race-based community, falsely proclaiming himself to be Japanese and responding rudely to her amicable inquiries. This same instinct naturally separated him from his co-nationals in college: "Yeah, there were a Chinese fraternity and sorority, but if you were bone-proud, you didn't have anything to do with SOP sisters and the Pineapple Pies" (17). Convinced that "everybody would rather be the indigenous people of a place than be its immigrants" (306), Wittman in the early stages of the novel has not yet learned how to be both/and: how being an indigenous American does not necessarily exclude identification with his Chinese heritage.

Wittman has a tendency to belie his own assertive denial of racial distinctions by unconsciously replicating the very stereotypes he stridently resists. He often attempts to explain his character traits through reference to his racial heritage, citing "being new at almost every dumb thing" (55) and "minding so much about justice" (53) as side-effects of a Chinese nationality. Reinforcing stereotypes is nearly a mental tic for Wittman, recurring unconsciously at every turn: Chinese are nosy (74), Chinese have a lot of nerve (75), Chinese have no sense of direction (152), Chinese don't drive well (208), Chinese lack orderly meal routines and proper table manners (213). These facile categorizations directly contradict Wittman's asserted passion for inclusion, yet they prove unshakable as they serve the psychological function of enabling Wittman to group himself with others rather than emphasizing the isolation of his own individualized state. Not only does Wittman clandestinely covet a community but, in spite of himself, he initially conceives of this community as necessarily Chinese. Despite his purported antipathy for Asian communalism, he

soon wonders "What's wrong with him that he keeps ending up in Caucasian places? [...] So where were the brothers? Where was the fraternité?" (57). That Wittman suffers from a racial identity conflict is evident; more subtle is the fact that his internal crisis arises specifically from the inability to accept myriad possibilities rather than strict binaries despite his strong desire to do so.

Wittman's resistance to alternative voices manifests itself in the first reading of his play when his Japanese host Lance improvises on the friendship oath of Liu Pei, Gwan Goong, and Chang Fei. Lance's new and multinational injection into the old story causes Wittman to take great offense over another narrative voice daring to dispute his own, until Charley speaks the correct incantation and restores the oath to its original Chinese context. Wittman, relieved at seeing the original narrative preserved, observes, "He knows. He knows. Charley is Chinese, and knows. He is a hearer of legends. And he's translating what may be the secret oath the tongs take into daylight English for all to understand" (144). Wittman thus desires a listening audience but not actively engaged co-authors; he is prepared, for the moment, to share the Chinese stories, but not yet to grant the privilege of participation to others.

Despite this instinctive desire to preserve Chinese national heritage, Wittman is too much a paranoiac to embrace any community fully. Constantly on the look-out for those who might potentially reject him for his race, he masters the preemptive strike and is constantly on the offensive. Fearing rejection from the beautiful Nanci Lee, Wittman quickly shifts from his previously asserted belief in American identity to a denunciation of Nanci for her failure to conform to her nationality. Thus he both scorns the FOB's for being too Chinese, and mentally derides Nanci for not being Chinese enough, and specifically being too mainstream American: "She's maybe only part Chinese ... Nanci Lee and her highborn kin, rich Chinese-Americans of Orange County, where the most Chinese thing they do is throw the headdress ball" (12). This inability to accept those either inside or outside the community incapacitates Wittman for the first portion of the novel, as

his self-concept depends on his perception of his own adherence to racial categorization.

Wittman's ability to integrate multiple voices into his narrative parallels this process of successfully uniting multiple races into his own identity. In this task his father proves to be an instrumental guide, encouraging a view of race that celebrates unlimited inclusion. Zeppelin Ah Sing is a man unhindered by any racial constructs, freely sprinkling his speech with phrases in Hawaiian, Japanese, and Pig Latin, and showing up his son with a superior knowledge of American car mechanics. Through Zeppelin, Kingston demonstrates how the miscegenated experience offers the advantage of expanded possibilities rather than the anxiety of liminality present in her early memoirs. As Wittman learns, an ambiguous racial background grants empowerment rather than obscurity; consequently, being colorless is a weakness, rendering one incapable of easy passage between boundaries. The "other" race gains control by its otherness, particularly through the power of transformation and disguise. Zeppelin teaches his son the delight of masquerading as a member of other ethnic groups, as in his conversation with Taña:

"Do you think I look Injun?" asked Zeppelin, who was wearing his turquoise belt buckle. "Some say I look Italian." He was proud to be taken for whatever, especially by one of their own kind, Mexican, Filipino. His favorite, he'd been asked by a Basque once near Gardenville, "You Basque?" "I'm pure Chinese," he told Taña. "A pure Chinese can look Injun, Basque, Mexican, Italian, Gypsy, Pilipino [sic]." (200)

"Passing" has a complex history in American letters¹¹—in Zeppelin's definition, it is entertaining, subtly anti-authoritarian, and ultimately self-affirming. Slipping in and out of racial categorizations at will, the only identity he feels obliged to uphold is his own. Wittman, constantly avoiding any possible stereotype, feels humiliated by Zeppelin's hilarious account of his attempt to procure a free lemon with his tea. Frustrated with his father's conformity to the image of the "Cheap Chang," Wittman wishes to distance himself from this stereotype and deliberately wastes the teabag when he knows "a

really Chang guy would've made one bag do for the entire tea party" (200).

As he gradually overcomes his own rigid mental categorizations, however, Wittman is able to note the similarities between himself and Zeppelin, conceding that his father is after all "the one [who] started me on my trips" (196). Zeppelin's stint with the lemon possesses a certain trickster feel, an exuberant rejection of authority and specifically a play on language.¹² Although he may resist such penny-pinching as a Chinese stereotype, the beatnik Wittman, who furnishes his apartment with card tables and mattresses abandoned on the street, has undeniably inherited the trait from his father. Indeed, when he is honest with himself Wittman is forced to admit the beauty of his father's frugality, recalling his childhood of discovering all the free gifts available to those in the know, for "a day out with Pop was filled with presents. The world was a generous place" (204). One of Wittman's later "tricks" makes adroit use of his father's teachings as he slides seamlessly into the persona of a Mexican in order to protest a racist joke he claims to overhear in a restaurant. Angrily renouncing the offenders, Wittman peppers his own speech with "gringo," "raza," "sabe," using language to claim himself as one of the insulted race. Learning from his father, Wittman too is eventually able to rejoice in many transformations, gleefully adopting all the identities America has to offer. Zeppelin thus serves as a practical model for Wittman of how to accept his extant character traits without incessantly evaluating them as functions of various stereotypes. Instead, Zeppelin exudes a comfortable self-acceptance that does not deny race, but renders it a malleable rather than a fixed construct.

V. Tripmaster Who?: Competitors, Collaborators, and Other Voices

I act you theater, you act me theater. (281)

While Wittman accepts aid from Zeppelin and sundry other assistants, doing so causes him tremendous angst. Accustomed to his own

narration, he cannot readily accept collaboration without experiencing a persistent anxiety that he will relinquish control of his private narrative. Wittman's acquisition of the "tripmaster" title is thus a gradual and laborious one, and the fact that the nickname alludes to his eventual but not fully actualized self adds another meaning to Kingston's clever subtitle. This is Wittman's "fake book" in that he is not truly its master; our narrator controls the story, and he is but a poor player who struts and frets his hour on its page. While multivocality is Kingston's signature style, it is only with substantial difficulty that her protagonist successfully deviates from his monologic discourse.

One of Wittman's greatest problems in forging an integrated narrative is that his chronic sexual insecurity and subsequent misogyny impede the potential inclusion of feminine voices. Kingston's subtle mockery of Wittman's gender anxiety is an obvious reflection of her feminist stance; but more significantly, her ability to sympathetically depict a masculine voice represents her triumph over any misandristic leanings. After directly addressing her agitation over the Chinese subjugation of women in *Woman Warrior*, Kingston attempted to examine the parallel problems confronting Chinese masculinity in her second autobiographical work, *China Men*. The latter tells the story of men but only underscores the plight of women; in one myth Kingston has her gods decree: "This man is too wicked to be reborn a man. Let him be born a woman" (CM 120). Thus *Tripmaster's* ventriloquism, permitting the female to speak through the male, represents an important transition for author as well as character. Wittman is doubly significant in that he is not only a sympathetic male character, but also a partial representation of Kingston's long-time antagonist, the critic and playwright Frank Chin who frequently accused Kingston of participating in the literary emasculation of the Chinese.¹³ By using her character as a mouthpiece for Chin's anxieties about Chinese masculinity, Kingston defuses her opponent by embracing him within her text. When William Satake Blauvelt asked her in an interview if her book was a way of "getting even" with Chin, Kingston replied, "It's like him sending me hate mail, and I send him love letters, it's

like that" (81). Subtly mocking Chin (even affectionately) might still be considered a counterattack; but it is one appropriate to Kingston's belief in passive resistance and the importance of inclusion.¹⁴

Wittman, preoccupied with being the author of every script, cannot so easily incorporate the voice of the opposite sex. When the women begin to write scripts of their own, he experiences the vertigo of the undermined playwright, terrified that his characters have taken on their own voices and rendered him irrelevant. Upon arriving at Lance's party he muses, "You prepare scripts with lines for yourself and lines for her, but you have to try them on somebody brand new you never saw before, and [I] semi-knew everybody here. And girls won't co-operate" (99). One can imagine that this approach does little to endear Wittman to the ladies, and indeed he strikes out with the beautiful Nanci Lee at his first opportunity. Finally face-to-face with a woman he has coveted since college, Wittman treats his date to a lengthy meditation on himself and effectively ignores her every attempt to contribute to the conversation (pausing only to note begrudgingly, "Her turn to talk about her kiddiehood"). Following Wittman's monkey act, Nanci summarily flees, but in the light of Kingston's other works the silencing of women surfaces as a primary factor in this interaction. In one of the most poignant scenes in *The Woman Warrior*, Kingston vividly describes her brutal attempt as a young child to force her silent female classmate to speak. In her desperate hostility, which ranges from threats to bribes, the young narrator reveals her own self-hatred and, retrospectively, her identification with the way society silences women: "We American-Chinese girls had to whisper to make ourselves American-feminine" (WW 172). In *Tripmaster*, Kingston appropriates the male voice who fails to listen, and demonstrates his subsequent rejection at the hands of the woman he refuses to hear.

