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Empathy with the Butcher, or: The Inhuman Non-Human in Michel Faber's *Under the Skin*

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This article is the first entry in a debate on "The Inhuman Non-Human in Michel Faber's *Under the Skin*" (http://www.connotations.de/debate/the-inhuman-non-human-in-michael-fabers-under-the-skin). If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

Empathy is generally understood to be a pro-social emotion and a significant aspect of social intelligence. It allows us to step into another person's shoes and to share that person's emotions and perspective; as such, it is closely related to sympathy and compassion. This ability should guide us in our recognition of pro-social, anti-social or even sociopathic behaviour and, as social beings, we should tend to feel drawn towards pro-sociality, altruism and reciprocity and averse to egotism, cruelty, atrocities and anti-sociality in general. This is not always the case. Not only does empathy show some weaknesses, being limited in its scope, endowed with only a short-term memory, and biased towards "us" rather than "them," it also has its dark sides and can easily be manipulated and employed for downright dangerous or evil purposes. Among the cognitive features that can be exploited for such ends is a kind of mental inertia, a.k.a. the confirmation bias or myside bias: once we have formed a positive—or negative—opinion about real or fictional persons we are likely to avoid any change of mind and tend to select and evaluate information accordingly. Faber's science fiction novel *Under the Skin* is an extreme example of our willingness to 'forgive and forget' even the worst atrocities. Our paper explores the literary strategies that influence our responses to the monstrous behaviour of the novel's extra-terrestrial protagonist, as well as the cognitive mechanisms that may be involved in our momentary acceptance of the inhuman non-human.

Empathy is generally understood to be a pro-social emotion and often regarded as a lodestone for our moral compass. Decety and Batson point out that "empathic concern or sympathy […] is often associated with prosocial behaviors such as helping, and has been considered as a chief enabling process for altruism" (113); Suzanne Keen regards "human empathy as a precious quality of our social natures" (viii) even though she questions "the contemporary truism that novel reading cultivates empathy that produces good citizens for the world" (xv). Indeed, over the last years some less favourable aspects have been explored in studies that discuss the dark sides of empathy.

1) Empathy favours "the one over the many" (Bloom 9), i.e. we are far more able to empathize with individual suffering than with large-scale disasters and atrocities. According to a famous dictum, attributed, inter alia, to Joseph Stalin, "[w]hen one man dies it is a Tragedy. When thousands die it's statistics" (McCullough 420). In consequence, pleas for empathetic response like hunger-relief ads are most successful if they employ images of solitary starving children, but "the focus on affected individuals distracts us from systemic problems that can be addressed only by interventions at an entirely different scale" (Prinz 228).

2) Empathy is temporary. It is "a limited resource" (Decety and Cowell 337), and a "form of compassion fatigue can lead to apathy and inaction, consistent with what is seen repeatedly in response to many large-scale human and environmental catastrophes" (Västfjäll et al.). Psychological defence mechanisms protect us from endless grief and even more from feeling extensively and persistently with the sorrows and sufferings of others, but it follows that empathy has a short-term memory and favours immediate action over well-planned strategies.

3) Empathy is "ineluctably local" (Prinz 228), i.e. like gravity its impact decreases with distance. As we can notice every evening in the news, local, regional and national calamities and disasters take precedence over far larger tragedies in the rest of the world. We feel most strongly with those who are near to us as part of our family or kin, our vicinity or our (imagined) community, while otherness diminishes our willingness or ability to get emotionally involved (see Prinz 227).

Unquestionably, these are problematic aspects of empathy, but we would like to suggest that they should be seen as weaknesses rather than dark sides of our cognitive and emotional faculties. Empathy in such cases fails to fulfil a valuable function, and it may even impede rational and productive action in favour of biased and short-term response. But although we can be manipulated to empathize with cute kids rather than with unruly brats equally deserving of our attention (see Prinz 229), with cuddly animals rather than with ugly beasts which may be just as much endangered, nevertheless our response would not be actively harmful or malevolent.

Empathy has, however, come under even more severe scrutiny by Nils Bubandt and Rane Willerslev, this time with a focus on "Mimesis, Deception, and the Magic of Alterity" (2015). They are concerned with "forms of deliberately deceptive forms of mimicry" and "the emotional and cognitive projection of oneself into the perspective or situation of another for deceptive purposes" (13). Here empathy, or rather the manipulation of empathy, indeed causes harm—the two examples chosen present mimicry and fake pleas for empathy as a hunting strategy and as a method to create political turmoil and aggression. The important element here is the manipulative use of *Theory of Mind*, the adoption of a false identity to lure the victim into an empathetic response to a deceptive behaviour or carefully constructed misinformation. In both cases, the victims are trapped and remain unaware of the deception; in the first example, the prey is simply killed by a masked hunter, in the second, a forged pamphlet suggesting a plot against an ethnic group leads to violent riots by the allegedly threatened community.

In our paper we argue that the manipulation can go even further and evoke empathetic responses in the face of violence and even atrocity if the right psychological buttons are skilfully pressed. The very fact that empathy is limited and proximate can be exploited, and the tale of a single member of our (imaginary) community suffering under oppression or maltreatment from someone belonging to an 'othered' group may easily turn the recipients to discrimination or the acceptance of violence against the whole group. Moreover, as we respond to fictional

characters with similar empathy as to real persons, it does not even matter whether the story has any claim to veracity. This is an important element of propaganda, and as such it was employed by movies like *The Birth of a Nation* or *Jud Süss*. Suzanne Keen explicitly draws attention to the "powerful stories" employed by the Nazis to legitimate racism and genocide and writes: "If narrative fiction has the capacity to alter readers' characters for the good, it may also possess darker powers" (25). More recent examples should readily come to mind, e.g. the faked Nayirah testimony about alleged atrocities committed by Iraqi soldiers; Fritz Breithaupt devotes a whole subchapter of his book to the "Trump Phenomenon" and his manipulation of the public's empathy (103-14).

An additional mental feature that can be exploited to manipulate our empathy is the predisposition to stick to our opinions and beliefs, and, in consequence, an unwillingness to admit to errors that would force us to change our minds. This can be regarded as a kind of mental inertia, but also, and possibly more importantly, as a way to maintain self-esteem and save face. The phenomenon has been researched and discussed on various levels; we can find it in religious belief systems and tenacious superstitions, but also in scientific world views, and, of course, in our daily lives. As Keith Thomas wrote in *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971):

> It is a feature of many systems of thought, and not only primitive ones, that they possess a self-confirming character. Once their initial premises are accepted, no subsequent discovery will shake the believer's faith, for he can always explain it away in terms of the existing system. (767)

The question is, then, not why people hold on to their beliefs, but why and how it can happen that they change them. On a smaller scale, such a "conceptual conservatism" (Nissani) and tendency to maintain and even protect once-formed opinions is closely linked to the so-called *confirmation bias*, or, as Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber prefer, *myside bias* (218-21). Experiments conducted by Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper, and Michael Hubbard in the 1970s demonstrated that first impressions, once they have settled into a relatively stable opinion or perspective, cannot

easily be shaken and adjusted to new conditions but show a remarkable tenacity and resistance to conflicting information:

> Once formed, initial impressions structure and distort the attributional processes through which subsequently considered evidence is interpreted. […]
>
> The perceiver, we contend, typically does not reinterpret or reattribute impression-relevant data when the basis for his original coding bias is discredited; once coded, the evidence becomes autonomous from the coding scheme, and its impact ceases to depend upon the validity of that schema. (889)

Thus, we tend to process information selectively. Data that confirm our beliefs are evaluated as more credible than those that contradict our views and opinions—a bias that is at present much discussed in the context of the selective use of information from social media and the consequently widening gap between political factions. The confirmation bias leads to a kind of self-created and avidly preserved cocoon that filters incoming information so that we ultimately receive and process only the news and "facts" that agree with our pre-formed opinions and thus give us the pleasant feeling of being consistently "right." To create and maintain empathetic responses thus requires chiefly the creation of a positive and stable first impression and, in situations when seriously conflicting facts could challenge our beliefs, a steady trickle of supporting information to keep us on track.

Such findings, of course, contradict assumptions that humans rationally evaluate information and thus arrive at sensible and well-considered conclusions; Antonio Damasio suggests that our decisions are strongly influenced by *somatic markers*, positive or negative bodily responses on the basis of previous experiences. As such, somatic markers "probably increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process" (173), but they also bias us to repeat previous decisions which led to agreeable results, a tendency that might be exploited by manipulative information. And as empathy is generally a benevolent feeling towards a person, we are probably biased to maintain this emotional response even if first impressions are called into question. Of course, we occasionally change our opinion about people, but experience tells us that it requires rather strong stimuli, and the result in such cases is usually

extreme—we do not regard a lost friend with indifference, but with scorn.

Let us at this point turn to literature and the theoretical propositions about our response to fictional characters. In her book *Why We Read Fiction*, Lisa Zunshine suggests that our metarepresentational abilities allow us to keep track of other people's utterances and, in case of misbehaviour or wilful misinformation, to reconsider our previous opinions and change our minds about them. Unquestionably this may happen, but it involves not only the adoption of a new perspective but also the admittance, to ourselves and maybe others, that we have erred in our judgment which may then lead to doubts in our social and psychological skills and a—real or imaginary—loss of face.

Zunshine offers Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* as an example in which the characters change their minds about others and, possibly, so do the readers.

> Elizabeth Bennet (and, through her, the reader) can get over her prejudice toward Mr. Darcy because one of the important representations on which she has based her deep dislike of him—Mr. Wickham's account of how Mr. Darcy had mistreated him in the past—is stored in her (and our) mind as metarepresentation. (61)

She then goes on to declare:

> Throw a strong *a priori* doubt on Mr. Wickham's character and see if Elizabeth Bennet will take his stories about Mr. Darcy's iniquity quite so uncritically, *even if she is already predisposed* to dislike Mr. Darcy. (61)

This may be true for Elizabeth, but is it for the attentive reader who has previously read a passage in which Darcy begins to see Elisabeth in a new light?

> Mr. Darcy had at first scarcely allowed her to be pretty; he had looked at her without admiration at the ball; and when they next met, he looked at her only to criticise. But no sooner had he made it clear to himself and his friends that she hardly had a good feature in her face, than he began to find it was rendered uncommonly intelligent by the beautiful expression of her dark eyes. To this discovery succeeded some others equally mortifying. Though he had detected with a critical eye more than one failure of perfect symmetry in her form, he was forced to acknowledge her figure to be light and pleasing; and

> in spite of his asserting that her manners were not those of the fashionable world, he was caught by their easy playfulness. […]
>
> He began to wish to know more of her […]. (Austen 70)

Obviously, the reader receives some information early in the text indicating that Darcy will eventually turn out to be the love interest in a novel which already presents the crucial concepts in its title; indeed, this information comes quite a few pages before Wickham is first mentioned. This is a decisive passage in the novel, as it helps us not to fall for Wickham in the way Elizabeth does. Arguably, the novel would have been far less successful had the reader not been forewarned and really formed a strong empathic attachment to Wickham, the breaking of which would impede our reading pleasure. As it is, we are in the know, read Wickham's story with caution, and are well-prepared to find out that our suspicions are confirmed when we later learn the truth from Darcy. We may even feel superior to the heroine as our mindreading ability, fed by information unavailable to Elizabeth, proves to be perfectly correct.

For the rest of the paper we would like to pursue the quite different and more problematic question to what extent it is possible to present us, as readers or spectators, with increasingly villainous figures and still manipulate us to persist in our empathic response to them. Transgressive heroes have been around in literary works for a long time, e.g. in the highly popular picaresque novel. For more recent developments in popular culture, Dan Hassler-Forest suggests that "[t]wenty-first-century culture […] offers a wide variety of iconic characters and public figures whose transgressions are an essential part of their appeal" (112), and the transgressions he mentions are quite serious. In Tim Burton's *Batman Returns*, for example, Batman is presented "deliberately and quite sadistically burning a criminal alive, running over countless henchmen with his Batmobile, and generally operating as an urban vigilante" (105). The audience, however, is obviously unwilling to change their view of a figure originally conceived as pro-social, and it probably helps that, despite his decidedly violent vigilantism, he regularly repeats that he is not above the law. In fact, popular genres occasionally

employ heroes who turn out to be decidedly anti-social (e.g. "The Man With No Name" in Spaghetti Westerns, the protagonists in *Pulp Fiction* and other films by Quentin Tarantino, or various charismatic criminals in recent TV shows like *The Sopranos* or *Boardwalk Empire*), a trend which almost amounts to a psychological experiment on what the audience will still tolerate in a protagonist. It seems as if violence among males, even if it includes a few atrocities, is no impediment to acceptance, and neither is violence against unsympathetic or dangerous women. Domestic violence or acts of cruelty against children, however, should be avoided. In other words, violence among equals as part of the battle is unproblematic while violence against supposed inferiors or people we actually like is not. And, importantly, it very much helps if the transgressive hero also occasionally suffers physically or emotionally, or if he or she faces serious problems, so that our empathy is fed and manipulated to maintain our loyalty.

One of the most radical texts testing our willingness to empathize with an unlikely heroine even in the face of cruelty and atrocity is Michel Faber's *Under the Skin* (cited as *UtS*). The primary focalizer in this science fiction novel is an alien female, Isserley, who regards herself as "human." Originally a beautiful four-legged creature with lovely fur, she had to undergo a highly painful surgical treatment to resemble the malformed inhabitants of our planet, the "vodsels."[1] At present, she still constantly suffers from severe pain but also from the misery of solitude and the loss of her previous biological features. She decided to undergo this treatment to escape a fearful fate that would have awaited her on her home planet, i.e. a life in abject squalor in the so-called Estates, which resemble dungeons rather than living quarters. Promised a life among the rich, she was seduced by members of the elite but then faced the usual threat of being discarded and sent to live a miserable life deep under the surface of a dystopian planet that very much resembles the Earth as it will look in a foreseeable future if the destruction of our environment will continue unimpeded. In consequence, she loves the presently still existing nature of Earth. Her mission on our world,

however, is to capture muscular and meaty men who will then be processed as "voddissin," a delicacy for the super-rich of her home planet. To do this, she drives up and down the A9 in Scotland to pick up and anaesthetize lonely hitchhikers who will not be missed too soon; they will then be delivered to the "farm," muted by cutting out their tongues, "shaved, castrated, fattened, intestinally modified, chemically purified" (*UtS* 97), and finally butchered. To facilitate the contact with her victims, Isserley has been bestowed with rather huge artificial breasts, and the mental responses of her victims that we can share in the form of free indirect thought almost invariably focus on this physical feature and the possibility of a sexual encounter; in particular her first victims are presented as primitive and misogynist, and so they do not evoke sympathy or pity. When Amlis Vess, the future heir of the corporation that sent her to Earth, comes for a visit, her mission is questioned as he objects to the company's policy and considers the treatment of vodsels as inhumane; he actually frees four captives who then have to be re-captured to prevent discovery. But, ultimately, he departs again, and business can proceed as usual. The novel ends, after some further incidents, with an accident that leaves Isserley immobilized in her car. To prevent the discovery of her transformed body and thus of her alien origin and her mission on Earth, she activates a self-destruction device, looking forward to becoming part of our natural environment when the atoms of her body will mingle with the air, the earth and the water of our planet.

Under the Skin manages to quickly dissuade its readers from expecting the ordinary—and, as it turns out, the alien Isserley is by far the most engaging character in the story. The novel plays with many of the most common tropes in science fiction and horror—the reversal of space exploration and colonization, and man-eating aliens have, of course, been around since H. G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898) and Damon Knight's short story "To serve mankind" (1950). In contrast to these texts, however, Faber's novel allows for insights into human concepts of empathy and mercy, which we typically see as a defining factor for our own species, from the perspective of an outsider. And while the

most impressive and shocking moments in the novel arise from the suffering of dehumanized humans, Isserley is still not constructed as a villain-protagonist. Instead, the narrative manages to portray her in a sympathetic light, and the lines between monstrosity and humanity are constantly blurred or reversed.

In the remaining part of this paper, we would like to examine the strategies the text employs in order to make the reader feel empathy towards Isserley rather than her victims, and analyse how the novel challenges the binary system of self and other, of human and non-human. For this analysis, the most pertinent questions will be: How does the story guide and influence the orientation of the readers' sympathies? Is our ability to empathize restricted by similarities in appearance or in thought? Why do readers empathize with the alien-Other despite the obvious cruelties towards humans? Of course, it is impossible to generalize the readers' response, and there are probably many who will not readily follow the textual strategies and resist manipulation. But then reviews suggest that the empathy with the in-human alien is at the core of the disturbing experience evoked by the novel, and the responses of students in seminars on recent Scottish literature or the Scottish Gothic indicate that the appeal to the dark sides of our empathy succeeds for a considerable part of the audience.

Most importantly, the text develops a kind of rhythm: once we have formed a fairly positive conception of Isserley, this view is challenged by information about her actual mission and passages of increasing cruelty. But before we actually reconsider and change our minds, some contrary information about her suffering, her solitude, and her love of nature and domestic animals like dogs or sheep lures us back on track and re-establishes our previous empathy towards her. In an interview with Ron Hogan, Faber made it quite clear that this was one of the intentions in constructing the novel:

> I deliberately keep the reader's sympathies balanced as much as I can. As soon as your sympathy tips towards the plight of the vodsels, I'll put something in that reminds you how vulnerable Isserley is and how much she is just trying to get by doing a tough job. (Hogan)

Under the Skin thus continually averts and subverts prototypical science fiction plot lines of human-alien-encounters. By choosing a female alien as the main focalizer, *Under the Skin* provides an unusual perspective on the traditional image of the hostile alien. The solitude and displacement in combination with the mutilated body and the struggle to manage the requirements of daily life in an utterly unfamiliar environment pave the way towards an understanding of, and compassion with, the alien intruder. Faber explained that he had deliberately tried to reveal as little as possible about Isserley's home world or the technological achievements of her people, as catering too much to the specific demands of the genre would foreground the science fiction elements of the novel to the disadvantage of the story's focus on its main character:

> "I was very careful not to talk too much about her own world and the various technologies," Faber says, "[…] because the more you talk about those sorts of things, the closer the book gets to science fiction and I'm really not interested in the furniture of science fiction, the window dressing of it. One of the big strengths of science fiction is the idea of the parable, the moral parable—and to some degree, *Under the Skin* is a parable, but, I think, at its heart it's a character study." (Hogan)

And a "character study" it is: While the story is told by a heterodiegetic narrator, it is still predominantly presented from Isserley's perspective, and the reader receives rather detailed insights into her feelings and thoughts.

While Faber tried to "avoid any Sci-Fi explanations" (Adams) to maintain a feeling and prevailing mood that was still grounded in reality, some elements are undeniably influenced by the generic features of science fiction and help to trigger specific responses in the reader that a realistic novel might not achieve as smoothly. Traditionally, aliens were othered and presented more often than not as hostile and morally (and often technologically) inferior (see Le Guin 41). The genre thus exploits the fact that identity formation can be guided by the existence of a diverging other, as humans identify themselves through dissociation from others:

> [I]deas about human subjectivity and identity have most often been established in a comparison between self (human) and Other (non-human) characters. So, in terms of the genre's codes and conventions it is possible to see how the alien or robot of science fiction may provide an example of Otherness, against which a representation of 'proper' human subjectivity is worked through. (Cornea 275)

This need not be negative, but it becomes problematic as soon as it includes a distinction based on an assumed human superiority, which was the normative view in most early science fiction. This perspective has changed to some extent over the last decades. Literary works as well as theories have explored processes of reverse othering, and the extra-terrestrial may now be the epitome of ecological virtue living in complete harmony with nature (e.g. in Joan Slonczewski's *A Door Into Ocean*) and/or the victim of human aggression (e.g. in Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game* and in Stanisław Lem's *Fiasco*). In *Under the Skin*, Isserley is not only an alien, but also female and, as a result of the radical surgery, an artificial creation sharing aspects of the cyborg. She is thus part of three groups that were traditionally othered but have since been re-valued, and, in consequence, the reader is now prepared to side with Isserley even though she turns against the humans as the default "us" of science fiction.

Of course, the narration does not simply take the reader's willingness to empathize with Isserley for granted. Among the strategies involved in the manipulation of the reader is an appeal to conceptual and linguistic conservatism. By choosing the alien as the main focalizer, the text establishes a linguistic distance between the human readers and the vodsels of the text. As in traditional science fiction, in *Under the Skin* the term *human* denotes the superior species, capable of sophisticated feelings and complex thought, i.e. the self. In contrast, the beings usually considered to be humans, i.e. the vodsels, are regarded as simple-minded, primitive, and hardly sentient mammals that populate the planet in large numbers. The "reversal of nomenclature in *Under the Skin* constitutes an ontological source of dis-ease for the reader throughout the novel" (Woodward 54). Along with their status as the

alleged pinnacle of evolution, the human victims seem to lose all fundamental rights. Calling them "vodsels," a name that has no meaning for the readers, disrupts the recognition of kinship and favours alienation. Horstkotte suggests that it is a "thingless name [that] highlights the change of perspective taking place in the text which forces the reader to accommodate himself to a full-blown terminological reversal" (82). It could, however, also be argued that the linguistic displacement feeds a cognitive inertia: We empathize with the "human" and despise the Other, and thus any terminological reversal remains unperceived by our emotional radar.

The linguistic dehumanization of the vodsels is then confirmed by their actual behaviour. Once Isserley picks up hitchhikers, the text assigns short passages to their thoughts. Although these detours are brief and of little consequence for the overall development of the plot, the effect of these glimpses into their psyches are not to be underestimated: With the exception of maybe two men (a German tourist and a guy she takes in a fit of anger after another man attempted to rape her), the future victims fail to inspire pity or compassion in the reader as their behaviour is mostly despicable. Most of them indulge in inappropriate or contemptuous thoughts about Isserley: "Fantastic tits on this one, but God, there wasn't much of her otherwise" (*UtS* 11); "She was a weird one all right. Half Baywatch babe, half little old lady" (*UtS* 12); "Breathing hard already she was, like a bitch in heat" (*UtS* 34); "Kind eyes, she had. Bloody big knockers, too" (*UtS* 80). Some make sexist or harassing comments, occasionally in strong dialect, amplifying the primitive, disrespectful and predatory attitude already displayed in their streams of consciousness: "'Are those real?' he said. […] 'What yis goat stickin' oot in front ae yi,' he elaborated. 'Yir tits.'" (*UtS* 37). Isserley's occasional reflections on earlier experiences confirm that this behavioural pattern is widespread among her victims: "Years ago, in the very beginning, she'd stung a hitcher who had asked her, scarcely two minutes after getting into the car, if she liked having a fat cock up each hole" (*UtS* 35). Indeed, one of the men assaults Isserley, forces her to perform oral sex on him and tries to brutally rape her (see *UtS* 177-88), pushing her

towards an emotional breakdown. After the attack, she frantically seeks vengeance and insists on watching the mutilation of some hitchhikers she had captured earlier (*UtS* 212-21), but as this is still understood to be a response to the trauma, and Isserley is still in an extreme state of mind, one of the most cruel scenes of the novel is softened.

Obviously, Michel Faber plays with reader expectations in the way he constructs his narrative and establishes character dynamics. Isserley is as alienated as possible from her own world, and the reader encounters a protagonist who is stranded on a foreign planet, only supported by a small number of rather unsympathetic male workers from her home world. Surrounded by the unknowable and repulsive alien population, she finds solace only in nature. In the beginning, hardly any of the quite outrageous science fiction elements are spelled out; only the feeling that something is not quite right persists. There is "no mediating authority between the fantastic other and the reader, so that the latter must work out the meaning of the unfolding scenario without any aid" (Horstkotte 83). The narration is at first deliberately vague about Isserley's motivations, and while her artificial breasts are repeatedly mentioned, the rest of her physical appearance merely appears to be slightly odd. When it is revealed that Isserley is actually a member of a completely different species and originally did not even resemble what the reader would call human, the immersion in her mental world has already produced a fairly strong attachment. At this point, readers are reluctant to let go of the pre-established notion that Isserley deserves their understanding and empathy. Moreover, as most of the victims, and in particular the first ones, are portrayed as deeply unsympathetic and morally reprehensible, the novel constantly blurs or reverses the lines between monstrosity and humanity. As Horstkotte points out, this complete reversal of perspective, the de-familiarization of the self, is unusually consistent and therefore successful in influencing the reader's ability to empathize:

> The insistence on one perspective in *Under the Skin* effectively abolishes the bipolarity of self and other discernible in other texts of the postmodern fantastic. It seems to return to the traditional fantastic's one-dimensionality, but only to turn this one-dimensionality around by 180 degrees—now the self is

> virtually invisible, and the fantastic other alone provides the standards by which to judge the world. (83)

Throughout the novel, Isserley passes relatively convincingly as a young woman, which is a requirement for her work and therefore gives her a special status among her colleagues. She is indispensable, but her artificially altered appearance is also disconcerting to them. Isserley feels deeply estranged from her own people because of her transformed physique and the knowledge that they are revulsed by her appearance:

> The men she worked with on the farm had been shocked […] but they were used to her now, more or less; they could go about their business without gawping (though if there was a lull in activities she always felt their eyes on her). No wonder she tended to keep to her cottage […] Being a freak was so wearying. (*UtS 75)*

Her mutilated body relentlessly reminds her of her unique outsider position, and the novel just as relentlessly reminds us of the constant pain she has to endure and shows in detail how lonely and hopeless she really is "setting out in the morning, after a night of nagging pain, bad dreams and fitful sleep" (*UtS* 6). Forced to stand upright on two legs despite the pain, her tail and her teats removed and her genitals mutilated—the novel paints a pitiful picture of Isserley, who still recalls her former beauty and now has been turned into a hybrid creature who is utterly displaced. As Suzanne Keen points out, "*empathetic responses to fictional characters and situations occur more readily for negative feeling states, whether or not a match in details of experience exists*" (72; italics in original), and this is exploited fully in the novel.

Undoubtedly, Isserley's decision to submit to the painful surgery was made out of desperation and not as any kind of career objective: She has been "offered rescue" (*UtS* 150) from a life of poverty by Vess Industries and tries to convince herself not to regret it, as she would have had "a brutishly short lifetime" (*UtS* 64) otherwise. And as science fiction frequently offers imaginative expressions for the readers' very real experiences, we may actually recognize some aspects of our lives in her conditions: "The conflicts she deals with, though, aren't much different from those many Earthlings experience, including a deep alienation

from her coworkers and resentment towards the class iniquities that have forced her to take such degrading work" (Hogan). This results in the image of a vulnerable young woman instead of a frightful and murderous alien.

For most of the time, Isserley's morals are the text's morals, and her intimate point of view constantly invites the readers to accept her perspective and also her biases. This becomes particularly interesting when she is confronted by the privileged, rich Amlis Vess. Before he arrives, the reader is already infected by Isserley's views about "the big man's son" who "never had a job of any kind," but is "always in the news, for the usual rich-young-pretender reasons," and "[c]ountless times, some girl or other made a fuss, claiming to be pregnant with his baby" (*UtS* 72-73). In addition, he is, according to Isserley's "human" standards, incredibly handsome, the "most beautiful man she had ever seen" (*UtS* 110). This serves two contradictory purposes; on the one hand, his physical perfection constantly reminds Isserley of her own disfigurement and frustrates any hope that he might still find her desirable, while, on the other hand, his features including fur, a "prehensile tail," "long spearhead ears," and a "vulpine snout" (110) do not really invite our empathy. Thus, when he finally emerges as an "animal rights activist" and tries to stop the corporation's barbarous but highly profitable slaughter of Earth's inhabitants, he has been firmly established as an intruder, a source of frustration, and one more problem that Isserley has to deal with. Her annoyance at his snobbish attitude seeps through the text and keeps us from rationally processing his arguments. When he tries to confront her with the cruelty of the treatment of Earthlings, Isserley is outraged by the fact that he seems to value vodsels more than her: "Typical man: so obsessed with his own idealism he was incapable of feeling empathy for a human being suffering right under his nose" (*UtS* 167). Her dismissive and hostile attitude towards the vodsels serves as a kind of defence mechanism, because she struggles to define what is left of her as a "human being" when she has been physically altered to a degree of unrecognizability. Consequently, she feels that Amlis's sympathy for the vodsels is greatly misplaced,

considering that nobody really seems to acknowledge her own quiet suffering: "'You don't know what cruelty is,' she said, feeling all the places on and inside her body where she had been mutilated" (*UtS* 229). She wishes to see her work as work only and prefers not to get emotionally involved; and Amlis's challenging of her detached view scares her, as she does not only see her own suffering diminished but also feels that Amlis lumps her together with the perceived animals: "'I don't know what you expect of me,' Isserley burst out, suddenly near tears. 'I'm a human being, not a vodsel'" (*UtS* 173).

Moments when the captive humans are shown in their utterly degraded and abused state are, of course, the most serious challenges to our empathic response to Isserley, as now we should review our perspective, feel compassion with them, and loathe her mission on Earth. Quite possibly many readers do, and Shildrick suggests that these passages cause conflicting reactions within the reader that are normally reserved for confrontations with the monstrous, namely "denial *and* recognition, disgust *and* empathy, exclusion *and* identification" (17; emphasis in original). Readers would then be encouraged to feel pity for the vodsels and be outraged at their treatment, but at the same time it is almost impossible to imagine them as humans who could still be rescued and then carry on with their lives. The text tries to steer us through these moments of horror without any change of mind by a series of carefully implemented narrative strategies. Our first encounter with the mutilated victims is the culminating moment of a hunt, i.e. Isserley has to re-capture the vodsels that have been set free by Amlis if she wants to preserve her mission. Her desperation and the fever of the hunt are transferred to the audience, so that the discovery of a vodsel comes as a relief. What we are presented with, then, is the result of a transformation that robbed the man of any identity and dignity, making him unrecognisable and unsuitable as a figure of identification for the reader as he has fallen deep into the "uncanny valley" (Mori):

> It had the typical look of a monthling, its shaved nub of a head nestled like a bud atop the disproportionately massive body. Its empty scrotal sac dangled like a pale oak leaf under its dark acorn of a penis. A thin stream of blueish-

> black diarrhea clattered onto the ground between its legs. Its fists swept the air jerkily. Its mouth opened wide to show its cored molars and the docked stub of its tongue. 'Ng-ng-ng-ng-gh!' it cried. (*UtS* 100)

This hunt could be seen as "the moral equivalent of a trick with mirrors: you're unsure whether to root for the horribly mistreated men or for Isserley and her fellow aliens" (Alexis). One of the tricks involved is a deflection of pity in a moment when Isserley expresses a modicum of compassion for her victims. When she thinks that "Amlis Vess had done this poor animal no favours in letting it go" (*UtS* 100), she does, in fact, not question their status or the harm that has been done to them but merely expresses some concern for their unpleasant situation in the forest. We are guided to associate the terrible sight and the misery with the escape, with the solitude and coldness, with the embarrassment the vodsel would feel if discovered by the police, and thus the death by being shot appears almost like a mercy killing. Isserley later, in a discussion with Amlis, again draws attention to the vodsels' suffering and death resulting from his supposedly cruel choice of letting four monthlings out of their prison (*UtS* 114-15). Of course, Amlis is quick to retaliate that they were prepared for slaughter, but his arguments are tainted because in his general evaluation of the vodsels' status he actually does not differ from Isserley, and he repeatedly refers to them as "animals" (*UtS* 114). His view is thus abstract, hers concrete, as she points to the corpse's frostbites and suggests that he would have frozen to death in consequence of Amlis's inconsiderate intervention.

At times, Isserley struggles with her own attitude towards the vodsels, alternating between reluctant compassion and outright hostility and rejection: "But isn't it true, she asked herself, that [the vodsels] have that dignity? Isserley pushed the thought away," and instead she focuses on "their stink, their look of idiocy, the way the shit oozed up between their toes," afraid that she was "so badly butchered, brought so close to an animal state physically, that she was losing her hold on humanity and actually *identifying* with animals" (*UtS* 172). While the reader can easily recognize the plight of the vodsels, the pain suffered in the aftermath of Isserley's surgical mutilation takes up a far larger

part of the novel and balances or even submerges the tortures inflicted on her dehumanized victims.

During a harrowing visit to the vodsel pens, which distresses Isserley more than she initially expected, she is confronted with a human scratching the word "mercy" into the ground, but refuses to read it to her companion Amlis, as the recognition of their faculty of speech would hint at a highly developed intellect. Many of the objections Isserley raises against attempts to "anthropomorphize" the vodsels are evocative of real-world arguments about the current treatment of farm animals, and she assumes a position of authority and muses that "people who knew nothing whatsoever about them were apt to misunderstand them terribly" (*UtS* 173).

The rather blunt depiction of the cruelty the captured men have to endure can then "be read as a cultural-critical metadiscourse of the way human beings treat animals in the meat industry. The novel's ecocritical stance […] is mainly expressed by interpolating an alien perspective, by inviting the readers to see human beings, themselves, from an alien point of view" (Gymnich and Costa 85). Again, the reader's empathy is challenged: at once, we are confronted with the abhorrent treatment of human beings *and* challenged to reflect on the way humans usually treat animals like cows, pigs, or sheep as unfeeling livestock. On this issue, Isserley unexpectedly sides with the animal lovers as, in consequence of her own original physique, she favours the familiarity that she recognizes in sheep or dogs over the strange and ugly beings that she has to deal with on a daily basis:

> A sheep had strayed onto the pebbled shore not far from her, and was sniffling boulders as large as itself, licking them experimentally. Isserley was intrigued […] She barely breathed, for fear of startling her fellow-traveller.
>
> It was so hard to believe the creature couldn't speak. It looked so much as if it should be able to. Despite its bizarre features, there was something deeply human about it, which tempted her, not for the first time, to reach across the species divide and communicate. (*UtS* 63)

In such passages we may detect a plea for animal rights and even a vegetarian subtext in Isserley's views, and some readers may not only

embrace her love for animals and nature but even see some cosmic justice in the treatment of the predominantly brutish male victims.

In consequence of all these textual strategies, and in the face of the immense human suffering in the novel, Isserley remains predominantly a character we can identify with. When confronted with the horribly cruel and repelling treatment of the human males, the readers' compassion may momentarily waver towards them; but as the audience is also witness to their indecent and degrading thoughts about Isserley, the emotional response quickly returns to her side. Moreover, the almost quest-oriented structure of Isserley's work and the immersion into her personal thoughts and feelings encourage the reader to feel for her. According to Alexis, "[t]he reader's sympathy for Isserley almost obscures the sheer cruelty of her behavior. […] Faber has found a playful way to ask fundamental questions. What is empathy? What is power? Can they coexist?" While the reader is most likely shocked and repelled by Isserley's participation in the continuous cruelties, the perspective elicits a kind of intimacy with her and therefore prevents feelings of outrage or hatred. As Faber points out: "Isserley's actions hurt us—get under our skin—precisely because we identify with her and want her to be OK" (Adams).

Thus, the novel can be read as an examination of our ability to empathize. Focalization, linguistic defamiliarization, reverse othering, and the skilful appeal to our confirmation bias once we have formed a first attachment contribute to the manipulation of the readers' empathy. In the course of the novel, the gap between the increasingly explicit depiction of the barbarous treatment of humans and the reminders of Isserley's pain and solitude widens, and step by step readers are invited to tolerate more and more excessive and outrageous cruelties. Thus, *Under the Skin* tests our willingness to reconsider and to reject the persuasive voice of a master narrative; it explores the possibility of employing empathy to cloud our rational faculties and to steer our sympathies towards the aggressor.

As pointed out above, some of the techniques are reminiscent of those employed in propaganda and, in particular, racist or Nazi propaganda.