In the end, Kingston does not vengefully abandon her protagonist to a woman's contempt, but instead provides him with a guide in the path towards intergender communications: his female counterpart, Taña De Weese. Wittman initially approaches Taña in his typical

fashion, anticipating a standard set of lines for them both. Surprised to find her reciting Robert Service, he fends off his impulse to be whimsically charmed by wondering why any well-educated woman would opt for Service over the more respectable T. S. Eliot. Hoping to return to his original script, he longs to recite back to her, to "educate her to a better poet (Yeats) than Robert Service," because, as he revealingly comments, "What's the use of having poems in your head if you can't have scenes in your life to say them in?" (115). Taña, however, proves to be her own author and throws Wittman's intended narrative off its course. Blithely, unselfconsciously, she spins her own tale featuring herself as the coveted femme fatale whom Wittman has secretly pursued all evening. Furthermore, Taña demands that Wittman speak her own words back to her, effectively dethroning him as playwright and relegating him to the role of actor speaking *her* lines: "Now, tell me that happened. Tell me that was what you did" (130). Nonplussed, Wittman plays along, but copes with this power play by mentally restoring himself to the position of authority: "Oh, at last. He'd found his woman who will talk while making love" (130). These lines confirm Taña's success; she has not only seduced Wittman into participating in her play, but also into believing it to be true.

Following their first sexual encounter the two engage in a similar battle for authorship when Taña outlines her "rules" of free love, negating any attempts to romanticize this sudden connection between strangers. Wittman has again lost his authorial ground, and thinks: "Damn. She beat him to it. Outplayed again. [...] He'd balked, and she'd taken his lines. Now what?" (154). His rhetorical maneuver is to refuse the very rules he would have chosen: "'I think I could love you,' he said. 'I think I do love you'" (154). While this statement leads, predictably enough, to lovemaking, Wittman's words are subtly subversive. Once Taña has ruptured his script, he can only respond by undermining hers in turn, claiming the one emotion she has forbidden him. Their relationship proceeds in a constant authorial struggle, one appropriately never resolved and always generating competitive creative potential. Somewhere in his subtle repartee with Taña,

Wittman begins to share control of his narrative, learning in the process that there is indeed a space for creative collaboration between surrender and domination. Permitting another master into the trip proves to be a crucial moment in his transition from intrapersonal monologue to interpersonal theatrical event.

While Taña is the primary force disrupting Wittman's univocal narrative, sundry characters follow suit throughout the novel. I would like to conclude with Lance and Charley as the men with whom Wittman reenacts the friendship oath of ancient Chinese epic, two significant contributors to his expanded sense of community and authorship. Wittman sees Lance as his *Doppelgänger*, formerly his comedy-act twin but currently his dark side sold out to high finance and a blonde bride. The two vie for linguistic control, toying with one another in an interchange that appears pure sport to Lance but genuine antagonism to Wittman, who "turned green and red with envy and admiration" (126) and then derisively addresses him with the strongest hippie insult: "Businessman" (127). Despite Wittman's attempts to the contrary, Lance wrests control of the narrative through his surreal tale of being stranded on an isolated island, incapable of returning to America. This story is notable not only for breaking into Wittman's monologue, but also for its replication of specific themes that form the very fabric of that monologue. Lance's primary subject is that of the outsider and outcast, of one desperately longing for a place in the United States he can never fully claim. Wittman, hearing what is in effect his own narrative retold by his dark double, viciously resents ceding his primary position as Tripmaster: "How to kill Lance and eat his heart, and plagiarize his stories? As a friend of the hero, you're a sub-plot of his legend. When you want to be the star" (126). By telling the tale of his exile, Lance has gained entrance; his narrative brings him inside the very circle from which he was once excluded. Wittman constantly fears becoming revealed as an outcast, an emotion he recalls vividly through a memory of watching a dentist and assistant flirt over his immobile head. Ultimately he must learn how to partake of Lance's heart without eating it; that is, how to make

productive, cooperative art without vying for primacy. Lance's ability to turn his outcast status to his advantage, to become the skillful host of the party who orchestrates the mingling of disparate characters, is instrumental in Wittman's education as the tripmaster of his own show.

While Wittman can only view Lance with a semi-hostile sense of competition, his friendship with Charley enables him to approach an understanding of communal artistic potential. Charley makes his entrance at the party (and in the text) at the very moment Wittman is thinking of him, and is therefore introduced as a reflection of Wittman's own subjectivity. Like Taña, however, Charley is fully capable of becoming his own author. He skillfully grasps control of the narrative by retelling, reshaping, and recreating a previous cinematic text, *The Saragossa Manuscript*. More than a microcosm of Kingston's own project and an obvious example of postmodern metafiction, the *Saragossa* tale is significant for the success of its multivocality as evinced in both the narrative process and its impact. The many plot twists hinge on layers of authorship, stories within stories, a man telling of a movie telling of a book which tells of a soldier. Wittman, silenced for a change, appreciates the power of the storyteller to unite the various drug-tripping listeners under his verbal spell. He begins to see the potential for unity and interconnectivity through a multivocal narrative:

[Charley] got them all inhabiting the same movie. Here we are, miraculously on Earth at the same moment, walking in and out of one another's lifestyles, no problems of double exposure, no difficulties crossing the frame. Life is ultimately fun and doesn't repeat itself and doesn't end. (103)

Such fluidity and openness indicates one of the many shifts in Wittman's cognitive patterns, a move away from the self-obsessed despair of the first chapter and toward the inclusive euphoria of the final one. Charley suggests a potential for a far less rigid concept of selfhood, one that doesn't necessarily deteriorate—and in fact, can even be enhanced—by the intrusion of others. He provides a nearly

utopian moment of perfect communication, after which all listeners will carry the film with them as though it were their own visual memory; as the prognosticating narrator tells us: "Charley had guided them so well that the visionaries will come away talking-story about this movie that they'd gone to" (104). Participating in this moment, Wittman glimpses the potential to cross boundary lines so that even reality is a flexible construct; even personal memories can become public ones. Armed with an expanded experience, his own and those of others, he is prepared to initiate his final performance.

The Wittman at the end of *Tripmaster* has an ambiguous future ahead of him. After a long public diatribe addressed to Taña, he concludes, "See how much I love you? Unromantically but" (339). He has accepted alternative voices into his narrative, but is still ambivalent about fully accepting Taña into his life. Although the crowd celebrates this statement as indicative of a match made in heaven, because "out of all this mess of talk, people heard 'I love you,'" (339), the reader recognizes that Wittman's commitment is by no means assured. As Kingston herself observed, "He's been a little bit tested—he managed to put on one show—but to truly be a realized adult man he has to continue [...] He's still reacting; he hasn't created himself yet" (Perry 175). The seeds of this creation are there in his newly-realized abilities for inclusion, but it will take some time for them to reach fruition. We never see this transition textually, but its effects are apparent from the opening pages of *Fifth Book*. In his enduring marriage to Taña, in his affection for his son Mario, and in his decision to escape to Hawaii as a conscientious objector to the Vietnam War, Wittman appears here as the fully-realized being implied in *Tripmaster's* conclusion. Just before the opening of his story, Kingston writes:

Oh, the necessity and comfort of writing 'I ... I ... I ... I ... I ...,' the selfish first person, author, narrator, protagonist, one. Freedom—to write diarylike, OK to be formless, no art, no good English.

Fiction cares for others; it is compassion, and gives others voice. It time-travels the past and the future, and pulls the not-now, not-yet into existence.

The garret where I wrote, which was just my height, burned. A sign. I do not want the aloneness of the writer's life. No more solitary. I need a com-

munity of like minds. The Book of Peace, to be reconstructed, needs community. (60)

Kingston writes here in her own voice, autobiographically, but it is Wittman's that follows. These words are a transitional moment, part hers and part his: evidence of their shared roles as writers and listeners, "trippers and askers."¹⁵ As Kingston populates Wittman's farewell party with all her previous characters, Wittman congratulates himself: "He was living right, that he had cultivated these people of all kinds into family community. He liked himself for keeping everybody he had ever met" (67). Thus equipped with the community he began building in an earlier novel, he is prepared for his newest project: "to write—the poem, the play that would stop war" (72), to bring a collective art into action.

New York University
New York

NOTES

¹Malcolm X, aka Malcolm Little: Pan-Africanist, Nation of Islam minister, revolutionary activist, 1925-1965. Amiri Baraka, aka Leroi Jones: African American poet and activist, born 1934. Frank Chin: Chinese-American playwright, born 1940; discussed further later.

²Like most of the Berkeley locations Kingston describes, Sutro's was real, as was the statue. This is especially fitting in the context here, as Wittman and Taña discuss the ways in which art mimics life. Alfred Sutro opened the area as a massive public bath in 1896, and it eventually included museums, theaters, ice rinks, and an amusement park. The area closed and mysteriously burned down shortly thereafter, in 1966. This is the fire Kingston mentions as the Ah Sings' third anniversary, although the fire occurred on June 26th, and the Ah Sings are married in autumn.

³See David Leiwei Li's review, which describes the work as "postmodern in its willful emphasis upon play" (217) or Sharon Suzuki-Martinez for a more detailed analysis of the work as postmodern.

⁴Some have found Kingston's excessive allusions to be off-putting or even impenetrable; but as Kingston notes in an interview, "In my conversation I make literary references all the time and in my head I make them even more—I can hear Joyce and Shakespeare and Rilke. So why can't I use them in my writing?" (*Back-*

talk 175). As explained above, I read these references as expansive attempts to gesture outward to multiple works, as well as reminders of the text's textuality.

⁵In keeping with the theme of open boundaries, the margins between humans and animals are blurred elsewhere in the text as well. Not only does Wittman turn into a monkey (32), but Judy Louis appears to turn into a boar (79), and one of Lance's kung fu champs turns into a bee (280).

⁶See for example King-Kok Cheung, Isabella Furth, and Diane Simmons.

⁷See David Leiwei Li's article, "*China Men*: Maxine Hong Kingston and the American Canon." Li claims that by her second book Kingston parallels the mother in *China Men* who stitches "good morning" in both languages, ever aware that "artistic expression and cultural accommodation are an integral process" (484).

⁸Incorporation of multiple languages is not atypical of Modernism. However, Joyce's experimentation in *Finnegan's Wake* is surely a different project than Kingston's here; her objective is, as I discuss, inclusive rather than exclusive. While many modernist and postmodernist works experiment with languages as a form of verbal play, *Tripmaster* has a particular focus on the communicative potential of polylingualism.

⁹Ellison famously describes this struggle between natural and culturally prescribed desires in the yam episode of *Invisible Man*. More recently, *The Onion* parodied such anxieties in an article entitled "Chinese Laundry Owner Blasted for Reinforcing Negative Ethnic Stereotypes" (April 2, 1998).

¹⁰In the early stages of the novel, Wittman follows Gary Snyder's tenets: "We must consciously and fully accept and recognize that this is where we live and grasp the fact that our descendants will be here for millennia to come. [...] Europe or Africa or Asia will then be seen as the place our ancestors came from, places we might want to know about and to visit, but not 'home.' Home—deeply, spiritually—must be here" (40). It is only later in the novel that he is able to integrate these concepts of being a "native" American with being ethnically Chinese.

¹¹See Nella Larsen's work of the same title; also Jean Toomer, who defended "passing" based on his projection of a future miscegenated race: "The New American."

¹²Zeppelin demands a full lemon rather than a slice, insisting that the menu promises "tea with lemon" (201).

¹³Frank Chin consistently attacks Kingston for both her supposed misandry, and her failure to adhere to the factual accounts of Chinese mythology. He accuses "Kingston and her literary spawn" of being "the first writers of any race [...] to so boldly fake the best-known works from the most universally known body of Asian literature and lore in history. And, to legitimize their faking, they have to fake all of Asian American history and literature. [...] This version of history is their contribution to the stereotype" (3).

¹⁴Patricia Chu puts it best: "Like Chin, Wittman Ah Sing is a Chinese American playwright, idealistic and enraged over racism, with the persona of an angry young man who can be exasperating—especially in his sexism—but is fundamentally decent. Though this portrait could be considered a personal attack, it is best understood as a mediating voice by which Kingston expresses her own anger over American racism" (117).

¹⁵This line, the title of *Tripmaster's* first chapter, suggests the ability to both lead and listen that Wittman will finally attain. It references "Song of Myself": "Trippers and askers surround me ..." (16).

WORKS CITED

- Amirthanayagam, Guy, ed. *Asian and Western Writers in Dialogue: New Cultural Identities*. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Blauvelt, William Satake. "Talking with the Woman Warrior, 1989." *Conversations with Maxine Hong Kingston*. Eds. Paul Skenazy and Tera Martin. Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1998. 77-85.
- Cheung, King-Kok. "The Woman Warrior versus The Chinaman Pacific." *Conflicts in Feminism*. Ed. Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller. New York: Routledge, 1990. 234-51.
- Chin, Frank. "Come all Ye Asian American Writers of the Real and the Fake." *The Big Aiiieeeee! An Anthology of Chinese American and Japanese American Literature*. Ed. Jeffrey Paul Chan, Frank Chin, Lawson Fusao Inada, and Shawn Wong. New York: Meridian, 1991. 1-92.
- Chin, Marilyn. "A MELUS Interview: Maxine Hong Kingston." *MELUS* 16.4 (1989-1990): 57-74.
- Chu, Patricia. "Tripmaster Monkey, Frank Chin, and the Chinese Heroic Tradition." *Arizona Quarterly* 53.3 (1997 Fall): 117-139.
- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove P, 1963.
- Furth, Isabella. "Bee-e-ee! Nation, Transformation, and the Hyphen of Ethnicity in Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey*." *Modern Fiction Studies* 40.1 (Spring 1994): 34-49.
- Jameson, Fredric. *Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
- Kingston, Maxine Hong. *China Men*. 1977. New York: Vintage International, 1989.
- . *The Fifth Book of Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
- . *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book*. 1989. New York: Vintage International, 1990.
- . *The Woman Warrior*. 1975. New York: Vintage International, 1989.
- Larson, Nella. *Passing*. 1929. New York: Penguin, 1997.

- Li, David Leiwei. "A Review of *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book*." *Amerasia Journal* 15.2 (1989): 216-217.
- . "China Men: Maxine Hong Kingston and the American Canon." *American Literary History* 2.3 (1990 Fall): 482-502.
- Lin, Patricia. "Clashing Constructs of Reality: Reading Maxine Hong Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey* as Indigenous Ethnography." *Critical Essays on Maxine Hong Kingston*. Ed. Laura E. Skandera-Trombley. New York: G. K. Hall, 1998. 333-48.
- Maini, Irma. "Writing the Asian American Artist: Maxine Hong Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book*." *MELUS* 25.3-4 (2000): 243-64.
- Perry, Donna. "Maxine Hong Kingston." *Backtalk: Women Writers Speak Out*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1993. 171-93.
- Simmons, Diane. *Maxine Hong Kingston*. New York: Twayne, 1999.
- Smith, Jeanne Rosier. *Writing Tricksters: Mythic Gambols in American Ethnic Literature*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997.
- Snyder, Gary. *The Practice of the Wild*. Berkeley: North Point P, 1990.
- Suzuki-Martinez, Sharon. "Trickster Strategies: Challenging American Identity, Community, and Art in Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey*." *Reviewing Asian America: Locating Diversity*. Ed. Wendy L. Ng et al. Pullman, WA: Washington State UP, 1995. 161-70.
- Toomer, Jean. "Race Problems and Modern Society." *Jean Toomer Papers*. American Literature Collection. New Haven: Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale U. Box 51, folder 1120, 31-32.
- Whitman, Walt. "Song of Myself." 1855, 1881. *The Essential Whitman*. Ed. Galway Kinnell. New Jersey: Ecco P, 1987.
- Williams, A. Noelle. "Parody and Pacifist Transformation in Maxine Hong Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book*." *Critical Essays on Maxine Hong Kingston*. Ed. Laura E. Skandera-Trombley. New York: G. K. Hall, 1998. 83-100.

"It's wanting to know that makes us matter": Scepticism or Affirmation in Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia*. A Response to Burkhard Niederhoff*

ANJA MÜLLER-MUTH

Tom Stoppard's plays teem with epistemological questions, attempts to reconstruct the past, puzzles to be solved, or, more generally, with the search for knowledge and truth. Since the quests of Stoppard's protagonists meet only with varying success, critics argue whether Stoppard's plays communicate a hope that truth and knowledge may eventually be retrieved, or whether scepticism and indeterminacy prevail. Burkhard Niederhoff's article has made a further contribution to this debate. Focussing on the epistemological function of the juxtaposition of the arts and sciences in *Arcadia*, Niederhoff disagrees with Antor's interpretation of the misunderstandings in Stoppard's dialogue as "semantic entropy,"¹ and takes great pains to demonstrate that, quite on the contrary, these misunderstandings create meaning (44). In the first scene of the play, for example,

[t]he interruptions of Thomasina's lesson do not cause pedagogical or cognitive entropy. They result in worthwhile lessons and insights, just as the misunderstandings that characterize the dialogue create interesting and relevant meanings. [...] In this play, meanings are found and discoveries are made when 'the unpredictable and the predetermined *unfold together*,' when a random or chaotic element finds its way into a rational, goal-oriented pursuit. (48-49)

Niederhoff then finds in Arthur Koestler's idea of bisociative thinking² a tool to assess Thomasina's and Hannah's ability to 'think aside'

*Reference: Burkhard Niederhoff, "'Fortuitous Wit': Dialogue and Epistemology in Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia*," *Connotations* 11.1 (2001/2002): 42-59.

For the original article as well as all contributions to this debate, please check the Connotations website at <<http://www.connotations.de/debniederhoff01101.htm>>.

and to adopt, adapt and improve chance findings for their theories in order to gain new insights. He finally attempts to disprove the play's alleged scepticism by hinting at the structure of *Arcadia* which evolves on two time levels that not only endow the audience with advanced knowledge but also enable the characters to catch up in the end (55). According to Niederhoff, *Arcadia* suggests that a clear distinction of true and false is as much possible as a reconstruction of the past. Perceiving Stoppard's focus on the process of research rather than on its results, he concludes: "The acknowledgement of irregularity, unpredictability, and disorder does not lead to scepticism. On the contrary, it opens the door to a new research paradigm [in the case of *Arcadia*, this new research paradigm is chaos theory] that creates fresh possibilities and opportunities" (57).