Robert Jay Lifton, for example, writes in *The Nazi Doctors* how a psychological doubling and linguistic reversal turned the genocide into a form of healing (433) and the act of murder into a self-sacrifice (435). The murderers were thus cast as victims who suffer under the terrible ordeal of their selfless work, while the real victims were dehumanized as a biological threat and excluded from ethical considerations (440). Hannah Arendt has pointed out that it is the fatality of Auschwitz that it could happen again (384), and Primo Levi, similarly, wrote: "Conscience can be seduced and obscured again—even our consciences" (396).

Such a repetition would not begin with the end of the development but with some first seemingly insignificant but ultimately disastrous steps. At present, one can hardly escape the feeling that those first steps may already have been taken, and the question whether we might be seduced to tolerate them and the subsequent progression into increasingly catastrophic scenarios depends on the possible malleability of our emotional faculties and the ways in which our empathy can be manipulated. An awareness of the weaknesses and dark sides of empathy is a crucial element in the defence against such manipulations, and works like *Under the Skin* contribute to this awareness.

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NOTE

[1]To avoid confusion, references to Isserley's species as being "human" will be put in inverted commas. The words human without quotation marks or vodsel denote our species.

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Out of Place: Looking for Donne in London—A Response to Theresa M. DiPasquale

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For further contributions on the debate on "Close Reading Donne" (https://www.connotations.de/debate/close-reading-donne/) see DiPasquale, Theresa M. "Ways of Reading Donne's St. Paul's Epitaph: Close, Comparative, Contextu[r]al, Concrete." *Connotations* 27 (2018): 167-89. If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

What does the literary pilgrim seek when visiting Donne's funeral monument in Saint Paul's Cathedral? How do spatial practices affect the traveler's experience of sites in Donnean memory? A poetics of place that accounts for the attraction of "truth-spots" must consider commercial and political interests as well as aesthetic and sensory factors.

In "Ways of Reading Donne's St. Paul's Epitaph: Close, Comparative, Contextu[r]al, Concrete," Theresa M. DiPasquale revisits Richard S. Peterson's magisterial article on Donne's epitaph in the context of her own visit to Donne's monument in St. Paul's Cathedral. DiPasquale's "situated close reading" of the nineteenth-century plaque above Donne's statue becomes an occasion for a case-study in the "poetics of place" as understood by the humanistic geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan. Tuan believes that students of both the natural and built environment need to prioritize the affective experience of places, appreciating the many ways sensory perceptions both mediate and complicate our impressions of the world around us.[1] DiPasquale thus starts small, with the flawed replica

of Donne's epitaph, but then widens her view to take in the location of Donne's effigy within the larger space of St. Paul's Cathedral. She not only confirms Peterson's findings—chiefly, that the plaque is an inaccurate facsimile of the original—but also recounts her own affective experience of this last of Donne's five commissioned portraits (see 168). After describing the inhospitable commercialization of St. Paul's with its high admission fees and her melancholy realization that it would be impossible to access the Benjaminian "'aura' of the monument as it was experienced by those who viewed it in 1633" (170), DiPasquale nevertheless is moved and shaken by her encounter with the shrouded and beatific Donne emerging from his urn and yearning for resurrection. "Tears sprang into my eyes without warning," she writes. "I felt them and noticed the blurring of my vision even before I was able to detect the heart-swell of which they were the outward sign. Aura, indeed" (178). DiPasquale then sits in front of the statue, pondering the poetics of place and observing the reactions of other visitors tuned to their audioguides.

In response to DiPasquale's critique that intertextual studies of Donne's epitaph have failed to deal with "the affective impact" of Nicholas Stone's funerary ensemble, I decided to follow her lead and "set […] foot" in St. Paul's, as she advises (177). My experience suggests that Tuan's poetics of place is a highly subjective endeavor reliant on the problematic value of self-reporting and anecdotes. In the two years since DiPasquale's visit in July 2017, a few things have changed at St. Paul's. Now, before one enters the cathedral, on the steps leading up to it, one must wait in line and pass through a security checkpoint. Once inside, there is a 20£ fee, two pounds more than she paid. DiPasquale implies that in 2017 only "part of the cathedral" was cordoned off, specifically including the area of Donne's monument (169). Now the ticket booth bars entry to the central nave and thus to the church itself. While Anglican services occur upwards of three times a day, according to the website, few worshippers are in evidence. The institution's energy seems focused on managing long queues of tourists and relieving their pocketbooks.

As Yi-Fu Tuan observes in his meditations on space and place, a person's experience of an architectural locale depends on a multitude of intangible factors, among them mood (see *Space and Place* 4, 33). I was clearly not in a receptive mood on 18 May 2019. Wren's cathedral is a mausoleum glorifying the military, especially the leaders of Britain's misconceived imperial projects. It is perhaps the least spiritual religious building I have ever walked in, its alignment with state power everywhere evident.[2] Above, it may be clear and airy, the clerestory windows letting in shafts of daylight even as the vaulting recedes into cavernous distances, but below it is a cluttered and greying obstacle course of free-standing tombs to Britain's warrior class. Yes, there is a little corner in the crypt devoted to artists (e. g. Lawrence Alma-Tedema, William Blake, John Everett Millais, Joshua Reynolds, J. M. W. Turner) and a colossal statue of Samuel Johnson in a toga in the northeast corner of the transept (J. Bacon, 1796). Yes, many nineteenth-century divines also lie in sepulchral state, mixed in with the admirals and generals. Nearest to Donne one finds the reclining effigies of James Bloomfield, Bishop of London, died 1828, and Marshall Creighton, a later Bishop of London, died 1901. All commemorate establishment authority.

By comparison with these pompous and frigid structures, Donne's statue seems modest, naïve and forlorn, as if dropped from another world. Granted, Donne became a figure of religious authority as Dean of the cathedral. Nor was he averse to colonial or proto-imperial adventures. He applied, after all, for a secretaryship in Ireland in 1608 and for a secretaryship in the Virginia Company in 1609. He also joined the Earl of Essex's marauding expeditions to Cadiz and the Azores in 1596 and 1597. Yet, poems like "The Calme" and epigrams like "A Burnt Ship" and "Fall of a Wall" offer an eloquent testimonial to Donne's disillusion with Essex's war-mongering, so that for me the statue of the divine Doctor Donne dreaming of his salvation feels out of place in Wren's mausoleum. Does this mean that I have revised my earlier view that "[i]t literally stands alone in its eccentricity, radiating emotion" (184)? Not really. The divine Donne still looks heaven-sent, caught in mid-motion, his bent knees about to straighten out into the upward swoon

of the rapture, his unseeing gaze willing the angelic hosts and forgiving Savior into being. Yet his surroundings do him no favors. In evaluating those surroundings, it may be inevitable that one will be selective, yet one ought to try to be more comprehensive. For example, by setting foot in St. Paul's I learned that Donne's statue is not the sole mortuary ensemble to have survived the Great Fire of 1666 that destroyed the old St. Paul's. Disposed along the north and south aisles of the crypt, one finds the blackened remains of six other funerary monuments, including the fragmentary tomb of Sir William Cokain, knight and London alderman, at whose death Donne preached one of his greatest sermons (12 December 1626). The monument to Sir Thomas Heneage, Vice-Chamberlain to Queen Elizabeth, and his wife, Lady Anna Heneage, still has the power to move. The married couple lies side by side, their little heads reposing on stone cushions, their chins reposing on stiff ruffs. These remnants from an earlier time also struck me as lost in the current cathedral.

A poetics of place depends on vantage point—a "situatedness" that is inevitably partial. Thus, DiPasquale leaves out all the discordant funerary tributes that surround Donne. Instead, thanks to its relative proximity to Donne's effigy, DiPasquale gives a detailed description of Bill Viola's permanent video installation, "Martyrs" (2015), in the south quire aisle. Her generous interpretation finds apt synergies between the two artworks. "The Donnean viewer," she imagines, will find Viola's representation of the "inner" life of martyrs "deeply" resonant (181). DiPasquale, however, fails to mention that Viola's "Martyrs," which is "[m]ounted on the west-facing wall at the extreme east end of the south choir" (180), is paired and matched symmetrically with another of his installations at the east end of the north choir, titled "Mary" (2016). This video tryptich, more than 13 minutes long (almost twice the duration of "Martyrs"), interprets stages of Mary's life through a montage of modern images ranging from shots of Yosemite and sunsets to a weeping fawn and a modern reenactment of the Pietà sans stigmata. Like the actors featured in "Martyrs," Viola's people in "Mary" are blessedly serene, unacquainted with pain. The spectacles that Viola films are so

aestheticized that all anguish has been airbrushed out. Nothing could be further from my sense of Donne's religious struggles.

Seeking to test a poetics of place against my own experience, as DiPasquale advises, I decided to extend my pilgrimage to other sites of Donnean memory. St. Dunstan-in-the-West, for example, proved far more evocative and "auratic." St. Dunstan is octagonal and intimate in scale. Although the neo-Gothic church was rebuilt in the 1830s, "much of the internal fabric pre-dates" this, their website assures; "[t]he high altar and the reredos are Flemish woodwork dating from the seventeenth century." It is almost possible to imagine Donne—who held the benefice of St. Dunstan from 1624 to 1631 while he was Dean of St. Paul's—preaching from the lovely old pulpit. "It is time to end," he might be saying, "but as long as the glasse hath a gaspe, as long as I have one, I would breathe in this ayre, in this perfume, in this breath of heaven, the contemplation of this Joy" (10:10.227).[3] A choir was practicing in one of the side chapels and later that afternoon a wedding was being rehearsed. The church emanated "spiritual authority and religious gravitas" in keeping with "cult value" versus "exhibition value" (171)—a distinction DiPasquale borrows from Walter Benjamin. Needless to say, it charges no entry fees although voluntary donations are encouraged. It also helped that I visited on the feast of St. Dunstan. To celebrate the patronal festival, the Dean of Westminster was scheduled to preach and Haydn's *Little Organ Mass* would be performed. Flowers bedecked various spaces. Thanks to rituals in action, I felt closer to Donne at St. Dunstan than at St. Paul's.

My visit to the National Portrait Gallery on May 13 was the high point of my Donne pilgrimage. Clearly, I was in a more receptive mood while viewing the Lothian portrait of Donne as well as Isaac Oliver's miniature of Donne.[4] There was something exhilarating about seeing these oft-reproduced images in the flesh, as it were. While one cannot touch them, of course, one can discern the different textures of the brushstrokes and one can almost sniff them. However, in keeping with DiPasquale's reference to "contexture" (a term coined by Neal Fraistat),

it may be wiser to dial back these affective responses and instead examine how these artworks are positioned vis-à-vis neighboring artworks.[5] As students of museum display know, cultural and political biases influence the presentation of artifacts.[6] Not surprisingly, in the National Portrait Gallery's case, respect for chronology, historicism, the role of cultural heritage in nation-building, and a notion of social networks loom large in determining the shape and order of the displays. How fitting that the 1595 Lothian portrait of Donne should form part of a pair, matched on the right by Abraham von Blyenberch's 1617 portrait of Ben Jonson! These boon companions share pride of place.[7] The viewer stands in the dusky blue elegance of room 4 devoted to Early Stuart Britain, surrounded on one side by full length portraits of King James by Daniel Mytens (1621) and of his queen, Anne of Denmark by John De Critz the Elder (ca. 1604-10), and on the other side of Lodowick Stuart by Paul von Somer (1620) and by Sir Nathaniel Bacon's self-portrait.[8] These monumental canvases are grandiose and overwhelming, compared to the intimate portraits of the two poets hanging on either side of the opening into the next gallery. But I was in a good mood so the extravagant, luxurious finery of the full-length sitters seemed semiotically significant, rather than off-putting. It was easy to turn away from them and instead concentrate on my poets. The portrait of Donne posing dreamily as a melancholy lover hangs on the left panel while that of Jonson's mobile face, his brow furrowed with indignation, hangs on the right panel. Contemplating their expressive gazes felt like a welcome reunion with old friends.[9]

I also had the good fortune of touring the National Portrait Gallery's special exhibition devoted to the miniatures of Nicholas Hilliard and Isaac Oliver (21 February - 19 May 2019). Magnifying glasses were made available at the entrance, although in certain restricted areas it was forbidden to use them, as the effect of the concentrated rays of light might damage the pigments. Visitors craned over display cases like versions of a sleuthing Sherlock Holmes—so many aquiline-nosed faces peering down and into the instrument.[10] One of the tilted glass cases held Oliver's miniature of Donne (1616) in an elaborate gold frame, on

loan from the Queen's personal collection.[11] Again, Donne was positioned in the vicinity of Lodowick Stuart, second Duke of Lennox and first Duke of Richmond. And again he was also placed near friends and patrons, in this instance two images of an aging Lucy Harington, Duchess of Bedford, baring her décolleté amid lace and embroidery, her bejeweled regalia and swirling veil glistening with silvery allure. A portrait of the glamorous Venetia Digby, her hair loose over a red-spangled mantle, lay close by. As in the main gallery, Donne's pictorial neighbors helped to recreate a semblance of Donne's social world. Somehow John Donne seemed less orphaned in the museum than in the cathedral.

Recently, the sociologist, Thomas Gieryn has written about "truth-spots," places that "lend credibility and legitimacy to beliefs and claims" (1). Gieryn's chapter on the oracle at Delphos, for example, exposes the complex ways the commercial and political interests behind truth-spots converge with the "will to believe" cultivated by pilgrims and cultural tourists. Truth-spots, in other words, deliver authenticity-effects and thereby help people believe. When going on a literary pilgrimage to an authorial site of memory, isn't one not-so-secretly hoping for a truth-spot? Gieryn's demystifying approach to the political, economic and social forces at play in the creation of truth-spots strikes me as a useful supplement to Tuan's subjective and aestheticized poetics of place.[12] It is not enough to be attentive to sounds and smells and textures, developing the right amount of psychological distance to perfect one's aesthetic sensibilities.[13] Waxing lyrical about one's private ecstasies needs to be supplemented with an unblinkered assessment of structural forces, together with a fine and ironic appreciation for the chanciness of what survives, both archaeologically and environmentally. Donne's monument in St. Paul's may well be a truth-spot for Donne devotees, but its aura, as DiPasquale rightly observes, is imperiled by its commodified and incongruous surroundings.

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Washington, D. C.

NOTES

[1]Tuan writes of "*multisensory* reality," saying "our proximate environment is experienced multimodally" (*Passing Strange and Wonderful*, 165-66). He adds, "we experience the world in terms of feeling-tones" (169).

[2]Yi-Fu Tuan comments that "[a]rchitectural space continues to articulate the social order […]. Architecture continues to exert a direct impact on the senses and feeling. The body responds, as it has always done, to such basic features of design as enclosure and exposure, verticality and horizontality, mass, volume, interior spaciousness, and light" (*Space and Place*, 116).

[3]Simpson and Potter speculate that the sermon on 1 Thessalonians 5.16, "Rejoyce evermore," was preached, not at St. Dunstan's as the Folio says, but at St. Paul's, in part because in it Donne addresses listeners in the "Quire." At St. Dunstan, they point out, "the congregation would not sit in the choir, but in the nave and aisles" (31).

[4]See Sarah Howe's recent essay on Donne's portraits; it brings their complicated stories and provenances up to date. For the Lothian portrait, see: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portraitConservation/mw111844/John-Donne.

[5]DiPasquale writes of "place-based contexture," noting that "the restored plaque is now the only *concrete* (as opposed to printed, drawn, or engraved) instantiation of the text that one can experience, and today's cathedral is the contextural frame within which that experience takes place. Only within that frame can one be in the presence of the monument as one reads the epitaph" (178).

[6]See Macdonald who asks: "Who is empowered or disempowered by certain modes of display? […] How is the audience imagined? […] And how do certain exhibitionary forms or techniques enable certain kinds of readings?" (4). She adds that the "capacity of exhibitionary representation to render the world as visible and ordered was part of the instantiation of wider senses of scientific and political certainty" (11).

[7]For Jonson's portrait, see: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portraitConservation/mw03528/Benjamin-Ben-Jonson.

[8]Bacon's self-portrait is the "only full-length self-portrait of a British artist from the seventeenth century," the website tells us. See: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw278735.

For the Mytens portrait of King James, see: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw03419.

For the De Critz portrait of Queen Anne, see: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw202589.

For the van Somer portrait of Ludovic Stuart, see: https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw07831.

[9]Since I visited in May 2019, the Lothian portrait of Donne has been moved from room 4 to room 35 and replaced by a portrait of the playwright John Fletcher. There

may be more changes leading up to and following the National Portrait Gallery's closure for renovations between 29 June 2020 and spring 2023.

[10]In *The Poetics of Space*, Gaston Bachelard discusses the man with the magnifying glass, theorizing that "he situates us at a sensitive point of objectivity, at the moment when we have to accept unnoticed detail, and dominate it. The magnifying glass in this experience conditions an entry into the world. […] The details of a thing can be the sign of a new world which, like all worlds, contains the attributes of greatness. Miniature is one of the refuges of greatness" (155).

[11]For Oliver's miniature of Donne, see: https://www.rct.uk/collection/420026/john-donne-1573-1631.

[12]Like Yi-Fu Tuan, Michel de Certeau also understands "spatial practices" as embracing subjective experience: "Places are fragmentary and inward-turning histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumulated times that can be unfolded but like stories held in reserve, remaining in an enigmatic state, symbolizations encysted in the pain or pleasure of the body. 'I feel good here': the well-being under-expressed in the language it appears in like a fleeting glimmer is a spatial practice" (108).

[13]Yi-Fu Tuan discusses "the psychological distancing necessary to aesthetic experience" (*Passing Strange and Wonderful*, 183).

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Understanding (Through) Annotations: Introductory Remarks[1]

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This article is the first entry in a debate on "Understanding (Through) Annotations" (http://www.connotations.de/debate/understanding-through-annotations). If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

This article introduces the special issue on "Understanding (Through) Annotations" and addresses the two topics that are fused into one by means of the brackets in its title, namely (1) the understanding of annotations, of what kind they are and how they are attached to texts, and (2) the understanding through or by means of annotations, their specific hermeneutic function. It assumes that the reflection on annotations furthers our insight into methods and functions of close reading, while, at the same time, also considering the functions of annotations in teaching. One of its major claims concerns the relevance of annotations to a text as a whole as well as the passage it immediately refers to. By positing a number of provocative examples and hypotheses it invites the critical debate on all matters related to annotations and their connotations.

Why *Connotations* and Annotations? This is a question we would like to address in our introductory remarks, together with some first ideas as to what it means to understand annotations, and what it means to understand through, or with the help of, annotations. The purpose of *Connotations*, founded almost 30 years ago by Inge Leimberg, has been to focus on "the semantic and stylistic energy of the language of literature

in a historical perspective" (www.connotations.de); in this phrase, "energy" is not a meaningless metaphor but chosen with the rhetorical notion of *energeia* in mind, that which makes literary expression have an effect. In other words, what *Connotations* aims at is the textual and linguistic properties that are responsible for each text having its specific meaning and effect. Such properties may often be local, i.e. consist in a particular word choice or turn of phrase, but they may also spread over a text, as in the case of characteristic motifs. We therefore believe that attention to detail is important in reading literature critically. And this is where annotations come in.

Of course, there are many ways of defining annotations, but even in the broadest sense they draw attention to detail. Reflecting on annotations helps us to get a clearer insight into methods and functions of close reading itself.[2] Addressing the central question, to what extent can/may annotations contribute to understanding a text, is also an excellent way of considering their functions in teaching.[3] Both aspects, we hope, will contribute to the methodological agenda of this special issue of *Connotations*. We will then also see that annotations are not just a marginal issue; rather, they have a key function in literary communication but are still lacking a theoretical rationale as well as best practice models. Our special issue aims to show that both can be advanced and that doing so means furthering literary theory and critical practice. In the following, we will very briefly address the two topics that are fused into one by means of the brackets in our title, namely (1) the understanding of annotations, of what kind they are and how they are attached to texts, and (2) the understanding through or by means of annotations, their specific hermeneutic function. Both questions are linked by considerations of relevance, which can be expressed as conditions to be fulfilled: the annotation must be relevant to the text or the part/aspect of the text to which it is attached if it is to make sense, and the passage annotated must be relevant to the text as a whole if the annotation is to further our understanding of it.

1. Understanding Annotations

To understand annotations means to learn more about their forms and functions. Annotations may range from text tagging and markup to interpretive notes. They may be the personal notes of a reader and document his or her process of understanding, or they may be notes made for other readers, frequently as part of an edition. Depending on the (academic) context one moves in, the word "annotation" may accordingly refer to very different kinds of phenomena. All of them, however, are related, in one way or another, to understanding a text or understanding it better. This is even the case when we understand annotations as mark-up and tagging and use them for quantitative analysis and "distant" reading, i.e. not just when we understand them as explanatory annotations (which may include interpretive notes) and use them for a qualitative approach.[4] Especially with regard to the latter, however, we can see huge differences whenever we open an annotated, i.e. scholarly, edition of a literary text. Editors do but rarely elucidate the approach they take in annotating a literary work; and even if they do, statements as to their practice remain vague. An example is the Cambridge School Shakespeare series edition of the sonnets that claims to encourage multiple interpretations but, in actual practice, then delimits ambiguity in the notes (see our paper on "Seven Types of Problems"). Obviously, annotations, in a school edition, serve a didactic purpose, but what that purpose is remains unclear. We see that, at least implicitly, annotations may serve a didactic agenda. Some critics suggest that the reader may even be pushed in a particular direction by means of explanatory notes (see Small 190; Hanna; cf. Bauer/Viehhauser/Zirker), e.g. because of the canonical effect of annotations (Martens 46). This effect, however, may have undergone some change with the upsurge of digital annotations; for example, in questioning the permanence of annotations and their authority, "how it is established and maintained" (McCarthy 371).

To our mind, annotations, especially explanatory annotations (see Bauer/Zirker, "Whipping Boys," and Zirker/Bauer, "Introduction"),

contribute to understanding and interpretation without necessarily being interpretive themselves. This concept of annotations presupposes a certain degree of objectivity, which means that they should be valid beyond an individual's reading—or understanding—of a text.

Questions regarding the understanding of annotations may hence include the following:

> Are they systematic?
> Can we separate information from interpretation?
> Are they placed plausibly in a text (anchors)?
> Are aspects of the medium (book vs. digital annotation) considered?
> What is the readership the annotator(s) has/have in mind?

The understanding of a (literary) text by means of annotations implies other issues, most of them of a hermeneutic kind.[5] Most prominent, or so we would like to suggest, is the part-whole problem; or, in other words: how can the local note contribute to our understanding of the text as a whole? This is of course a question belonging to our second point (understanding *through* annotations) but the answer very much depends on the nature of the note whose prerequisite, as we have pointed out above, is the relevance of the annotation to the annotated passage.

In some cases, notes are hard to understand. They presuppose, for example, expert knowledge—but even given that are difficult to handle. In the edition by Joseph Duchac—*An Annotated Guide to Commentary Published in English, 1978-1989*, of Emily Dickinson's poems, one of the entries on "Myself was formed a carpenter" (J488) reads as follows:

> 1988 Wolff, *Emily Dickinson*, pp. 431-32
> "Although the poem claims to describe a process in which power is transferred, thepoem itself is finally without power. And if the image of 'Scaffolds drop' indicates liberation, it also carries the shadow image of an execution." (266)

When we taught this poem in a class on "Annotating Religious Poetry," everyone was puzzled. There are no scaffolds in the poem, either stable

or dropping. Apparently, this note presupposes "expert knowledge" (our "problem" #3; "Seven Types of Problems" 216-18) but also leads the (non-expert) reader on to the wrong track (#4), and its function is unclear (#2). Because we could not make any sense of it, we started to google, and, alas, found that the line "Scaffolds drop" is from a different poem altogether ("The Props assist the House" J729). Checking Wolff confirms this: her passage refers to J729 but the editor turned it into an unintelligible note on J488. This example may be a particularly glaring case of an annotation that is hard (if not impossible) to understand, but it still exemplifies tendencies: notes often refer to other texts without sufficiently explaining why. And it may suggest a few answers to our next question, if and how understanding is furthered through annotations.

2. Understanding through Annotations

In order to address this point, we would like to give a few examples that may help illustrate links between understanding annotations and understanding through annotations. The examples are taken from different works and their editions in the field of English literature.

2.1 Annotations that Obstruct/ Complicate Understanding

We suggest that we can learn about the way in which annotations help us understand a text by looking first at an example of "annotations that obstruct or complicate understanding." In the latest version of Jane Austen's *Juvenilia* – published as *Teenage Writings* (OUP 2017), the editors, Kathryn Sutherland and Freya Johnston, point out that their notes were "written with the aim of expanding the reader's sense of what the young Austen might have been responding to" (245), i.e. the notes primarily serve to point towards Jane Austen's own reading and how it fed into her early literary creations, which means the emphasis of their

annotations is on intertextuality. This approach undoubtedly focuses on a relevant aspect of the text as a whole (our second condition); nevertheless, some of the notes obscure their relevance (our first condition) since all sorts of explanations are being mixed up with interpretations, which makes it difficult to separate factual information from subjective reading. What is more: there is no (clear) principle to be found as to which items are explained and which are not.

In "Frederic & Elfrida," the opening passage of "Chapter the Third" reads as follows:

> In the mean time the parents of Frederic proposed to those of Elfrida, an union between them,* which being accepted with pleasure, the wedding cloathes were bought & nothing remained to be settled but the naming of the Day.* As to the lovely Charlotte, being importuned with eagerness to pay another visit to her Aunt, she determined to accept the invitation & in consequence of it walked to Mrs Fitzroys to take leave of the amiable Rebecca, whom she found surrounded by Patches, Powder, Pomatum & Paint* with which she was vainly endeavouring to remedy the natural plainness of her face. (5)

Three items are given a note (see * in the quotation). While the first two refer to marriage conventions of the time (e.g. that naming the date of the wedding "was the bride's prerogative" 250n), the third item is explained as follows:

> Patches, Powder, Pomatum & Paint: an echo of the most celebrated list in 18th-century literature: 'Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux' (The Rape of the Lock, canto I, l. 138). 'Pomatum' is an ointment for the skin or hair. JA originally wrote 'Rouge, Powder, Pomatum & Paint'; by changing 'Rouge' to 'Patches' she heightens the comic alliteration and makes the allusion to Pope more overt. (Austen 250n5/5)

Explanations seem to be scattered somewhat randomly. "Pomatum" is explained but "Patches" is not, nor is the fact that "Powder," at the time, was used for hair not the face (as is common in our days). The note is helpful in spotting the link to Pope, which is confirmed by Austen's afterthought of replacing "Rouge" with "Patches." The reader is left alone, however, when it comes to possible functions of the echo. Is it

just to participate in the fame of the list? The point of Pope's list seems to be to mix articles of beautification with "Bibles" (NB the plural) and evidence of love-affairs. Austen studiously avoids the satirical mix, but why does she bother then to evoke Pope? Those readers who do not spot the allusion without the annotation would need some further explanation in any case, if the annotation is to be useful to them. How many undergraduates, one may ask, know what Pope's *The Rape of the Lock* is about? Since evaluation is included anyway ("the most celebrated list"), why not go a step further and include a few suggestions as to its meaning and connotations? Otherwise, the intertextual reference may leave a reader puzzled as to the significance of Pope for Austen's work: is this just a one-time reference? Was Pope an author that she frequently, if not regularly referred to? Particularly in the *Juvenilia* perhaps? Is the function of the list the same, or at least similar, in both works? What is even more pertinent to our interest in understanding through annotations: does the pointing out of this intertextual allusion explain Austen's text? Considering that the passage annotated should be relevant to the text as a whole if the annotation is to further our understanding of it, this annotation does not serve its purpose. A more integrative approach seems to be required which, to be fair, tends to exceed the limited space of a printed book.

2.2 Annotations that Further the Understanding of a Text

For all that, we are not confined to worrying about how not to do it. Our next example of an annotation is one that may further the understanding of a text. It is taken from the third Arden edition of Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* by Peter Holland. In 1.3, Volumnia, the mother of Caius Martius, his wife Virgilia, and a friend who is visiting, Valeria, talk about the son of Caius Martius and Virgilia—and about how he tore apart ("mammocked" 1.3.67) a butterfly after, or rather while playing with it. The action is described by Virgilia, and her mother-in-law

comments: "One on's father's moods" (1.3.68). Holland writes in his note (182n68):

> **moods** rages (*OED n.*[1] 2.b; cf. R3 1.2.244, 'Stabbed in my angry mood'); but Volumnia may also have in mind *OED* 2.a, 'Fierce courage; spirit, stoutness, pride' if the meaning was still current.

The annotation opens up the historical meaning of the word "mood"; the last reference for this meaning in the *OED* is 1579 (and the definition in fact reads: "Fierce courage; spirit, vigour. Also: pride, arrogance. *Obsolete*.").[6] This historical meaning of mood as "courage," "spirit" and especially "pride" gives us a hint early in the play as to the attitude of Coriolanus' mother that will become relevant time and again in the course of the tragedy. "Pride" is one of the major characteristics of Caius Martius,[7] and his mother is proud of her grand-child, because he is like his father. She, accordingly, does not condemn his brutal action (as we probably do) but praises it. The potential ambiguity of "mood," opened up by the annotation, hence makes us understand something about the characters in this play.

2.3 A 'Best Practice' Model: TEASys—The Tübingen Explanatory Annotation System

Studying examples of annotations that hamper or further our understanding of literary texts, we have been wondering how to establish a methodical approach to the problem. With this end in mind, we started developing TEASys, the Tübingen Explanatory Annotation System. It is closely linked to our theoretical considerations and attempts to put them into practice while, at the same time, it helps us revise the theory based on the practical experience of researching and writing notes.

TEASys strives to make the processes entailed in annotating transparent in the annotations themselves. It therefore addresses both issues: make annotations understandable and make them contribute to the un-

derstanding of a text. We work with altogether eight categories of annotation[8] on three levels.[9] Annotations are created by students in peer-groups and go through an internal reviewing process, first by the peers and then by us, the supervisors. They are published electronically, which entails several advantages, e.g. the possibility to filter information (if someone is, for instance, interested in intertextuality only) and to set internal but also external links (see www.annotating-literature.org).

A challenge that we regularly meet in our work is relevance. To give an example: in Charles Dickens's Christmas Story of 1843, *The Chimes*, Toby Veck, the protagonist, prepares his dinner at one point:

> Yet Trotty sniffed the savour of the hissing bacon—ah!—as if he liked it; and when he poured the boiling water in the tea-pot, looked lovingly down into the depths of that snug cauldron, and suffered the fragrant steam to curl about his nose, and wreathe his head and face in a thick cloud. (120)

In the first version of this annotation, the student wrote the following note:

> A cauldron is a "large kettle or boiler" (OED "cauldron/caldron, *n.* 1."). Due to different works of fiction, such as Shakespeare's *Macbeth* or the *Harry Potter* series, a cauldron is often associated with witches, wizardry and magic. However, in Dickens's time, the cauldron was primarily used to prepare food or drink over an open fire. Trotty, for example, boils tea in his cauldron. "cauldron/caldron, *n.*" *OED* Online. July 2014. OUP. 02. July 2014.

When we read the note and commented on it, we remarked, apart from correcting the language, on the lacking relevance of the references to Shakespeare and the *Harry Potter* books. Our first condition was glaringly ignored. The student had read up on "cauldrons" and found that they were used in contexts of magic and wizardry; she probably found that information fascinating, perhaps even with regard to the multiplicity of contexts in which the word may be used. Accordingly, she found it hard not to share this information with other readers. Still, she came to the decision to mitigate its lack of relevance. She subdivided the note

in accordance with our levels and categories and introduced, after explaining the linguistic meaning of "cauldron" on L1, an L2 context note, titled: "Cauldrons and Witches."

What often proves useful and also easier to approach than the composition of a note from scratch is the expansion of an existing note, e.g. from a scholarly edition, on an advanced level. In the annotations to SON 81, for example, existing annotations are used but expanded upon. For the phrase "common grave" in l. 7, the following language note is given on L1:

> 'Common' here means simple, ordinary, "of no special quality" or undistinguished (cf. *OED* "common, adj." 11 a.+b.); i.e. "an ordinary grave, a grave shared with others" (Duncan Jones 272n7).
> References:
> *OED* "common, *adj*." 11.a.+b.
> Duncan Jones, Katherine (ed.). *Shakespeare's Sonnets*. London: Thomson, 1997.
> (http://www.annotating-literature.org/annotations/read.php?pid=71)

Duncan Jones goes on to explain how the fact that "Shakespeare was buried in an honorific position in the chancel of Holy Trinity Church, Stratford, is not, as has been suggested especially ironical (Brown and Feavor, 27ff.), for the contrast here is between any physical form of burial and the living monument of verse." Our annotators, however, opted to leave this out and add an interpretive note that foregoes speculation (and its discarding) regarding Shakespeare's potential foresight as to his burial place on L2:

> The ordinary grave is contrasted with the monument in line 9. The speaker is only awarded a common grave, but the sonnet stands as a monument to the addressee. Even though his writing can make the addressee immortal the speaker assumes that his writing will not bring him enough acclaim, so that he will not be remembered.
> (http://www.annotating-literature.org/annotations/read.php?pid=71

Concluding Remarks

In order to trigger a fruitful debate on annotations, we have opened the special issue with a provocatively normative claim: annotations, at least

explanatory annotations published online and in scholarly editions, must be clearly subservient and conducive to the hermeneutic process. In order to fulfil that function, they must be relevant to the element of the text to which they are attached, and that element must be relevant to the understanding of the text as a whole. Whereas the first kind of relevance is comparatively easy to evaluate, the second one is much harder to assess. The objection may be made that we only know if an annotated text item is relevant to understanding the text as a whole when we have understood the text completely. This is either impossible or only possible if every *possible* contribution to such a general understanding is known, which in many cases requires annotations—a vicious circle. Still, for the time being, we would like to maintain our relevance claim because it may guide the annotator who has to decide about what to annotate. Such priorities can help, especially in a digital context in which there are no technical limits to the number of annotations. And what the annotator, especially after feedback from a group of readers and co-annotators, can show to be relevant to an understanding of the poem, play, or novel, should have first priority. But this is open to critical debate.

Eberhard Karls-Universität
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NOTES

[1]This special issue is based on papers given at the 15th International Connotations Symposium, July 28 – August 1, 2019. We are grateful to the participants, and in particular to our doctoral candidates Leonie Kirchhoff and Miriam Lahrsow, for valuable suggestions and feedback.

[2]For some recent discussions of close reading, see Brooks; Devereux; Kontje; Lockett; McIntyre and Hickman.

[3]On the didactic aspects of annotation, see Brown; DiYanni; Feita and Donahu; Gailey, Porter-O'Donnell; Wolfe.

[4]For an intermediate approach, see e.g. Bauer and Ebert. On "scalable reading," see e.g. Mueller; Weitin.

[5]See Gius and Jacke; Senger.

[6]The *OED* quotes from Fenton's translation of *Historia Guicciardin* ("Not waighin in their glorious moodes, how farre the daunger exceeded the attempt."), but we may assume that the meaning was not obsolete in Shakespeare's time. In fact, the passage in *Coriolanus* may speak in favour of its still being in use.

[7]The word "proud" is mentioned 15 times, mostly with reference to Coriolanus, e.g. 1.1.31, 1.1.35 by the First Citizen; but it is also used by Coriolanus himself, e.g. 1.1.260. "Pride" is mentioned ten times, e.g. 2.1.19, 2.1.25, 2.1.35 etc.

[8]The categories are: A linguistic (vocabulary, syntax, etc.), B formal (verse, narrative structures, iconicity, etc.), C intratextual (motifs, recurring structures, etc.), D intertextual (explicit references to other texts), E contextual (biographical, historical, philosophical, etc.), F interpretive (Synthesis A-E), G textual (Variants), H open questions.

[9]Level 1 (L1): basic information for text comprehension; L2: further information, based on information presented on level 1; L3: more advanced information, based on information presented on levels 1 and 2.

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Annotation as an Embedded Textual Practice: Analysing Explanatory Notes in Three Editions of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*

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This article is the first entry in a debate on "Annotation as an Embedded Textual Practice: Analysing Explanatory Notes in Three Editions of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*" (https://www.connotations.de/debate/understanding-through-annotations/). If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

The present article has two parts. The first part (sections 2 to 5) compares and reviews the explanatory notes in three recent editions of R. L. Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. The editors are Richard Dury (Edizioni C. I. Genova 1993), Katherine Linehan (Norton 2003), and Roger Luckhurst (OUP 2006). The three sets of notes differ considerably in number, length, choice of lemmata, and style. They also differ in the kinds of comment they offer. All three annotators provide problem-solving notes that paraphrase difficult words, trace quotations, or explain topical references. Luckhurst and Dury, however, also write interpretive notes that point out symbols and thematic patterns. While some of these interpretive notes are illuminating, others are distracting or misleading. Interpretive annotation is also questionable because it cannot be carried out in a consistent and exhaustive fashion.

The second part of the article (section 6) underpins our scepticism about interpretive annotation with a more general argument. This argument is based on a distinction between the critical essay on the one hand and annotation on the other. While the critical essay is a response to a literary text and is read independently, reading a note is an embedded activity, subordinate to the reading of the literary text. If reading a literary text may be compared to a journey, consulting a note is like a detour in that journey. Consequently, notes should be reader-oriented and self-effacing. They should provide the necessary information succinctly and clearly,

making the reader's detour in his or her textual journey as brief as possible. Annotators who take this approach will focus on the problem-solving notes and avoid free-wheeling and speculative interpretation.

1. Introduction[1]

The aim of the present article is to provide a "rationale of annotation," to quote the title of an essay by Martin Battestin, with whose restrictive views on the subject we are in agreement. Our thinking about annotation is based not only on scholarly articles by Battestin and others; it is also informed by the fact that we have been researching and writing notes for an edition of six early short stories by Robert Louis Stevenson.[2] However, we have decided not to refer to these notes—fabricating the evidence for one's own claims is a questionable procedure. Instead, we will base our argument on three annotated editions of Stevenson's novella *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. We will first analyse, compare and review the explanatory notes in these editions and then, in the final section of this article, connect our findings with a more general and theoretical argument about annotation as an embedded textual practice.

2. Three Editions of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*: A Numerical Comparison

For our comparison, we have chosen three editions that are relatively recent, were published at roughly the same time (between 1993 and 2006) and designed for the academic market; they all combine annotation with critical readings and contextual material. The editors are Richard Dury (Edizioni C. I. Genova 1993),[3] Katherine Linehan (Norton 2003), and Roger Luckhurst (OUP 2006). At the outset, we would like to state that we have learnt a lot from all their annotations. We will voice some criticisms of their work, especially of one or two notes by Luckhurst, but all three annotators provide many valuable insights into Stevenson's text.

What is most striking about the notes in the three editions is how much they differ. As our comparison will show, there seems to be little

consensus as to what, how and for whom one should annotate; the three editors select different lemmata (*lemma* is the word or passage that is the subject of annotation), and they annotate them for different audiences and in different ways. To prove this point, we will begin with some numbers:

	Linehan (Norton)	**Luckhurst (Oxford)**	**Dury (Genova)**
Number of notes	122	47	311
Lemmata shared by all	20		
Exclusive lemmata	45	15	231

Although the three editors annotate the same text, the number of notes varies extremely: Luckhurst offers 47, Linehan 122, and Dury 311. In other words, Linehan presents more than twice as many notes as Luckhurst, and Dury almost three times as many as Linehan (and hence more than six times as many as Luckhurst). Only twenty lemmata are explained in all three editions, while each features a considerable number of lemmata neglected by the other two. This is hardly surprising in the case of Dury with his 311 notes, but even Luckhurst has an astonishing number of exclusive lemmata: 15 out of 47. Almost a third of his notes focuses on words or passages that neither Linehan nor Dury considers worthy of annotation.

The notes composed by the three editors also differ in length, as is shown by the following table:

	Linehan (Norton)	**Luckhurst (Oxford)**	**Dury (Genova)**
Words overall (est.)	2,900	3,700	16,400
Words per note (aver.)	24	79	53

Linehan's 122 notes amount to approximately 2,900 words, Luckhurst's 47 to 3,700 and Dury's 311 to 16,400. Consequently, the average length ranges from Linehan with 24 words per note over Dury with 53 to Luckhurst with 79. Thus, Luckhurst's notes are, as a rule, about three times

as long as Linehan's. These differences do not mean that Luckhurst and Dury are more verbose writers than Linehan; they mean that Luckhurst and Dury write notes of a different kind. To substantiate this claim, we have assigned all of the notes from the editions to seven categories, which are listed below. These do not amount to a systematic or exhaustive typology of annotation; they are based on the corpus in question, i.e. the 480 notes from the three editions of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, and their principal purpose is to allow for a comparison between them. With texts from another period or genre or with another kind of argument, a typology of annotation would look different, including additional or fewer categories.[4]

(1) Words. This category covers words that are obsolete or otherwise unknown. It also includes obsolete meanings of words that look familiar, such as the adjective "mere" in the following passage, in which Jekyll's friend Utterson has a sleepless night worrying about the doctor: "It was a night of little ease to his toiling mind, toiling in mere darkness and besieged by questions" (14).[5] Linehan annotates "mere" as follows: "Absolute, pure (an obsolete usage which occurs again later in the tale)" (14n1).

(2) Historical and cultural phenomena. This category refers to people, places, events or customs that readers might not know because of the historical and cultural distance between themselves and the world described in the text. It also includes phenomena that are still familiar but have changed in meaning, such as the sum of one hundred pounds mentioned in the opening pages of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. Linehan's note on the purchasing power of this sum in the late nineteenth century will be quoted below.

(3) Intertextuality. This category comprises quotations, allusions, proverbs and more large-scale literary borrowings.

(4) Parallels and genre conventions. Notes in this category point out similar passages in other works by the same writer or from the same period. During one of his sleepless nights, Utterson thinks about the collision between Hyde and a little girl, an incident that he knows about from his relative Mr Enfield: "Mr Enfield's tale went by before his mind in a scroll of lighted pictures" (14). Dury's note, which focuses on the

phrase "a scroll of lighted pictures," lists parallels in other writings by Stevenson and by George Eliot:

> *a scroll of lighted pictures*: Stevenson was fond of comparing the memory of a story or of events themselves to a series of pictures. After finishing a book, he says, the story should "repeat itself in a thousand coloured pictures to the eye" (1882/Tus.29: 119). "The events of the ignoble day," he says in *The Ebb Tide*, "passed before him in a frieze of pictures" (1894/Tus.14: 115). George Eliot also compares successions of thoughts to "magic-lantern pictures" (1871-72/1965: 226) and sequences of pictures in a diorama (1859/1980: 91). (100n1)

Under category no. 4, we have also included genre conventions because they are closely related to parallels. After all, an annotator who wishes to provide evidence for a genre convention will have to list parallels from other texts belonging to the same genre, as is shown by a note from Dury's edition; it refers to a passage that sets the scene for Utterson's first encounter with Hyde: "By ten o'clock, when the shops were closed, the by-street was very solitary and, in spite of the low growl of London from all round, very silent" (15). Dury's note to the words "very silent" identifies a convention of the Gothic tale and illustrates this with two parallel passages from works by other writers:

> *very silent*: clearly marked silence is a typical 'Gothic' characteristic for the 'frame' of a frightening event. In Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto* (1764/1986: 62) there is "an awful silence" in which the steps of the fugitive are echoed. In Le Fanu's "The Familiar" (1872/1964: 212) Mr Barton walks home alone through streets in "that utter silence which has in it something indefinitely exciting" and which "made the sound of his steps, which alone broke it, unnaturally loud and distinct." (103n3)

It may not always be easy to tell category no. 4 (parallels and genre conventions) from category no. 3 (intertextuality). If a lemma reminds an annotator of a well-known passage from a canonical work that was published earlier than the work to be annotated, he or she could annotate this passage either as the source (no. 3) or as a parallel (no. 4). In principle, however, the distinction between categories 3 and 4 should

be clear enough. It corresponds to the distinction between "intertextualité" and "architextualité" in Gérard Genette's typology of transtextuality in *Palimpsestes* (7-16).

(5) Defamiliarised language. We have included this category to accommodate 44 notes in Dury's edition. Dury believes that the strange case of Dr Jekyll is presented in a strange style, i.e. that the language of the text is systematically defamiliarised, and he points out many instances of this. Notes of this type will be discussed below in the section on Dury; they do not occur in the other two editions.

(6) Interpretation and critical reception. The term "interpretation" used for this category might raise some eyebrows. Do not all of the categories listed thus far involve interpretation, even the most basic one, the explanation of words? Is it not true that Linehan interprets Stevenson's text when she claims that the phrase "mere darkness" in the description of Utterson's sleepless night means "absolute, pure darkness"? The answer to these questions is yes.[6] However, some animals are more equal than others. Notes may be more or less interpretive or, to put it in other words, they may offer different kinds of interpretation. A note from category 1 responds to a problem: the possibility that readers fail to understand a passage (if they do not know a word) or that they misunderstand it (if they attribute a modern meaning to a word that is used with a historical meaning). In these cases, the interpretation provided by the note merely helps readers to achieve a first, literal understanding of the text. Consider, by contrast, the following note from Dury's edition; it refers to a conversation in which Utterson asks Dr Lanyon whether he has ever come across Hyde (14). Dury's note to Lanyon's answer—"'No. Never heard of him'"—reads as follows:

> *"No, never* [sic] *heard of him"*: Lanyon's denial of knowledge of Hyde can be seen, in a psychological interpretation, as a repression of certain aspects of his own personality. Further rejections of Hyde are made by Poole ("He never dines here," 108), and by Jekyll himself ("I do not care to hear more," 112; "I am done with him," 124). (99n6)

Evidently, this note does not respond to a problem of comprehension; no reader will fail to realise the meaning of Lanyon's answer: he has

never met Hyde, nor can he remember the name from a conversation. Dury's interpretation goes beyond the obvious or literal meaning that Lanyon's answer has in its context to add a second meaning, which is part of a psychological pattern that informs the novella as a whole. Ignorance of a stranger stands for Freudian repression; Hyde is an embodiment of the problematic parts of the self. "Interpretation" as a label for category 6 in the present typology refers to readings of this kind; it means that the annotator goes beyond a first, literal understanding of a passage, perceiving it in symbolic or allegorical terms or as part of large-scale thematic patterns. Notes that refer to the critical reception of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* have also been subsumed under category 6, as the critical arguments summarised in these notes tend to be interpretive (while occasionally also including critical appreciation or evaluation).

The six categories listed thus far have been arranged from the less to the more interpretive. Categories 1 to 3 are of the problem-solving type. They enable the reader to understand the text when he or she might fail to do so or misunderstand it. This should be perfectly obvious for categories 1 and 2, but it also applies to category 3. If a reader fails to recognise the allusion to "Cain's heresy" in the first paragraph of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, he or she will not be able to make sense of this phrase. The same cannot be said for categories 4 and 5. Instead of enabling the reader to understand the text in the first place, they *add* to this understanding by placing the lemma in a context in which it belongs (category 4) or from which it deviates (category 5). No reader will have a problem with the words "very silent" in the setting of the scene before Utterson's first encounter with Hyde; learning that they echo a Gothic convention and looking at parallels will enrich his or her reading of the passage (assuming that the convention really applies and that the parallels are pertinent). While notes from categories 4 and 5 are still on relatively safe ground in that they require the presentation of literary and linguistic evidence, no. 6 is the most speculative of the categories.

(7) Miscellaneous. This category includes a mere 6 notes (out of 480) which do not fit into any of the previous six categories. One of these is a note by Dury in which he justifies an emendation of the text: "*G.J.*

Utterson: corrected from 'J.G.' since he is elsewhere called 'Gabriel John' (150)" (130n3).

Before offering a table that shows the numbers for the different categories, we need to mention a methodological problem. As Linehan, Luckhurst, and Dury were not aware of our seven categories, they have unfortunately felt no obligation to confine themselves to one of them in composing a single note. A note may easily combine the explanation of a word (category 1) with the claim that it is archaic or otherwise strange (category 5), or it may use the pointing out of parallels (category 4) as a springboard for an interpretive argument (category 6). In cases like these, we have attempted to establish the dominant element in a note and assigned the note to just one of the categories accordingly (instead of assigning it to several categories, which would have entailed all sorts of computational complications). Needless to say, this has involved some choices which might have been made differently. The numbers in the following table have thus to be taken with a grain of salt. However, they vary so clearly that, in their broad outlines at least, they are reliable enough to establish the different profiles of the three annotators.

		Linehan (Norton)	**Luckhurst (Oxford)**	**Dury (Genova)**
Categories				
1	Words	83	11	81
2	Historical and cultural phenomena	17	8	3
3	Intertextuality	15	13	7
4	Parallels and genre conventions	1	3	23
5	Defamiliarised language	———	———	44
6	Interpretation and critical reception	5	12	148
7	Miscellaneous	1	———	5

Linehan has a clear preference for the problem-solving categories 1 to 3, in particular for the first one. 83 notes out of 122 (c. 68%) paraphrase difficult words, another 32 (c. 26%) explain late-nineteenth-century

phenomena or trace intertextual borrowings. Interpretive notes are few and far between (5 out of 122 [c. 4%]). The comparative brevity of Linehan's notes is due to these preferences; her lexical explanations tend to be very short, consisting of a single word in some cases. In Luckhurst's edition, the first three categories feature as well, yet they are accompanied by a substantial number of notes from categories 4 and 6 (15 out of 47 [c. 32%] as compared to 6 out of 122 in Linehan [c. 5%]). In Dury's edition, finally, word annotations play a significant role (81 out of 311 [c. 26%]), while historical and cultural phenomena as well as intertextuality are almost negligible. Categories 4 to 6 outnumber categories 1 to 3 (215 vs. 91), and interpretation takes the lion's share (148 out of 311 [c. 48%]). To sum up, Linehan has an almost exclusive preference for the problem-solving notes, while Luckhurst and Dury are much more likely to offer interpretation.

3. Linehan (Norton)

In the preface of her edition, Linehan includes a brief comment on her explanatory notes:

> The annotations to the text found in this edition fit the picture of an intensely literary author who carries his knowledge lightly, partly through an affinity for the abstract simplicity of the fable. Topical allusions are virtually nonexistent and only a few actual London place names are mentioned. However, the text frequently features unusual word usages that subtly evoke older meanings or give a fresh twist to a familiar word or phrase. It also contains an abundance of muffled literary echoes, particularly biblical ones, that operate almost subliminally in the narrative. (xiv)

Broadly speaking, this comment is in keeping with our findings. It does not do justice to the frequency of Linehan's notes in category 2 (if we are right in assuming that her "topical allusions" correspond to our "Historical and cultural phenomena"), but it mentions the first three categories, to which her notes are almost exclusively restricted, and points out the importance of no. 1 ("unusual word usages") and no. 3 ("abundance of muffled literary echoes").

First and foremost, Linehan provides lexical explanations. As she indicates in the preface, her annotations are frequently occasioned by words that look familiar but are used with unfamiliar meanings. In the opening paragraph, Utterson is introduced as a person who "had an approved tolerance for others" (7). In a typically concise note that consists of only one word, Linehan points out that "approved" here means "Proven" (7n1). Only a few sentences later, the narrator suggests that Utterson's "friendships seemed to be founded in a similar catholicity of good-nature" (7). Once again, Linehan recognises the difficulty posed by the term "catholicity," which, in this context, has nothing to do with the Church of Rome, and provides another one-word note that offers the synonym "Breadth" (7n3).

Second, Linehan explains the nineteenth-century context where this might pose difficulties for a reader from the twenty-first century. When Hyde runs into a little girl, Utterson and some bystanders force him to indemnify the girl's family. As Enfield puts it, "'we screwed him up to a hundred pounds for the child's family'" (10). Since today's readers might not be familiar with the purchasing power of a hundred pounds in the late Victorian period, Linehan provides the following annotation: "A large sum at the time; as a rough point of comparison, consider the figure mentioned in George Gissing's novel *The Odd Women* (1893) as the salary of a character working as a mathematical lecturer at a London college in 1888, namely, one hundred and fifty pounds a year" (10n2). Another note that bridges the gap between the 1880s and today refers to the phrase "the first fog of the season" (23). Linehan explains that this fog is not merely a meteorological phenomenon:

> *the first fog of the season*: In modern terms, smog; by the late nineteenth century, smoke pollution in industrialized London had become so thick that when mixed with fog, especially during the winter months, it produced famously sky-darkening, choking hazes that could last for days or weeks on end. (23n3)

Third, Linehan supplies intertextual notes which trace allusions and quotes, in particular biblical echoes, of which she identifies a much larger number than Dury and Luckhurst. Shortly after Utterson has been introduced as a man with "an approved tolerance for others" (7,

see above), this character trait is illustrated with Utterson's motto, "'I incline to Cain's heresy, […] I let my brother go to the devil in his own way'" (7). Linehan writes a note to "Cain's heresy," explaining that "Adam and Eve's firstborn son Cain murdered his brother Abel and afterwards asked, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' (Genesis 4:5)" (7n2). She points out the origin of the allusion, summarises the biblical context and, for more detail, refers her readers to the source. When later Jekyll sends Utterson a letter, stating that he (Jekyll) is "the chief of sinners" (30), Linehan similarly indicates the source of the allusion: "An echo of the line in Paul's First Epistle to Timothy, 'Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief' (I Timothy 1:15)" (30n2).[7]

Thus far, we have talked a little vaguely about twenty-first-century readers who might not be familiar with Stevenson's usage of words such as "mere" and "approved" or with the nineteenth-century setting of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. In the case of Linehan's annotations, this reader can be identified more precisely as the North American undergraduate. Like all covers of the more recent editions in the Norton series, the cover of the edition states that the series caters to the needs of "undergraduate readers" and that its goal is to "[help] students to better understand, analyze, and appreciate the literature." The audience that Linehan has in mind can also be inferred from the notes themselves and from the knowledge she assumes her readers to have (or rather not to have). At one point, she explains that the "first floor" in *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* is "the first floor above the ground floor, or what North Americans would call the second floor" (11n8). Elsewhere, she indicates that "M.P." is short for "Member of Parliament" (27n8). These are explanations that no British reader—and no American reader with a good general education or some familiarity with British culture—would require.

4. Luckhurst (Oxford World's Classics)

Luckhurst's edition in the Oxford World's Classics series is similar to Linehan's Norton edition in its broad outlines. It contains a note on the text, related writings by Stevenson and his contemporaries as well as a

critical introduction. However, Luckhurst's notes are very different from Linehan's. Consider the following annotation on Utterson's allusion to Cain:

> *Cain's heresy*: Cain is the Bible's first murderer, killing his brother Abel. Genesis 4: 9, 'And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother? And he said, I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?' Utterson might be misremembering his Bible, since it is Cain who goes to the devil, not Abel. However, there was an early Christian dissident sect, the Cainites, that regarded Cain as 'possessed of a dignity, power and enlightenment superior to Abel' (as discussed by James Hastings, *A Dictionary of the Bible* (Edinburgh, 1898)). This is an early sign that conventional biblical meanings may be inverted in the tale. (184n5)

Luckhurst begins in a fashion reminiscent of Linehan in that he gives chapter and verse and provides some biblical context. Yet in contrast to Linehan, Luckhurst does not leave it at that. He recognises that Utterson's identification with the murderer Cain is peculiar and offers an explanation that culminates in the interpretive claim that "conventional biblical meanings may be inverted in the tale." This claim is based on a quotation from a roughly contemporary dictionary of the Bible, which is a typical trait of Luckhurst's notes (and of his critical introduction). He tends to situate Stevenson's text in its sociocultural context in the late nineteenth century.

Generally speaking, attention to historical context is a virtue in a literary critic. However, it can lead to a lack of attention to the immediate context of a passage, i.e. the work itself. Luckhurst's suggestion that Utterson might be misremembering one of the most well-known stories from the Bible is unlikely; after all, the lawyer reads "a volume of some dry divinity" every Sunday night (12). Luckhurst also misses the irony in the allusion, indicated by the narrator, who says that it is made "quaintly" (7). The statement "I let my brother go to the devil in his own way" is Utterson's way of saying that he would rather help friends in trouble than upbraid them with self-righteous comments. However, being a very reticent person and the last man to sing his own praises, he refers to his tolerance and support for others not in straightforward

or positive terms but with self-deprecating understatement. Luckhurst's far-fetched reference to a scholarly dictionary does little to elucidate these complex ironies, leaving aside the fact that it was published twelve years after *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. If there is a contemporary context for Utterson's allusion, it is Thomas Carlyle's biography of Frederick the Great, published in 1858. One of the famous pronouncements of the Prussian King, who was a freethinker and a patron of Voltaire, concerns his tolerance in matters of religion: "In meinem Staate muss jeder nach seiner Façon selig werden." Carlyle's English version of this reads, "'in this Country every man must get to Heaven in his own way'" (3: 290), a phrasing echoed by Utterson's "I let my brother go to the devil in his own way." Like Frederick the Great, Utterson refers to his tolerance in an ironical manner; he merely varies the phrase by substituting heaven with the other place.

Luckhurst's tendency to write interpretive notes also becomes evident in the following example. When discussing the relationship between Jekyll and Hyde, Enfield comments: "'Black mail, I suppose; an honest man paying through the nose for some of the capers of his youth. Black Mail House is what I call that place with the door, in consequence'" (10-11). Luckhurst singles out the phrase "Black Mail House" as his lemma and provides the following note:

> *Black Mail House*: that a low, repulsive young man like Mr Hyde has some power of blackmail over Dr Jekyll is the theory held for most of the novella by his concerned circle of friends. This is a knowing wink and nudge from Enfield, who does not need to spell out the various heterosexual and homosexual associations of blackmail at the time: these are discussed in the Introduction. However, this oblique conversation deliberately leaves open many possibilities: Hyde might also be the very product of those blackmailable sins—an illegitimate son. This was a classic 'sensation fiction' plot line, and the relationship of Jekyll and Hyde is repeatedly described in terms of father and son. (185n8)

The note combines interpretation (the nature of the suspicions considered by Jekyll's friends) with genre conventions (the typical plot lines of sensation fiction). In addition, it hints at the sociocultural background (blackmail in the late Victorian age), which is discussed in more

detail in the introduction to the edition. Luckhurst's notes are often a seamless continuation of the interpretation offered in the introduction, and this interpretation is anchored in the sociocultural context. Luckhurst focuses on "the various heterosexual and homosexual associations of blackmail *at the time*."

Another interpretive note offered by Luckhurst refers to the incident of Hyde and the little girl. When Enfield describes how the two collide at a corner, he states that "'the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear, but it was hellish to see'" (9). Luckhurst's annotation reads as follows:

> *It sounds nothing to hear*: in a famous letter to Robert Bridges on 28 October 1886, the Catholic priest and poet Gerard Manley Hopkins commented: 'You are certainly wrong about Hyde being overdrawn: my Hyde is worse. The trampling scene is perhaps a convention: he was thinking of something unsuitable for fiction,' Gerard Manley Hopkins, *Selected Letters* (Oxford, 1990), 243. In a poor parody that appeared in 1886, *The Stranger Case of Dr Hide and Mr Crushall* by 'Robert Bathos Stavingson', this scene is made significantly more violent: a baby is kicked down the street. Later described more generally by Jekyll as 'an act of cruelty', contemporary audiences might have had in mind W. T. Stead's journalistic exposé, 'The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon', in which he sensationally described the violation of young girls on the streets and in the brothels of London (see Introduction). (184n7)

This note falls squarely in category 6 (interpretation). Hyde's trampling over the little girl is seen as an allegory of teenage prostitution in late Victorian London. As usual, Luckhurst backs up his interpretation with documents from the sociocultural context: a letter in which G. M. Hopkins interprets the incident and a journal article by W. T. Stead. For good measure, Luckhurst includes an early parody, which, however, does not fit in with the sexual reading of the passage.

Luckhurst's note raises the question whether an annotator needs to alert his or her readers to the possibility of a sexual interpretation of the incident. It would appear that in this day and age, Freudian readings have become so commonplace that they hardly need to be pointed out. A second, more important question is whether the Freudian reading does justice to Stevenson's text. In our view, it distracts the audience

from a literal reading of the passage, which, in this case, is crucial to its effect. The incident with the girl is the reader's first encounter with Hyde. In contrast with later encounters, which show the presence of evil and cruelty, this incident reveals the absence of social or humane impulses. Just imagine an adult man colliding with a little girl who falls to the ground and begins to scream. What one would expect is some kind of emotional response: concern, pity, guilt, perhaps also some irritation, or a mixture of these. What is so extraordinary about Hyde is his complete lack of emotion. He walks over the girl as if she were part of the pavement.

Admittedly, one might feel that even the literal reading favoured here does not quite account for the discrepancy in Enfield's response: "'It sounds nothing to hear, but it was hellish to see'" (9). However, an annotator who wishes to give further explanations should seek them first of all in the text of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, where they are not hard to find. The discrepancy in Enfield's response forms part of a pattern; the characters react to Hyde with a disproportionate intensity which they cannot account for. Enfield himself sums up his response to Hyde as follows: "I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarce know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives a strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn't specify the point" (11). A doctor who helps the little girl is "about as emotional as a bagpipe," yet he "turn[s] sick and white with the desire to kill" Hyde (9). When Utterson meets Hyde, he thinks that neither the appearance nor the behaviour of Hyde can "explain the hitherto unknown disgust, loathing and fear with which Mr. Utterson regarded him" (17). Jekyll's servant Poole states, "there was something queer about that gentleman—something that gave a man a turn—I don't know rightly how to say it, sir, beyond this: that you felt it in your marrow kind of cold and thin" (37). Lanyon uses more scientific expressions—"incipient rigor […] accompanied by a marked sinking of the pulse" (44)—but is likewise at a loss to account for his sensations. An explanation of the pattern informing all of these responses is finally given in Jekyll's concluding statement:

> I have observed that when I wore the semblance of Edward Hyde, none could come near to me at first without a visible misgiving of the flesh. This, as I take it, was because all human beings, as we meet them, are commingled out of good and evil: and Edward Hyde, alone in the ranks of mankind, was pure evil. (51)

If an annotator wishes to explain the discrepancy in Enfield's response to Hyde, these passages from the context of the novella itself are surely more relevant than letters or journal articles by other writers, even if they are from the same time.

While Linehan's annotations are addressed to undergraduates, Luckhurst's audience is less well-defined. A simile that compares the female relatives of the little girl with harpies is annotated as follows by Luckhurst: "*harpies*: in Greek mythology, noisome birds with the faces of women who embody violent winds that carry men off to their deaths" (185n7). This is a note in the style of Linehan; it gives a concise explanation aimed at academic novices. Elsewhere, however, Luckhurst seems to presuppose a much more knowledgeable reader. In his note on the incident with the little girl, for instance, Luckhurst mentions the poet Robert Bridges in passing without identifying him any further.

Luckhurst also makes fairly high demands on his reader through the way he structures his notes. In this respect, he again differs from the editor of the Norton edition. Linehan usually makes it very clear what she is explaining. She begins by paraphrasing the lemma or by stating the principal point of the explanation before going into detail. Her note on the purchasing power of a hundred pounds (see above) is structured in this reader-friendly manner. First of all, she conveys the main idea ("a large sum"); only then does she illustrate it with an example from a contemporary novel. Consider, by contrast, Luckhurst's note on the incident with the little girl. The principal point is, as we have seen, that the incident amounts to an allegory of teenage prostitution. However, Luckhurst does not state this at the outset; he merely suggests it by way of the quotation from Hopkins's letter. This quotation requires more explanation than the text it is meant to explain. The sexual reading is hidden behind the vague periphrasis "something unsuitable for fiction." Nor is it immediately clear what Hopkins means when he says

"my Hyde is worse" or that the pronoun in "*he* was thinking of something unsuitable for fiction" (our emphasis) refers to Stevenson. Readers will have to ponder the quotation very carefully before having an inkling of what Hopkins is driving at. If they read on, they are led into a completely new direction by the reference to a parody in which the act of violence is directed against a baby. The only merit of this reference would appear to be that it meets Luckhurst's criterion of coming from the nineteenth-century context; otherwise it is pointless and distracting. The principal idea of the note is only made explicit in the final words, in connection with the journal article on teenage prostitution. Instead of explaining difficulties, Luckhurst's note introduces difficulties of its own. Readers who understand this note without the help of further annotations are so knowledgeable and sophisticated that they do not need the note in the first place.[8]

5. Dury (Edizioni C. I. Genova)

Dury's edition is entitled *The Annotated Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, and it contains, as we have stated above, 311 notes, three times as many as Linehan's and six times as many as Luckhurst's. The notes are not only numerous, but sometimes also complex, featuring quotations from other nineteenth-century novels and scholarly references. Clearly, this edition is not designed for beginners but for advanced students and fellow scholars.

In the preface, Dury states his view "that although the language of the text is easy to understand, since the context generally explains all, on closer study it is full of archaisms, colloquialisms, unusual syntax and extravagant uses of words: in short, a 'strange' language" (ix). The aims of the annotation are summarised as follows:

> (i) to indicate and discuss strange word-uses and sequences, with reference to translators' difficulties where relevant, (ii) to collate the comments of critics with the passage they refer to […], (iii) to give my own comments on passages that are particularly interesting from the point of view of Stevenson's manipulation of themes, narrative structures, and genre conventions. (x)

As in Linehan's case, this self-description is broadly in keeping with the findings presented in our numerical comparison of the three editions. Dury's first point indicates the high number of notes in category 1 (words: 81) and category 5 (defamiliarised language: 44); and his second and third point are in line with the frequency of notes in category 4 (parallels and genre: 23) and category 6 (interpretation and critical reception: 148). As indicated above, we have seen that notes which belong in categories 2 and 3 are few and far between.

Like the other two editors, Dury annotates Utterson's allusion in the opening paragraph of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*:

> *Cain's heresy*: a refusal to admit responsibility for others (cf. Genesis 4: 9). Utterson ironically suggests that if he interfered, it would only be to make the other person go to the devil in another way (i.e. he does not claim an absolute knowledge of truth). (86n4)

Dury's edition may be designed for a more advanced audience than Linehan's, but he also organises his notes in an accessible, reader-friendly way. He generally begins with a paraphrase of the lemma, in this case explaining "Cain's heresy" as "a refusal to admit responsibility for others." In the present note, Dury is perhaps a little stingy in his presentation of the source. He merely provides a reference without paraphrasing the episode and without quoting the crucial question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" But unlike the other two editors he points out the irony. On the whole, he strikes a happy medium between the reticence of Linehan, who merely traces the allusion without explaining its unorthodox and self-deprecating manner, and the speculative manner of Luckhurst, who neglects the immediate context in his search for sociocultural contexts further afield.

The next note also shows Dury's strengths as an annotator. It comments on the title of the third chapter, "Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease":

> *Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease*: The reader is immediately puzzled by the past tense of the verb, since the finite verb of a chapter title is normally in the present tense, e.g. "Sherlock Holmes *Gives* a Demonstration." […] The unusual past tense here […] creates a feeling of doubling: either it is a direct quotation

> of a part of the following text (where the past-tense verb is allowed), making it semantically opaque, rather like the title "Pipe" accompanying a painting of the word *pipe*; or it is a part of the narrative that has invaded the paratextual frame, hence not really a title, despite the fact that it is presented graphically as such, but merely the beginning of the next section of the text. Neither alternative turns out to fit: the title does not quote any piece of text that follows, nor does it connect coherently with the following narrative. Indeed, the following chapter is about how Dr Jekyll was *not* at ease […]. (110n1)

This note addresses a convention for the chapter titles of English novels and thus belongs to category 4. However, while other notes of this type show Stevenson's adherence to literary conventions, this note points out a deliberate deviation. As the convention in question concerns the choice of tense, the note also falls under category 5, the defamiliarisation of ordinary language use. For reasons of space, we cannot enter into all of the details of Dury's note, of which we have only quoted a part,[9] but the principal observation, the change in tense from the present to the past, is perceptive and pertinent, and the claim about the purpose of this change is highly plausible. The substitution of the distant, summary-like present ("In Which Dr Jekyll Is Quite at Ease") to the more immediate and assertive statement in the narrative past highlights the hollowness of this statement. Dr Jekyll's relaxed manner is a pretence that hides his panic.

Like Luckhurst, Dury also annotates the incident of Hyde and the little girl. In his note on this passage, he refers to a section from his introduction, which we will quote along with the note:

> *the man trampled calmly over the child's body*: an example of Stevenson's indeterminacy (see p. 29). The collision of the two bodies can be seen as an example of a chaotic event in the modern large city, where individuals meet by chance, like elementary particles in an electromagnetic field. (91n3)
>
> In the account of Hyde's brutality to the girl he knocks down (Ch. 1) the familiar meaning of *trample* ('to step repeatedly and heavily [on something] and so flatten') does not fit in with what comes before and after. We could understand '*the crowd* trampled over the child's body,' or 'the man *stepped* over (or: *stepped on*) the child's body,' but not 'the man trampled over the child's body.' (29)

This note is characteristic in that it combines two categories that are frequent in Dury's annotation. The first is category 5, the defamiliarisation of language that Dury discerns time and again. While we are in general agreement with Dury's observations on this point, we have some doubts about this particular example. It would appear that "trampled calmly over the child's body" is not a deviation from common usage, as we have found some parallel instances in nineteenth-century texts.[10] The second category that the note belongs to is no. 6, interpretation. What is immediately striking about Dury's reading in the present context is how much it differs from Luckhurst's. While Dury sees the collision as a chance occurrence, as a random encounter typical of the modern metropolis, Luckhurst considers it anything but accidental. As an image of teenage prostitution, it is a strongly motivated and predictable event. In our view, Dury's reading of the incident is less far-fetched and intrusive than Luckhurst's, but we are not sure that it is so compelling that it needs to be brought to the attention of the reader. The London of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* is not a metropolis in which crowds mingle and jostle, producing myriads of chance meetings. On the contrary, it is a strangely depopulated place in which Enfield "begins to long for the sight of a policeman" (9), in which the street where Utterson waits for Hyde is "very solitary" (15), and in which a servant is "living alone in a house" and sitting by herself at a window before she witnesses the murder of Sir Danvers Carew (21). Moreover, the element of chance would appear to be foreign from the tragedy of Dr Jekyll. Once he has swallowed the fatal potion, he is caught up in an inexorable motion that takes him to his doom. Instead of seeing the collision with the girl as a chance event, one might also see it as a warning and a foreshadowing of Jekyll's ultimate detection and downfall.