While I wholeheartedly agree that *Arcadia* is primarily concerned with epistemological processes and that the misunderstandings in the play are creative rather than disruptive, I part company with Niederhoff when he tries to invalidate sceptical readings. I shall ground my response on three major aspects:

1. Intertextuality

Arcadia lends itself especially well to an intertextual reading which considers the various meanings that are grafted onto the text via allusions. For example, the allusions to *Arcadia*, landscape gardening, chaos theory or Lord Byron infuse the play with meanings which, by undermining notions of determinate knowledge, not only account for its wit but also for its uncertainties. As I have elaborated on this topic elsewhere,³ one example may suffice:

In his thorough analysis of the first scene of Stoppard's comedy, Niederhoff perceives Sidley Park as "an *Arcadia* where exciting but hazardous discoveries can be made, an Eden where knowledge may be gained at the price of innocence" (47). Niederhoff apparently plays down the challenge to the pursuit of knowledge that generically resides in the allusion to Paradise—after all, eating from the tree of

knowledge was the sin which closed Eden to Adam and Eve.⁴ If Stoppard's play is as optimistic about the pursuit of knowledge as Niederhoff's article suggests, the frame of reference renders this pursuit problematic. On the one hand, the allusion to Eden realigns knowledge with sin; on the other hand, the allusion to Arcadia evokes ambiguity, especially when characters quote the famous sentence "Et in Arcadia ego." In a seminal article on Nicolas Poussin's two versions of *The Arcadian Shepherds*, Erwin Panofsky discussed the ambiguity of this phrase implying either nostalgic longing or a *memento mori*.⁵ Both readings also resonate in the first scene of Stoppard's *Arcadia*, when Lady Croom quotes the sentence in a nostalgic manner, whereupon Thomasina refers to the grammatically more accurate reference to death (13).⁶ The paradisiacal and Arcadian subtext thus provides a setting by no means favourable for the advancement of unambiguous knowledge, a twist which Niederhoff's reading does not take into account.

2. Misprisions

Unravelling intertextual references is, of course, a question of method; and in choosing to focus on the dialogue and the structural elements of the play, Niederhoff perhaps necessarily puts aside intertextual considerations. This does not explain, however, the instances where he clearly misreads *Arcadia*.

Arguing that Thomasina makes important discoveries in the first scene through misunderstandings and interruptions, Niederhoff presupposes an innocent Thomasina who, through observing her seniors, quickly advances if not to experience, at least to a sound knowledge of life. We should not forget, however, that Thomasina is a precocious prodigy whose reactions to Septimus's evasive answers to her questions about carnal embrace very clearly indicate that she already knows what this expression signifies. Later on, her witty repartees are definitely no chance remarks but pointed comments on the dialogue.⁷ When referring to the metaphor of the seed falling on

stony ground, for instance, Thomasina does *not* misunderstand Septimus's biblical allusion (cf. Niederhoff 48) but sees through it and, as Niederhoff himself points out, retorts with a reference to Onan.⁸ In so doing, she reunites the biblical frame of reference with the sexual one, thus skilfully outmanoeuvring Septimus's evasive reply. There is a gradual increase of knowledge in the first scene of *Arcadia*, but this forms part of the exposition of the play, conveying information about its topic, setting, and protagonists to the readers or the audience who are actually the ones who gain new insights and 'learn' most in this scene. This enhancement of knowledge, however, is largely a matter of theatrical conventions.

The juxtaposition of Bernard and Hannah needs some qualification, too. If Bernard is not susceptible to evidence against his theory, Hannah's readiness to adapt to chance findings does not induce her to alter her opinion on the relationship of Enlightenment and Romanticism, either. Although she revises her interpretation of the Sidley Park hermit from a "mind in chaos suspected of genius" (*Arcadia* 27) to "[t]he Age of Enlightenment banished into the Romantic wilderness" (*Arcadia* 66), her aversion to Romanticism remains unchanged. This is the more remarkable because, as Niederhoff demonstrates, Hannah owes her evidence largely to twists in the plot that could be classified as (however loosely) "romantic" within the binary oppositions deployed in the play: random discoveries, (sexual) attraction, or conversations on chaos theory.⁹ In fact, Bernard's comment on her book *Caro*, malicious as it may be, raises the suspicion that Hannah's scholarly work rests firmly within the matrix of feminist recovery studies blaming patriarchal society for condemning the works of female writers to oblivion.¹⁰ Her new book project displays a similar revisionary rhetoric of a powerful, central, hegemonic force (Romanticism) suppressing a marginalized figure or idea (Enlightenment, embodied by the Sidley Park hermit).

I also doubt whether Hannah's and Thomasina's research methods exemplify bisociative thinking. Working on the interdisciplinary topic "landscape and literature 1750-1834" (*Arcadia* 25), Hannah does not

have to learn anything in order to look at other disciplines, and as has just been seen, Hannah is far less flexible in her research paradigms than Niederhoff suggests. Moreover, insights in *Arcadia* do not result from playing or daydreams (Niederhoff 50; I cannot find any example of a daydream in this play), but from accidental finds (e.g. envelopes, folders, or pictures) during an otherwise very systematic and methodical research.¹¹ Last but not least, Thomasina's observations on rice pudding with jam ("You cannot stir things apart"; *Arcadia* 5) which catalyzes her later insights about the second law of thermodynamics neither result from "thinking aside" nor are they inspired by a "visual image," as Niederhoff suggests. They merely follow the old inductive principle of deriving a general rule from observations of everyday occurrences. Koestler and bisociation are by no means needed to explain this particular passage and other moments of discovery in the play.

A further misprision occurs with reference to the setting. Whereas Peter Paul Schnierer¹² considers *Arcadia* to be an elusive space, Niederhoff declares:

The *Arcadia* of the play is not located in an elusive elsewhere but right before the audience's eyes: in the schoolroom shared by Thomasina and Septimus. This is Thomasina's room of her own, a privileged and protected environment in which she can pursue her intellectual interests and make her discoveries in the company of a gifted and sympathetic teacher. (54-55)

This is altogether wrong because "[t]he *Arcadia* of the play" is first and foremost identified as and located in the garden of Sidley Park. This garden, in turn, is represented in a drawing in the gardener's sketchbook and in a number of verbal references in the dialogue, but it is not visualized right before the audience's eyes.¹³ The schoolroom is far from being "Thomasina's room of her own," for people frequently intrude into it, even sending her out. As an institutionalized site for the perpetuation of conventional knowledge—Thomasina is taught traditional maths and Newtonian principles—a schoolroom epitomizes precisely the traditional matrix that would impede innova-

tive thought according to Koestler's bisociation (cf. Niederhoff 53). Finally, the room itself proves to be unstable, its props move through time, acquiring different meanings depending on the century and the scene of the play in which they are used. In sum, the temporally unstable setting of *Arcadia* can hardly serve to counter the idea of elusiveness.

3. Return to Scepticism (?)

Let me return to the question whether *Arcadia* professes a sceptical attitude towards the pursuit of knowledge or not. Niederhoff finds evidence for an anti-sceptical stance in resolved misunderstandings, learning processes, insights and verifications of theories. The examples he quotes indeed support an affirmative position, yet I believe one has to consider some further aspects in order to arrive at a balanced view of the play.

For one thing, it is crucial to distinguish between different levels of communication, because insight and knowledge are unevenly distributed in *Arcadia*. The nineteenth-century characters have the knowledge of past events for which the twentieth-century characters are craving. On the other hand, the twentieth-century scientists have an advanced technology and discoveries at their disposal which the nineteenth-century characters are still lacking. During their research, the scholars and scientists on both time levels gain on each other, but due to the time lag and the ensuing historical and scientific rift, they cannot catch up entirely. It has already been suggested that the meanings brought about by the misunderstandings which Niederhoff has analysed create above all insights in the *external* communicative system, i.e. among the audience who has access to the different frames of reference and thus can enjoy the comic effects produced in the play. When assessing insight and knowledge in *Arcadia* it is therefore vital to note *whose* advancement of knowledge is at stake.

It is equally important to realize that several uncertainties still remain unresolved at the end of the play for both characters and audi-

ence, who still do not know,¹⁴ for instance, why Byron left England, or who shot the hare.¹⁵ *Arcadia* also remains painstakingly vague about Septimus's precise motivations and occupations as hermit of Sidley Park. Whereas Burkhard Niederhoff is very confident about details concerning Septimus's eremitic life,¹⁶ the play makes no explicit statement on why Septimus had decided to spend the rest of his life in the hermitage, what he did with the formula, whether he understood it, or whether he wanted to prove or disprove its implications. We do not even know whether Septimus was really insane or whether his contemporaries, not understanding Thomasina's algorithm and its implications, only believed him to be a lunatic. Val and Hannah refer to Septimus as mad, but their remarks are based on nineteenth-century documents and on Val's prejudice that only a madman would take the pains to plot an iterated algorithm with pencil and paper.¹⁷ Before taking this remark at face value, we ought to remember that Val also believed a girl living at the beginning of the nineteenth century could not come up with the algorithm Thomasina discovers. And if Septimus is not mad—what about Hannah's theory on the significance of the mad Sidley Park hermit for the status of Romanticism? Burkhard Niederhoff asserts:

The outcome of the research or detective plot also precludes scepticism. [...] This plot contrasts Bernard's theory, which is wrong, with Hannah's theory, which is right, and both are *proved* to be so in the course of the play. [...] As I pointed out above, the final moment of *Arcadia* is about the discovery of the missing piece of evidence that establishes the truth of Hannah's theory. A sceptical play would end on a different note. (55, italics B. N.)