6. Conclusion: Annotation as an Embedded Textual Practice

Thus far, we have based our criticisms on specific notes or on comparisons between notes from the different editions. In this final section, we would like to provide a more systematic argument, which is based on

the distinction between annotation on the one hand and the critical essay on the other.[11] These two types of discourse are similar in that they aim to elucidate the meaning of a literary text. However, they also differ in a number of ways. First, the critical essay presents one coherent argument, while annotations are a series of relatively short texts that do not cohere with each other (at least not to the same degree). As a consequence, we read a critical essay from beginning to end. Of course, we may be interrupted by a phone call or choose to stop reading and have a sandwich, but there is nothing in the essay itself that breaks up our perusal. Notes, by contrast, are not read consecutively but separately. Second, a critical essay responds to the text as a whole (or to significant parts of it). Annotations, however, focus on one word or a very brief passage.[12] This means that reading the essay is separate from reading the literary text itself; ideally, we study an essay soon after we have finished the work that it is about. The reading of a note, by contrast, is not a separate activity. It is embedded in, and subordinate to, the reading of the literary text. If reading a literary text is like a journey, consulting a note is like a brief detour in that journey. A third difference that follows from the first two is that reading a critical essay is the result of a deliberate choice. We study a piece of criticism because we think highly of its author, because we are interested in the approach indicated by the title, because it seems to be relevant to an article or a paper we wish to write, etc. Annotations are not chosen in the same way; reading a note is usually the by-product of another choice, the decision to read a particular text (and, perhaps, a particular edition).

The differences in structure and reading entail different responsibilities on the part of the annotator and of the writer of the critical essay. If we think in terms of a basic communication model with three points of reference (writer, subject matter and reader), the first responsibility for both the annotator and the critic is to the subject matter, i.e. the literary text. As modes of scholarly discourse, the annotation as well as the essay should make precise and well-researched statements that are grounded in the available evidence. The second responsibility, however, is different: to the writer him- or herself in the case of the essay,

to the reader in the case of the annotation. The essay may and should express the interests and the personality of the critic; it should not be exhaustive but selective, reflecting a particular approach and stating it in strong terms that are likely to engender the critical debate favoured by the present journal. By contrast, a note should be as reader-oriented and self-effacing as possible. It should avoid strong terms and stylistic graces and provide the necessary explanations succinctly and clearly, making the annotative detour in the reader's textual journey as brief as possible. The ideal note does not challenge the reader to critical debate but answers a question that occurs to him or her while reading the annotated text. The principle of reader orientation also implies that the number of notes be kept to a minimum. After all, every note is an interruption of the intimate communion between the reader and the literary text. Annotators should only interrupt this communion when they have good reason to do so.

Viewing annotation as an embedded textual practice clearly favours the first three categories of our typology. Notes in these categories are based on the assumption that a reader has encountered an obstacle in his or her textual journey. The detour caused by the note is necessary and justified as it facilitates the progress of the journey. It will thus come as no surprise that we sympathise with Linehan's approach to annotation and also with her practice because she tends to make her notes clear and concise, keeping the textual detour as brief and smooth as possible. It may be objected to Linehan's annotation that it is pedestrian, providing the proverbially ignorant American undergraduates with knowledge they should have in the first place or find out for themselves. However, a pedestrian project carried out well is better than an ambitious project carried out badly. Moreover, Linehan's thorough coverage of the first three categories may not be as pedestrian as it seems. Every annotator who works his or her way through a text word for word knows that even supposedly simple works such as Stevenson's tales pose many difficulties even for experts, and that solving these difficulties takes a lot of time and thought. Linehan's painstaking focus on words and biblical echoes yields results that are far from triv-

ial. Her annotations show that, due to our historical distance and to Stevenson's idiosyncratic usage, the language of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* is quite different from the language of today, and she thus provides evidence for Dury's theory of Stevenson's linguistic defamiliarisation.

A further argument for the first three categories as the principal tasks of the annotator follows from the twenty lemmata that are the same in the three editions. We mentioned this number above because it is so low, thus proving how different the three sets of annotations are. It is just as interesting to see, however, to which categories these twenty notes belong:

Shared lemmata		20
1	Words	9
2	Historical and cultural phenomena	3
3	Intertextuality	7
6	Interpretation and critical reception	1

Only one out of twenty notes falls into the category of interpretation, while nineteen belong to the problem-solving categories 1 to 3. The lemmata in these categories are the ones that the three annotators, who are otherwise so different in their preferences, intuitively agree upon. This provides strong evidence for the relevance of the problem-solving categories.

The fact that interpretation figures only once in the shared lemmata indicates that it is a questionable category. When it comes to interpretation, annotators do not even agree as to *what* they should interpret. In our review of interpretive notes, we have argued that the readings presented by some of these are far-fetched or at least not very compelling. In the case of Hyde's collision with the girl, we have shown how much the interpretations provided by Dury and Luckhurst diverge, and we have also indicated our own interpretation of the incident, which would result in yet another note if we had to annotate the passage. This goes to show that interpretive notes are very likely to disrupt the reading experience. Experts who have strong opinions themselves will be antagonised or irritated. Even worse, undergraduates or non-experts

will be prevented from developing their own understanding of the text, taking the annotations in a scholarly edition as gospel truth.[13]

Admittedly, the interpretation suggested in a note is not by definition far-fetched or disruptive. There are many interpretive notes by Dury and Luckhurst that provide plausible or illuminating readings. However, the fact remains that interpretation cannot be given in a consistent and exhaustive manner through annotations. Consider the opening sentences of *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*:

> Mr. Utterson the lawyer was a man of a rugged countenance, that was never lighted by a smile; cold, scanty and embarrassed in discourse; backward in sentiment; lean, long, dusty, dreary and yet somehow lovable. At friendly meetings, and when the wine was to his taste, something eminently human beaconed from his eye; something indeed which never found its way into his talk, but which spoke not only in these silent symbols of the after-dinner face, but more often and loudly in the acts of his life. He was austere with himself; drank gin when he was alone, to mortify a taste for vintages; and though he had enjoyed the theatre, had not crossed the doors of one for twenty years. (7)

Dury annotates four different lemmata from this passage ("a man of a rugged countenance," "and yet somehow lovable," "Mr Utterson the lawyer […] acts of his life," "to mortify a taste for vintages"), and he provides much valuable information. However, anyone who is familiar with Stevenson's novella will see many additional opportunities for interpretation: the fact that the narrator introduces Utterson in a very formal way, with the title "Mr.," his last name and his profession, thus indicating the lack of personal and family relationships in his life and in *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* generally; the mentioning of the law at a very early point in the tale; the fact that Utterson represses parts of himself and has thus developed a divided personality like his friend Jekyll; the no less important fact that the divisions are very different, almost opposite, in the two friends (Jekyll is an affable man who harbours a murderous demon, Utterson a cold and austere person who conceals a benevolent core); the motif of the wine, which occurs throughout the tale, as a parallel to the potion that brings about Jekyll's transformations[14]; the metaphor "beaconed," which suggests that Utterson provides psychological support and moral guidance for his friends. And so on. Dury

offers 148 notes that we have assigned to the category of interpretation. However, it should have become evident that it would not be too difficult to add another 148 interpretive notes. Making the notes in categories 1 to 3 consistent and exhaustive is a feasible, if challenging, project. Making the notes in category 6 consistent and exhaustive is a wild goose chase. Thus any selection of notes in this category will inevitably remain arbitrary. Interpretation, we suggest, is best left to the critical essay.[15]

And what about categories 4 and 5 (genre and defamiliarised language)? These are not of the problem-solving type and thus, strictly speaking, not necessary to the unimpeded progress of the reader in his or her textual journey. However, as we have stated above, these categories are less speculative than interpretation. The comparatively small number of notes in these categories suggests that they impose some restraints on annotators. After all, pointing out a parallel, a genre convention or a deviation from this convention requires some textual evidence, and this evidence cannot be fabricated ad libitum. Dury's note on the past tense in the chapter title "Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease" is a case in point; annotators who make a discovery of this sort are well justified in bringing it to the attention of their readers. In our view, notes from categories 4 and 5 are less objectionable than interpretive notes, provided annotators do not indulge themselves and make sure that the parallels or conventions indicated are pertinent. In these categories, as well as the others, the first virtue of the annotator is self-restraint.

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NOTES

[1]This article was originally presented as a talk at the 15th International *Connotations* Conference "Understanding (Through) Annotations" in 2019. We would like to express our gratitude to the organisers of this conference, Angelika Zirker and Matthias Bauer, and to the participants of the conference, who provided helpful criticisms and comments.

[2]This will appear as a volume in *The New Edinburgh Edition of the Collected Works of Robert Louis Stevenson*, published by Edinburgh University Press.

[3]References will be to the revised edition published in 2005.

[4]For a complex typology of annotation, see Bauer and Zirker, who distinguish six categories, each of which is further distinguished into three levels. The levels differ in terms of complexity, from brief information to scholarly discussion, and are evidently designed for the hypertextual possibilities of the digital medium ("Whipping Boys Explained" n. pag.). In its more recent version, the number of categories has increased from six to eight ("Explanatory Annotation" 225). Examples can be found on the website TEASys (Tübingen Explanatory Annotation System) at http://www.annotation.es.uni-tuebingen.de/. A less systematic list of ten types of annotations is suggested by Bontilă, who compiles her list on the basis of annotated works of Nabokov (14-15).

[5]Hereafter, quotations from *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* will be from Linehan's Norton edition.

[6]In his historical and theoretical study of hermeneutics, Kurz discusses both commentary and glosses or annotations (*Anmerkungen* in German) as genres of interpretation (25-33); elsewhere he argues that even the mere act of reading is a mode of interpretation (55).

[7]One might add that the phrase "chief of sinners" is used in precisely this form by John Bunyan in the title of his spiritual autobiography *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, published in 1666.

[8]It is thus an example of the fallacy of "Presupposing (expert) knowledge," one of the seven "problems" of annotating identified by Bauer and Zirker ("Explanatory Annotation" 216-18).

[9]See Dury's "The Uncertain Relationship between Title and Text" for an even more extended version of this note published independently.

[10]Parallel instances include references to "those sanctified islands […], where no little boys jump over grave-stones, or no great ones trample over the dead with callous indifference" (329) in Botfield's *Journal of a Tour through the Highlands of Scotland* from 1830, and to "the peculiar feel and sound produced by trampling over the bilberry bushes" (190) in the anonymous "Visit to the Scene of Comus" from 1866.

[11]In the discussion following the talk at the *Connotations* Conference (see n1), participants suggested that there are intermediate forms of critical discourse, situated halfway between the annotation and the critical essay. These intermediate forms

do indeed exist. Some of the contributions to the journal *Notes & Queries* belong to this type; so does Dury's article on "Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease," which developed from a note in his edition of Stevenson's novella (see n9). One might also think of the German distinction between *Stellenkommentar*, a series of annotations on words or brief passages, and *Blockkommentar*, a comment on longer passages. Examples of the latter type can be found in the *Englisch-Deutsche Studienausgabe* of Shakespeare's works, where the annotations of lemmata in a particular scene are complemented by a more general comment on the scene as a whole (see for instance the edition of *Hamlet*, edited by Greiner and Müller). The presence of these intermediate forms, however, invalidates our argument no more than the presence of tragicomedy invalidates the distinction between tragedy and comedy.

[12]A similar point is made by Friedman: notes are about the parts of a text, while criticism or "analysis," to use his term, is about the whole (124-25).

[13]The danger that the annotator will not support readers but exercise undue control over them is also mentioned by Hanna (180-81), Lamont (53-54) as well as Bauer and Zirker ("Whipping Boys Explained" n. pag.).

[14]On the leitmotif of the wine, see Nabokov (180), Jefford (51-55), and Niederhoff (44-45).

[15]Our scepticism about interpretation is shared by Battestin, who writes: "Though he [the editor] is responsible for supplying essential information, he should strive to avoid imposing on the reader his own interpretation of a passage. His aim is to make the act of criticism possible, not to perform it" (13). Jack similarly argues that the "annotator can hardly be too self-effacing: if […] he wishes to print his own interpretation of the book he has been editing, then the place for his criticism is an introduction or a critical essay published elsewhere" (334). For a qualified approval of interpretive annotation, see Bauer and Zirker ("Whipping Boys Explained" n. pag.); interpretation is also one of their six or eight categories of annotation. This may have something to do with the fact that their typology is designed for the digital medium, where constraints of space do not apply and where readers have a greater liberty to negotiate their way around a network of annotation; they may, for instance, decide to stay on the first level of annotation, or move up to higher levels, where more information and comment is provided. However, our argument is not limited to the realm of the book. The fact that, in the digital medium, the temptation to offer interpretation is not limited by constraints of space does not mean that it should be indulged.

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The Praise of Cosmopolitanism: *The Confidence-Man* by Herman Melville

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This article is the first entry in a debate on "The Praise of Cosmopolitanism: *The Confidence-Man* by Herman Melville" (https://www.connotations.de/debate/herman-melville-and-cosmopolitanism). If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

This essay is an attempt at reconstructing the logic underlying *The Confidence-Man* by Herman Melville. Its main focus will be on the function of the Cosmopolitan who represents a key dimension which has sadly been very little studied. The novel will be seen as the locus of a philosophical experiment in which Melville tries to determine how far an individual can go in order to be fully free and fulfill his or her inner potential as much as possible. Among the numerous manners of approaching *The Confidence-Man*, the essay will choose an anti-idealistic tradition going from Heraclitus to Deleuze through Spinoza, Nietzsche and William James and stressing the radically immanent nature of the world in which we live and the problems raised when one wishes to invent a new conception of faith or confidence.

Herman Melville's Cosmopolitan is strangely neglected and regretfully unloved in the literature devoted to *The Confidence-Man.* Yet, there is no denying that the novelist invented an extraordinary character. In point of fact, the Confidence-Man with his avatars must be seen not as a character in the usual sense of the term, but rather like some sort of theoretical concept. This essay will consider the Cosmopolitan as the locus of a philosophical adventure with all the implications it involves. In that

respect, it could be argued that there are two Herman Melvilles: on the one hand, the individual eking out a life of genteel poverty in New York with his wife and four children, and, on the other hand, a daring critic and thinker using fiction in order to conduct an experiment and try to determine how far a human being can go in order to discover and exploit all his or her potential. The first Melville is only of interest for his friends, some of whom were always ready to help him whereas others were (sadly) not. He is of no concern to us. The second Melville is a more abstract figure that can be seen as a "Road Not (yet) Taken,"[1] to use Robert Frost's phrase, that is to say as a series of "possibilities of life" (Friedrich Nietzsche's phrase this time; see Pearson), or possibly as a Message in a Bottle hopefully to be found by unknown readers from another century and another continent. Maybe some of these readers will not be interested and will quickly dispose of the bottle, while others will discover that it is going to change their lives. The second alternative is what motivates the approach followed in this essay.

The "road" that could be taken by the passengers of the *Fidèle*, and more generally by Americans, not to say humanity, implies making ours a vision of man that stresses accepting the full richness and complexity of life without any exclusions. It is radically anti-idealistic in so far as it is an invitation not to restrict our identifications to the values of a single given community and accordingly not to reject the potential offered by other human groups around us. More specifically, it urges us not to follow and repeat models—always the same models—whose origins are obscure and very often alleged to belong to some hypothetical otherworld. There is only one world, it is immanent, and it is the concrete world in which we live. One essential consequence is that the future, our future, is largely as yet unwritten, that is to say that it is full of open possibilities and always to be invented. We should thus continually construct who we are, adding and never subtracting, in a process of infinite becoming and variation. Such is Melville's idea of cosmopolitanism. Before studying the ways in which *The Confidence-Man* articulates that vision, it is first necessary to investigate the technical conditions of its emergence and in particular how it depends upon a certain

conception of time. The essay will then determine to what extent the Confidence-Man can be defined as a function aimed at revealing the evil and the narcissism men hide in their hearts, which will lead us to ask ourselves what went wrong with American history. Once these false values have been eliminated, the essay will start unfolding the essential components of the concept of cosmopolitanism. The theoretical vision conveyed in the novel, however, should be regarded as some kind of abstract ideal, and the essay will conclude with an assessment of its practical, pragmatic nature.

Before we start reconstructing the logic of cosmopolitanism, it is important to ask ourselves a number of technical questions having to do with the specific conditions under which the notion can make sense. From a theoretical point of view, if we simplify and consider only extreme positions, there are fundamentally two manners of understanding Melville's experiment. The first is the majority approach which posits that it consists in an allegory, in other words that the novel should first and foremost (and very often solely) be referred to another text, which frequently is the Bible—as was the case in medieval hermeneutics. The Confidence-Man and his avatars have in this way often be seen as Christ and/or Satan figures, and that has usually been the last word about the novel. In particular, the final chapter is sometimes said to reenact the Book of Revelation when darkness envelops the ship, heralding, one supposes, the end of the world and the Last Judgment.[2] This approach could be called the Procrustean school of criticism as what does not fit the bed—or the Bible—is ruthlessly ignored. Melville himself was perfectly aware of the problem (see the allusion to Procrustes and his bed on 78). In brief, interpreting a text in an allegorical way consists in imposing upon it a series of patterns belonging to other texts. The text is accordingly turned towards the past and linked to a logic of repetition as one looks, above all, for something that belongs to what could be called the category of the Same.

This essay will adopt the other alternative: Melville's exploration is directed towards a future which is deemed to be largely not written as yet and therefore made up of elements that cannot be recognized or

represented. It has nothing to do with a logic of repetition. In that regard, it may be recalled that, at the end of *Remembrance of Things Past*, Marcel Proust explains that good books are like those glasses anyone can buy in a store.[3] They enable you to see things in yourself and in the world which had been present all the time but which you could not perceive. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari warn us: "There is nothing to understand in a book but a lot that one can use. Nothing to interpret and to signify, but a lot with which one can experiment. A book should be like a machine interacting with something else, it should be a small tool turned towards what is outside it" (*Rhizome* 72; my trans.). In even more simple terms, one could similarly say: "Book! you lie there; the fact is, you books must know your places. You'll do to give us the bare words and facts, but we come in to supply the thoughts" (Melville, *Moby-Dick* 360-61).[4]

Our starting point will be that, technically speaking, *The Confidence-Man* is doubly linked to time—inside itself and outside itself—and, in order to determine the ultimate implications of the novel and elucidate the notion of Cosmopolitanism, it is necessary to be aware of the conceptual framework that this temporal conundrum poses for us. It should first be noted that the beginning of the novel is somewhat misleading: "At sunrise on a first of April […]" (9), which may suggest that the whole journey possibly takes place on that particular day. If, however, one looks at the meeting of the Cosmopolitan and the old man, one notes that it happens some thirty minutes after the scene with the barber ("But what was told me not a half-hour since?" 241). Only readers having paid attention to the wording of the contract between the cosmopolitan and the barber become aware of the time of the last scene: "Done, in good faith, this 1st day of April 18—, at a quarter to twelve o'clock, p. m., in the shop of said William Cream, on board the said boat, *Fidèle*" (234). They discover that the date is now April 2nd, 15 minutes past midnight, and they then conceivably understand that the Confidence-Man (the character) and *The Confidence-Man* (the novel) are taking them into the future. By definition, one cannot know objectively what the future will be like. One can only hope that it will not be of the

order of the Same, but radically different from the present. One is reminded at this juncture that, twenty-five years later, Friedrich Nietzsche began his *Dawn of Day* with the following epigraph borrowed from the Hindu *Vig Reda*: "There are many dawns which have yet to shed their light" (4). Melville, as for him, ends his novel with the words: "Something further may follow of this Masquerade" (251). What comes—and there must be something coming next, for us, in our lives—will be purely unwritten as yet. It will have to do with life and health, and above all with new possibilities of life which are always to be invented and reinvented. The question we should then ask ourselves is: can we imagine a new conception of faith and confidence for a purely immanent world? Put differently, this essay will endeavor to show that, for Melville, such a conception means becoming a Cosmopolitan with all that implies.

The Confidence-Man is also bound up with time in a second manner. It is as if it can only make sense and transform people's lives in the future. The first editions published in 1857 in Britain and in the USA remained confidential. The book was not reprinted until Michael Sadleir's *Standard Edition of the Works of Herman Melville* (1923), which, to say the least, did not spark off an abundant critical literature. Things began to change with Elizabeth Foster's 1954 edition, and of course, her invaluable introduction and notes. Most of the studies of the novel belong in fact to the second half of the twentieth century, and they include a fair number of contradictory interpretations. Will there be a twenty-first century *Confidence-Man*? Once again, one is reminded of Marcel Proust and of what he wrote in *Remembrance of Things Past*, this time about Auguste Renoir. When they were first exhibited, his paintings were strongly rejected by the general public, but twenty years later people had started to look at the world as if it were a painting by Renoir (see *The Guermantes Way* 257). In other words, writing about what is potentially inherent in a literary work (which also means writing about my own or your own potential) will have to be a work in progress. Just like Jacques Derrida's conceptions of democracy, justice or hospitality, Melville's Cosmopolitanism is a highly complex notion. It cannot be represented in

terms of our present and above all it is always to come ("*à venir*") and will have to be continually (re)constructed.

The hypothesis behind this essay is that Melville's novel is not only a nineteenth century text, but also a twenty-first century text, as well as for instance a sixteenth century philosophical treatise that could very well have been written by the good Master François Rabelais. In other words, one makes sense of a literary work by means of juxtapositions in our minds with other works, older or more recent. Texts throw light upon one another and in this way reveal problems we would not have been aware of otherwise, which powerfully helps us unravel their various implications. For us, the meaning of a text can only be part of the culture we have constructed with all its networks of correspondences, and one of the main objectives of the reading activity is to produce a greater semantic complexity in ourselves and hopefully take risks and change our lives, something for instance neither Pitch nor the barber are prepared to do in the novel. Making sense of Melville's novel will thus be a question of choice, of inscribing it in an intellectual tradition. Some readers will always want to find the Same in a novel. Others will prefer to look for suggestions helping them to embark upon new roads and invent novel possibilities. This essay is for them and it will rely on a red thread coming from François Rabelais, M. D. (novelist, philosopher and physician), passing through Spinoza and Nietzsche, two philosophers who are so difficult to separate, William James, and of course closer to us with Gilles Deleuze whose two "gods," as it were, were Spinoza and Nietzsche, and who also wrote a well-known essay on Melville and was wont of discussing *The Confidence-Man* in his lectures at the University of Vincennes. In that long line of anti-idealistic, anti-platonic thinkers, Heraclitus should obviously also not be forgotten.[5]

A Confederacy of Frauds

Before discussing the Cosmopolitan proper, it will first prove helpful to take a look at the avatars of the Confidence-Man in the first half of the novel. Highly critical of their interlocutors and dressed in black and/or white, they pave the way for the affirmative power of Melville's

great Original with his motley costume in the second half. They are not full-fledged characters but empty shells without any psychological depth. They are only a name plus usually a single item of clothing. Above all, they represent a formula and a function. In that respect, they are in the same class as Bartleby who is also an empty character who keeps repeating his own formula: "I would prefer not to," that is an unfinished sentence without a subordinate clause ("if you don't mind"?), meaning neither *no* nor *yes*, with the anaphora *to* being a kind of mirror sending back his requests to the lawyer: copy, read, go to the post-office, etc. The structural function of the formula is to force the lawyer-narrator to reveal the hidden values underpinning his identity. Readers are thus able to discover that in his case he has inherited a certain vision of American history as he keeps alternating between considering firing his employee (in the spirit of capitalism) or trying to succor him (in the spirit of Christian charity). It is easy to understand that Melville is here addressing what originally went wrong in America, beginning with those Puritans who could not choose between God or Mammon, the salvation of their souls or worldly financial success as a sign of God's approval.

The avatars of the Confidence-Man in the first half of the novel all address their various interlocutors with their formula: "Do you have confidence in me?" Their objective is the same as that of Bartleby: reveal what secretly matters to the cross-section of American society gathered on the *Fidèle*. The narrator even provides the metaphor we need to understand the specific *modus operandi* of the avatars: they are like those revolving Drummond lights (see chapter 44) which send forth their powerful rays, never showing anything about themselves (obviously), but revealing even the smallest details of the objects around them. It should be noted that the lamp invented by Thomas Drummond produced a very strong white light by projecting oxygen and hydrogen onto a mass of lime and was quickly adopted by theaters, hence the term *lime-light*. One now understands better the role played by Melville's confidence-men—they show us that American society is a stage: "And one man in his time plays many parts." Jaques said it famously

in *As You Like It* (2.7.143), and Melville's narrator duly repeats the quotation at the end of chapter 41.

Alternatively, the avatars could be seen as trickster figures.[6] The trickster is also and only a function: he uses all sorts of means both fair and more often than not foul to force the people he encounters to change. What needs to be noted is that the trickster does not know what he wants. He is not a character with a sense of self and beliefs of his own. He only wants people to change, and he does not tell them in what manner they should change. In fact, he could not represent to them what the future would be like if they agreed to change. All he knows and all he requests is a future non-written and qualitatively different from the present. In Western culture, one of the traditional figures of the trickster was of course the court jester who had the right to criticize everybody with impunity including the king. Is that why the Cosmopolitan appears in chapter 24 in a multicolored costume which will surely remind readers of the jester's motley coat? ("O that I were a fool! / I am ambitious for a motley coat," says Jaques, Shakespeare's would-be trickster in *As You Like It;* 2.7.42-43).

It would be wrong to assume that the interlocutors of the avatars are victims. *They* are the crooks. It is them that need to be investigated by the scholarly critics of the novel, as there is literally nothing to say about the Confidence-Man apart from the fact that he is only a formula and a function. He does not have any convictions of his own about society, morality or medicine. If he chooses to defend nature in front of Pitch, for instance, that does not mean that he harbors some sort of religious faith in it. Like a mirror, he fashions his discourse after the beliefs of his adversaries. He has guessed that for a number of reasons Pitch hates nature and all that is associated with it. He has also noticed that Pitch's favorite figure of thought is analogy: "the child is father of the man; hence, as all boys are rascals, so are all men" (123). As a consequence, he will ply Pitch with a series of various analogies until the Bachelor gives in and contradicts himself.

At this juncture, readers of Melville are perhaps reminded of Gilles Deleuze's pronouncement when he explains that writers are (like) physicians in his *Essays Critical and Clinical*, especially in the first chapter, "Literature and Life" (11-17). Deleuze briefly gives some examples: Thomas Wolfe, Franz Kafka, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, and of course Herman Melville. The term '*diagnosis*' means collecting symptoms and establishing distinctions between them (*dia*), and then producing a body of knowledge (*gnosis*) that can later be used critically to understand the illnesses of a given society and also, it goes without saying, in order to enhance our possibilities of life (that will be the function of the Cosmopolitan in the novel). In the essay he devotes to Melville in the same volume,[7] Deleuze suggests in his own words along what lines one could today understand the logic of Melville's social critique. According to the highly original interpretation put forward by the French philosopher, the novelist must have felt that the first half of the nineteenth century represented a complete betrayal of the ideals of the American Revolution, and more specifically of its dream of a republic of "brothers." That fraternity should have been founded on the spirit of universal immigration, with the brothers settling stochastically on the seemingly limitless surface of the continent and building complex networks of mutual relationships between them, somewhat like islands in an archipelago. The logic at work could be described as a logic of addition, "and … and …," stressing equality between its various elements. In 1857, however, Melville knows that America has become a post-Jacksonian universe in which nature is being steadily destroyed, and cities and factories proliferate in the north just like slave plantations in the south. The "father" is back asserting his power upon the "brothers." Put differently, man has become a "stranger" to man, a word which is repeated time and again in the novel.[8]

Through his attacks on his successive interlocutors, the Confidence-Man gradually reveals that the illness at the core of the United States is made up of three components. Chapter after chapter, the novel reveals a generalized process of selection excluding those who are below or outside a white elite which goes on repeating itself and getting richer

and richer. The first disease is slavery or, more precisely, the exploitation of men by other men. It is denounced through the interactions of the Confidence-Man with two characters: a Southerner, the Man with the Gold-Sleeve Buttons, and a Northerner, Pitch, the so-called Missouri Bachelor, who tells us that he actually came from "the east" (120). There is no need to comment on the first, who is a cliché which would be amusing if we didn't know the nature of the ruthless reality behind it. The second is more interesting. He says that he is not a slave-holder and that he in fact objects to the Southern peculiar institution, but he also confesses that he lost a huge ("ten thousand dollars' worth") "plantation" in Missouri when it was flooded by the Mississippi (113), and the way he calls his employees ("boys") is strangely reminiscent of the manners of speech of overseers on more classic plantations. The fact that he is between the north and the south seems, however, to imply that he understands that slavery is fundamentally a structure. From the perspective of exploitation, there is not much difference between being a worker in the north or a slave in the south. It should be pointed out that Pitch has directly inherited the logic of "Benito Cereno," a story with its white slaves (when Babo is their master) and its black slaves (when Aranda was master, and even before in Africa when they already were the slaves of an African king), and of course when, at the end, Delano (from Boston, Massachusetts!) returns them to slavery in Lima. Melville knows it and Pitch sums it up: slavery has nothing to do with the color of a person's skin. In addition, Pitch is aware of what the future holds in store and Melville's novel seems to have been written to be read and understood in the twenty-first century: economically speaking, the future belongs to machines.

The second component takes us one step further: genocide. As, for some obscure reason, the Indians cannot be exploited, they should be exterminated. The way the Man in Grey approaches the widow in chapter 8 soliciting alms for his Widow and Orphan Asylum is particularly ironical, as it was that very tribe which had been largely wiped out by the US army in two wars (a third was on the way) in which a lot of women and children had been ruthlessly killed in Florida in the name

of progress. The main thrust of the argument however concerns Colonel John Moredock, or rather an ideal representation of the Colonel, the Indian Hater "*par excellence*" (155). That colonel is not a real person, but a character in an interpolated story, becoming in this way one of the numerous fictions that make up our culture in our minds, exactly like the personality of the real Moredock was shaped by the stories he heard when he was a child. The ideal Colonel thinks in terms of platonic essences. Readers who are not careful are, however, liable to forget that, no more than a white person, an Indian can be said to be 'pure,' a most meaningless word if there is one when applied to humans. We are all admixtures of good and evil (if one insists on thinking in moral terms), just like a slave (or a slave-owner) can be black or white or any unspecified combination of skin colors. The problem then is Moredock's statement: "There is an Indian nature. 'Indian blood is in me,' is the half-breed's threat" (155). Terms like *nature*, *race* or *blood* are ideologically constructed categories which were then used for purposes of social classification, in fact of exclusion. It is the logic of *them* vs. *us*, and *them* have to be exterminated. Thinking in terms of platonic essences becomes here an instrument of mental confusion, as when people pretend that society is like nature (with the concrete conclusions that one surmises): "Surprising, that one should hate a race which he believes to be red from a cause akin to that which makes some tribes of garden insects green?" (151).

Finally, the Confidence-Man's questions reveal America's third illness: imperialism. There is never enough territory to conquer, and it is thus 'logically' necessary that America's sense of superiority should be imposed upon other countries. It is almost as if literally the sky was the limit. Passing from one interlocutor to another, the avatars ironically map out an inexorable movement forward, foreshadowing our modern conceptions of a global economy. There is always a noble pretext, but what matters is the relentless extension of power or economic domination of the United States. It is possible to distinguish eight stages and aspects: (1) the pioneer penetrating the wilderness: "the backwoodsman would seem to America what Alexander was to Asia—captain in

the vanguard of conquering civilization" (150); (2) "the emigrants' quarters [on the *Fidèle*], […] owing to the present trip being a down-river one, will doubtless be found comparatively tenantless" (77): these are the exception, as potential pioneers were not attracted by the south as a result of the competition of slavery; (3) the allusion to the Seminoles slaughtered by General, then President, Jackson of course recalls the same Jackson's 1830 Indian Removal Act; (4) the Soldier of Fortune admittedly did not take part in the 1847 war against Mexico which led to the annexation of Texas and California, but the stories he invents convince passengers that giving a few coins to a cripple is not too high a price to pay for an enormous increase of space; (5) industry takes over with the coal mines of the Black Rapids Coal Company (the novel does not mention that, in the nineteenth century, most coal mines were situated in the south and accordingly manned by unpaid slaves); (6) the next turning point is the advent of the "Wall street spirit" (49), meaning that you can speculate on stocks and shares and achieve that ultimate miracle of earning (a lot of) money without actually working; (7) the description of the new city called The New Jerusalem is not an aberration but the logical continuation of the free development of capitalism, showing that people like our Bernard Madoff were already alive and kicking. The Collegian is not as stupid as he seems and he does ask the right questions: "And are all these buildings now standing? […] These marginal squares here, are they the water-lots?" (59). The answer is of course no, there aren't any buildings, only water (and diseases …); (8) imperialism is a movement that nothing can stop, as frontiers will be abolished, and anything can be bought or sold, including people's consciences. Melville has never been as serious as when he speaks of "the World's Charity": "I am for sending ten thousand missionaries in a body and converting the Chinese *en masse* within six months of the debarkation. The thing is then done, and turn to something else" (50). Of course, we are not talking of *bona fide* charity, but of trade, and more precisely of one-way trade. Each and every one of the billions of Chinese people will contribute one American dollar, and the Man in Grey

is then planning to expand to Africa and Borneo. The twentieth century has already begun.

This is the social backdrop against which the interlocutors, frauds all of them and certainly not victims, of the Confidence-Man thrive with their overriding obsession: the logic of the Same which cannot be separated from a refusal of others. At the beginning of the journey, money is the obvious motive, though it quickly becomes clear that it is the least interesting. These characters are at that stage prey to a single obsession, always the same, that is a compulsion to get richer and richer. It has become almost a reflex action for the Collegian and the Good Merchant: they cannot resist trying to buy shares whose value they suppose will soon increase. It follows that that nice widow with her Bible in chapter 8 must one way or another pose a problem to the reader: why would she be an exception to the rule that all the interlocutors have only their turpitude to reveal? Isn't she too perfect in our post-lapsarian world? It should probably be noted that the passage is full of echoes to other similar passages of the novel. She is reading from Chapter 13 of 1 Corinthians (as chance would have it), as if she alone aboard the *Fidèle* attached any importance to what the deaf-mute kept writing on his slate in chapter 1. It is not mentioned whether she is actually reading it, but her finger is on chapter 13 of 1 Corinthians. Is she really interested in Paul's words? Maybe, the problem is the finger. If she is a crook, she certainly masters one of the basic tricks of her trade, which is going to betray her in our eyes: she drops the book. The reader will perhaps remember that detail when later the President of the Black Rapids Coal Co. "accidentally" "forgets" his book. In the scene with the widow, the Man in Grey seizes the Bible on the floor: in front of a confidence-woman, he immediately becomes an authentic confidence-man, and, needless to say, a better one. The Cosmopolitan will later act in a similar manner with Charlie Noble, asking him for $50 before his opponent does. In chapter 8, the Man in Grey uses the same technique, beating the Widow at her own game.

More importantly, the logic of the Same manifests itself as a resilient form of narcissism which cuts off the subject from his fellow humans.

Melville usually describes each of the interlocutors by means of a single object: gold-sleeve buttons, plantation cigar, Bible; or through a role they have assumed: bachelor, rich southern collegian, widow with Bible (again), etc. These characters have identified with an image, and the word *identify* is meant to be understood as in *identical*: it is always the same object and always the same role. The Gentleman with Gold-Sleeve Buttons is certainly an extreme case with his immaculate cleanliness, to which should be associated the Collegian who tells us that he is never happier than when "smoking my plantation cigar" (57). Their white identity and their sense of superiority are made possible by the slaves who wear out their bodies for them "by deputy" (44), as it were, and charity is another ploy white people use in order to feel that they are above the other men they humiliate. Chapter 3, showing Black Guinea catching coins (and buttons) with his open mouth, is perfectly explicit in that context, implying that he is not a man, but a dog; or, if that is not sufficient, so is the scene in which Egbert agrees to play the part of Charlie Noble and reveals the extent of the selfishness hidden in Winsome's mystical theories. The Cosmopolitan's "Help, help, Charlie, I want help!" (207) never elicits the slightest answer from him. Meeting another person will never change anything in the identity these frauds have constructed for themselves. The logic of the Same is the contrary of the logic of (true) Charity.

The same rationale explains the behavior of the Missouri Bachelor and that of the Barber. They will never take any risks. As Pitch aptly puts it: "all boys are rascals, so are all men" (123). There are strictly no exceptions for him. This logic also accounts for the importance of sick characters in the novel. It is clear that Melville is not concerned with the physical dimension of their complaints, which is never in doubt in the case of the Sick Man (chapter 16), the Miser (chapter 20), or Thomas Fry (chapter 19). Psychologically speaking, however, it looks as if these individuals are in love with their symptoms. They want to retain them as they both need them and the recriminations that accompany them in order to bolster their sense of self. Accordingly, the Confidence-Man tries to suggest to them that they should believe in hope and of course

never stop trying new types of remedies, even if one is never assured in advance that they will cure them. As the Cosmopolitan says, speaking of the Lady of Goshen (who does succeed in changing): organic disease is always associated with "a certain lowness, if not sourness, of spirits" (139). Thus, it should be recognized that Fry in the end makes an effort, which leads him to confess to the Confidence-Man: "You have made a better man of me" (106).

Sticking to the logic of the Same and refusing to change, mentally speaking, is the highest form of illness. In that respect, the Methodist Clergyman is probably right when he remarks:

> "I have been in mad-houses full of tragic mopers, and seen there the end of suspicion: the cynic, in the moody madness muttering in the corner; for years a barren fixture there; head lopped over, gnawing his own lip, vulture of himself; while, by fits and starts, from the corner opposite came the grimace of the idiot at him." (24)

The Advent of the Cosmopolitan

Melville's novel starts with a cross-section of contemporary American society, stressing that the general evolution of the nineteenth century has led to a general process of exclusion in which the ruling group has discovered limitless possibilities of indulging in the logic of the Same, at the same time identifying with a stable image of itself and rejecting other human beings who are seen as different. Melville unquestionably knows that there is nothing new under the sun. He is actually describing the worst tendencies of human nature, which explains why his novel still speaks to twenty-first century readers and will continue to make sense to readers in an infinity of communities present and future. Yet Melville's greatest invention is the Cosmopolitan, who embodies a spirit of assertion following the negative critiques conducted by the first avatars of the Confidence-Man. Interestingly, without having been aware of Melville's novel, Nietzsche used a similar formal structure in

part IV of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Zarathustra is the German philosopher's great Original.[9] He comes down from his mountain to destroy in order to rebuild the world upon new values. It could also be said of him that he is "a new law-giver, a revolutionizing philosopher, or the founder of a new religion" (definition of the "original" in *The Confidence-Man* 237). Curiously (such is the power of chance), he encounters seven "Superior Men," the same number as that of the avatars of the Confidence-Man. That term is deeply ironical, as these so-called superior beings embody the old beliefs linked to death, that is to say precisely the hidden values of the Confidence-Man's interlocutors. Their minds are full of resentment and nostalgia for the past. On the contrary, Zarathustra will preach the need for new values taking into account the richness and complexity of life, and looking towards an as yet unwritten future.

In Melville's novel, the emphasis on positive values begins in chapter 24 with the sudden arrival of the Cosmopolitan. These values are developed through the use of two semantic fields: clothes and wine. The Cosmopolitan appears with his multi-colored costume made up of items of clothing belonging to a large number of cultures from all around the world: "the stranger sported a vesture barred with various hues, that of the cochineal predominating, in style participating of a Highland plaid, Emir's robe, and French blouse" (136). He immediately stresses his philosophy of life:

> "Served up à la Pole, or à la Moor, à la Ladrone, or à la Yankee, that good dish, man, still delights me; or rather is man a wine I never weary of comparing and sipping; wherefore am I a pledged cosmopolitan, a sort of London-Dock-Vault connoisseur, going about from Teheran to Natchitoches, a taster of races; in all his vintages, smacking my lips over this racy creature, man, continually." (138)

By definition, the Cosmopolitan is a citizen of the world. Etymologically, his name is made up of *kosmos* (*world* in Greek) and *polis* (*city*). Combining definitions culled from contemporary dictionaries,[10] one could say that the term refers to a person *free from local, provincial, national, ethnic or religious prejudices, limitations and attachments*. He is a

man for whom no other man is a "stranger," to use one of the key words of the novel. More specifically, he changes and adapts all the time in an endless process of becoming and variation. As he himself puts it, he is "catholic" (137), that is to say that he literally rejects nothing and no one, as his acceptance of all the possibilities of life inherent in a human being is *universal* (the Greek meaning of *katholikos*).

In the culinary description he gives of his identity ("Served up à la Pole, or à la Moor, à la Ladrone, or à la Yankee"), he is perfectly explicit: he will not identify with a single human group, in other words with a series of habits, conventions and traditions. He does not say: I belong to community *a* or *b*. On the contrary, he explains that he would like to share in the experience of communities *a*, *b*, *c*, etc. He follows a logic of addition *a* + *b* + *c*, etc., and never a logic of subtraction: I don't want this or that characteristic belonging to *d* or *f*, etc. He is *par excellence* the man who experiments, who has espoused a process of infinite variation, that is who is always different from himself. He is thus a "taster of races" (138), which implies that he wants to live as much as possible and relish all the potential hidden in the hearts of his multitudinous fellow human beings. Even though it looks a lot more modest that the interminable enumerations favored by Walt Whitman, his small list needs to be analyzed closely. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that, as the four ethnic groups he mentions were then not officially recognized communities, they prove somewhat hard to characterize.

The "Poles" will help us understand the logic underlying the Cosmopolitan's way of defining himself. In the nineteenth century, Poland was divided between Prussia, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it is very tempting to remark that, at that time, the Poles were the Indians of Europe. A possible clue enabling us to understand the Cosmopolitan's identification with the Poles can be found in Chapter 89 of *Moby-Dick*: "Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish": "What was Poland to the Czar? What Greece to the Turk? What India to England? What at last will Mexico be to the United States? All Loose-Fish" (334).

A minority human group that is neither a nation nor a state is full of possibilities as it is not the prisoner of any kind of orthodoxy or official

watchwords. (If it is, that implies that it is almost a nation and will possibly become an established state, losing in the process its creative potential). The narrator of *Moby-Dick* similarly notes: "What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish? […] What is the great globe itself but a Loose-Fish? And what are you, reader, but a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?" (334). The problem becomes thus the reader's problem. We are all of us part of usually one or possibly several communities, with their ideologies and obligations. At the same time, it is always an option with us to imagine what another life would be like in order to be able to start inventing a new future that is as yet unforeseeable and unrepresentable. At this point, one will perhaps recall what we said about the two worlds of Herman Melville: a bourgeois (albeit impoverished) existence and an artist's life dreaming of experimenting what it might mean to become more and more human.

Secondly, the "Yankees." On the face of it, they refer to the official majority in the United States. One should, however, remember that we are going down the Mississippi. Melville urges us to question the nature of the possible relationships between the north and the south. Once again, it is essential to try and imagine what the future might be like, especially as in 1857 a civil war had become a distinct possibility. One needs in fact to go even further ahead than that: What new America are we going to build? Is it still possible to envisage a new type of society now that the post-Jacksonian era has imposed industrialization and its ills, without forgetting slavery and imperialism?

Thirdly, the "Moors." The original meaning of the word in Roman times referred to the inhabitants of Northern Africa, today's Maghreb. Seen from Italy, their skin was perceived as especially dark, and, if one exaggerates a little, black. (Shakespeare's play is called *The Tragedy of Othello, the Moor of Venice*, as its hero comes from Africa, Black Africa in his case.) Later, with the islamization of Northern Africa, the term started to refer to Muslim people. Becoming a Moor, the Cosmopolitan becomes even more complex and elusive. His identity is now at least twofold: he is a black person, and he is a Muslim. It follows that readers are now faced with two important implications. (1) So far he had been

a white person. Now, he is both black and white. The irony of that situation is all the more acute when one remembers that the steamboat is progressing both in space (towards New Orleans and the biggest slave market in the U.S.A.) and in time (towards the civil war). (2) The Cosmopolitan was first a "Yankee" Protestant (the majority religion in the north), then a Catholic (the majority religion among Poles). He is now a Muslim, without forgetting the many gods from Black Africa. In a book dealing with life and possibilities of life, it would seem that Melville is here suggesting that health consists not only in changing religions regularly, but also in possessing two and preferably more than two religions, which is the only manner in which one can truly be free and creative.

The "Ladrones." The word is familiarly used to designate the natives of the Mariana islands in Micronesia, and readers know fully well that natives have always had pride of place in Melville's novels. The Cosmopolitan becomes ever more a "stranger," being now a member of one of the numerous minorities ignored by the advent of modernism in the nineteenth century. There is unquestionably a progression: the novel at present asserts the value of paganism and polytheism. Melville's discovery is that religions can become richer and more complex. In fact, structurally, they can be considered as multiplicities in progress, with the consequence that adopting several of them will, as a consequence, make of us processes of becoming. It is important to add that the Spanish word *ladrón* was used to talk of a rascal (to speak like our Missouri Bachelor). Magellan, who discovered and plundered these far-off islands, started using the term when he considered that the natives were too prone to stealing from his ships. It means that one is either on the side of orthodoxy and honesty (like Magellan), or on the side of Melville's Confidence-Man whose function is to reveal the corruption under the veneer of honesty and orthodoxy.

In addition, the Cosmopolitan praises the virtues of wine in his allusions to the docks of London where hundreds of varieties of wines from all over the world were stocked (see 138). Just like the other human beings we encounter in our lives, wines are all different from one another.

In fact, the number of wines is practically infinite, and Melville here proves to be a true disciple of the great François Rabelais who not only proclaimed that "Laughter's the property of man" (*Gargantua* 204, "To the Reader"), but also that wine is the property of man (cf. *The Fifth Book of Pantagruel* 1013). As a matter of fact, the *Fifth Book*, which is about the quest for the Divine Bottle, always refers to wine, or rather to wines, by means of lists: "Falernian, Malmsey, Muscadet, Tabbia, Beaune, Mirevaux, Orleans, Picardan, Arbois, Coussy, Anjou, Graves, Corsican, Verron, Nérac and others" (984), the important term being "*and others*," as the list could, one imagines, go on for ever. One does not choose and reject, but on the contrary, just like the Cosmopolitan is a "taster of races" (138), one should adopt a logic of Addition and taste one wine after the other.[11]

Rabelais ends *Pantagruel* with the following words: "And if you desire to be good Pantagruelists (that is, to live in peace, joy and health, always enjoying good cheer) never trust folk who peer through a hole" (164). Laughter, wine and health, these three things cannot be separated. Need we remind ourselves that Friedrich Nietzsche used to define himself as *Arzt der Kultur*, the physician of civilization?[12] *The Confidence-Man* preaches the same wisdom, which also includes a clear condemnation of people who look through what Rabelais calls a "[key]hole." In his denunciation of judgment (judging others, but also judging yourself in the name of illusory values), Melville is part of the tradition chosen in this essay, that is a tradition which goes from Rabelais through Spinoza and Nietzsche.

In order to understand what is maybe the driving question behind Melville's novel, it is essential to go back to Spinoza's famous pronouncement in *Ethics*: "*Quid Corpus possit? Nemo hucusque determinavit*" (III, scolium of proposition 2)—What can a body do? As yet, no one has determined it.[13] The quotation summarizes the Cosmopolitan's essential function: in order to be fully human, one needs to experiment with all the potential which is inside our bodies and our minds (in other words, accept no censorship or self-censorship), which symbolically means enjoying as many different wines as possible and trying to wear

all the clothes of the world and of course giving the utmost freedom to all the parts of our bodies. Nietzsche will say the same thing in his own words: "If only someone could rediscover '*these possibilities of life*!'"[14] He more specifically believed that the main purpose of a work of art was to point to a healthy (the only healthy?) way in which one should approach our lives and invent a new future. He added (and nobody will deny that going down the Mississippi in a steamboat was a highly dangerous enterprise both physically and philosophically, as the last chapter avers): "There is as much invention, reflection, boldness, despair and hope here as in the voyages of the great navigators; and to tell the truth these are also voyages of exploration in the most distant and perilous domains of life" (2-3).

A brief theoretical detour should help us apprehend the fundamental choice offered to readers of *The Confidence-Man*. One remembers that the classification offered by Spinoza of our activities into two passions, gay passions and sad passions, is also *mutatis mutandis* to be found at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy: on the one hand, some readers will choose to transpose into their lives what they discover in the novel and invent new relationships with the world and with other people, as well as of course with themselves, whereas, on the other hand, other readers will prefer to "react" rather than "act," their actions will depend on a model or a norm usually of obscure origins, with the consequence that there will never be anything remotely personal or individual about their lives. The logic of what Rabelais called the "keyhole" is part and parcel of the second alternative: there is always someone who will try to induce you to stick to sad passions, a someone who will often be yourself, and that will "judge" you and reproach you with ever renewed moral arguments for not respecting some model or other. The "keyhole" is another name for the logic of the Same: according to it, one should always identify with the same community and its norms and conventions.

The novel shows that it is a question of power, except that the term *power* possesses two contradictory meanings, as does *Macht* in the title of Nietzsche's *Der Wille zur Macht* ("The Will to Power"). Spinoza used

potentia and *potestas* in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and then in *Ethics*.[15] *Potentia* refers to one's potentialities, and the fundamental problem it raises is how far one can go on developing the possibilities of our minds and bodies if one really wants to be free; whereas *potestas* concerns the power institutions, religions, political ideologies, etc., hold (often in a subliminal manner) upon our minds and bodies. It is the contrary of freedom, as our lives are, as it were, 'written' for us. In this connection, one remembers that, in Book IV of *Ethics*, Spinoza conjures up three theoretical characters to illustrate what *potestas* really consists in: it is what is hidden behind the sad passions of the slave, the tyrant and the priest. The tyrant obviously wants power, the priest convinces the slave to submit and the latter loves and needs his symptoms to which he is used exactly like Melville's invalids, such as the Man with the Wooden Leg (chapter 3), the Sick Man (chapter 16), the Kentucky 'Titan' (chapter 17), Thomas Fry (chapter 19), etc.

This essay would like to contend that, fundamentally, when he created the extraordinary theoretical character of the Cosmopolitan, Melville was primarily thinking in terms of life and potentialities. As Gilles Deleuze, the last member of our tradition, puts it in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*: "The truthful man [an ironical term here, the man who believes that he possesses the truth] in the end wants nothing other than to judge life; he holds up a superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving to judge, he sees in life an evil, a fault which is to be atoned for: the moral origin of the notion of truth" (137). He then immediately adds: "There is no value superior to life, life is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it has 'the innocence ·of becoming', beyond good and evil" (138). John Steinbeck, who adopted a similar approach, would have maintained that life is "non-teleological."[16] There is no denying that this is the harsh lesson discovered by Charlemont in Melville's novel. His story is important as it is the only long inset narrative related by the Cosmopolitan and not by one of the opponents of the Confidence-Man. The character has understood that life is not a long succession of events following a straight line going from a beginning to its end. It first and foremost depends upon chance and,

after having been virtually destroyed, Charlemont will become strong again and reconstruct himself: "No, no! when by art, and care, and time, flowers are made to bloom over a grave, who would seek to dig all up again only to know the mystery?—The wine" (144).

One may very well imagine that, when he was writing *The Confidence-Man*, Melville was thinking of the novel published by his friend Nathaniel Hawthorne seven years before. Philosophically speaking, Hester Prynne is a distant cousin of the Cosmopolitan, and that on two accounts. Firstly, in chapter XVIII, "A Flood of Sunshine," she discards her letter and the cap hiding her hair.

> O exquisite relief! She had not known the weight until she felt the freedom! By another impulse, she took off the formal cap that confined her hair, and down it fell upon her shoulders, dark and rich, with at once a shadow and a light in its abundance, and imparting the charm of softness to her features. There played around her mouth, and beamed out of her eyes, a radiant and tender smile, that seemed gushing from the very heart of womanhood. (*The Scarlet Letter* 138)

The young woman symbolically feels strong and full of joy as she rejects the power (*potestas*) the clergymen/magistrates of Boston had been holding upon her body and her mind. What should be noted is that the magistrates are adepts of the logic of the Same (always the same uniform, always the same sad grey clothes and the same grey life for women), as well as of the logic of Subtraction (your hair does not belong to you and you have no right to show it). *We* know what is good (right?) for you.

There is a second similarity linking Hawthorne's protagonist and Melville's Cosmopolitan: Hester puts the letter and the cap back. She does so not only in the forest scene, but also at the end of the novel, when she returns as an old woman from Europe when everybody has forgotten about her punishment. She knows, however, that one cannot but live in a society and that figuratively it is the role of the letter on her chest to inscribe her in that society. In other words, she accepts reality and society as they are with their limitations, but at the same time she embroiders the letter, she becomes an artist, almost like a writer, and in

this way with her gold thread she goes as far as she possibly can trying to assert herself and her hidden possibilities (Spinoza's *potentia*). In what follows, this essay will analyze the last chapter of the novel and accordingly show that, just like Hester Prynne, the Cosmopolitan is fully part of society. The universe imagined by Melville in his novel is unquestionably immanent, which does not mean that it is disembodied. It is the concrete world in which we live with and only with what is materially possible in it. The remarks that follow will thus be not abstract, but practical.

The Critique of Practical Charity

> "Talking of alleged spuriousness of wines," said he, tranquilly setting down his glass, and then sloping back his head and with friendly fixedness eying the wine, "perhaps the strangest part of those allegings is, that there is, as claimed, a kind of man who, while convinced that on this continent most wines are shams, yet still drinks away at them; accounting wine so fine a thing, that even the sham article is better than none at all. And if the temperance people urge that, by this course, he will sooner or later be undermined in health, he answers, 'And do you think I don't know that? But health without cheer I hold a bore; and cheer, even of the spurious sort, has its price, which I am willing to pay.'" (167)

The Cosmopolitan is extremely explicit about the importance of always belonging to a given human group and more generally of being part of the here and now, that is to say: it would be wrong to imagine that there are other worlds from which our values would supposedly come or where we would hopefully "live" after our deaths. Just like purity, perfection does not exist. It is only an empty word misleading us, and that is also true of wines: they are just like human beings, neither good nor bad, in some cases more good than bad or more bad than good. That also applies to our standards of behavior, and in this respect the Cosmopolitan shows us that, even though "chronometrical" values should ideally be considered desirable (to speak like Plotinus Plimlimmon in *Pierre*, Book XIV), we only have "horological" values to live with. The

last scene of the novel in which the Cosmopolitan tries to come to the help of the old man is unquestionably modest and un-heroic as the two characters speak of money and of surviving a dangerous river trip. At the same time, it could be said that conceptually it is revolutionary. *The Confidence-Man* began with the Mute proclaiming the virtues of absolute charity with his slate. The novel ends with an exercise in practical charity.

It should be remembered that the approach chosen in this essay is always in terms of logic and problematics. Charity is indeed a problem, and the last chapter provides a reasoned answer to it. In the first half of the novel, charity is defined negatively through the reactions of the interlocutors of the Confidence-Man. It is what they don't possess in their narcissistic obsession with themselves. Charity is the contrary of the logic of the Same: meeting someone, anyone, should imply that you can no longer remain the same. Yet the Mute's list of quotations from 1 Corinthians is an invitation for readers to try to define what charity is, or at least what its essential properties are. Readers are meant, as it were, to continue writing on his board: "Something further may follow of this List." The list is indeed to be continued, not in the novel (the interlocutors are simply not concerned), but by an infinity of readers in their own lives across continents and across centuries.

The Mute quotes from the King James Version. *Charity* is a translation of *caritas* in Jerome's Latin *Vulgate*.[17] It means *dear* as in *my parents are dear to me* or *this merchandise is dear*. Basically, we once again encounter the ambiguous union of God and Mammon. The Mute obviously refers to the first alternative, *caritas* as a translation of the Greek *agapè*. The meaning of the term was spelt out without any ambiguities by Christ at the Last Supper: "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another" (King James Version, John 13:34). Only one interpretation is possible: that, like Christ, you should give your life for the "stranger" (Melville's word) you encounter on your road. A slightly less 'chronometrical' meaning can of course be considered, as the Cosmopolitan points out: "You are so charitable with everybody, do but consider the tone of the speech.

Now I put it to you, Frank; is there anything in it hortatory to high, heroic, disinterested effort? Anything like 'sell all thou hast and give to the poor?'" (176, being an echo of Matthew 19:21).

In the last chapter of *The Confidence-Man*, the perspective is, however, different and things are now seen at a more "horological" level, which was foreshadowed in the following exchange: "'Charity, charity!'" exclaimed the Cosmopolitan, 'never a sound judgment without charity. When man judges man, charity is less a bounty from our mercy than just allowance for the insensible lee-way of human fallibility'" (161). The Cosmopolitan will now show us in a very practical manner what is meant by "allowance[s]." There is nothing exceptional about the old man and there will accordingly be nothing Christ-like about the Cosmopolitan, which does not mean that the elderly passenger concerned with his money and his life is not a symbol. In point of fact, he is first and foremost the embodiment of a problem. How old is he? May-be 68 years old? Maybe not? It is tempting to imagine that he could very well be the age of the country and that he was born with it in 1789. Melville's diagnosis is that politically and morally speaking the American Republic has failed. Who knows? "Something further may follow of this Masquerade," (251) the country may be reborn with new values together with the break of day on April 2nd. After all, historically, in the Middle Ages, April 1st was considered the beginning of the new year and of course it also coincides with the arrival of spring and the renewal of life.

The solution of the problem will consist in trying to figure out how a new faith and a new confidence are possible in a completely immanent universe. The passage is about "signs," as the old man keeps repeating, that is to say that it is about social phenomena. Two types of signs are analyzed in a critical manner. Firstly, dollar bills are compared with a series of models in a *Counterfeit Detector* (as in a detector of counterfeit money or as in a detector that is counterfeit?). The old man is told to look for a miniature goose hidden like the image of Napoleon on the bill. It is of course not so much the old passenger as the reader who is confronted with a real conundrum: why should there be a figure of the

French emperor on an American bill? The answer is that there may possibly be a figure of George Washington, but certainly not that of a foreign statesman! Besides, these figures can only be discovered if and only if "the attention is directed to it" (248), which implies that we know in advance that the said figure will be present on (in?) the bill. The Cosmopolitan is right to imply that it has become a real wild-goose chase, and that the goose is the old man or the old man's desire (or at least that it is in the old man's mind and not on the bill). The parallelism with the second type of signs is then unavoidable: trust or faith has nothing to do with what is supposedly inside the Bible and, just as there is no Napoleon on the bill, there is no God in the Bible whose very heart, as the old man graphically remarks, is symbolically made up of the apocryphal books which by definition cannot be trusted. Geese and gods are human creations, and looking for them inside a sign is a very good example of the type of allegorical readings this essay has consistently been trying to avoid.

Most of the religious content of the passage deals with the question of Providence. That notion posits that a transcendent God knows in advance everything which is going to take place in our human universe, and that He intervenes in these events as a "beneficent caretaker" so as to afford protection to our souls and our bodies. The Cosmopolitan is aware of the humorous dimension of the fears of the old man and reassures him that Providence is like a "Committee of Safety" (249), watching over us when we are comfortably asleep and unable to look after ourselves properly. Part of the humor is obviously that the real and original 1793 *Comité de salut public* led to the worst horrors of the French Revolution and opened the door to Napoléon Bonaparte's bid for power. In other words, it is impossible to separate Providence from the Terror (that is the word) it can create. The exchange between the two men reveals in fact an aporia: God as Providence will shelter us, while, on the other hand, as the Cosmopolitan stresses, steamships are often involved in horrible accidents with lots of victims. Does that signify that God is ineffective or more simply that He is a fiction and never

existed? This possibility seems borne out by the pathetically selfish motivations of the old man: what he requires from Providence is solely physical protection for himself. At bottom, providence is thus a matter of projection: rather than having transcendence intervening in the affairs of immanence, it is immanence that dictates to a supposed transcendence.

Consequently, the Cosmopolitan extinguishes the solar lamp "with the image of a horned altar [and] with the figure of a robed man, his head encircled by a halo" (238), two symbols traditionally construed as referring to the Old and the New Testaments. The light has indeed become very weak, and we are told that the other lamps are "barren" (239). It is time to leave Christian allegories behind and enter a new universe endowed instead with as yet unwritten life-affirming values. The last touch of humor, or rather farce, concerns the life preserver the old man requests. The Cosmopolitan points to a "brown stool" (250). There are no life preservers onboard the *Fidèle*, the notion of a transcendent Providence is only an illusion, and a chamber pot will have to do, that is to say that there is no protection against accidents and no promise of everlasting life. Worse, there is no soul, just that "brown stool" (chamber pot or excrement?) conveniently present underneath one's backside. Rabelais, Melville's great ancestor, resorted to the spirit of carnival and a similar technique in order to deflate those official discourses that tried to give the illusion of seriousness and transcendence: he replaced all the forms of bogus solemnity with a reference to our low bodily functions inviting us look at the results. Readers of chapter XIII of *Gargantua* certainly never forget the pages devoted to testing the respective values of a long series of various "torche-culs" (arse-wipes). It could be said that Melville symbolically ends here his "Quarrel with God."[18] Put more radically, through the Cosmopolitan's action, the novelist seems to be telling us: "the 'true world' does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous" (Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image* 137; the French text says "*l'être*" instead of "the true world," that is God, the [Supreme] Being).

The conceptual turning point of the chapter is reached when the novel stops being critical and starts offering positive, down-to-earth advice. The end of the passage deals with what should be called the Cosmopolitan's practical charity. It is both very modest from a factual point of view and daring from a theoretical perspective, as if Melville's intellectual experiment had led him to intuit what a pragmatist way of thinking could consist in. One is perhaps reminded that Deleuze confesses in one of his university classes that he deeply admired William James, and that for him pragmatism is part of a long philosophical manner of thinking going from Rabelais to Spinoza and Nietzsche.[19] Provided it is not unduly simplified, pragmatism is about patterns of behavior and problems to solve. Secondarily, it implies avoiding false questions and above all other-worldly solutions. Surprising as it may seem, the Cosmopolitan's pragmatic charity is once again best explained thanks to one of thinkers belonging to the intellectual tradition chosen in this essay: Baruch Spinoza and his theory of evil, a most pragmatist conception if there is one.[20] The Dutch thinker distinguished between morality (the opposition between good and evil) and ethics (the opposition between good and bad). The problem with morality is that it traditionally refers to obscure values supposedly revealed to us and possessing some dubious transcendent origin. On the other hand, ethics (from the Greek *ēthos*, habit, custom, the way you shape your life) is concerned with what is concretely good (with here a different meaning from the abstract *good* which is opposed to *evil* in morality) or bad for your body and consequently for yourself. It is basically about the relationships between an object and yourself: will the object enhance or diminish your *potentia*, or is it liable to poison your body or your mind? There is no metaphysics whatsoever involved here and an example will make clear the importance of the notion: "the bill is good" (248). The Cosmopolitan adds: "Throw it away, I beg, if only because of the trouble it breeds you" (248), referring to the *Counterfeit Detector* which prevents the old man from living his life fully. Life is the only value one must always choose. The old man, on the contrary, claims that "the bill is good" if there is a goose in it. He thinks in an allegorical way when

the Confidence-Man thinks in a pragmatist way. For him, the dollar bill, just like the Bible, are what Plato would have called *simulacra*, and it would be a mistake to look for a model, "idea" or essence (gold? God?) behind them. Simulacra and only simulacra proliferate in the world in which we live and we have to make do with them as best as we can.[21]

The problem has fundamentally to do with the production of faith as a human activity in a purely immanent universe. That, of course, was precisely the key question raised by William James in *The Will to Believe* (1896). Faith should be considered as an immanent type of behavior. It has nothing to do with gods or allegedly supernatural other worlds. One can have faith or not in a god or in a dollar bill. Maybe the bill is genuine or maybe it is false, it is only (for me) a matter of chance, but that should not be seen as the real problem. What matters is the possibilities offered to me by the bill. The only thing that should be taken into consideration is that it may well be accepted in a store even if it is counterfeit. I will only know the answer when I try to use it, and it follows that I should not poison my mind now asking myself metaphysical questions about it. It is also understandably important to have the same attitude concerning one's personal safety. Maybe there will be an accident during the night, or maybe not. It is useless to start worrying, especially if nothing happens, and it is definitely too early to panic should the ship run aground. The new faith to be invented should be directed at real possibilities of life, that is to say at what I can do with my body and myself in the future, and that should include sleep at night.

The importance of chance is thus the last notion that has to be considered in the light of the intellectual tradition that produced pragmatism at the end of the nineteenth century as well as Gilles Deleuze's philosophy in the twentieth. It began long before Rabelais, and most certainly before the tradition developed by Plato with his transcendent world beyond ours, and more generally by the idealism of monotheistic religions which shared the same dual-world structure. (As Nietzsche famously said: "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'"; *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, Preface 2.) Its earliest

known representative is the pre-Socratic thinker Heraclitus, still remembered today for two vital maxims. First, Fragment 21: "You cannot step twice into the same river; for other waters are continually flowing on" (Wheelwright 29). What we should understand is that men become alienated, they can no longer be truly human, if they choose the logic of the Same and identify with always the same mask and with the norms of a single community. Man's estate implies, on the contrary, a logic of Becoming, of constantly accompanying the unpredictability of life and consequently becoming different from oneself. In other words, it implies inventing and experimenting with ever new possibilities of life. Secondly, in Fragment 24, Heraclitus reminded us that "[t]ime is a child moving counters in a game, the royal power is a child's" (29). Our future is (largely) not written, and above all it cannot be represented since the only principle hidden behind it is chance. As a consequence, it is impossible to produce an allegory of the future, unless of course one prefers an idealistic approach to our lives limiting ourselves to repeating ready-made (when? where?) models.

When he wrote *The Confidence-Man*, it would seem that Melville in his own way had an intuition of that great tradition, largely similar to that of Nietzsche, when the latter composed his *Morgenröte*: "There are many dawns which have yet to shed their light" (4). It is then not overly surprising that structurally Melville's great novel should end exactly in the same manner as *Thus Spake Zarathustra*: ""This is my morning, my day beginneth: *arise now, arise, thou great noontide!*"— —/ Thus spake Zarathustra and left his cave, glowing and strong, like a morning sun coming out of gloomy mountains" (325).[22] "Something further may follow of this Masquerade" (*The Confidence-Man* 251).

Just as Erasmus wrote his *In Praise of Folly* in which he denounced the universal stupidity of man, Melville was justified in giving us his own praise of Cosmopolitanism in which, starting from a diagnosis of the ills of nineteenth-century American society, he offers a generalized vision of the possibilities open to man, a vision that can then be transposed and adapted to other places and other times across centuries and continents: how far can we go in body and mind in order to become

always more human? The novel's answer is that we should renounce the illusory belief that everything is already written, and that the only thing that is reassuring is the category of the Same. Instead of repeating passively what we are, judging others and judging ourselves, we should choose health, which is synonymous with a logic of addition. Just like Whitman famously wrote "I contain multitudes,"[23] it is important for us to recognize that we can share in several contradictory communities and also possess several religions. It is lethal to oppose social norms: I can be both *us* and *them*. Cosmopolitanism is thus presented in the novel as an experiment: what new road could / should we follow? Concretely, readers are invited to unfold the implications of a number of singularities, a costume, wines, Poles and Moors, a dollar bill, a chamber-pot, etc. In order to explicate the potential of these objects, they then need to complicate their vision of them, and, consequently, their vision of themselves. Being truly alive and accepting without simplifications the richness and the complexity of the only world there is, our immanent world, fundamentally implies embracing the principle of infinite variations along which life carries us, inviting us to invent tomorrow's ever new possibilities of life.

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NOTES

[1]It is here modestly proposed that the present essay could be seen as a belated contribution to the *Connotations* issue on "Roads Not Taken" (vol. 18). As Matthias Bauer writes in his introduction: "the road not taken may be the road we should take, in the author's view" (2).

[2]A key characteristic of most of the critical literature on *The Confidence-Man*, especially that of the second half of the twentieth century, is that it considers the novel within a Judeo-Christian framework, which, let us immediately add, does not mean that a lot of these studies are devoid of interest in other respects. The avatars of the Confidence-Man are usually immediately assimilated to Satan, sometimes to Christ, and, in some more sophisticated interpretations, a number of scholars have started to wonder (in Leslie Fiedler's phrase) "whether Christ is the Devil" (437). A list of these studies would be exceedingly long. Suffice it to say that this approach can be found in such "classics" as for instance Dryden's *Melville's Thematics of Form*,

Bellis's *No Mysteries Out of Ourselves*, Elizabeth Foster's introduction to the 1954 edition, and Miller's famous *PMLA* article "The Confidence-Man: His Guises." A few of these, as could be expected, seize upon the darkness that descends upon the ship at the end to claim that the novel should be read in conjunction with the Book of Revelation as it culminates with the advent of some kind of apocalypse, whether it is a "Comic Apocalypse" (see R. W. B. Lewis's chapter "Days of Wrath and Laughter" in *Trials of the Word* 184-235), or a "Satirical Apocalypse" (in Cook's *Satirical Apocalypse*, a long concatenation of all the possible allegorical interpretations of *The Confidence-Man*).

[3]See Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past, Time Regained* 266.

[4]Starting from these premises, Gilles Deleuze explains, in an important digression in *Proust and Signs* (45), what a practice of close reading could consist in. He turns the family of the Latin term *plicare* ("to fold") into an operative concept. In our case, the various components of the figure of the Cosmopolitan will have to be unfolded ("dé-pliées") and *ex-pli-cated*, that is to say that we need to show how they are *com-pli-cated* and full of *im-pli-cations* at different levels (political, religious, psychological, philosophical, etc.) and, it follows, how they are liable to open new possibilities of life for us.

[5]It could almost be said that it is thanks to the concept of cosmopolitanism that Melville's novel will enter the twenty-first century. In the critical literature on *The Confidence-Man* between 1950 and 2000, very little has been written on the subject, and even less on the philosophical approach chosen in the present essay. A small number of books or essays, however, have proved to be real Drummond lights, even though the philosophical approach adopted here is of course entirely different. Pride of place should be given to those by Bellis, Brodtkorb, Dryden, Irwin, Sten, and Thompson. In his (unfortunately too brief) presentation in *Leviathan*, John Bryant proves especially illuminating. Christopher Sten's 1997 essay is also worth reading. He briefly touches on Melville's main novels and devotes four pages to *The Confidence-Man*, stressing the writer's "faith in humanity." It should be noted that it is Sten who writes that "one begins to wonder whether it [cosmopolitanism] is not as important a subject as confidence" (43). In addition, it is essential to add Martha Nussbaum's contribution in which she goes back to Diogenes, perhaps the first self-proclaimed "citizen of the world." She rightly stresses that the concept implies freeing oneself from the limitations of class, gender, lineage and city, etc. Finally, Mischke's study is mainly economic and political. He sees cosmopolitanism as deeply negative, which explains why this essay will not follow him on that subject.

[6]This is a stimulating line of inquiry initiated by Warwick Wadlington in *The Confidence Game in American Literature*.

[7]"Bartleby; or, The Formula," reprinted in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (68-90).