In view of the points made above, Niederhoff's alleged refutation becomes as valid as the claims for the play's scepticism he attempts to invalidate. Yet, instead of trying to prove or disprove the alleged scepticism or affirmative attitude in Stoppard's *Arcadia* I would rather highlight what I consider to be Niederhoff's most valuable insight: "Stoppard is less interested in truth than how it is found or missed; he is less interested in the result of research than in its process" (56). Although I am wary of speculating about authors' intentions, I can

wholeheartedly subscribe to Niederhoff's emphasis on epistemological *processes* in Stoppard's play. When one looks at *how* knowledge is achieved, scepticism ceases to be an important issue because a reading that looks at epistemological processes instead of gained insights can cope with multiple meanings and indeterminacy. What Stoppard's *Arcadia* witnesses is a serene variation of existentialism, of plodding on towards a self-set goal without knowing whether one is going to achieve it, or whether it even exists. This is the glory of Hannah's "It's wanting to know that makes us matter" (*Arcadia* 75). Stoppard's characters matter because they *want* to know. The problem with us scholars may be that we tend to be so hungry for results that we *pretend* to know, even if it may sometimes be "[b]etter to struggle on knowing that failure is final" (*Arcadia* 76).

Otto-Friedrich-Universität
Bamberg

NOTES

¹See Heinz Antor, "The Arts, the Sciences, and the Making of Meaning: Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia* as a Post-Structuralist Play," *Anglia* 116 (1998): 326-54. Antor uses the term "semantic entropy" in the sense of dissolving and disrupting meaning. Originally, semantic entropy is a term from translation theory, denoting "a measure of semantic ambiguity and uninformativeness" (I. Dan Melamed, "Measuring Semantic Entropy," *Proceedings of the SIGLEX Workshop on Tagging Text with Lexical Semantics*, Washington, DC, 4-5 April, 1997, <http://acl.ldc.upenn.edu/W/W97/W97-0207.pdf>, 17 Nov. 2003, 41-46). It occurs, for example, in words which are used in a multiplicity of contexts. Since the misunderstandings in Stoppard's *Arcadia* are not caused by overused words drained of meaning, but by the fusion of two competing frames of reference, the term "semantic entropy" is rather inappropriate in this context.

²According to Koestler, creativity and innovation emerge from bisociative thinking, i.e. associating hitherto unconnected frames of reference with each other. Koestler expounds on this theory in detail in his *The Act of Creation* (1964; London: Hutchinson, 1976).

³See my dissertation *Repräsentationen: Eine Studie des intertextuellen und intermedialen Spiels von Tom Stoppards Arcadia* (Trier: WVT, 2001).

⁴The exact type of knowledge gained through the fall is still a matter of theo-

logical debate. In a biblical context, "to know" implies both scientific or scholarly and sexual knowledge. For a critique of interpretations of Genesis 3 in merely sexual terms see Oswald Loretz, *Schöpfung und Mythos* (Stuttgart: Verlag katholisches Bibelwerk, 1968) 112-14 and Walther Zimmerli, 1. Mose 1-11: *Die Urgeschichte* (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1967) 161. Derek B. Alwes completely ignores the sexual connotation of "knowledge" in the biblical sense when he says: "[K]nowledge is not a 'sin' in the world of the play, in which the most attractive characters are highly educated, if not geniuses" (Derek B. Alwes, "'Oh, Phooey to Death!': Boethian Consolation in Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia*," *Papers on Language and Literature* 36 [2000]: 397). That the allusion to Eden is an important subtext to *Arcadia* was illustrated in the London and New York premieres of the play, when Nicolas Poussin's painting *Le printemps, ou Adam et Eve au paradis terrestre* was projected onto the curtain, establishing an allusion to paradise in a visual paratext to the performance.

⁵See Erwin Panofsky, "Et in *Arcadia* Ego: Poussin and the Elegiac Tradition," *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (London: Penguin, 1993) 340-67. The article was initially published under the title "Et in *Arcadia* Ego: On the Conception of Transience in Poussin and Watteau," *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*, ed. R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1936) 223-54. See also Jean-Claude Berchet, "Et in *Arcadia* Ego!" *Romantisme* 15 (1986): 85-104. For a detailed interpretation of the allusion to this quotation in Stoppard's *Arcadia*, see Müller-Muth 206-08.

⁶All page numbers refer to the 1993 Faber and Faber edition of Stoppard's *Arcadia*.

⁷Thomasina does not re-enter the first scene with the question "What is the topic?" (Niederhoff 46), either; at least in my 1993 Faber and Faber edition of the play she is asking "May I return now?" (*Arcadia* 10). Nor does she enquire for the topic of the conversation—she need not do so because she is the only one on stage who can at once distinguish the two competing frames of reference that create the misunderstandings. In this scene, Thomasina takes the position of an observer who, not being directly involved in any of the affairs discussed in the conversation, can take a step back and look at, or rather listen to, the others from a distanced vantage point.

⁸Septimius initially refers to the parable of the Sower, Mark 4:3-20. The story of Onan is told in Gen. 38:8-10.

⁹I am listing chaos theory in this context not because of any intrinsic bonds between chaos theory and Romanticism but because of its association with romantic concepts in *Arcadia*. Unpredictability is one of the issues supporting this connection. In an interview with Katherine Kelly and William W. Demastes, Stoppard explained that he organized the allusions to science in *Arcadia* in a binary opposition between "Classicism" (represented by Newtonianism) and "Romanticism" (represented by chaos theory); see "The Playwright and the Professors: An Interview with Tom Stoppard," *South Central Review* 11.4 (1994): 5. This pattern is

largely indebted to Gleick's popular monograph *Chaos*, which Stoppard read and which fashions the heralds of chaos theory in terms of romantic rebels against the academic establishment. See James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (1988; London: Abacus, 1993) e.g. 163 ff. and 186-87; see also Katherine Hayles's comment on Gleick's romanticization of chaos theory in her *Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990) 171-74. In the "Biographical Sketches" appended to his *Fractal Geometry*, Benoit Mandelbrot pursues a similar strategy, inscribing himself into a line of renegades of scientific thought; see Mandelbrot, *The Fractal Geometry of Nature* (New York: Freeman, 1977) 391-404.

¹⁰"Byron the spoil child promoted beyond his gifts by the spirit of the age! And Caroline the closet intellectual shafted by a male society! [...] You got them backwards darling. Caroline was Romantic waffle on wheels with no talent, and Byron was an eighteenth-century Rationalist touched by genius. And he killed Chater" (*Arcadia* 60). Despite the final sentence and Bernard's maliciousness, there is some truth in these statements insofar as Lady Caroline Lamb's literary merits are indeed disputable, and Lord Byron's attacks at the first generation Romantic poets as well as his preference for early eighteenth-century satirists partly undercut his role as an epitome of Romanticism.

¹¹The picture of Septimus and Plautus, for instance, does not arrive "out of the blue" (Niederhoff 53), it was introduced previously in the play when Thomasina drew it. It is not the result of non-rational thought, either, for Gus knew that Hannah was looking for it.

¹²Peter Paul Schnierer, "In *Arcadia* Nemo: The Pastoral of Romanticism," *Biofictions: The Rewriting of Romantic Lives in Contemporary Fiction and Drama*, ed. Martin Middeke and Werner Huber (Rochester: Camden House, 1999) 152-61.

¹³I have extensively commented on the absentification of the garden in *Arcadia* and on Lady Croom's ekphrasis of Sidley Park in "Re-presenting Representations: The Landscape Garden as a Sight/Site of Difference in Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia*," *Word and Image* 15.1 (1999): 97-106 and in chapter 3.3 of *Repräsentationen*, esp. 223-26.

¹⁴I disagree with Alwes, who assigns a privileged perspective to the audience in all respects (Alwes 392 and 394). As I shall demonstrate in this paragraph, *Arcadia* leaves some questions unanswered even to the audience.

¹⁵Niederhoff does not hesitate to give Augustus the credit: "At this point [Bernard is giving his test lecture, quoting from a game book which attributes the dead hare to "Lord B."], the audience have already heard Septimus say that his friend is a poor shot (13), and their doubts about Byron's marksmanship are confirmed in a later scene when the Augustus mentioned in the game-book entry, Thomasina's brother, refers to the hunting episode: 'Lord Byron?!—he claimed my hare, although my shot was the earlier! He said I missed by a hare's breadth' (79)" (55). The play itself is far less lucid in this respect than Niederhoff. Septimus is envious of his more famous and successful friend, whereas Lord Byron and

Augustus are represented as boastful machos—none of the three is a truly reliable witness in the hare affair. Augustus's complaint only tells us who shot first, not who hit and who missed.

¹⁶Septimus goes mad, he says, "as a result of the death of his pupil [...] and spends the rest of his days in the hermitage" (43). Towards the end of the article, the explanation of Septimus's madness differs slightly: "This remark [Thomasina's marginal comment on her iterated algorithm, in imitation of Fermat] is more than a mere joke—in fact, it is the joke that makes Septimus mad; as a lunatic in the hermitage, he will cover thousands of pages with the iterations of Thomasina's algorithm" (57). A footnote adds: "This is only part of his work; he also tries to disprove Thomasina's anticipation of the second law of thermodynamics and its pessimistic implication" (59n12).

¹⁷Alwes equally trusts these filtered comments in the play as if they were indubitable facts (400).

(Un)tying a Firm Knot of Ideas: Reading Yang Mu's *The Skeptic*

LISA WONG

When *Yi Shen* (*The Skeptic: Notes on Poetical Discrepancies*) came out in 1993, it won immediate acclaim. In the same year, the book was elected one of the "Books of the Year" by the *China Times* and awarded "The Best Book Award" by *The Reader*.¹ Critics and readers were impressed by the humorous ways Yang Mu writes about his skepticism on religion. As a system of belief founded on texts, religion is taken as a "firm knot of ideas" (2) to be untied by the skeptic. Some reviewers, however, read the book as the author's attempt to supplant traditional religions with his own "religion" of poetry built on the Romantic notion of beauty and truth.² Of note here is a very interesting point: *The Skeptic*, a deconstructive reading of religious discourses, is now read against its grain. Such divergence, in fact, effects a self-evacuating irony on the book that precisely justifies the author's concerns about "poetical discrepancies." An investigation into these discrepancies, presented in the book and in its reception, not only demonstrates critical issues in interpretation and criticism of a literary kind, but also sheds light on some significant differences in the approach to language.