[8]The question of democracy has for some time now been slowly taking a greater importance in Melville studies. Using a different methodology from that chosen in this essay, Jennifer Greiman illuminatingly goes back to Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, showing that democracy is a state of affairs which does not exist as yet,

but should be seen as a process of becoming, always to be redefined. In *The Confidence-Man*, it cannot be separated from Melville's vision of a multiplicity of life which keeps producing ever new networks of differences.

[9]The point is illuminatingly made by Gilles Deleuze in his class on "Cinema" of December 20, 1983. See http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=276.

[10]Mainly James Murray's *Oxford English Dictionary* published in 1884, and Noah Webster's 1828 *American Dictionary of the English Language*.

[11]It is time to correct a common preconception shared by a number of people: alcohol is rumored to be dangerous and getting drunk is said to be the easiest way of opting out of our world. The objection is perfectly justified, except that it concerns hooligans, football supporters, (some) students and (very few?) academics, and that it always involves some cheap vodka or a similar substance that you drink very quickly in order to get drunk very quickly. This manner of treating alcohol fully belongs to the logic of the Same: always the same inferior vodka, always the same way of drinking it, always the same loss of consciousness. Rabelais and Melville, on the other hand, use wine as a metaphor: not only does it bring you a form of exquisite pleasure if you savor it slowly, enjoying its bouquet with your nose, then letting it linger on your taste buds before swallowing with a deep feeling of love. Melville has discovered all that: wine increases the sensitivity of our consciousness and permits us to understand how rich and complex our world truly is. Mr. Robert, the Good Merchant, has this intuition in Chapter 13: "Ah, wine is good, and confidence is good; but can wine or confidence percolate down through all the stony strata of hard considerations, and drop warmly and ruddily into the cold cave of truth?" (73), except that he is not a hero, just a merchant. He suddenly becomes afraid of what he has uncovered, he fears truth and trust, and he immediately goes back to his habits and his certainties. What a pity (for him …).

[12]See "The Philosopher as Cultural Physician" in *Philosophy and Truth*.

[13]Just like the present essay, Michael Jonik's extremely suggestive book, *Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman*, celebrates what should be called a twenty-first century Melville. He rightly points out that, even though Melville never read Spinoza, he seems to think along similar lines as the Dutch philosopher. Understandably, Jonik also refers to Gilles Deleuze, making it clear that a literary text can only make sense for us today if it is placed in perspective with other works belonging to our culture, be they anterior or posterior to it. The present article adds Friedrich Nietzsche, an author inseparable from Spinoza in the essential implications of his method of articulating problems.

[14]Nietzsche, "The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom," *Philosophy and Truth* 144; see Pearson 245 and Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* 101.

[15]In Italian, for instance, Antonio Negri opted to speak of *potere* and *potenza*, and French followers of Gilles Deleuze use *puissance* and *pouvoir*, which shows that a radical distinction between the two notions is indispensable.

[16]See Edward F. Ricketts's "Essay on Non-teleological Thinking" in John Steinbeck's collection *Sea of Cortez*. The word comes the Greek *telos*, goal. Steinbeck was

impressed by this conception that held that life never stops, but proliferates in a haphazard manner, always diverging, always inventing new forms and new relationships.

[17]The problem is of course that of the definition of *love*, that word being the translation commonly found today for *agapè* in modern translations of the Bible. The Authorized Version uses the archaic *charity*.

[18]Reference to Lawrance Thompson's 1952 classic *Melville's Quarrel with God*.

[19]Among other references, see session of December 13, 1983, "Cinéma Cours 49," http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=272.

[20]See the letters to Willem van Blyenbergh, XVIII to XXIV (republished in *The Correspondence of Spinoza*).

[21]Readers who would prefer a theoretical interpretation may look upon this reference to Plato as a more philosophical way of rephrasing the problem raised by Melville in this last chapter. In *The Sophist*, in order to offer a comprehensive description of reality as we know it, the Greek philosopher explains that one has to distinguish between two kinds of images: (1) the image-copy (*eikôn*), a necessarily imperfect reflection of the perfect, immortal essences; (2) the image-simulacrum (*fantasma*), always part of the infinite number of assemblages of images governed by chance that proliferate around us with neither origin nor goal. Plato was compelled to mention the latter as he could not deny that they actually existed, but understandably he strongly disapproved of them. Modern philosophy, especially in its anti-idealistic tendencies, has, however, reevaluated simulacra. Gilles Deleuze was especially instrumental in that respect with the Chapter "Plato and the Simulacrum" in the appendices of *Logic of Sense* (253-65). Simulacra, of course, make up the purely immanent and constantly changing universe in which we live, a universe about which we no longer think in terms of an opposition between essence and appearances: there are only appearances and the supposedly transcendent level with its models is only an illusion. Christianity inherited Plato's distinction when it insisted that man was made in the "image" of God (see Genesis 1:17). It follows that the very end of *The Confidence-Man* can be seen as an attempt at thinking outside that Platonic or Christian structure: life begins after the solar lamp on the horned altar has been extinguished. Humans stop being defined in terms of the logic of the Same in order to begin becoming ever different from themselves.

[22]The darkness that invades the ship in the last chapter need not be construed as an allegory of Christian apocalypse. It would rather seem that Melville has followed a similar intellectual evolution as that of Nietzsche, whose *Twilight of the Idols* (to quote the title of his 1889 book) shows how necessary it is to destroy all the false values that enthrall our minds before the advent of a new 'dawn' becomes possible.

[23]"Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)" (Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself" #51, *Leaves of Grass* 58).

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Hamlet and the Limits of Euphuism: A Response to Frederick Kiefer

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For further contributions to the debate on "*Hamlet* and the Limits of Euphuism," see http://www.connotations.de/debate/john-lyly-and-the-most-misread-speech-in-shakespeare. If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

The response paper challenges Frederick Kiefer's argument that the euphuistic quality of Hamlet's "What a piece of work is a man"-speech can be held accountable for its ambiguity. It argues instead that Hamlet's speech is not as euphuistic as Kiefer claims and that the ambiguity of the speech is less related to its presumed euphuistic nature but rather to Hamlet's use of irony throughout the play.

In his analysis of Hamlet's famous "What a piece of work is a man"-speech, Frederick Kiefer argues that the lines express "a sharp incongruity" (30) between Hamlet's feelings and his description of the "most excellent canopy" (2.2.265). According to Kiefer, this incongruity illustrates the double objective of the passage as both a sincere expression of Hamlet's feelings and as a "pose concocted to insulate the prince from those who would ferret out the secret of his transformation" (26-27). Kiefer's main argument is that the euphuistic quality of the speech can be held accountable for this ambiguity. By way of their euphuistic style, Hamlet's lines, like Lyly's prose style, invite the dialogical exploration of themes and the "unwillingness to arrive at a summary judgment" (33).

In the following I would like to challenge Kiefer's arguments on three counts. First of all, I will question the claim that the speech displays the strong incongruity which Kiefer ascribes to it. Secondly, I will argue that Hamlet's speech is not as euphuistic as Kiefer makes it out to be. Thirdly, I wish to argue that the ambiguity of the speech is less related to its presumed euphuistic nature but rather to Hamlet's use of irony throughout the play.

1. Incongruity

On the surface, Hamlet's speech is indeed characterized by incongruities. On the one hand, the prince talks about "this goodly frame the earth," "this most excellent canopy the air," "this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire" (2.2.264-67).[1] On the other hand, he perceives the world in negative terms when he describes earth as a "sterile promontory" and the skies as "a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours" (2.2.268-69). This contrast, however, does not represent an incongruity. As Kiefer himself notes, Hamlet's speech is often regarded as a typical expression of early modern melancholy.[2] But regardless whether this speech is just a "parade of fashionable melancholy" (*Hamlet*, ed. Edwards 130n280-90) or the real thing, it nevertheless gives expression to an emotional state which by the end of the sixteenth century was seen to be an integral part of the human condition. As Robert Burton writes in his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, published in 1621:

> Melancholy in this sence is the Character of Mortalitie. [...] We are not here as those Angells, celestiall powers and Bodies, Sunne and Moone, to finish our course without all offence, with such constancy, to continue for so many ages: but subject to infirmities, miseries, interrupt, tossed and tumbled up and downe, carried about with every small blast, often molested and disquieted upon each slender occasion, uncertaine, brittle, and so is all that we trust unto. (131)

Hamlet's melancholic state of mind, his perception of the world, is not incongruous with Ptolemaic cosmology. By comparing the imperfections of the sublunary cosmos with the heavenly order, Hamlet at the same time gives voice to the belief expressed by Pico della Mirandola in his famous *Oration on the Dignity of Man* that

> man is the intermediary between creatures, that he is the familiar of the gods above him as he is lord of the beings beneath him; that [...] he is the interpreter of nature, set midway between the timeless unchanging and the flux of time. (3-4)

In order for Hamlet as a Renaissance man to "comprehend the meaning of so vast an achievement" (Pico della Mirandola 5) like creation, recognizing its divine order and beauty on the one hand, and acknowledging the imperfections of man as mortal creature on the other, is not an incongruity but a distinguishing feature of Early Modern man. After all, it is the faculty of "apprehension," referred to by Hamlet in the same speech, that man as intermediary being between the sublunar and the heavenly realm has in common with the angels and which sets him apart from the baser creatures.[3] Hamlet's conclusion then, that "[m]an delights not me—nor women neither" (2.2.274-75), is not "strangely inconclusive and its effect unclear," nor does the speech never reach "a destination that the listener has been led to expect" (Kiefer 34). Rather, by juxtaposing Mirandola's optimistic Neo-platonic view of humanity with Burton's Baroque discourse of melancholy, Shakespeare opens up a discursive space for Hamlet to explore the tensions between two worldviews.[4]

2. Euphuism

Kiefer identifies in Hamlet's lines a "sheer amplitude of [...] euphuistic speech" (33), and the question remains whether this is actually the case. In his understanding of euphuism, Kiefer draws on, among others, Carmine Di Biase, according to whom the euphuistic style is characterized

by "a self-conscious and excessive use of proverb lore, classical allusion, natural philosophy, rhetorical figures, and phonetic devices, especially alliteration" (Di Biase 85; see Kiefer 27). Kiefer further identifies in Lyly's style "indeterminacy" (33), a "pervasive ambivalence" (33-34),[5] "an extraordinary reliance upon analogy" (34), and "[s]ly humor, born of wit" (35). Even if we accept these criteria as an exhaustive definition of euphuism (which I think they are not, as I will show below), it becomes evident that Hamlet's lines do not quite live up to this catalogue. To begin with, and as I have already shown above, the speech is less ambiguous and "indeterminate" than Kiefer claims it to be. As regards euphuism's structural and formal features, Hamlet's lines show only a few of them and not in the "amplitude" suggested by Kiefer. For example, if we understand a "proverb" as a "short pithy saying which embodies a general truth [...] related in form and content to the maxim and the aphorism" (Cuddon 706), Hamlet's speech shows none. Although the prince refers to "natural philosophy" (Di Biase 85) by alluding to geocentric cosmology, humoral pathology and humanist ideas, as indicated above, calling the earth a "sterile promontory," the sky a "majestical roof" and man "the beauty of the world" does not equal "pithy saying[s]." A similar statement can be made for the classical allusions, of which the speech also contains none. Moreover, Hamlet's use of analogy "involving the various forms of life he catalogues—human, angelic, divine, animal" (Kiefer 34) seems to be a far cry from the "forest of analogies" (Maslen 237; see Kiefer 34) usually found in euphuistic prose.

As regards Di Biase's "rhetorical figures, and phonetic devices, especially alliteration," Hamlet's lines admittedly do include a few examples of syntactic parallelism and chiasmus,[6] oppositions,[7] assonances and alliterations,[8] but so do many of his and other figures' speeches in the play (and to a greater degree).[9] Moreover, the elaboration, complexity and abundance of tropes, figures and schemes which David Bevington identifies in the euphuistic style is not discernible in these lines:

> Lyly's famous Euphuistic style, with its elaborate rhetorical schemes and tropes of isocolon, parison, and paramoion (similarity of length, grammatical

> form, and sound in successive and corresponding phrases or clauses), alliteration, word repetition, *similiter cadentes* (similarity at the end of a phrase), metaphors from fanciful natural history, and the like, is elegantly suited to a drama of antithetical debate. The style [...] revels in parallels, logical structures, and syntactic oppositions, through which a thing may be defined by its opposite, or two things may be held in equilibrium, or one thing may be seen to possess contrary properties within it. (46)

Again, Hamlet's speech undoubtedly employs parallels, oppositions, and logical structures, but what is missing here (especially compared to other instances of euphuism in the play) is the elaborateness ("[e]laborate rhetorical schemes") and exuberance ("the style revels in") of the euphuistic style.

In fact, when it comes to the play's engagement with euphuism, other figures than Hamlet suggest themselves, most prominently Polonius and Osric. These figures with their highly artificial and sententious manner of speech are widely held[10] to be an expression of Shakespeare's critical view of the euphuistic style which, as Kiefer himself attests, "was becoming old-fashioned by the time Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet*" (36). As early as 1875, Edward Dowden argued that Polonius' advice to his son (1.3.54-80)

> is a cento of quotations from Lyly's "Euphues." Its significance must be looked for less in the matter than in the sententious manner. [Compare also Gertrude's admonishment of the counsellor ("More matter with less art," 2.2.95) after the latter's verbose exordium.] [...] what Shakspere [sic] wishes to signify in this speech is that wisdom of Polonius' kind consists of a set of maxims; all such wisdom might be set down for the headlines of copybooks. (141-42)

Polonius' extensive use of proverbs[11] and his overly verbose and stilted style[12] give testimony to Shakespeare's critical stance towards euphuism which "[b]y the turn of the century [...] had become ripe for parody" (Kiefer 36).

Apart from Polonius, there is yet another figure, the "*courtier*" (5.2.66 S.D.) Osric, who, although appearing only in the final scene,[13] embodies Shakespeare's (critical) engagement with euphuism to a far greater degree than Hamlet's own prose.[14] By submitting Osric's "affected style

of speech, full of empty and repetitive formulas" (Thompson and Taylor 441) and his "verbosity" (444) to intense mockery by Hamlet's cynical replies, Shakespeare introduces a character who serves as a parody of euphuism.[15]

3. Irony

Finally, I would like to contest Kiefer's argument that the euphuistic quality of Hamlet's speech is responsible for its analytical and dialogical quality. Drawing on Scragg's analysis of Lyly's *Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit*, Kiefer sees the euphuistic mode as inherently equivocal. He quotes Scragg, who argues that the euphuistic style

> draws the reader not towards an irrestible conclusion, but into a series of branching avenues leading progressively further from an inevitable goal, frustrating the drive of the narrative towards finality and closure, and proliferating the positions from which a judgement might be reached. (5)[16]

Scragg identifies a "pervasive ambivalence at the heart of the euphuistic mode [...] endow[ing] Lyly's work with a far greater degree of ambiguity than its subject matter initially suggests" (Scragg 4; see Kiefer 32). Consequently, for Kiefer the euphuistic quality of Hamlet's speech is largely responsible for its analytical character and inconclusiveness. Hamlet's "euphuistic prose invites the exploration of an issue" (Kiefer 32). I would like to suggest, however, that this inconclusiveness and ambiguity is less an effect of Hamlet's euphuistic style but of his pervasive use of irony.[17]

Although I have argued above that the "sharp incongruity" which Kiefer (30) identifies in Hamlet's speech between what he says he feels and what he describes does not really exist, incongruities and ambiguities are in fact highly relevant for Hamlet as character. They define him, however, outside a strictly euphuistic perspective. In his commentary on Hamlet's rhetorical strategies in his first appearance in 1.2, Müller draws attention to the prince's use of "ambiguous speech—above

all by way of puns" (Greiner and Müller 427).[18] This "purposeful ambiguity" (Greiner 100)[19] is Hamlet's strongest weapon against the machinations of his adversaries and reveals itself most strongly in his ironical puns which Greiner interprets as Hamlet's way of responding to "the ambiguity of political and social reality" (Greiner and Müller 105).[20]

As has been noted, Hamlet employs irony not only in his first scene.[21] Throughout the entire play, "[p]uns, equivocations, and *double entendres* comprise his repertoire, his means of countering duplicity with doubleness" (Holstein 334).[22] Klaus Reichert even ascribes to Hamlet's puns a function of protest (Reichert 45; qtd. in Greiner and Müller 428.). Therefore, the openness and inconclusiveness of Hamlet's speech cannot be reduced to his (anti-)euphuistic style alone, but are integral to his main rhetorical strategy of irony and his answer to the duplicity of the world.

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NOTES

[1]Here and in the following all quotations from Hamlet are taken from Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor's Arden Edition of the play.

[2]He refers to Philip Edwards's assessment that the speech can be seen "as an example of the world-weariness not only of Hamlet but of a whole age" (*Hamlet*, ed. Edwards 130n280-90).

[3]"*Hamlet* is largely animated by Shakespeare's consciousness of man's being in action like an angel in apprehension like a god, and yet capable of all baseness." (Tillyard 84). Unlike Thompson and Taylor who use Q2 as the base text for their edition, Tillyard follows F1. Cf. also Tillyard 78-79.

[4]I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for this observation.

[5]Kiefer quotes here from Scragg 4.

[6]"how noble in reason; how infinite in faculties, in form and moving; how express and admirable in action; how like an angel in apprehension; how like a god; the beauty of the world; the paragon of animals" (2.2.270-73).

[7]"goodly frame" (2.2.264) vs. "sterile promontory" (265); "excellent canopy" (265), "brave o'erhanging firmament" (266), "majestical roof" (267) vs. "foul and pestilent congregation of vapours" (268-69); "paragon of animals" (273) vs. "dust" (274).

[8]"roof fretted with golden fire" (267); "infinite in faculties, in form" (270-71); "express and admirable in action" (271); "an angel in apprehension" (272; all italics mine).

[9]See e.g. Claudius' long opening speech (1.2.1-39, 87-117) which is also characterized by rhetorical figures such as oppositions, parallelism, and chiasmus. For an excellent analysis of the rhetorical features of Claudius' speech, see Wolfgang G. Müller's commentary on 424-35 in his and Norbert Greiner's joint bilingual edition of the play. For the euphuistic qualities of Polonius' and Osric's speeches see below.

[10]For Polonius, Johnson writes: "One of the Shakespearean characters who uses a euphuistic style is Polonius in *Hamlet*" (166); see also Dowden 141-42; Draper 38; Rushdon 44-47. For Osric, see Draper 73; Hawkes 50; Williamson 79.

[11]A few examples of Polonius' proverbs and "commonplaces" (Greiner and Müller 437): "For the apparel oft proclaims the man" (1.3.71); "borrowing dulleth th'edge of husbandry" (1.3.76); "Ay, springes to catch woodcocks—I do know / When the blood burns how prodigal the soul / Lends the tongue vows" (1.3.114-16); "'Tis too much proved that with devotion's visage / And pious action we do sugar o'er / The devil himself" (3.1.46-48).

[12]Cf. in particular 2.2.86-107 and 128-48.

[13]Osric has three appearances in the final act (5.2.67-163, 203-97, 334-87), of which the first one includes the encounter with Hamlet.

[14]Cf. Draper 73 who compares Osric's style to euphuism.

[15]"Sein [Hamlets] Spiel mit Osric besteht in der Hauptsache in komischer und ironischer Kritik an seiner Sprache. Er lehnt die artifizielle Rhetorik ab, die Osrics Ideal von Vornehmheit entspricht" (Greiner and Müller 527-28). 'His [Hamlet's] playing with Osric consists mainly in comical an ironic criticism of the latter's speech. He rejects the artificial rhetoric that constitutes Osric's ideal of refinement' (my trans.). For a full discussion of the exchange between Osric and Hamlet, see Greiner and Müller 526-28.

[16]See Kiefer 34. Kiefer misquotes "positions" as "propositions."

[17]For a discussion of the relationship between ambiguity and irony, see Bauer.

[18]"[D]oppeldeutiger Rede—vor allem in der Form des Wortspiels" (my trans.).

[19]"[G]ezielter Doppelsinn" (my trans.).

[20]"[D]ie Ambiguität der politischen und sozialen Wirklichkeit" (my trans.).

[21]Cf. Burnett; Holstein; Greiner and Müller 427-29 (in particular 427n27); Greiner.

[22]Quoted in Greiner and Müller 428. Kiefer (36) himself concedes that "Hamlet displays the wit that he has exhibited *from* his first moments onstage" (my italics).

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Milton's Consistency: An Answer to Jason Kerr

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Abstract
In his "Shifting Perspectives on Law in *De Doctrina Christiana*: A Response to Filippo Falcone," Jason Kerr makes a convincing case for *De Doctrina Christiana* as in itself dynamic and discontinuous as the expression of Milton's Scripture-related intent and evolving theological thought. In the following answer to Kerr, Falcone argues for that same dynamicity and discontinuity as incompatible with the consistency of Milton's undisputed works.

Jason Kerr's response to "Irreconcilable (Dis)continuity: *De Doctrina Christiana* and Milton" is a compelling piece which aptly builds its case on solid evidence—namely the material document of *De Doctrina Christiana*—rather than on the mere interpretation of texts. As it tackles material evidence, Kerr's article reads the textual variations on the definition of the law in the manuscript as shifting perspectives in *Milton's* understanding thereof. Scholars who have attempted to reconcile *De Doctrina* with Milton's early and late prose as well as with the major poems have themselves argued for Milton's shifting perspectives on a number of theological issues. This attitude is well represented in Campbell and Corns's *John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought* (273):

> Theology was a living discipline for Milton, and his opinions on many theological issues changed in the course of his life. *De Doctrina* affords a view of his theological thinking in the 1650s. His thinking is for the most part unexceptionable, but on some issues he adopts minority opinions which he defends vigorously.

This is Kerr's own argument, but with a difference: Kerr argues that the manuscript has a life of its own, which is defined in conversation with Scripture (and, with respect to the role of the law, with Milton's belated reading of Zanchi's commentary on *Ephesians*), irrespective of whatever comes before or after. He finds evidence of significant changes in Milton's theological thinking within the very manuscript of *De Doctrina*, that is in the material tampering with the manuscript resulting in variants for which the Yale edition only marginally accounts ("Irreconcilable (Dis)continuity" is based on the Yale edition). These variants show an evolving view of the law and its relationship with the gospel, which is neither antinomian nor nomistic. To be in the company of Bishop Burgess and seek for evidence of discontinuity between Milton's undisputed work and *De Doctrina* is to partake in a foolish enterprise, Kerr suggests, for discontinuity lies at the very core of the manuscript:

> I am trying to make a case that the treatise has a life of its own independent of *Paradise Lost*.
>
> I turn, therefore, to Falcone's claim about how the treatise handles the abrogation of the law, for the pages where this claim unfolds show just such a scripturally-driven change of mind at work. (Kerr 130)

While Kerr's argument is well presented, it does little to refute the main point "Irreconcilable (Dis)continuity" makes regarding the law. Rather, Kerr's argument both misrepresents it and enhances it. It misconstrues it by arguing that my article portrays *De Doctrina* as antinomian (see Kerr 132). Whereas Kerr's misrepresentation may well result from my lack of clarity, "Irreconcilable (Dis)continuity" does not intend to portray *De Doctrina* as antinomian, nor is the idea "that the dividing wall of the law cannot be reduced to ceremonies alone" (Kerr 132) central to my argument. I rather try to underscore how the treatise and Milton's

uncontested works come to largely similar conclusions, but by entirely different paths.

With respect to the law, as with prevenient grace, "Irreconcilable (Dis)continuity" argues from a plain fact: the Latin treatise in none of its variants singles out the subdivision of the moral law (Falcone 80). In addressing Zanchi's commentary on *Ephesians* (MSS 320-21), the author of *De Doctrina* does refer to Zanchi's theological category of "the ceremonial code," but only as part of that which he calls "the whole positive law of Moses" which the new covenant has done away with in its entirety (see *OCW* 8: 700-03; quoted in Kerr 132). In other words, *De Doctrina* in none of its variants envisions substantial subdivisions in the law. Significantly, both the early prose and *Paradise Lost* resort to the phrase "the moral law" and clearly point to substantial subdivisions in the law (Falcone 81). While minor shifts may be noticed in turning from the antiprelatical tracts to the divorce tracts as well as between two subsequent editions of *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* and then *Tetrachordon*, both the early prose and *Paradise Lost* consistently argue from divisions in the law to show that the gospel does away with the detrimental effects of the law to enable man to fulfill the moral law. By contrast, after arguing for the abolition of the law as a whole as essential for the gospel and Christian liberty (see Kerr 135, and the quote from *OCW* 8: 712-13), *De Doctrina* is forced to introduce the essence of the law almost as an afterthought (*CPW* 6: 531; see Kelley's n15). The problem for Milton is never the law in and of itself, as it is for the author of *De Doctrina*, but the law as a means to righteousness before God. Milton's undisputed works never argue for the abrogation of the law as an element of Christian liberty, but rather for the gospel as the end of both the ceremonial and the moral law *as a path to righteousness*, with Christ standing as that righteousness and hence as the sole ground of both freedom and love (the sum of the moral law).

The second way Kerr's response enhances my essay's argument is closely related to the previous one: for all the "shifting perspectives" underlying *De Doctrina*, no shift but rather continuity informs the early prose and *Paradise Lost* as well as later works when it comes to the respective portrayals of the law. To be sure, the uniformity of Milton's

undisputed works stands out to an even greater extent against the backdrop of the treatise's mutable heterogeneity. While theology is a living discipline for Milton—hence varying emphases and nuances in different works—the consistency of his theological views in his uncontested works appears to set them apart from the restless wrestling of *De Doctrina* with itself. In fact, if it may indeed be foolish to reason in terms of discontinuity between this sort of *Pietà Rondanini* of divinity and Milton's undisputed works, the continuity informing the latter is never undermined by *De Doctrina* and rather challenges Milton's relationship to the treatise.

We should welcome a shift in our perspectives from regarding *De Doctrina*'s manuscript as a monolithic work to seeing it as an ever-evolving body of competing thoughts or rather a patchwork, in fact as many *De Doctrina*s and respective authors (whether one or many) as the views therein reflected. Even so, far from finding a synthesis, the contrast between Milton's uncontested works and the multi-faceted treatise in divinity remains and rather proves amplified.

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Form and Spiritual Content in the Poetry of George Herbert and Henry Vaughan: A Response to Jonathan Nauman

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For further contributions to the debate on "Poetic form and function in George Herbert's ‚Deniall' and Henry Vaughan's 'Disorder and Frailty': A Response to Jonathan Nauman," see http://www.connotations.de/poetic-form-and-function-in-herberts-deniall-and-vaughans-disorder-and-frailty. If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

Jonathan Nauman makes a fine job of demonstrating how Herbert sought to express the operation of divine grace in poetry by integrating meaning and form. I take issue, however, with his argument that Vaughan's reliance upon *imitatio* prevented him from sustaining a similarly creative prosody in his own work. He devised original ways of matching form with content not only in simple quatrains and complex stanzas, but also in irregular organic structures that reflected the turbulent spiritual experiences that distinguish his poetry from the calmer narrative art of Herbert.

Jonathan Nauman begins by noting that much of the commentary on George Herbert's collection of devotional lyrics has been preoccupied with two topics: the "articulation of an acute and searching Anglican Protestant spirituality" and the "unprecedented range of original and demanding poetic forms" (113). His initial project is to take further the more difficult task of "exploring some of the evident connections between the design of Herbert's verses and their message"; and he acknowledges that this is complicated by the question of "God's external influence over the poet's verse" (113). It is useful to preface an assessment of Nauman's accomplishment of this task by recalling that

Herbert himself was fully alive to these issues and approached them again and again throughout the *The Temple*. In "A true Hymne," for example, he tells how his "heart was meaning all the day, / Somewhat it fain would say" but could not get beyond the opening exclamation—"My joy, my life, my crown!"; and how he came to recognize that "these few words"—if "truly said"—could "take part / Among the best in art"; the second stanza ends by foregrounding the importance of sincerity: "The finenesse which a hymne or psalme affords, / Is, when the soul unto the lines accords"; and the third raises a specific aspect of poetic craft and admits that God—"who craves all the minde, / And all the soul, and strength"—may justly complain if "the words onely ryme," implying that verbal rhyme is inadequate without a deeper accord between words and soul. Furthermore, provided "th' heart be moved," even if "the verse be somewhat scant," God will supply the artistic "want," a process which is then demonstrated in the poem's closing couplet: "As when th' heart sayes (sighing to be approved) / *O, could I love*! and stops: God writeth, *Loved*" (Herbert 576). Herbert's belief that a "true" poem depends upon a vital relationship between the poet and God is expressed in a variety of ways. In "Dulnesse," he prays for a "quicknesse" that will enable his praise to be "brim-full," which can be granted only by the One who is to be praised: "Lord, cleare thy gift, that with a constant wit / I may but look towards thee" (Herbert 410-11); in "Love (II)," he implores the "Immortall Heat" of the Holy Spirit to "let thy greater flame / Attract the lesser to it," so that "true desires" may be kindled "in our hearts" and "our brain" may lay "all her invention" on the "Altar," "and there in hymnes send back thy fire again"(Herbert 191).[1] Several poems offer brief examples of the kind of utterance that such a relationship generates, like God's laconic "*Loved*" written in response to the sighing in "A true Hymne." "Jordan (I)" dismisses the "fictions," "false hair," and "winding stair" of contemporary verse in favour of something less "vail'd" or riddling: "Nor let them punish me with losse of ryme, / Who plainly say, *My God, My King*"(Herbert 200); and in "The Posie," invention, comparisons, and wit are all set aside for the biblical text that Herbert took as his motto: "*Lesse then the least* / *Of all Gods mercies*, is my posie still"(Herbert 632).[2]

As Nauman points out, Herbert's love of music furnished him with "countless possibilities for divinely orchestrated human expressions of grace" (118). "Employment (I)," for instance, ends with the plea: "Lord place me in thy consort; give one strain / To my poore reed" (Herbert 205)."[3] The analogy of music is used more extensively in "Easter" to bring individual artist, human craft, and divine assistance together in the "struggle" to find a "part" for the poet's "lute" in the act of composition (Herbert 139):

> Consort both heart and lute, and twist a song
> Pleasant and long:
> Or since all musick is but three parts vied
> And multiplied;
> O let thy blessed Spirit bear a part,
> And make up our defects with his sweet art. (Herbert 140)

Helen Wilcox's commentary points out that the "three parts" form "the triad or common chord, made up of three concordant notes, each a third apart" (142n15), which is the basis of musical harmony, and that a "part" in polyphonic music is "a separate line" that pursues "an independent linear progression"(Herbert 142n17).[4] In Herbert's view of sacred poetry, the three parts are taken by the human heart (or soul), the lute (or poetic craftsmanship), and divine inspiration. The example given by Nauman to demonstrate Herbert's management of "the formal and spiritual implications" of tuning his own instrument exactly to the pitch of his Creator is "The Temper (I)" (117). The stanza form devised for this poem, which shortens "from pentameter [in line 1] to tetrameter [in lines 2 and 3] to trimeter [in line 4]," is said to epitomize "what finally is identified as God's tuning action" (118):

> Yet take thy way; for sure thy way is best:
> Stretch or contract me thy poore debter:
> This is but tuning of my breast,
> To make the musick better. (Herbert 193)

Nauman's analysis can be enhanced by noticing that, alone among the seven stanzas of the poem, this one introduces disyllabic rhymes in the

second and fourth lines, so that there is a steady tightening of the lines from ten syllables to nine to eight to seven in imitation of the tuning process.

However much Herbert asserts the need for an "accord" between "soul" and "lines" and for God's active participation in the process of composition, the actual examples of successful utterance he offers—"*Loved,*" "*My God, My King,*" "*Lesse then the least / Of all Gods mercies*—do not provide evidence of how the "sweet art" of the "blessed Spirit" makes up the "defects" of "heart and lute" in the complex formal aspects of the poems that are assembled in *The Temple*. It is this gap that Nauman seeks to fill with an analysis of "Deniall," his main example of "the mode of Herbert's English devotional poems" (114), in which rhyme was not the "difficult toy" of Thomas Hobbes's adverse criticism but "an enabling discipline" analogous to the "spiritual disciplines by which God perfected the human soul" (115)[5]. This poem has frequently been cited as an example of Herbert's ability to match form with content. It enacts the consequences of unanswered prayer—"Then was my heart broken, as was my verse"—by denying the closure of rhyme to five consecutive stanzas, only to restore harmony in a sixth stanza with the very word "rhyme":

> O cheer and tune my heartlesse breast,
> Deferre no time;
> That so thy favours granting my request,
> They and my minde may chime,
> And mend my ryme.
> (Herbert 289)

For Arnold Stein, this device was merely "a piece of arbitrary wit," which offers "a token solution to the problems of the poem" (16). More often, critics have followed Joseph Summers in seeing it as a prime instance of Herbert's "attempt to make formal structure an integral part of the meaning of a poem" (135). Nauman serves Herbert well by going beyond these merely literary or aesthetic considerations to argue that "the enabling and constraining force of poetic form" in the last stanza is an effective means of figuring "the presence of God's grace within

the speaker's petition" (118). In his reading, the very "disposition towards grace is a sign of grace" and the "formal resolution"—which indicates independent and transcendent action by God—is a manifestation of that "divine-human collaboration" which makes possible a "true" poem (118-19).

"Deniall" was chosen to illustrate the operation of grace in Herbert's poetic practice not only because it is amenable to this kind of interpretation (more so, perhaps, than any other poem in *The Temple*),[6] but also because of its direct connection with a poem that is used in the second half of the article to illustrate Henry Vaughan's quite different approach to poetic form. Describing "Disorder *and* frailty" as "a lyric meant to answer Herbert's formal strategy in 'Deniall'" (121), Nauman argues that it was rooted in the "habits" of "*imitatio*" absorbed by Vaughan during his "poetic apprenticeship" to the Caroline followers of Ben Jonson (119). When he appropriated "formal techniques" that "for Herbert" were "especially analogous to divine ordering," he merely turned from "classicist *imitatio* to sacred *imitatio,*" so that—however much he desired to "merge his sacred devotion with Herbert's"—his "classicist eloquence and emphasis" were less "tentative and exploratory" than his master's "complex poetic experiments" (119). As a preliminary example, the "formal constraint" (Nauman 119) with which Herbert draws up a quasi-legal "deed" (Herbert 374) of self-dedication to God's service in "Obedience" is contrasted with Vaughan's "impassioned acceptance" (Nauman 119) of the challenge to set "hand / And heart" (Herbert 375) to the deed and pass on Herbert's inheritance in "The Match" (Vaughan 1:97-98). Nauman's verdict is that, unlike Herbert, Vaughan fails to match "a demanding form to his message" beyond the first stanza and so succeeds only in producing an "emulative and testimonial voice" that lacks the sustained appropriateness of Herbert's "inventive prosody" (120-21).

Vaughan's "effort toward *imitatio*" in "Disorder *and* frailty" is judged to be "more successful and wide-ranging" than "The Match," with each of the stanzas descanting on the thought and imagery of a different Herbert poem (121). Not only does the poem imitate Herbert's in frustrating the aesthetic closure of rhyme at the end of the first three of the

four stanzas, but it also leaves the fifth line of each fifteen-line unit unmatched until "perverse" is echoed by "verse" in a "rhyme-mending conclusion" that emulates its model in turning "from description of the speaker's situation to a petition directed to God" (124):

> But dresse, and water with thy grace
> Together with the seed, the place;
> And for his sake
> Who died to stake
> His life for mine, tune to thy will
> My heart, my verse. (Vaughan 1:110)

Nauman allows that the implication of grace being "already present" in "the speaker's desire for grace" is similar to that at the end of "Denial," but insists that it has been enabled by Vaughan's "artistic experience of Herbert's poetic forms," which opened up to him "opportunities for *imitatio* higher than the earlier sort he had pursued, more intense in its formal demands and more admirable in its spiritual results" (124-25).