What first captured the attention of readers is the book's bilingual title, 疑神 [Yi Shen] *The Skeptic: Notes on Poetical Discrepancies*. Although the title in Chinese, *Yi Shen* [Doubting God], carries an explicit referent, "God," as the subject for scrutiny, the myriad meanings of the Chinese character, *shen*, such as "spirit," "higher being," "deity," "divinity," "supernatural," "magical" or even "uncanny," undermine its clarity. In contrast, the title in English supplied by the author, *The Skeptic: Notes on Poetical Discrepancies*, suggests no specific subject for

doubts. The gist of the book—the skeptical attitude—is personified as “the skeptic” who takes nothing for granted. Such attitude to life leads a person to observe various idiosyncrasies in the rhetorical articulation of faith and belief.

According to Geertz, it is “a cluster of sacred symbols, woven into some sort of ordered whole, which makes up a religious system. For those who are committed to it, such a religious system seems to mediate genuine knowledge, knowledge of the essential conditions in terms of which life must, of necessity, be lived.”³ Reflecting a similar view, Yang Mu analyzes the transcendental concept, “god,” “dao,” or any logos, as a center which “is born of false conclusions drawn from far-fetched analogies; He [it] dies of textual research and deconstruction” (Yang 70). The notes present “discrepancies” of two major kinds: over-selectivity and distortion, as identified by Geertz. Like ideology, religion is subject to a pernicious selectivity in which only some aspects of actual life are emphasized. In addition, those aspects thus recognized are distorted to support the ideologues. What *The Skeptic* illustrates is that in most religious texts, over-selectivity and distortion work to formulate a closed system of signification within which “god” is installed.

Demonstrative of a signifiatory act, the principal statement in the first section of *The Skeptic* is put in a poetic way: “Religion is merely a firm knot of ideas” (2). When Yang Mu renders the Chinese transliteration of “ideology,” he cleverly turns it into a four-character word “yi-di-lu-jie” [a firm knot of ideas]. It follows that in order to untie the “firm knot of ideas,” one must unravel the process of signification. “Everybody knows the images,” but the skeptical speaker claims in Section 5, “only I know the ways to display and preserve these images [...]. Everybody pays attention to images; I do not. I pay attention to the ways images are displayed and preserved” (64, emphasis mine). Images are indispensable since “god” ought to be inscrutable. Therefore, “god” needs to be mystified by images and hidden in shrines, in order to show how important or omnipotent he is.

In a way, what is poetic in religious language lies in its capacity to

create a new way of life and to open readers' eyes to new aspects of reality.⁴ In many sections of *The Skeptic*, the creative potentialities of the images of "god" are closely examined. There are all kinds of "god" in different cultures. Gods can be male or female. In the West, there are the Christian god and the Greek gods and goddesses on Mount Olympus. In Asia, in the coastal areas of China and in Taiwan, for example, there are sea goddesses worshipped by fishermen and sailors. In some oriental cultures, such as Japan, Kami (god) can reside in objects. People who are serious about drinking tea may admire "Tea gods" and study "Tea Bible" (296). Common to most cultures, images of god are primarily man-made in the form of verbal or plastic arts. It is believed that the Christian god created mankind in his image. In so saying, humans are endowed with a certain degree of divinity above other creatures and given a hope of resembling god in appearance and virtues. Race-conscious people, however, often question the validity of such claims because it is too "obvious" that the image of the Christian god, as embodied by Jesus Christ, is fashioned after the look of a White Caucasian male. The skeptic observes an interesting cultural difference: "The sculptures of arhats, are all individually given a unique appearance whereas all angels look more or less the same" (295). Plastic arts certainly give the most direct impression of a "god." Athena, Apollo and King David appeal to the skeptic through paintings and sculptures. Once, a picture of a bronze sculpture of Athena stuns him: "She is so beautiful that one dare not look at her in the face" (118). It is a beauty that is mystified by reproductions far removed from the "origin." Yet the "godliness" of Athena lies in this beauty. Comments like these do not aim to imply an expedience of research into the true face of the referent, be it arhats, angels or Athena, but to arouse readers' interest in the diverse methods of representation.

To deepen the understanding of signs, Yang Mu offers a Chinese perspective that ruptures the Saussurean notion of signification. In the Chinese language, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is not entirely arbitrary. In section 19, noting that Chinese

pictorial writing offers a graphic resemblance to the physical landscape, the skeptic wonders about the order of appearance of an island, the signified, and the Chinese character, "dao" 島, the signifier.

No one knows whether there had been such an island before Cang Qie made the character "island" or there had been such a character before some mighty being made the island in the bay outside my window.

*

Whichever came first, the power of imitation is incredible.

If the island has existed before the character, it [the character] is "a god-sent inscription."

On the contrary, if the character has existed before the island, it [the island] is "the craft of god and spirit."

Both are superb. (275-76)

His argument, in fact, reveals the inadequacy of Western linguistic theory when applied to a non-alphabetical and non-phonetic language. As a sign, the Chinese ideogram facilitates three ways of "looking" at the issue of signification. First, not every island resembles the Chinese character 島, so the relationship is arbitrary. Second, some islands do bear a close resemblance to the graphic sign, so there is a definitive mimetic relationship. Third, when the signifier is rendered in different calligraphic styles, they bear a visual resemblance to an island in different weathers, so that the signifiers and the signified are both indeterminate, but the matching can still be possible. The indeterminate, reversible link between the origin and the trace causes doubt. Whether it is an island that has existed before the character or vice versa, the skeptic ascribes the creation of the sign to the supernatural, as suggested by the god-affixed Chinese adjectival phrases. Thus, the relationship between the signifier and the signified oscillates between divine determinism and mimetic craftsmanship. At times, the question of distinguishing the origin from its imitation can be resolved by chance in the Chinese language. Such serendipity proves the supremacy of art, whether it is the verbal art of copying the shape of an island or the sculptor's art of axing the landscape according to the character—"Both are superb."

Driven by imagination and mysteries of life, man has needed to invent a sign to contain the metaphysical and arrived at a name, "god" (①). In *The Skeptic*, a variety of signs from different cultures orchestrate a play of poetical discrepancies, which become particularly conspicuous in translation. The Greek word "logos" was translated into the English word, "Word," capitalized to give it a mystic and divine flavor. In Chinese, "logos" is rendered by the character, "Dao" 道. In the Chinese translation of "The Gospel according to John," a back translation of the opening sentence reads: "In the beginning was Dao, Dao was with God, and Dao was God" (114). The Bible, in this light, seems to follow Laozi's (in the third century B.C.) explanation of the mysterious origin of the world: "I do not know its name and call it Dao" (115). The elasticity and inexactness of the term Dao plays a crucial role in this cultural transfer, linking ancient Chinese philosophy with Christianity. Readers are reminded of the Chinese concept of immanence as epitomized in the ever-present but inadducible Dao. "The Dao that can be verbalized is not the universal Dao" (116). In Chinese culture, to build a system on the unreproducible Dao is self-defeating. In spite of the constructedness of signs and traces, Section 16 illustrates how poetical representations of the abstract and ineffable have been institutionalized into systems of belief or disciplines: Dao into Daoism; god into theology and different religions; and words into poetry, poetics, and different schools of poetics.

From an ironic distance, the author sees through different strategies of signification but makes use of them at the same time. When a question of location "Where are gods and demons?" is posed, different religions and philosophies come up with different answers. To the skeptic, Christianity is a cultural construct composed of architecture, music, poetry, and visual arts. The composition of soaring vaults, melodious prayers, and variegated colours in a cathedral provides an ideal setting for reading Rilke's *Duino Elegies*. In this, "all the beauty of Western culture is contained" (9). Cathedrals are an exquisite design worked out by humans to house their god. So are temples for other gods. These images symbolize a sanctuary—in times of wars

and in holocaust movies in particular. Some religious systems do away with buildings and house their "god" in nature. In Buddhist scriptures, for instance, different Buddhas are found sitting under different trees (249-58). Sakyamuni, the most revered of Buddhas, is known to have been enlightened during his meditation under a Bodhi tree. Confucius, the great Chinese philosopher, often enshrined as god, is said to have been teaching under apricots (261-62).

As for the whereabouts of the Devil, a priest will say, "Devil is in your heart." When people wonder where Dao is, Zhuangzi's (369?-286? B.C.) reply is, "everywhere".

Then he elaborates it with examples and situates Dao in ants, in weeds, and in earthware. Finally, he actually comes up with "in urine and excrement." It is really getting worse and worse.

*

//Deep in the mountain, there is a vast mansion, a Spanish monastery with a red-tiled roof. Greeting one's eyes are pineapples all over the mountain. A breeze blows. (20)

To Yang Mu, it is not the locations or the validity of such locations that matter. It is the ways the place is signified that deserve one's attention. His witty juxtaposition in fact teases the "confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism."⁵ After citing the contingent location of Dao "in urine and excrement," the author immediately cuts to a red-tiled Spanish monastery in the green and refreshes the air with the sweet-smelling breeze of pineapple. A game of jozzling signifiers is played here, in which disparate sets of images collide into one another head-on. Humor and irony are the marked style of the passages in *The Skeptic*, especially when they are read in a self-alienating approach.

Like a cultural critic, the skeptic examines the discursive logic in the theory and practice of a religion by engaging a wide range of texts; examples from numerous systems of belief are drawn. The mysterious reincarnation of a Tibetan Lama who died in March 1984 into a Spanish boy born on 12 February 1985 in Granada, a Catholic community, was a wonder to the world (33). The skeptic is amazed by such belief

in transcendence beyond temporal-spatial bounds. Greek myths of Apollo and Athena that extrapolate "truths" beyond human experience are also explored. As for the sedimentation of discourses, Christianity apparently excels in its number of publications and multi-mediumistic representations. Besides the Bible, there exists a vast amount of writings in different categories. In literature alone, representative texts discussed in *The Skeptic* include narratives such as Chaucer's *The Canterbury Tales*, John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and Milton's Christian epic, *Paradise Lost*; and poetry such as the works of John Donne, religious verse by Hopkins, and the sacramental sonnets of the poet-monk, Edward Taylor. Set among monasteries and churches, Christian narratives repeatedly performed by pilgrims, knights, monks, and clergymen since the Medieval times have discursively established the religious system. Apart from this organized dissemination of the Christian doctrine through verbal texts, there are theatrical performances and cinematic versions dealing with the same story of crucifixion and salvation. In this connection, the skeptic looks into a modern mode of indoctrination featured by the theatrical rendition of the 1960s musical, "Jesus Christ, Superstar," which was later made into a movie. To him, the director plays god in an adaptation, and the biblical plot can be re-staged and re-cast in any setting, for example the Ming dynasty in China (13). Despite discrepancies in the artistic form of signification, the formulaic presentation serves to perpetuate the Christian logic.

From a literary point of view, striking resemblances in the depiction of death are found between religious texts and other forms of writing. The most famous contemplation of death, Hamlet's soliloquy of "To be or not to be," is used as a prelude to the topic in section 10. "The undiscovered country from whose bourn / No traveler returns, puzzles the will" solicits various attempts to explain and explore the region beyond this life. Yang Mu places in one category the serenity of philosophers confronted with death. As known from ancient writings about the sages' "biographies," Confucius knew his time had come and had actually prepared for it, whereas the execution of Socrates

was accepted by the victim: "If gods find this well, let it be." In another category, an ironic comparison is made between the ways Jesus Christ and Ah Q behave when death is near. By placing Christ, "a melancholic man," in the Bible with Ah Q, the despised clown in a famous vernacular Chinese fiction, the author reads them not as the son of "god" or a creation of a writer, but as different poetical embodiments of human reaction to death (147-50).

Apart from analyzing the literary and aesthetic process of image-building, the author meticulously checks the coherence of individual religious discourses and uncovers aberrations against reduction. In the skeptic's reading, some aspects of Christianity exhibit inherent contradictions.

God is almighty, within a system. (6)

*

God decides everything, including your belief in god and my disbelief in god. God decides that I do not believe that god can decide everything. (8)

*

The missionary's job is a riskless one because god has already decided who is to believe him and who is not. (8)

To an average reader, the illogic underscoring Christianity is too obvious to miss. Ideological aberrations are often required when one needs to make up his mind about what should be ascribed to god's grace, and what to his own faults. Needless to say, the decisions must fall within the system. Contradictions are to be suppressed by faith, and doubts dismissed by the admission of human limitations.

Similar tactics of over-selectivity and distortion are found in other kinds of discourse. Assuming the role of a literary critic in section 15, the skeptic does a close reading of Karl Marx's love letter to his wife, Jenny, in 1856 when he was in exile in London. With the practical skills of American formalism, the skeptic anatomizes the stylistic features of the text. To him, Marx's simile of comparing his yearning for love during a period of separation to the plants' need of sunlight and rain is too conceited, though the logic works well. However, Marx's allusions to Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach, a German phi-

losopher; Jacob Moleschott, a Dutch physiologist; and Pythagoras, an ancient Greek philosopher and mathematician, are rather strange in a love letter. As a materialist, Marx would probably refute the notion of rebirth, as formulated in the Brahman belief of reincarnation in Hinduism and Jesus Christ's resurrection in Christianity. But for love, Marx ends his love letter with a poetic line, "Buried in her arms, and be reborn in her kisses." This seems to be a reconciliatory note of Marx, forsaking his usual dialectical thinking and materialistic outlook for love. Such a romantic line in the love letter nonetheless stands up as a rupture to the Marxist logic. In *The Skeptic* (Section 15), Marx's well-argued love letter is placed side by side with a lover's speech in Gustave Flaubert's novel, *Madame Bovary*. Rodolphe says to Madame Bovary in their first meeting after a six-week separation, "Oh, I think of you constantly. It drives me to despair, [...]. Forgive me! I'll leave you [...]. Good-bye! I'll go away, far away, and you'll hear no more of me."⁶ The approach-and-avoidance conflict of forbidden lovers is a cause for dramatization in literature. Emma and Rodolphe's manneristic indulgence in theatricality constitutes a sharp contrast to Marx's letter. There is no analogy by logical deduction, but an intense emotional outburst. Marx's conceit and Rodolphe's verbiage are divergent signifying practices that exhibit poetical discrepancies in the discourse of love, "real" and "fictional." The discrepancies distinguish a scientific socialist from an artist (Flaubert). The discussion also reveals contradictions within a person's language. Even Marx, the god who fathered Marxism, has to admit the irrelevance of his scientism and resort to transcendental imagery in the emotional aspects of human life. A major source of pleasure in reading *The Skeptic* is to retrace the way in which the author examines the language in a discourse—how the language follows, and at times, breaks away from the system that circumscribes it.

Most powerful is signification at the critical moment when one's religious faith is put to the test. Several instances of religious struggle are cited in *The Skeptic*, in which the author perceives a loss of subjectivity and a distortion of human nature. The coercive twist of natural

human responses into a stereotypical piety is exposed in the horror-stricken scenes of faithful Christians fighting lions in the colosseum and the bloody image of having Jesus nailed to the cross. The skeptic discerns that the repulsion and eeriness of these images are actually suppressed by faith and naturalized by rituals. Violence and blood are shock therapy to wandering souls. Sacrificial acts serve to revive disciples' sense of guilt and to repress their human responses. Besides, the suppression of romantic love and passion in the name of god is no less unnatural. To lodge a protest, Alexander Pope's poem, "Eloisa to Abelard," is read (36-44). Pope lends a voice to Eloisa's complaint, "Nature stands check'd; Religion disapproves" (line 259) and lets her prayer of religious anguish rise to an ecstasy of sexual orgasm. In the poetic treatment, the antagonistic entities, the Christian god and the forbidden lover, Abelard, merge into a referent of her intense yearning.

Unlike poetic language that opens one's imagination, religious language is embedded in an element of commitment. A dramatization of decision-making is indispensable in a religious discourse. Common to many systems of belief, conversion usually occurs in a momentary oblivion of the self, requiring the unconscious subjugation to the unknown in the process. In many cultural traditions, images of nature play a crucial role in signifying such experiences. The last few pages of *The Skeptic* describe how the skeptic, on waking up from a nap, is confronted with a reservoir of "religious" signifiers. The nap, a temporary loss of mastery over one's own intellect and senses, is awe-inspiring like death. Yet in an uncompromising manner, he defies the signs immediately available to him; these include a cross, a chapel, and scattering spots of light from the stained glass windows—the stock images in the Christian language of divine revelation. He refuses to allow his experiences to weave into a religious conversion. With a decisive statement, "I have to go now," the notes of poetic discrepancies end. The skeptic finally chooses to free himself from the scene of "godly" revelation and break away from the totalizing signification.

Above all, "epistemological tyranny" is a kind of power exercised in terms of and upon language by insisting on an invented set of signifying practices, so as to monopolize the linguistic signs (280). "Names and jargons are primarily fluid [...]. When signs are systematized, defined and restrained into a closed system, they are turned into terminology [...]. Selected words are polished, revised, and canonized" (281). Over-selectivity and distortion work to formulate a set of signifiers into terminology that helps produce a monolithic, repressive language to perpetuate tyranny. Resulting from this operation is the exclusive and dualistic "defensive" and "offensive" attitude of disciples in many religions, which the skeptic criticizes from the start (2). *The Skeptic* is an ideological critique that attacks the doctrinaire logic not by a theological debate, but by blowing up the arguments into an open image-field. The bits and pieces the author picks and puts together do not presume coherence in form. In the interrogative interaction between the notes, the language of power—on which the unity of any system will depend—breaks up.

Since its publication, *The Skeptic* has impressed many critics by its unconventional approach to religions. Despite the author's humorous unraveling of "the firm knot of ideas" in many religious discourses, some critics still rest assured with the monolithic belief that this book by Yang Mu is, without exception, about the quest of beauty and truth. In their reading, the author's challenges hurled at religions and authoritarian institutions are leveled down to serve as a backdrop. Chinese poetics is known for its traditional assumption of transparency in mediation, one that favors a reading of meaning in terms of the author's intention.⁷ Close to the historical-philological methods predominant in the pre-structuralist era in the West, the intentionalist hermeneutics underscores Chinese literary interpretation and criticism, resulting in a historical-biographical approach to texts.⁸ The reception of *The Skeptic* illustrates what happens when a text which delineates the post-structuralist doubts about language is received by readers who, under the dictates of Chinese tradition, prefer a reading for referent.⁹ This is another kind of "discrepancy" that calls for a

critical inquiry into the diverse approaches to language prevalent in different eras and cultures.