The perceptive analyses of two major instances of the relation of poetic form to spiritual purpose in this article offer new and valuable insights into the practice of sacred verse and into some of the differences between two major seventeenth-century practitioners. Such a small and carefully selected sample from each poet, however, tends to underplay the extent to which Vaughan inherited from Herbert an interest in the conditions necessary for the composition of what Nauman calls "a verbal emblem of authentic Christian devotion" (113). In "Anguish," Vaughan reveals his acute awareness that the task of producing such an emblem went far beyond a mere facility with words:

> O! 'tis an easie thing
> To write and sing;
> But to write true, unfeigned verse
> Is very hard! (Vaughan 2:615)

And he knew that *imitatio* was not enough, however holy the model and skilful the imitator. Only God could give his spirit "leave / To act

as well as to conceive," that is, to go beyond the idea of what a poem should be and create a truly devotional verbal emblem (Vaughan 2:615). The dedication of the 1650 *Silex Scintillans* to Christ humbly accepts that the heart's crucial role in the shaping of a sacred poem is dependent upon divine activity: "Some drops of thy all-quickning bloud / Fell on my heart; these made it bud / And put forth thus" (Vaughan 1:56). In the first paragraph of "Mount of Olives (II)," he describes how all his "pow'rs"—"soul," "heart," "bloud," "thoughts," and "eie"—were animated when he first experienced the presence of God (1:142). The shorter second paragraph makes it clear that the real subject of the poem—as its title implies and as the punning reference to "leafs" (leaves of paper) confirms—is his absolute reliance on the Creator for the gift of authentic sacred poetry:

> Thus fed by thee, who dost all beings nourish,
> My wither'd leafs again look green and flourish,
> I shine and shelter underneath thy wing
> Where sick with love I strive thy name to sing,
> Thy glorious name! which grant I may so do
> That these may be thy *Praise*, and my *Joy* too. (Vaughan 1:143)

Many of the images and phrases in this poem are derived from an array of poems in *The Temple*—the commentary in *Works* (3:974) cites "The Glance," "Jordan (II)," "The Odour," "The Morning-watch," "Affliction (I)," "Unprofitablenes," and, in these last lines, "The Flower": "Who would have thought my shrivel'd heart / Could have recover'd greennesse" (Herbert 568)—amply demonstrating the contrast with Herbert, in whose poetry "there is no regime of formal emulation, quotation, or allusion" (Nauman 119). But in the final line-and-a-half, there is that sense of grace bestowed in the very act of requesting it that Vaughan shares with Herbert and that comes from personal conviction rather than *imitatio*.

The limited choice of poems for comparison in the article, which serves to set the "classicist eloquence and emphasis" of Vaughan against the "tentative and exploratory" (Nauman 118) nature of Herbert's "complex poetic experiments," overlooks a significant feature of

the later poet's art. It is true, as James Simmonds has convincingly shown, that Vaughan's "most basic, constant patterns" (44) are the couplet and the quatrain, which he handles with a virtuosity that varies from "formal symmetry" to an "organic unity of thought and rhythm" (Simmonds 58, 60). The latter is achieved in the simple octosyllabic quatrain that concludes "The Incarnation, and Passion":

> O what strange wonders could thee move
> To slight thy precious bloud, and breath!
> Sure it was *Love*, my Lord; for *Love*
> Is only stronger far than death. (Vaughan 1:78)

The awestruck bafflement of the first two lines is resolved in the repeated word "*Love*," which is given metrical emphasis by the two pauses in the third line; and the negative note struck by the concluding rhyme on "death" is overridden by the forward impulse created by enjambement. Some of Vaughan's most expressive effects are achieved by varying the length of lines in a rhyming quatrain, as in this stanza from "They are all gone into the world of light!"

> And yet, as Angels in some brighter dreams
> Call to the soul, when man doth sleep:
> So some strange thoughts transcend our wonted dreams,
> And into glory peep. (Vaughan 2:568)

The sense of hushed and privileged wonder conveyed by the last short line depends on the longer sweep of the preceding lines and the syntax they orchestrate, which includes the twelve-syllable unit of meaning and rhythm that results from running the first line over into the second. Among Vaughan's finest devotional lyrics, of course, are ones written in more elaborate stanzas, some taken over unchanged from *The Temple* but more often of his own devising.[7] Jonathan Post cites "Ascension-Hymn," from the 1655 *Silex Scintillans*, as evidence that Vaughan could "chisel out" stanza forms with a skill equal to that of the "master carver" of "The Altar" and "Easter Wings." In this case, he develops "his own 'hieroglyph' of ascension" from a quatrain made up of lines

of disparate length followed by an octosyllabic couplet (Post 85-86). The poem ends with a final triumphant repetition of a form designed to match the poem's spiritual subject matter in the steady lengthening of lines from three syllables to four to the soaring movement of the last two:

> Hee alone
> And none else can
> Bring bone to bone
> And rebuild man,
> And by his all subduing might
> Make clay ascend more quick then light. (Vaughan 2:567)

There are also poems by Vaughan that are much more adventurous formally than the "classicist eloquence" that Nauman regards as characteristic of his reliance on *imitatio*. "Distraction" expresses—or rather embodies—a sense of disintegration and spiritual alienation that is both individual and a general aspect of the human condition:

> But now
> I find my selfe the lesse, the more I grow;
> The world
> Is full of voices; Man is call'd, and hurl'd
> By each, he answers all,
> Knows ev'ry note, and call,
> Hence, still
> Fresh dotage tempts, or old usurps his will. (Vaughan 1:75)

Although it consists of seventeen pairs of rhyming lines, the unpredictable varying of line length, together with frequent caesuras and enjambments in this poem led Post to describe it as Vaughan's "most visually chaotic lyric," which reflects "in its own verbal disjointedness" the "spasms of living without God" (Post 176). Anne Cluysenaar valued the "immediate visceral impact" of a poem that demands to be read "as an event unfolding through time" and attributed its "emotional intensity" to unpredictable changes in the "inter-relations of metre and syntax" (Cluysenaar 98, 99, 104). Another example of what she calls

"organic" (105) development is "Affliction (I)," which distributes rhymes and line-lengths in no detectable pattern throughout its forty lines in a demonstration that "Vicissitude plaies all the game" in a world where affliction is God's means of curbing and checking "the mule, unruly man." This poem even enunciates an aesthetic justification for its refusal to fall into any regular pattern: "Beauty consists in colours; and that's best / Which is not fixt, but flies, and flowes" (Vaughan 125).

Anne Cluysenaar's description of "Distraction" as "an event unfolding through time" (99) points to another contrast with Herbert that can also be illustrated by reading "Deniall" and "Disorder *and* frailty" side by side. Herbert's poem narrates a period of spiritual desolation, when God appeared to ignore his prayers: "My breast was full of fears / And disorder"; "My heart was in my knee, / But no hearing"; "Therefore my soul lay out of sight, / Untun'd, unstrung" (288-89). Only in the last stanza does the poet break through into the present with his plea for "favours" that will bring his "minde" into harmony with God (289). Nauman aptly glosses this with a biblical text—"Ask, and ye shall receive" (John 16:24)—but his statement that "the speaker's *emerging* disposition towards grace is a sign of grace" (emphasis mine) is not quite true to Herbert's poetic strategy or the reader's experience. As R. A. Durr long ago suggested, Herbert's "struggle to attain and hold his piety" had already gone through a "formulating discipline" before being recorded in poetry. As a result, the "texture of his poems" was "smooth" and their "curve of progression" was "simple and clear, though varied and rich" (Durr 11).[8] There is a sense, then, that the resolution of "Deniall" was premeditated, the unrhymed line that "hung / Discontented" at the end of each stanza being deliberately placed in anticipation of the concluding "ryme" with "chime" (Herbert 73). Vaughan's imitation of "Deniall" also begins in the past tense, with a brief account of how God first got possession of his "heart." It quickly moves into a present tense evocation of his subsequent predicament, however, where his determination to love God "most" is a continual struggle:

[…] here tost
By winds, and bit with frost,
I pine, and shrink
Breaking the link
'Twixt thee, and me; and oftimes creep
Into th' old silence, and dead sleep. (Vaughan 108)

The rest of the poem offers analogies for the failure of his attempts to restore that link, until he prays for divine assistance in the final stanza. Nauman notes that Vaughan's ambitious emulation of Herbert's "formal strategy" features a stanza form "much more complex and lengthy" than that of "Deniall" (121).[9] What he does not acknowledge is that the effect of the variations of line-length, the missing rhyme for the fifth line, the rhyming of line 14 back to lines 6 and 7, and the frequent pauses and run-over lines is much more like the "organic" form in Vaughan's own "Distraction" than Herbert's more "constrained" five-line stanzas. The reader of "Disorder *and* frailty" is plunged into an experience—rather than offered a record—of grace perplexingly granted and withdrawn, in which he is touched by divine "fire" and "bloud," only to have his "leaves" blasted back to "the bare root" or his flight cut short, "Untill thy Sun again ascends" (1:108-109). The appeal for God's help, which alone can "tune" his "heart" and "verse," might more appropriately be said to "emerge" from the maelstrom of Vaughan's unresolved present than Herbert's more calmly contrived conclusion.

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NOTES

[1]The dedication presents the entire collection of poems in *The Temple* to God as "my first fruits," but immediately qualifies the claim to ownership: "Yet not mine neither: for from thee they came, / And must return" (Herbert 45).

[2]The motto is a conflation of Genesis 32:10 and Ephesians 3:8.

[3]A consort is a small group of musicians; a strain is a melody; and a reed, in musical terms, is a reed instrument like a shawm.

[4]Wilcox also notes that to consort is to play together in a small musical group; to twist is to interweave the parts in polyphonic music; to vie means both to increase and to be in opposition, since musical parts increase the sound by working against one another; and to multiply here is to repeat and echo the three parts in octaves and harmonic notes (Herbert 142n).

[5]Nauman cites the passage about rhyming verse in Hobbe's *Answer* to Davenant's preface, in *Sir William Davenant's Gondibert*, ed. David F. Gradish (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1971) 47.

[6]Nauman also mentions briefly formal elements of "The Altar," "Easter Wings" and "Repentance" (114-15, 122), "Home" (n5), "A True Hymne" (n6) and "Paradise" and "Heaven" (n13).

[7]Mary Ellen Rickey was among the first to recognize that Vaughan "derived a significant part of his conception of form" from Herbert (162); and Jonathan Post attributed to the influence of Herbert "the sudden burgeoning of stanzaic forms" in the 1650 *Silex Scintillans* (80).

[8]Durr had in mind the discipline of "church ritual," but the discipline of poetic art was also involved. He adds that the effect of Herbert's method is felt even in his most blatantly rebellious poem, "The Collar," in which "[h]e tells us he pounded the board, but it was a long time ago and he smiles to think of himself then" (11).

[9]The scheme of the poem—8a8b8a8b4c8d6d4e4e8f8f4g4g8d4h (with a varied pattern of abba in the opening quatrain of the second stanza)—is much less easily held by eye or ear than the five-line structure of "Deniall."

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Annotation as an Embedded Textual Practice: Some Further Comments in Response to Lena Linne and Burkhard Niederhoff

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For further contributions to the debate on "Annotation as an Embedded Textual Practice," see http://www.connotations.de/debate/understanding-through-annotations/.
If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

The present article, in dialogue with Lena Linne and Burkhard Niederhoff's recent article in *Connotations*, presents writing explanatory notes as an art, involving a feeling of what is right. In the first part, it discusses some of Linne and Niederhoff's points about how explanatory notes are read and their advice on composition that derives from this. A modification is suggested to their recommendation that notes should be "as self-effacing as possible" to that they should be simply "self-effacing," as some element of personality will always emerge. Similarly it is suggested that "as concise as possible" could be modified to "concisely-formulated." Their comparison of notes to a detour on a journey is a good guide to avoid excessive length and irrelevance, although even a longish note can be read without disturbance if taken at a natural break in the reading. The authors also mention the possibility of notes in the form of extended commentary between annotation and the critical essay, and to their examples another is proposed: the "annotated edition," inspired by *The Annotated Alice* of 1960.

The second part takes the examples from Dury (2005) quoted by Linne and Niederhoff to see how, guided by the authors' comments, these would be rewritten by Dury in 2020. The actions here involve greater concision, removal of interpretation, moving a note to a more relevant point of the text, and provision of additional information to clarify. In the penultimate example, a final interpretative comment in the area of genre conventions is preferred to leaving the reader with a

series of comments on ambiguity. In the last example, an accepted difference over interpretation is handled by using modality to present the explanation as not final.

In their recent article, Lena Linne and Burkhard Niederhoff have made a valuable contribution to the study of the explanatory notes accompanying a literary text. From their comments it is also easy to extract a series of practical guidelines to the writer of notes, and in the second section of this contribution I will show what I have learnt from them in an exercise of rewriting some of the notes they cite that were written by myself (or, anyway, by "Dury 2005"). First, however, I would like to talk around, in an essayistic way, the idea of notes as embedded textual practice.

I.

Explanatory notes—well-written—are irresistible: they are the salted peanuts of an edition, and I have often read through them all at one sitting (or, in a bookshop, standing). The reader might see this as just the sort of thing an occasional writer of notes might do (and if the reader is French, they might well call it *déformation professionelle*).

Yet this habit of reading through a set of explanatory notes by at least one eccentric subject (the same who habitually starts a magazine at the end and works forward, for reasons yet to be explained) does suggest that readers are free to read the notes in various ways: quick consultation as the annotated word or phrase is encountered in the text, in a block after or before reading a chapter, or even before or after reading the whole text.[1] Walter Scott's long historical notes are probably not often turned to and read at the point in the text where they are indicated by a footnote but at some convenient moment when reading is suspended.

The notes are a part of the paratext, i.e. the titles, illustrations, introductions, blurb, etc.: the sections of a volume surrounding the text. Like all these other elements they can be read in any order. The introduction, though placed at the entrance of the volume, is, in fact, generally read last of all. In contrast, the text itself is an artfully constructed sequence

and is read through from beginning to end. The same eccentric subject mentioned above does often look at the first and last sentence of a narrative before starting, or turns over the pages to look at the illustrations, but this is rather like appreciating the bouquet of wine before drinking. What is important is that nobody reads the last chapter and works backwards or reads in any other way than in the strict sequence of the words in that complex linguistic structure that is a novel.

The authors call explanatory notes an "embedded textual practice" (49), an activity (as I understand it) of texts, written and read, that are dependent on another text. CliffsNotes are separate slim volumes but nevertheless are not read for the pleasure of their deathless prose. An eccentric reader may read through the notes in a scholarly edition in one go, but this will always be with reference to the main text in the volume, not for the joy of the random information they contain (or not for this alone). So far, the authors and I are in agreement. They offer an attractive metaphor: "If reading a literary text is like a journey, consulting a note is like a brief detour in that journey" (68). From this follow two recommendations: "a note should be as reader-oriented and self-effacing [and] as brief as possible" (69). The note should not distract through the writer's style and interpretative views nor interrupt the reading of the text for too long.

Those expressions of degree "as possible" and "too [long]" are in alignment with Battestin's dictum that "annotation more nearly resembles an art than a science" (7). Self-effacement of the author and concision are matters of tact, a feeling of what is right. But concerning self-effacement, I think, in slight disaccord with the authors, that some kind of personality will often be perceptible[2]: the choice of what to annotate and what to say about it will reveal an individual hand. And while it is true that reader-friendly organization of the note involves a restraint on the annotator's views and personality, the understanding of what will be interesting to the reader and the graceful manner of its formulation creates a relationship of gift and gratitude between the two that does not exist in those inept notes assembled by copy-and-paste, performed almost as a penance rather than a pleasure. I am not in disagreement

with the authors in principle, just think that "self-effacing" would be a better guide than "as self-effacing as possible"—a matter of fine-tuning.

Similar thoughts are stimulated by the idea of the note as detour that should be as short as possible. It is true that interruptions make reading difficult, but it is the interruptions that come from others that break the intense concentration required to read a sentence or a paragraph. (This is something that other people do not seem to understand.) In contrast, a text read in sections that are divided by self-chosen interruptions is not only the normal but the only way that anything but the shortest texts are read. It would be good to understand how exactly we are able to read a book over days, weeks or (in the case of Proust) even years; how are we able to interrupt our "journey" through the text and pick up again without any problem? From common experience, we seem to be quite resilient to this kind of interruption; we can leave off and take up a book again later: it is something everyone does with no problems, as long as the interruptions are not too frequent and the period between reading sessions not too long. Reading even a long-ish note on a recent word or phrase at a natural pause in the text soon afterwards should not cause any problem to the activity of reading.

The important thing is that the note should aim for concision, should not stray into irrelevant matters and so become uninteresting, and should not lose itself in interpretation. The note should not be as short, but as *concisely-formulated* and as *interesting* as possible. Interesting information is unexpected, encourages thought, provokes curiosity, gives pleasure; it cannot be created by copy-and-paste.

On this point, I would like to take up a fascinating idea that (like many fascinating ideas in other texts) is found among the footnotes. The authors report in endnote 11 that, in the discussion following the talk at the *Connotations* Symposium (referred to in n1), "participants suggested that there are intermediate forms of critical discourse, situated halfway between the annotation and the critical essay". The authors then give some examples: short articles on a word or phrase of a literary text in *Notes & Queries*, a whole article of normal length on a point of particular difficulty in a text, or an edition with occasional notes on a section of the text, such as an edition of Shakespeare with

longer notes on a whole scene. I would like to add here another example: the edition often given a title beginning *The Annotated*, which gives prominence to the notes and includes among these illustrations, cross-references, variants found in manuscript drafts, the annotator's interpretations and reference to the interpretations of others. The model for these is Martin Gardner's *The Annotated Alice*, first published in 1960.[3] This is organized in pages of two columns, the slightly narrower outer columns on the two-page spread dedicated to notes in a smaller font, which occasionally occupy two columns on the same page for exceptionally long notes (Gardner excludes notes, however, on "allegorical and psychoanalytic exegesis" [xiv]). The note numbers are prominent: bold and larger than normal[4]; the choices of note type and length, of number format and pagination clearly encourage the reading of the text and the notes in a fluid back-and-forth manner and promote the note to an essential and important part of the edition. The reception of this edition depended very much on the reader, as Gardner reports:

> Several reviewers of *AA* complained that its notes ramble too far from the text, with distracting comments more suitable for an essay. Yes, I often ramble, but I hope that at least some readers enjoy such meanderings. I see no reason why annotators should not use their notes for saying anything they please if they think it will be of interest, or at least amusing. Many of my long notes in *AA* […] were intended as mini-essays. (xxx–xxxi)

The success of *The Annotated Alice* suggests that many readers have enjoyed Gardner's notes.

Gardner continued his new kind of annotated text in *The Annotated Snark* (1962) and *The Annotated Ancient Mariner* (1965), and meanwhile the idea caught on with an increasing number of similar publications.[5] Genre and fantasy fiction seem to have attracted annotated editions,[6] suggesting that writers and readers of some of these editions belong to a fan community who just cannot get enough of the text that unites them. However, annotated editions of central literary texts have also continued into the present century: *Pride and Prejudice: An Annotated Edition* (2010, and then all the other Jane Austen novels), *The Annotated*

Waste Land (2006), *The Annotated Uncle Tom's Cabin* (2007), *The Annotated Peter Pan* (2011) and *The Annotated Brothers Grimm* (2012), *The Annotated Emerson* (2012), and so on.

These editions all have "annotated edition" in their title or subtitle, while in the citation form of the normal edition the existence of notes is associated with information on the second author, typically in a phrase like "edited with an introduction and notes by." It is therefore easy to separate out "annotated editions" from normal editions with explanatory notes. In the latter, the notes occupy less space, are clearly subordinate to the main text and do not impose themselves visually on the reader.

Notes, it is clear, can range from the most concise bibliographical references and the curtest glosses, where the pleasure of the note is absent, to the running commentary of an "annotated edition" where everything depends on the reader's relationship with the commentator. The situation in the later case is similar to following the guide to a cathedral or an art exhibition: both are interposing themselves (standing in front of the painting), yet we know from experience that the guide can supply the most mechanical of repeated phrases or be someone who transmits enthusiasm and knowledge and creates a memorable communicative experience.

The analysis of the authors refers to the suitability of notes to the typical students' edition. It should be said, not in defence or justification, that Dury (2005) is slightly different from the other two editions taken for comparison. It has in fact a two-level title: "*The Annotated Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* by Robert Louis Stevenson / edited with an introduction and notes by Richard Dury." The longer and even interpretative notes therein might have a justification, but let us not quibble over definitions: the authors compare notes from all three editions to reveal a difference of approach and judge their suitability to the familiar kind of edition. In this context, the notes in Dury (1993) are useful as extreme examples. Nor do the cited notes merely give an example (and warning) of what would be indulgent length in a normal edition, for the analyses also reveal that Linehan, in a briefer set of notes, has the perception to identify many more biblical allusions—

of obvious relevance in a work with a hypocritical protagonist given to reading "a pious work," which his alter ego has "annotated […] with startling blasphemies." Let us leave behind the inviting detour of Hyde's own annotations, and move on swiftly to an examination of something more practical: what I have learned from the authors' guidelines in the writing of explanatory notes.

II

In their article, Lena Linne and Burkhard Niederhoff take three sets of notes accompanying the same text, Stevenson's *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, and compare them in terms of lemmas chosen and of a taxonomy of such notes, taking into account the aim to convey as much information as is necessary to allow the reader to gain a literal understanding of the text. As one of the three editions is Dury 2005, perhaps it may be of interest to learn what Dury 2020 has learnt from the article, and how that person might rewrite some of the cited notes in the light of the authors' comments. The authors justly observe that "fabricating the evidence for one's own claims is a questionable procedure" (49). What follows hopes to avoid justification, except in an occasional passing comment, and tries instead to learn from the observations, and adjust criticized notes, before commenting on any aspects worthy of debate.

1. *No. Never heard of him*

Here is one of the notes from Dury 2005 that the authors comment on:

> *"No, never* [sic] *heard of him"*: Lanyon's denial of knowledge of Hyde can be seen, in a psychological interpretation, as a repression of certain aspects of his own personality. Further rejections of Hyde are made by Poole ("He never *dines* here," 108), and by Jekyll himself ("I do not care to hear more," 112; "I am done with him," 124). (Dury 2005, 99n6)

I agree with the authors that Lanyon's answer presents no difficulty in understanding, and the note contains a psychological interpretation

(here joining notes covering the other main traditions of interpretation) that would be out of place in a standard edition.

On consideration, I would now shift a modified version of the note to a passage that follows in a later chapter: "'I wish to see or hear no more of Dr. Jekyll,' he said in a loud, unsteady voice. 'I am quite done with that person; and I beg that you will spare me any allusion to one whom I regard as dead'" (Dury 2004 (henceforth JH) 35). Here is the proposed new note:

> *I am quite done with that person*: Lanyon's rejection of Jekyll is later echoed by Jekyll's rejection of Hyde (again addressed to Utterson): "I am done with him in this world" and "I am quite done with him."

It is true that again the meaning is clear, but the note is now focussed on an important patterning that the reader might not notice. Of course this is a text of multiple patternings, many of which will not be commented on, but this does not seem a problem: like the art exhibition guide going beyond names and dates, annotators, when moving beyond definitions and identification of allusions, necessarily have to choose aspects that they feel to be the most important and most interesting for their audience.

2. *Cain's heresy*

The authors comment on the following note:

> *Cain's heresy*: a refusal to admit responsibility for others (cf. Genesis 4:9). Utterson ironically suggests that if he interfered, it would only be to make the other person go to the devil in another way (i.e. he does not claim an absolute knowledge of truth). (Dury 2005, 86n4)

They say (rightly) that the mere reference to the source would be better replaced by a paraphrase of the biblical episode which quotes the question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" At this point the authors enter into the fascinating exercise of perfecting an explanatory note and thereby make a valuable contribution to understanding Utterson's own gloss on "*Cain's heresy*," "I let my brother go to the devil in his own way":

> If there is a contemporary context for Utterson's allusion, it is Thomas Carlyle's biography of Frederick the Great, published in 1858. One of the famous pronouncements of the Prussian King, who was a freethinker and a patron of Voltaire, concerns his tolerance in matters of religion: "In meinem Staate muss jeder nach seiner Façon selig werden." Carlyle's English version of this reads, "in this Country every man must get to Heaven in his own way." (60)

Following the recommendations of the authors, here is my rewriting of the note, which I now feel is better dealt with if split in two:

> *Cain's heresy:* Cain murdered his brother and when asked by God where he was replied "I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?" (Genesis 4:9).
>
> *I let my brother go to the devil in his own way:* i.e. I prefer non-interference, I let everyone go to the devil in the way they prefer. This is Utterson's self-deprecating version of the narrator's judgment that he preferred to help those who had committed misdeeds rather than reprove them. This formulation seems to be a witty variation on the dictum of Frederick the Great "in this Country every man must get to Heaven in his own way" (Carlyle's translation in his 1858 biography, III.290). Identifying this preference as "Cain's heresy" adds to the strangeness of the text, since it is Cain not his brother who "goes to the devil" through sin.

I have replaced the longer comment on irony with "self-deprecating," which is more concise, and because it is self-irony that seems dominant. I originally thought of putting "self-deprecating (and heavily humorous) version" but then thought that Utterson's ponderous wit did not require pointing out.

3. *Dr. Jekyll Was Quite at Ease*

Although the authors approved of this note, I now see it would be far too lengthy for a normal edition. The authors quote 161 words from the 438 in Dury (2005). If I was now to write it as a normal explanatory note, this is what I would put:

> *Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease*: The past tense of the verb in the title is unusual (so unusual that it is occasionally translated with a present tense). It would be possible in the form "Tells How Dr Jekyll Was Quite at Ease," or if it were a direct quotation from the following chapter, or even if it could be taken as the

> following narrative's first words. But it does not quote any piece of text, nor does it connect coherently with what follows: indeed, the following chapter is about how Dr Jekyll was *not* at ease. Apart from its disallowed past tense verb and its problematic relationship with the following text, the title is itself ambiguous: it could mean "Dr Jekyll felt quite at ease," or "looked quite at ease"; and *quite* could mean "entirely" or "to some degree." After the shocks of the first two chapters the reader of a sensational tale is expecting a relaxing interlude: for a moment, the title holds out a promise of this.

The last sentence possibly crosses the line of interpretation, though it is essentially drawing attention to a genre convention, so I would like to ask the authors to be indulgent. I felt that the reader would be disoriented if just left with a note on the title's strangeness, incoherence and ambiguity. Remove the final sentence and the note seems to come with the comment "Make of this what you can." Adding the comment rounds off the note and offers the reader some help. It might be said that there are other interesting aspects of the title: a division between the narrator and the author of the chapter titles; a linguistic disorientation; and no doubt others. That last sentence, however, does not seem to impose an interpretation: it is a passing comment to stimulate thought that still leaves the reader free to work on interpretation. In addition, generic expectations are a first tool we use when following and interpreting a narrative, and notes on them fall into the authors' category 4 of "parallels and genre conventions": not essential problem-solving matters that enable understanding (the chapter title is, indeed, easy to understand) but nevertheless notes that add to understanding.

4. *the man trampled calmly over the child's body*

The last note in Dury 2005 that the authors comment on involves a two-stage detour as it refers to a passage in the introduction, given here below the note:

> *the man trampled calmly over the child's body*: an example of Stevenson's indeterminacy (see p. 29). The collision of the two bodies can be seen as an example of a chaotic event in the modern large city, where individuals meet by chance, like elementary particles in an electromagnetic field. (Dury 2005, 91n3)

> [p. 29] In the account of Hyde's brutality to the girl he knocks down (Ch. 1) the familiar meaning of *trample* ('to step repeatedly and heavily [on something] and so flatten') does not fit in with what comes before and after. We could understand '*the crowd* trampled over the child's body,' or 'the man *stepped* over (or: *stepped on*) the child's body,' but not 'the man trampled over the child's body.' (Dury 2005, 29)

The authors raise a critical eyebrow at the characterization of the collision as "a chaotic event in the modern large city etc.," and Dury 2020 agrees that, while of interest, it is not "so compelling that it needs to be brought to the attention of the reader" (67). I remember that the note was influenced by the recent reading of a study of connections between modern science and the modern worldview. The note might be more appropriately applied to Utterson's dream-version of the event, which focuses more on the modern city: "if at any time he dozed over, it was but to see [the mysterious figure] glide more stealthily through sleeping houses, or move the more swiftly and still the more swiftly, even to dizziness, through wider labyrinths of lamplighted city, and at every street-corner crush a child and leave her screaming" (JH 15). But, even then, it seems to enter too far into the territory of interpretation.

The second point they raise concerns the alleged strangeness of "trampled over"[7]: "It would appear that 'trampled calmly over the child's body' is not a deviation from common usage," they write, "as we have found some parallel instances in nineteenth-century texts" (67). Their examples, however, do not constitute a clear case: first, "great [boys] trample over the dead [i.e. over the graves] with callous indifference" (67n10)—could still be an act of flattening by a group. True, you could say "the boy trampled over the grave" but this would involve several heavy steps along the length: one foot placed by one person while crossing over, for me, would not be "trampled over." Then, "the peculiar feel and sound produced by trampling over the bilberry bushes" (67n10; continuing in the source with "as we wander through the solitude of the forest")—refers to several people flattening bushes with their feet (in order to get past and through them).

The ambiguity here of *over*, either "above and from one side to the other and proceeded on his way" or "along the surface of," leaves the

reader unsure of what has happened. It is an ambiguity in the event that has been remarked on by readers from Bentzon in 1888 ("insufficiently described"),[8] to Punter in 2013 ("not […] easy to imagine. It lingers in the memory, but only because of its strangeness" [4]).

The authors propose a literal interpretation: "What is so extraordinary about Hyde is his complete lack of emotion. He walks over the girl as if she were part of the pavement" (62). This would be an unproblematic interpretation if Stevenson had written "Hyde tramped over her," but the verb "trampled" involves flattening. It is also difficult to understand why overturning and then walking over a girl, for all its shocking lack of humanity, could make the bystanders want to kill Hyde and enable them to extract from him the equivalent of a workman's annual wages after he accepted voluntary overnight custody with them until the banks opened. It seems this is a point on which we will have to agree to differ.

But my comments on the article on explanatory notes is turning into an article about *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. Let us return to our subject and to a more interesting task: how would I rewrite the note for a standard students' edition?

> *the man trampled calmly over the child's body*: This incident is not easy to visualize: the verb "trampled over" could suggest Hyde walking over and in some way flattening, or stepping over and going on his way. The first would correspond to the reactions of the bystanders and the substantial compensation; the second to the doctor's comment that the girl was more frightened than hurt. Something about the incident, it seems, is missing, possibly suppressed. Jekyll later calls the incident "[a]n act of cruelty," but in the draft at the same point he says Hyde was "detected in an act of infamy" (JH 64, 149), and Enfield's account, it seems, contains details with connotations of both versions of the event.

I started with the pleasure of reading notes, and, after this exercise in re-writing, I should say a few words on the attraction of writing them. The pleasure of writing, we know, lies mainly in the phase of editing the draft: the pleasure of testing alternatives, cuts and additions, in balancing phrases—in shaping and making form. The note is a short text that allows a focussing on this creative and poetic process. It has some

affinities with the short poem: it is self-contained and is consciously worked so that the message is communicated with the most elegant and suggestive concision. For giving me the opportunity to experience this pleasure in re-writing notes, as well as for their insights into the well-formed note, I would like here to convey to the authors my thanks.

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NOTES

[1]As Montaigne says of the essay-like works of Plutarch and Seneca, "They both have this notable advantage for my humor, that the knowledge I seek is there treated in detached pieces that do not demand the obligation of long labor, of which I am incapable. […] I need no great enterprise to get at them, and I leave them whenever I like. For they have no continuity from one to the other" (II.10, 364).

[2]For Battestin, each editor will annotate "according to his interests, competencies, and assumptions—according, indeed, to his temperament and sensibilites" (7).

[3]In 1990 Gardner published a sequel, *More Annotated Alice*, containing additional notes, a new set of early illustrations, and a chapter written but omitted from the published text of *Through the Looking-Glass*. In 2000, *The Definitive Edition* was published combining the notes from both works. In 2015, *The Annotated Alice: 150th Anniversary Deluxe Edition* was published, combining the previous works of Gardner and expanded by Mark Burstein with more than 100 new or updated annotations and over 100 new illustrations. A similar form of point-by-point commentary is found in the scholastic text surrounded by a frame of marginal glosses and commentaries, the product of teaching through "lessons" (i.e. "readings") of a text accompanied by explanation. The modern "annotated edition" of a literary text, however, is clearly influenced by Gardner's example.

[4]In *The Definitive Edition*, note numbers were changed to conventional format.

[5]William S. Baring-Gould's *The Annotated Mother Goose* (1962), Edward Guiliano's *The Annotated Dicken*s (1968), P. Van Doren Stern's *The Annotated Walden* (1970), and Alfred Appel's *The Annotated Lolit*a (1971).

[6]William S. Baring-Gould's *The Annotated Sherlock Holmes*, (1968, second ed. 1979), Leonard Wolf's *The Annotated Dracula* (1975) and his *The Essential Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: The Definitive Annotated Edition* (1995), Martin Gardner's own *The Annotated Innocence of Father Brown* (1987) and *The Annotated Thursday* (1999), and

Douglas A. Anderson's *The Annotated Hobbit* (1989), and so on, up to Leslie S. Klinger's *The Annotated Sandman* by Neil Gaiman (2015) dedicated to a cult fantasy comic book "epic," and all the fantasy and dark fantasy texts now heavily annotated on wiki sites.

[7]"An Internet search for 'trampled over' produced 3650 hits, with (apart from instances of this text) no other example used literally of a physical act with a single agent and a single person affected; all the thousands of others involved a crowd of people or animals as the subject and something like a flower-bed or a fallen body or bodies as the object, or were used metaphorically to mean 'humiliatingly defeat (another team)' or 'violate (the constitution etc.)'" (JH xlix).

[8]"L'acte de cruauté commis par Hyde, au premier chapitre, envers la petite fille qui se trouve, on ne sait comment, la nuit, au coin d'une rue déserte, semble bien insuffisamment indiqué" (Bentzon 680).

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Connotations
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Revisiting the History of the *De Doctrina Christiana* Authorship Debate and Its Ramifications for Milton Scholarship: A Response to Falcone and Kerr[1]

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Abstract

This essay details the history of the *De Doctrina Christiana* authorship controversy, suggesting that the debate's conclusion in favor of Miltonic provenance was declared prematurely. It considers Falcone's and Kerr's recent essays in light of the larger controversy and proposes that one consequence of the larger debate should be the liberty for scholars to analyze Milton's theological presentations in his poetry apart from the specter of *DDC*.