The Chinese intentionalist hermeneutics demands a rather clear-cut thematic reading of the text. Instead of having a suspension of belief and disbelief in the referent, many readers expect a configuration or refiguration of "god," and their reading is a search for coherence. In order to identify the author's intent in the text, some critics strive to provide a textual structure, by supplying other information to fill the gaps in the notes, when the reading is obstructed by indeterminacy. Ying Peian, for example, summarizes and reorganizes the notes into some concordant arguments in a question and answer form. He offers annotations to sharpen the author's points by drawing references from other sources.¹⁰ Amendments are also inserted to modify Yang Mu's views, for example concerning the meaning of "humility," which Ying finds incongruous with the ecclesiastical understanding.¹¹ In many cases, critics turn the text—notes on poetical discrepancies—against itself, and discuss it as merely an elaborate footnote to Yang Mu's romantic notion of beauty and truth.¹²

Other critics suspect that the skepticism in *The Skeptic* is merely a camouflage to erect a religion of poetry over other systems of belief.¹³ In Wu Qiancheng's opinion, "Like poets from Romanticism to Modernism, Yang Mu, knowingly or unknowingly, has often taken poetry as a religion or a semi-religion [...]."¹⁴ If Yang Mu's attempt of casting doubts on gods or religions aims only at replacing them with one's own god, as some critics have said, the whole discourse of *The Skeptic* is but a sheer legitimatization of the same though recodified totalizing power. The philosophical project of deconstructing the discourses of 'god' thus collapses. In fact, the author goes beyond the oppositional imagination of systems of belief. When disparate signifying practices are brought into contact in *The Skeptic*, the focus lies not in the power of one system over another, but in the power of signification.

As the dialogic relation of the book's English and Chinese titles implies, the book does not offer absolute answers to the doubts about god suggested in the Chinese title, instead it opens up a site of poetical

discrepancies discovered by the skeptic. The discrepancies are more poetical than religious in nature because they point to "the creative, revelatory, and deceptive powers of language" in different discourses of "god."¹⁵ Recovered in the discrepancies are the plurality, incompleteness and ideological ruptures that have been repressed. The discursive construction of a religious text, like any other linguistic text, operates by a tying of drifting signifiers into a firm knot—"god." By showing that signifiers are empty and free-floating but the ways of suturing them are unlimited, Yang Mu reveals the infiniteness of the discursivity of "god" in his deconstructive reading.

Verified by a historical-biographical reading of Yang Mu's other publications, the critics' conclusions about the author's intention to install a religion of beauty and truth in *The Skeptic* are indeed an ironic turn to the book. Nonetheless, an insight can be gained from this resistance to discrepancies because in their commentaries one can clearly see a divergent approach to signification, with the process of over-selectivity and distortion working as in a religious discourse. All in all, from the untying and tying of the firm knots of ideas, as illustrated by *The Skeptic* and the critical responses the book elicits, the interesting dialectic tension between the Western post-structuralist scrutiny of language and the Chinese intentionalist pre-structuralist reading is thrown into relief.

Chinese University of Hong Kong

NOTES

¹Yang Mu (born in 1940) is one of the most important Chinese poets, writers, and literary scholars writing today. His publications include more than twenty books of creative writing of poetry and prose. Books and essays on literary criticism and comparative literature were published in Chinese and English. As professor of comparative literature, Yang has taught in the United States, Taiwan and Hong Kong. He was awarded the National Prize for Literature and Arts in 2000. In April of the same year, he was the "Poet in Residence" at Charles University, Prague. His poems were translated into English and German. Examples are *Forbidden Games and Video Poems: The Poetry of Yang Mu and Lo Ching*, trans. Joseph R. Allen (Seattle: The U of Washington P, 1993), *No Trace of the Gardener: Poems of*

Yang Mu, trans. Lawrence R. Smith and Michelle Yeh (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998) and *Patt Beim Go: Gedichte chinesisch-deutsch*, trans. Susanne Hornfeck and Wang Jue (München: Al Verlag, 2002). Other scholarly works by Yang Mu include the Chinese translation of *Selected Poems of W. B. Yeats* and *The Tempest*. The book in discussion here is *Yi Shen*, hereafter referred to as *The Skeptic*. See *Yi Shen (The Skeptic: Notes on Poetical Discrepancies)* (Taipei: Hung-fan, 1993).

²Yang Mu's confessed affinity to the Romantic poets, John Keats, in particular, has been known to his readers since he published "Letters to Keats" in the early 1960s.

³Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 129.

⁴For a discussion of religious language as some kind of poetic language, see "Poetry and Possibility" in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdes (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 448-62.

⁵Paul de Man, *Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986) 11.

⁶Yang Mu translated the speech into Chinese in section 15, *The Skeptic*, 223; the English version quoted here is taken from Gustave Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*, trans. Alan Russell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1950) 168.

⁷Zhang Longxi proposes the term "intentionalist hermeneutics" to describe the tendency in Chinese lyric tradition to take the intention of the poet as the highest authority in the interpretation of poetry. He finds a powerful endorsement of this intentionalist hermeneutics in the works of Mencius, whose exegetical method can be summed up in his own words: "the interpreter of a poem should not let the words obscure the text, or the text obscure the intention. To trace back to the original intention with sympathetic understanding: that is the way to do it." See Zhang Longxi, *The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West* (Durham: Duke UP, 1992) 134.

⁸In *The Works of Mencius*, Book V: "Wan Zhang," Part II, ch. viii, it says, "He repeats their poems [poems of the men of antiquity], reads their books, and as he does not know what they were as men, to ascertain this, he considers their history." *The Chinese Classics*, trans. James Legge, vol. 1 (Taipei: SMC, 1991) 392.

⁹Post-structuralist discourses in the latter half of the twentieth century highlight the instrumental role of language in fostering absolute power. Attention is drawn to the strategic use of language to mystify rather than to present the "truth" or "intention."

¹⁰Ying Peian, "Yi Shen—zai shangdi de huxucong zhong he huxucong wai" [*Yi Shen—Inside and Outside God's Beard*]. *Suye wenxue* 54 (August 1994): 14-23.

¹¹Ying 19.

¹²Besides Ying Peian's work, some reviews and essays that serve to homogenize the author's arguments by the notion of beauty and truth are He Jipeng, "Pingjie: Yi Shen" [A Review of *The Skeptic*]. *United Daily News*, 4 March 1993; and "Shiren sanwen de dianfan—lun Yang Mu sanwen zhi teshu gediao yu diwei" [Paradigm of

Poets' Prose—a Discussion on the Special Style and Status of Yang Mu's Prose], *Proceedings of the First Conference on Hualian Literature* (Hualian: Hualian Cultural Centre, 1998) 150-62; and Zhang Juanfen, "Yang Mu: Yi 'shen' yi 'quan'" [Yang Mu: Skeptical of "God" and "Power"] *China Times*, 23 December 1993.

¹³For example, Yang Zhao's, "Yishu zhouwei yizhong zhongzhao—ping Yang Mu de Yi Shen" [Art as Religion: A Review of Yang Mu's Yi Shen], in *Wenxue de yuanxiang* [The Prototype of Literature]. (Taipei: Lianjing, 1995) 209-11.

¹⁴Wu Qiancheng, "Pingjie: Yi Shen" [A Review of *The Skeptic*] *China Times*, 26 February 1993.

¹⁵Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981) 36.

Connotations

A Journal for Critical Debate

Contents of Volume 12 (2002/2003)

| | |
|---|-----|
| Spenser's Parody DONALD CHENEY | 1 |
| * | |
| "If we offend, it is with our good will": Staging Dissent in <i>A Midsummer Night's Dream</i> DAVID LAIRD | 35 |
| * | |
| Shakespeare's Falstaff as Parody ARTHUR F. KINNEY | 105 |
| * | |
| Catholic Shakespeare? A Response to Hildegard Hammerschmidt-Hummel E. A. J. HONIGMANN | 52 |
| "The most important subject that can possibly be": A Reply to E. A. J. Honigmann HILDEGARD HAMMERSCHMIDT-HUMMEL | 155 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Parody, Satire and Sympathy in <i>Don Quixote</i> and <i>Gulliver's Travels</i> DAVID FISHELOV | 126 |
|--|-----|

*

| | |
|---|-----|
| "Grace beyond a curled lock:" Further Thoughts on Henry Vaughan's "Isaac's Marriage" GLYN PURSGLOVE | 167 |
|---|-----|

*

| | |
|--|-----|
| Unsexing Austen: A Response to Leona Toker AMANPAL GARCHA | 183 |
|--|-----|

*

| | |
|---|----|
| Brontë and Burnett: A Response to Susan E. James LISA TYLER | 61 |
|---|----|

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>Wuthering Heights</i> and <i>The Secret Garden</i> : A Response to Susan E. James ANNA KRUGOVOY SILVER | 194 |
|---|-----|

*

| | |
|--|-----|
| The Making of a Goddess: Hardy, Lawrence and Persephone ANDREW RADFORD | 202 |
|--|-----|

*

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>Dracula</i> and the Cultural Construction of Europe JASON DITTMER | 233 |
|---|-----|

*

| | |
|---|----|
| Tragedy in <i>The Turn of the Screw</i> : An Answer to Ursula Brumm EDWARD LOBB | 67 |
|---|----|

*

| | |
|--|----|
| Elizabeth Bishop's "The Prodigal" as a Sympathetic Parody FRANK J. KEARFUL | 14 |
|--|----|

*

| | |
|---|----|
| War, Conversation, and Context in Patrick Hamilton's <i>The Slaves of Solitude</i> THIERRY LABICA | 72 |
|---|----|

*

| | |
|--|----|
| Allusions in Gary Snyder's "The Canyon Wren" LING CHUNG | 83 |
|--|----|

*

| | |
|---|-----|
| From Lone Monkey to Family Man: Wittman's Evolving Inclusion in <i>Tripmaster Monkey</i> LARA NARCISI | 249 |
|---|-----|

*

| | |
|---|-----|
| "It's wanting to know that makes us matter": Scepticism or Affirmation in Tom Stoppard's <i>Arcadia</i> . A Response to Burkhard Niederhoff ANJA MÜLLER-MUTH | 281 |
|---|-----|

*

Angels, Insects, and Analogy:
A. S. Byatt's "Morpho Eugenia"

JUNE STURROCK

93

*

(Un)tying a Firm Knot of Ideas:
Reading Yang Mu's *The Skeptic*

LISA WONG

292

*

Parody as Cultural Memory
in Richard Powers's *Galatea 2.2*

ANCA ROSU

139