As a Milton scholar who throughout his career has remained quite undecided on the question of Milton's authorship of *De Doctrina Christiana* (*DDC*), I have been heartened by the lively recent exchange in *Connotations* between Filippo Falcone and Jason Kerr regarding *DDC*'s provenance, a discussion that encourages me to rethink this important subject, one that has lain largely dormant in Milton studies since the 2007 publication of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana and the ensuing—and perhaps premature—declaration that this book had conclusively resolved the provenance controversy. In the course of my present essay, I wish to address not primarily specific details of Falcone's and Kerr's debate but rather the history of the larger *DDC* provenance debate (a scholarly history that has never been recounted in a

sustained manner), to consider Falcone's and Kerr's contributions within the context of that larger debate, and to reflect on what their exchange means to the larger field of Milton studies, and specifically to me personally as one whose scholarship consistently addresses matters of Bible and theology in Milton. Along the way, I will share my own scholarly journey with *DDC* and its attendant controversies, concluding with some reflections regarding how, in light of Falcone's and Kerr's interchange, scholars might choose to use or not use *DDC* in their future work.

My own engagement with the *DDC* controversy began in early 2000 as I commenced researching my doctoral dissertation on Milton. One night I unexpectedly awoke at 2 a.m. and, being unable to get back to sleep, I began reading William B. Hunter's *Visitation Unimplor'd* (1998)—to this day the most sustained challenge to Milton's authorship—and proceeded to read it through to its end before noon. Although I was already aware that most Milton scholars had rejected Hunter's position, I found Hunter's arguments genuinely fascinating and, though I was not completely convinced, largely compelling. What struck me most powerfully was that, if Hunter was right, a great deal of important Milton scholarship reliant on *DDC* and its Miltonic authorship would be seriously compromised. Soon afterwards, as a naïve graduate student still rather in awe of my scholarly superiors, I spoke in hushed tones of this matter with a celebrated Miltonist at the Chicago Newberry Library Milton Seminar.

> "Some of his arguments are really good," I said.
> "They sure are," s/he soberly answered.
> I then said, "If Hunter is right, then the whole of Milton scholarship will have to speak a collective 'Ooops!'"
> "We sure will," s/he answered.

As I will discuss later, no such collective mea culpa or anything close to it was ever uttered, but I share this anecdote to remind us of how very threatening Hunter's thesis was before the matter of Miltonic authorship of *DDC* became an essentially dead issue within Milton scholarship, a deadness, I will suggest, that is more the product of inertia and

convenience than of decisive argumentation, a deadness that Falcone's article and, perhaps unintentionally, Kerr's response have challenged.

A History of the *DDC* Authorship Debate, 1991-2006

How times in Milton scholarship have changed. We do well to remember that, when Hunter first put forth his thesis, which contested Miltonic authorship based both on differences between the treatise's theology and the theology of Milton's poetry and on historical matters regarding *DDC*'s manuscript—including Hunter's distrust of copyist Daniel Skinner—it was offered within an atmosphere of vigorous, collegial, and sustained debate. Hunter's seminal 1992 *Studies in English Literature* article, "The Provenance of the *Christian Doctrine*," was originally presented at an August 1991 session at the Fourth International Milton Symposium, followed by responses by two of the most eminent living Miltonists, Barbara K. Lewalski—who emphasized theological similarities between *DDC* and Milton's poetry—and John T. Shawcross—who found Hunter's concerns about *DDC*'s copyists to be unpersuasive. Hunter then responded to Lewalski and Shawcross, calling for a deeper investigation into *DDC*'s Latin alongside Milton's indisputable Latin prose. Lewalski's, Shawcross's, and Hunter's responses all appeared in the same 1992 issue of *SEL* (Lewalski, Shawcross and Hunter) immediately after Hunter's essay, which was subsequently awarded the Milton Society of America's James Holly Hanford Award for the year's most distinguished article in Milton studies.

And the provenance debate was only beginning. The next year Hunter published another essay in *SEL* which highlighted the work of Bishop Thomas Burgess, who had challenged Miltonic authorship when *DDC* was first translated and published in 1825 ("The Provenance of the *Christian Doctrine*: Addenda"). Then, in 1994, *SEL* published three more articles in the same issue: in separate essays, both Maurice Kelley ("The Provenance") and Christopher Hill ("Professor William B. Hunter") challenged Hunter's original 1992 arguments even

as they both insisted on various parallels between *DDC* and other of Milton's works and, in Hill's case, attacked Bishop Burgess's competency. In his own response to Kelley and Hill, Hunter maintained the "[b]asic contradictions of dogma" between *DDC* and the indisputable Milton canon ("Animadversions" 202). Hunter accused Kelley and Hill of sidestepping his most persuasive claims, arguing that, although they "certainly demonstrate Milton's connection with *DDC*," they nonetheless "have not conclusively proved his authorship of it" (202).

At this point, if the matter of authorship remained unresolved, what was clear was the degree to which Hunter's thesis threatened the established order of Milton scholarship, a phenomenon clearly represented by Hunter's prominent interlocutors. Most obviously, Kelley's stature as a Miltonist rested largely on his influential *This Great Argument: A Study of Milton's* De Doctrina Christiana *as a Gloss upon* Paradise Lost (1941). Kelley's subtitle reveals exactly what was at stake for him in his attempts to refute Hunter's thesis. And Kelley's other most significant work in Milton studies was his editing the *The Christian Doctrine* for the Yale University Press *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, a 1973 volume in which, throughout his "masterful" (Falcone, "Irreconcilable (Dis)Continuity" 91) footnotes to *DDC*'s English translation's text, Kelley restated his aforementioned connections between *DDC* and *Paradise Lost*. Indeed, as recently as 1989, the venerable Kelley had urged scholars to make use of *DDC* "as a gloss for *Paradise Lost*" ("On the State" 47).

DDC's significance to Lewalski's and Hill's scholarship was similarly crucial. In *Milton's Brief Epic: The Genre, Meaning and Art of* Paradise Regained (1966), the first of her many celebrated books on Milton, Lewalski predicated her analysis of Milton's Son on *DDC*'s Arian Christology. For his part, Hill drew upon the heterodox *DDC* to buttress his portrait of the politically and religiously radical Milton in *Milton and the English Revolution* (1977). And if Shawcross had less direct investment in Miltonic provenance, he too, as had long been typical in Milton scholarship, regularly utilized *DDC* to support his analysis of Milton's poetry and prose. I must emphasize that I accuse none of these scholars or anyone else of dishonesty in their opposition to Hunter's arguments.

Nonetheless, it was obvious that they, like so many other Milton scholars, had much to lose if Hunter's thesis proved correct.[2]

Curiously enough, Hunter's claims strikingly undermined some of his own most important previous scholarship, which included his earlier arguments that *DDC*'s Christology was actually compatible with early orthodox Christianity ("Milton's Arianism Reconsidered"), and the fact that Hunter was willing to go against his earlier scholarship indeed gained his views credibility in the eyes of some readers (Urban, "On Christian Doctrine" 238). But both Hunter's earlier and later writings regarding *DDC* sought, in one way or another, to bring Milton into the fold of orthodox Christianity. Indeed, Hunter's 1992 response noted that if *DDC* were demonstrated to not be authored by Milton, then Milton and his writings could be recognized as "closer to the great traditions of Christianity, no longer associated with a merely eccentric fringe" (Lewalski, Shawcross and Hunter 166). I will admit that I heard scholarly whisperings that Hunter's assertions against Miltonic provenance were motivated by Hunter's trinitarian Christianity, and his obituary does suggest his significant involvement in a historic, albeit mainline, Christian Protestant church (Obituary). But we do well to remember that scholars' own religious commitments do not necessarily coincide with their handling of *DDC*. Indeed, it bears mentioning that two Miltonists whose books argue vigorously for an Arian interpretation of *Paradise Lost*—Michael Bauman and Larry Isitt—were and are themselves identifiably orthodox in their own Christian beliefs.[3] Significantly, Bauman's highly influential *Milton's Arianism* (1987), which specifically contested Hunter's claims that *DDC* was compatible with orthodox Christianity, appeared just four years before Hunter's initial presentation of his thesis, and although Hunter did not cite it, Bauman's book may have influenced Hunter's change of mind regarding *DDC*'s essential orthodoxy (*Visitation* 99).[4]

Amid Hunter's efforts, another highly regarded scholar, Paul R. Sellin, without explicitly accepting Hunter's arguments, added his voice to Hunter's skepticism regarding Miltonic authorship, and Sellin's efforts display how the controversy was expanding beyond *SEL*

into other respected journals. In a 1996 *Milton Studies* article, Sellin challenged *DDC*'s compatibility with *Paradise Lost*, particularly emphasizing the works' differences regarding predestination, contingent grace, and free will. In light of these differences, Sellin cautioned against using *DDC* "as the authoritative gloss on *Paradise Lost* that Maurice Kelley envisioned" ("John Milton's" 58). The next year, Sellin continued to push back against the allegedly close relationship between *DDC* and Milton's uncontested canon, publishing an article in *SEL* challenging the scholarly claim that *DDC* refers to Milton's divorce tract *Tetrachordon* ("Reference").

Meanwhile, Gordon Campbell led a committee of scholars who were studying the Latin manuscript, publishing in 1997 in *Milton Quarterly* a history of the manuscript (including the involvement of its scribes, Jeremie Picard and Daniel Skinner), a comparison of the contents of *DDC* and the indisputably Miltonic canon, and a discussion of *DDC*'s Latin stylometry (Campbell et al., "Provenance"). The committee's conclusions were cautious but overall more sanguine about Miltonic authorship than Hunter, calling *DDC* "a working manuscript" that Milton was revising (110). At the same time, the committee postulated, among other things, both that some sections seemed more authentically Miltonic than others and that Milton's work on the manuscript largely took place "during the late 1650s" (110). The committee cautioned that *DDC*'s "relationship [...] to the Milton oeuvre must remain uncertain," a matter punctuated by *DDC*'s being an unfinished work and the attendant uncertainty regarding "what other changes, especially what deletions of doctrines to which he did not subscribe, Milton would have made in completing his task" (110). The following year, the committee's subcommittee, supplementing the 1997 report, also advised caution. Publishing in 1998 in *Literary and Linguistic Computing*, these scholars focused on *DDC*'s Latin stylometry, emphasizing stylometry's importance to the authorship controversy. Like the 1997 report, this report suggested that some parts of *DDC* appeared much more Miltonic than others, explicitly warning against *DDC*'s being "appropriated […] straightforwardly as a gloss on Milton's theological musings in *Paradise Lost*" (Tweedie, Holmes and Corns 86).

Such caution, however, did not sit well with various Milton scholars. Lewalski, in a 1998 *Milton Studies* essay, pushed back against the 1997 report as well as Hunter's *SEL* articles and Sellin's *Milton Studies* article, specifically disputing these works' warnings against using *DDC* to elucidate *Paradise Lost* and other of Milton's works. In response, Lewalski cited eleven parallel passages on various subjects, emphasizing "how closely, in ideas, language, and characteristic attitudes, *De Doctrina Christiana* conforms to Milton's other writing" ("Milton" 203). Lewalski's article, which also expressed incredulity toward the committee's use of stylometry, suggested that she was ready to be done with the provenance controversy, a sentiment articulated more forcefully by Stephen M. Fallon in an essay appearing in the 1998 collection *Milton and Heresy*. There, Fallon unapologetically used *DDC* as a gloss upon *Paradise Lost*, stating, "the case for Milton's authorship mounted in response to Hunter strikes me as insurmountable" ("'Elect Above the Rest'" 97). The editors of *Milton and Heresy*, Stephen J. Dobranski and John T. Rumrich, asserted their position even more resolutely, like Lewalski casting doubt on the 1997 report's use of stylometry, and declaring: "[B]y ordinary standards of attribution—which none of the participants in the controversy has challenged—Milton's authorship […] is […] indisputable" (7). In his own essay in *Milton and Heresy*, Rumrich also supported Kelley's model of using *DDC* as a gloss for *Paradise Lost*, arguing that the two works' "coherence" is "far-reaching, detailed, and, in their shared deviations from Christian orthodoxy, distinctive" ("Milton's Arianism" 75). And in a 1999 article in *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, Fallon warned that the ongoing provenance controversy could harm Milton studies on a whole, for *DDC*, being "an invaluable quarry of Milton's engaged critical and theological intelligence, will be considerably more difficult to use if scholars must in every essay and every book rehearse yet once more the overwhelming reasons for accepting the work as Milton's" ("Milton's Arianism" 122).

But Hunter's *Visitation Unimplor'd* also appeared in 1998, ensuring that, contrary to Fallon's wishes, the controversy would be alive for the

foreseeable future. *Visitation* offers chapters on topics such as "The Evidence of the Early [Milton] Biographers"; *DDC*'s "Two Scribes"—developing Hunter's aforementioned concerns regarding Daniel Skinner as well as his reservations regarding Jeremie Picard; and *DDC*'s "Continental Context"—something Hunter believed was at odds with Milton as a British author. *Visitation* also contains several chapters analyzing discrepancies between *DDC* and Milton's canon, particularly *Paradise Lost*. Reviews were positive but emphasized the controversy's continued uncertainty, praising, like Hunter himself did, the 1997 report.[5] In his review of *Visitation*, John Hale, an author of the 1997 report, noted the most significant problem with the ongoing controversy: "that the outstanding proponents have by now become entrenched" (30). Hale called for greater Latin expertise in Milton studies and emphasized the importance of stylometry even as he noted that "stylometricians [...] have their own vigorous debate about evidence, method and standards of probability in proofs" (30). In another review, *Milton Quarterly* editor Roy Flannagan commented that many scholars "have deplored" Hunter's "trouble-making" efforts (271), concluding that "Milton scholars are staying tuned in for the next installment in this theological soap opera" (272). I specifically quote these reviews because, in their own very different ways, they each emphasize both the controversy's continued uncertainty and a growing frustration among scholars with the controversy itself.

For his own part, Hunter seemed content with *DDC*'s authorship remaining perpetually unresolved. In his 1999 *Milton Quarterly* response to *Milton and Heresy* and Lewalski's 1998 essay, he wrote, "I recognize that I have not been able finally to prove that Milton did not author *De Doctrina*, which I suppose would require his notarized affidavit" ("Responses" 36). At the same time, he insisted that his opponents had not "demonstrated that he authored all of it," adding his hope that Miltonists could "agree that the work is a composite one" (36). He pushed back more strongly against Lewalski's and Rumrich's respective uses of *DDC* as a gloss for Milton's canon, particularly *Paradise Lost*, a practice that Hunter argued brought about various misunderstandings of Milton's epic. And in an essay immediately following Hunter's, Sellin

responded to Lewalski's and Fallon's respective disagreements with his own aforementioned essays. He repeated his misgivings regarding scholars' insisting that *DDC* has numerous passages analogous to those in Milton's prose and *Paradise Lost*, a practice Sellin contended led to readings of Milton's canon so strained that he felt "concerned about quality of argument" pertaining to "the current controversy" ("Further Reponses" 48). Significantly, even as Fallon argued that skepticism regarding *DDC* would hurt Milton scholarship by depriving scholars of an invaluable resource, Sellin rather asserted that unchecked enthusiasm for *DDC* was leading scholars to use the treatise to justify sloppy argumentation regarding Milton's writings.

In any case, the matter of continued uncertainty regarding *DDC*'s authorship manifested itself in what became for a time a common if not begrudged habit among Milton scholars, who, while continuing to use *DDC* in their articles and books, nonetheless included in footnotes or introductions disclaimers explaining that, although they recognized that the controversy regarding *DDC* had not been fully resolved, they did not find Hunter's arguments ultimately persuasive and still believed *DDC* to be thoroughly Miltonic and thus appropriate for their own scholarly endeavors. Such statements were a source of the frustration that Fallon articulated in his 1999 essay. But these disclaimers continued for some years. A particularly lengthy, memorable, and perhaps even whimsical statement was offered by Stanley Fish in the introduction to his magisterial *How Milton Works* (2001). There, after analyzing the controversy for some three and a half pages, Fish writes:

> At any rate, given what we do know and what we don't know, I come to the conclusion that the answer to the question "Who wrote Milton's *Christian Doctrine*" is "Milton." To be sure, the fact that I have come to that conclusion will not settle the matter, but it does settle it for the purposes of this book. (19)

Fish's blunt final clause is memorable because it reflects the attitude of most Miltonists during the height of the provenance controversy:

Whatever the merits of Hunter's thesis, they are not sufficiently persuasive to refrain from significantly incorporating *DDC* in any given study of Milton's writings.

But if in 2001 Fish felt the need to offer the above disclaimer, Lewalski, in her award-winning 2000 *The Life of John Milton*, did not. She does not mention the controversy until well into her biography, where she simply writes, "Though a few scholars have called into question Milton's authorship of *De Doctrina Christiana*—some of them seeking to distance Milton's poetry from its radical heterodoxies—their arguments have not been widely accepted" (416). Representing the participants in the controversy in a surprisingly brief footnote, Lewalksi lists only Hunter's book and articles with regard to skepticism toward *DDC*, making no mention of Sellin or of either the committee or the subcommittee report even as she cites her and Shawcross's 1992 "Forum" responses, Hill's essay, Dobranski and Rumrich's volume, and her own *Milton Studies* essay in favor of Milton's authorship. For Lewalski, the controversy was effectively over, and her statement about scholars being motivated to distance Milton from *DDC*'s heresies perhaps underscored the lack of scholarly merit she was willing to concede to Hunter's position. In any case, Lewalski did not allow the controversy to distract from her own presentation of a Milton for whom the heterodox *DDC* was an integral part. Indeed, Lewalski devotes twenty-six pages to her discussion of *DDC*, a document she postulates, in contrast to the 1997 *Milton Quarterly* report, "was finished in all essential respects in 1658-65, in tandem with *Paradise Lost*" (416). Lewalski's statement anticipates her own practice in the biography of using *DDC* as a gloss to Milton's epics, something she notably does in arguing that, in *Paradise Lost*, "Milton's Arianism"—a matter "set forth in *De Doctrina Christiana*"—"allows him to portray the Son as a genuinely dramatic and heroic character" (473); and that "Milton's Arianism is central to [*Paradise Regained*], allowing for some drama in the debate-duel between Jesus and Satan even though the reader knows that Jesus will not fall" (513).

But while Lewalski was effectively dismissing the controversy, another major Miltonist, Michael Lieb, though not completely accepting

Hunter's arguments, was embracing the notion of *DDC*'s authorial uncertainty. At both the April 2001 Midwest Conference on Christianity and Literature and the June 2002 International Milton Symposium, Lieb announced that he would no longer call Milton the author of *DDC*, but rather refer to "the [unnamed] author of *De Doctrina Christiana*." Lieb's efforts to champion matters of authorial uncertainty reached their apex with his lengthy 2002 *Milton Studies* essay, "*De Doctrina Christiana* and the Question of Authorship," which offers a thorough study of *DDC*'s Latin manuscript, Bishop Burgess's writings on *DDC*, and the involvement of Picard and Skinner. Early in his essay, Lieb both commends Hunter's efforts and states, "I do not think we shall ever know conclusively whether or not Milton authored all of the *De Doctrina Christiana*, part of it, or none of it" (172).[6] Although Lieb conceded that "not many" scholars had sided with Hunter (172), the fact that Lieb's article won the Milton Society of America's James Holly Hanford Award for the year's distinguished essay indicated that the *DDC* controversy was still deemed significant within the larger Milton community.

But despite its celebrated reception, Lieb's essay marked the final high-profile effort challenging Miltonic provenance of *DDC*, and strong voices in Milton Studies continued to challenge the legitimacy of the controversy's continuance. In 2003, John Rumrich published an essay about the state of the controversy which developed his earlier concerns about matters of stylometry.[7] Rumrich begins his essay by suggesting that the aforementioned replies to Hunter by Lewalski, Hill, and Kelley should have been sufficiently "decisive" to end skepticism regarding *DDC*'s provenance ("Provenance" 214). What has prolonged the ongoing controversy—and the "heavily annotated disclaimers" offered by "politic Milton scholars" is "not so much" Hunter and his "persistence" but rather "the efforts of a self-appointed committee of experts"—the report offered by Campbell et al. in 1997, as well as the 1998 report offered by Tweedie et al.—that "[deny] the reliability of *De doctrina Christiana* as a guide to Milton's beliefs and [recommend] skepticism as to the authorship of the treatise" (214, 215). From his opening paragraph,

Rumrich reveals his exasperation with the degree to which the provenance controversy has dragged out because of the influence of this "self-appointed" (215) group of authorities. He expresses particular frustration toward Campbell, whom Rumrich states is behind the committee's 1997 conclusion that *DDC* is unfinished and incomplete, a position "that no scholar but Campbell has found tenable since Maurice Kelley, more than a decade ago, refuted it" (216).[8] Rumrich goes on to assert that, although the committee presents itself as "unbiased" (216), the desire to [present] Milton as an orthodox Trinitarian" (220), "though largely unacknowledged in the committee's report, influences it profoundly" (221).[9] Rumrich then argues that the 1998 report's stylometric methodology is not appropriate for the genre of *DDC* because it "neglect[s] the obvious explanation for the heterogeneity of the treatise's style—Milton's reliance on the commonplace tradition" (225), something that assured that *DDC* would quote the writings of various authors without explicit acknowledgement. A better measure of *DDC*'s Miltonic consistency is "Milton's most distinctive authorial practice—his extraordinary dependence on and synthesis of Scripture" (231), a practice, Rumrich suggests, that likely exceeded that of any other theologian of Milton's era.

Although the matter of *DDC*'s authorship still remained unresolved, by this point the debate implicitly receded from prominence, articles on *DDC*'s provenance became rare, and the disclaimers that Fallon and Rumrich found so distasteful became less frequent or at least more perfunctory and even dismissive.[10] And those who had emphasized the authorial uncertainty of *DDC* either ceased to do so or modulated their message. The venerable Hunter died in 2006 at the age of 91; Sellin, who was himself well into his seventies, wrote no more on the topic; and Lieb, in the introduction to a book published the same year as Hunter's death, proclaimed himself "a firm believer in Miltonic authorship" of *DDC* (*Theological Milton* 4); moreover, moving away from his earlier declarations, Lieb called *DDC*'s author "Milton" throughout his book. At the same time, however, Lieb still maintained that "Milton's exact presence" in *DDC*'s manuscript "is obscured by a host of factors" (4),

also emphasizing his belief that *DDC* ought not "in any sense be construed as a 'gloss' on [Milton's] poetry" (2).

Milton and the Manuscript of De Doctrina Christiana and the Effective Cessation of the *DDC* Controversy: 2007-2018

Perhaps Lieb's shift regarding the provenance of *DDC* was influenced by the fact that, at the June 2005 International Milton Symposium, Campbell's committee presented a report that, in contrast to the cautious reports of 1997 and 1998, affirmed Milton as the author of *DDC*. The committee's 2007 publication of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana effectively ended the controversy that Hunter instigated in 1991. In this book, which also offered detailed historical evidence connecting Milton to *DDC*'s manuscript, the committee revealed additional stylometric studies that indicated that, despite the stylometric diversity within *DDC*, the treatise actually demonstrates greater internal consistency than do the theological treatises of Ames and Wollebius (Campbell et al., *Milton and the Manuscript* 84-88), whose writings *DDC* seems largely modeled upon. Indeed, according to the committee, "Milton's *De Doctrina Christiana* is at least as much his work as Wolleb's or Ames's treatises belong to the writers to which they are, uncontestedly, ascribed" (159). Concluding its stylometric analysis, the committee asserted: "Since the stylometry points to Milton's near certain involvement in some sections of the text, we may postulate his authorship (or perhaps 'authorship') of the whole, given that this is a genre in which the work of others is silently appropriated" (88). But despite the committee's confidence regarding Miltonic authorship, it bears mentioning that, Rumrich's protests notwithstanding, the committee still maintained that *DDC*'s manuscript remained unfinished and far from ready to be sent to a press (156-57).[11] Moreover, the committee concluded that Milton's work on *DDC* ended by 1660 or earlier (157-58), cautioning that the treatise's "value as a guide to the interpretation of [*Paradise Lost*] is limited" (161).[12]

Overall, *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana was regarded as an unqualified success, one that liberated Milton scholarship from the constricting burden that Hunter had placed upon it. The Milton Society of America awarded it the James Holly Hanford Award for the distinguished book published in 2007, and reviewing the book in *Milton Quarterly*, the prestigious Miltonist John Rogers celebrated the end of the controversy, declaring victory not only for Miltonic provenance but also for Milton studies as a whole:

> [T]he authorship question hovering over Milton studies has now been authoritatively resolved. The critics committed to the study of Milton's religious concerns are now officially released from the faint but unmistakable form of scholarly bondage under which they have been writing for over 15 years now: we no longer need shackle our scholarly prose with the hollow gestures of uncertainty concerning Milton's responsibility for the *De Doctrina Christiana*. (66)

We may presume that Rogers's words represent the relief felt by scholars such as Fallon and Rumrich who had earlier expressed their annoyance and anxiety toward the lingering specter of uncertainty regarding *DDC*'s authorship. Indeed, *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana allowed scholars to again use *DDC* without apology in their critical endeavors. It is noteworthy, however, that Rogers—another scholar who has regularly used *DDC* to promote a heretical understanding of Milton and *Paradise Lost*[13]—in his review made no mention of the authors' expressed caution regarding using *DDC* to interpret *Paradise Lost*. But such cautions notwithstanding, it seems accurate to suggest that the committee's book effectively returned *DDC* to its pre-1991 status regarding its usefulness to help interpret *Paradise Lost* and various other works in Milton's canon.

Significantly, however, not all reviewers were as sanguine as Rogers.[14] Writing in *The Review of English Studies*, Ernest W. Sullivan criticized the committee's failure to find watermarks in *DDC*'s manuscript, a failure that directly contrasted with Sullivan's own discovery, during his 2001 inspection of the manuscript, of five watermarks and two countermarks, markings that suggested "an erratic production of the

manuscript over a substantial period of time, possibly beginning in 1625—a date that would preclude Milton's authorship of a manuscript not in his hand" (153). Sullivan lamented that the book's authors "fail to apply the watermark evidence to the authorship debate, evidence that could break, if not make, their case" (154). Stating that "the evidence from stylometrics, Latin style, and theology is inconclusive," Sullivan concluded his review by declaring: "The debate remains open" (154). One might think that Sullivan's concerns, published in a highly influential journal a year and a half before Rogers's celebratory review appeared,[15] would have mitigated scholarly enthusiasm for the book's confident assertions of Miltonic authorship, but with very few exceptions, I see little evidence that such mitigation ever occurred. Rather, the controversy was essentially declared over amid a vacuum of any sustained high-profile opposition to *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana.

Indeed, as Kerr rightly notes, since the book's publication and celebratory reception, "skepticism about the treatise's authorship has mostly gone underground" (128), with a striking paucity of developed published challenges to the committee's confident assertions regarding Milton's authorship. Most notable is Sullivan's subsequent silence after his review. I remember reading Sullivan's review when it first appeared, and, because the review specifically mentioned his presenting his watermark findings in "a paper at the Milton Society session at the 2001 MLA" (153), I fully expected Sullivan to follow his review with a developed article detailing the significance of these watermarks to the authorship of *DDC*. But no such article ever appeared. Lingering skepticism toward authorship has also been expressed by John Mulryan in his 2013 review of John K. Hale and J. Donald Cullington's translation of *DDC*, where Mulryan writes:

> The editors contend that the Latinity of the treatise is superior to other systematic theologies of the time, a "fact" which "proves" Milton wrote it. I do not find it so. The Latin, by and large, is neither polished nor sophisticated in its syntax and is almost totally devoid of rhetorical ornament. (81)

As was the case regarding Sullivan and his review, one might hope that Mulryan would have followed up his objection with a developed article explaining why *DDC*'s Latin makes ascribing it to Milton problematic, but no such article has yet appeared. Finally, Hugh Wilson, perhaps the most indefatigable skeptic regarding authorship, has presented numerous conference papers arguing against Milton's authorship, but as of now, none of Wilson's papers has appeared in published form. Indeed, to my knowledge, in the years between the publication of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana and Falcone's 2018 *Connotations* article, only one article appeared that offered a developed challenge to Milton's authorship of *DDC*: Falcone's 2010 piece—published in an Italy-based journal unknown to most Milton scholars—which discusses discrepancies between *DDC* and various passages in *Paradise Lost* and Milton's final prose tract, *Of True Religion* ("More Challenges").

Of course, this dearth of published challenges does not in and of itself validate Milton's authorship of *DDC*, but there is definitely an overall sense that scholars in the field consider the matter a non-issue, a long-resolved relic of the past to which they are not interested in returning. Indeed, practically speaking, why spend time re-investigating a theory that cannot be proved, that in the minds of most Miltonists has effectively been *disproved*, when there are, to paraphrase Fallon, treasures to mine from *DDC* applicable to so many dimensions of Milton scholarship? In my own experience, the degree to which the scholarly community has moved beyond the controversy was demonstrated most profoundly when, at the most recent (October 2019) Conference on John Milton, I chaired a session on the Provenance of *DDC* which involved only an extended presentation by Wilson and his colleague James Clawson, followed by ample discussion. It was a fascinating session, made memorable by the contribution of Clawson, a stylometrician who emphasized that he had no scholarly or emotional investment in the matter of Milton's authorship. Having said that, he argued, based on his stylometric analysis, that Milton was probably not the author of *DDC*. But what was perhaps even more memorable—and indeed unsettling—was the fact that, in addition to the presenters and me, only three people, Kerr being one, attended the session.[16] For myself, I came

away from the session with my somewhat dormant suspicions regarding *DDC*'s authorship renewed, but also with a conviction that if those who dissent regarding Miltonic authorship want the matter not to fade further into oblivion, they need to aggressively publish their arguments.

The Significance of the Falcone-Kerr Debate to Our Understandings of the Larger *DDC* Authorship Controversy and *DDC*'s Relationship to *Paradise Lost*

And this is part of what makes the current *Connotations* debate between Falcone and Kerr so important. Falcone has, as it were, brought to the surface the lingering underground skepticism regarding *DDC* and Milton—not yet prominently, but at least in view for those who would reexamine the topic or perhaps discover it for the first time. Falcone's 2018 article is particularly valuable for its discussion of discontinuity between *DDC* and *Paradise Lost*, especially regarding their respective portrayals of the Mosaic Law. At the very least, Falcone reminds us that any application of *DDC* to the rest of Milton's canon must be done with discretion and humility, something the authors of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana themselves suggest. And the publication of this article in *Connotations* invites, indeed exhorts contribution, whether in *Connotations* or elsewhere, by those other underground scholars, named or yet unnamed, to publish their cases in a developed manner. For his part, Kerr merits commendation for responding to Falcone. It would have been easier for him to not reply, to simply say that the matter had been resolved. Instead, his essay offers, at least on one level, a remarkable point of basic agreement with Falcone, for in recognizing discontinuity within the manuscript of *DDC* itself, Kerr also advocates for a cautious use of *DDC* with relation to the epic. Memorably, Kerr argues that "the treatise has a life of its own independent of *Paradise Lost*," and he challenges the idea of "hold[ing] *Paradise Lost* firmly to [*DDC*'s] theological standard," suggesting rather that *Paradise Lost*

"might simply represent a further change of mind" (131). As Falcone recognizes in his very recent answer to Kerr, "Kerr's response" actually "enhances [Falcone's] argument" in that "for all the 'shifting perspectives' underlying *De Doctrina*, no shift but rather continuity informs the early prose and *Paradise Lost* as well as later works when it comes to the respective portrayals of the law" ("Milton's Consistency" 127).

Falcone's and Kerr's reengagement of the controversy has encouraged me to examine again the debate's history; to recognize factors involved that might motivate one position or another; and to consider the possibility that the debate was prematurely squelched, either from matters of self-interest, or weariness, or simply individual scholars' need or desire to get on to something else. These are all understandable motivations, but they are not conducive to the rigorous examination of scholarly pronouncements on matters of such critical import for one's field. Indeed, I feel the need to revisit what I consider a particularly problematic statement that the committee offers in its 2007 efforts to affirm Milton's authorship of *DDC*. Let us consider again, carefully, this sentence: "Since the stylometry points to Milton's near certain involvement in some sections of the text, we may postulate his authorship (or perhaps 'authorship') of the whole" (Campbell et al., *Milton and the Manuscript* 88). We should appreciate the logical jump being made here. Because Milton is "*near*[ly] certain[ly]" involved with "*some* sections of the text," the committee therefore "*postulate*[s]" "his authorship [...] of the *whole*." Hmmm. Does this statement honestly inspire a confident declaration—and indeed a celebration—that the matter of *DDC*'s authorship has been settled? Why did the committee's conclusions so easily win the day in the face of Sullivan's concerns? What of those watermarks that Sullivan briefly but disturbingly addressed? What of Sullivan's saying that the stylometry was "inconclusive"? Why did Rogers's celebration of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana so easily prevail over Sullivan's skepticism? And what about Rumrich's 2003 grievances against both the inexact science of stylometry and the audacity of a "self-appointed committee of experts" declaring their authority over the larger process? Should not Rumrich's concern cut both

ways, as Sellin had suggested in a 2001 article?[17] And, at the risk of repeating myself, why have the skeptics offered such anemic published resistance to the committee's conclusions? In the end, had the belief in authorial uncertainty, already a rather anti-social position even before the 2007 book, fallen so out of fashion that it simply was not worth the effort?

We might recognize that on some level the committee's 2007 conclusions stand on tenuous ground. Certainly Falcone's 2010 and 2018 articles have added to the notion of theological discontinuity between the treatise and the rest of Milton's canon. Of course, Campbell and Corns can answer such concerns by reminding us that Milton's "opinions on many theological issues changed in the course of his life"; *DDC* simply "affords a view of his theological thinking in the 1650s" (*John Milton* 273). But as Falcone cogently argues throughout his 2018 essay and effectively reiterates in his 2020 response to Kerr, the degree of continuity between Milton's works besides *DDC*—a continuity which can be traced through works both preceding *DDC*'s presumed time period and works following it, without interruption besides *DDC*, without any "clear indications of major shifts toward heterodoxy" (Falcone, "Irreconcilable (Dis)Continuity" 95)—is striking. May we go so far as to say that this continuity within the undisputed Miltonic canon, combined with various examples of discontinuity between *DDC* and the undisputed canon, is enough so that Campbell and Corns's explanation is ultimately less persuasive than the notion that *DDC* is substantially not Milton's work? We should also note that the committee's 2007 chapter on stylometry is still largely the same as what the subcommittee offered in their 1998 report that pronounced uncertainty regarding authorship (compare Tweedie et al. 80-86; and Campbell et al., *Milton and the Manuscript* 72-80). The fact that the 2007 stylometric analysis suggests that *DDC* is more internally consistent than Ames's and Wollebius's treatises does not in and of itself conclusively point to Miltonic authorship, a matter reflected by the committee's cautious wording that I quote in the previous paragraph.

But in any case, it merits notice that many voices on both sides of the controversy—both older voices and newer voices, both the quick and the dead—regarding their hesitancy toward using *DDC* to explicate *Paradise Lost* or other Miltonic works. Such voices include Hunter, Sellin, Lieb (both in 2002 and 2006), the 1997 report, the 1998 report, and the 2007 book, Campbell and Corns's 2008 biography, and, more recently, Falcone and Kerr. Those who during the course of the controversy have spoken most passionately in defense of using *DDC* to explicate the larger Miltonic canon—Lewalski, Kelley, Hill, Fallon, Rumrich, and Rogers—are also scholars whose writings are strongly dependent on the notion of a heretical Milton whose heresy is primarily dependent on Milton's being the author of *DDC*. In their defense, it seems quixotic at this point to think that the controversy, such as it still exists in the eyes of a minority of scholars, will ever reverse itself enough to authoritatively disprove Miltonic authorship and thus deprive scholars of *DDC*'s helpful portrait of the heterodox Milton. Still, it bears repeating that the authors of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana, the work that liberated them from Hunter's doubting specter, themselves recommend a cautious use of *DDC*, a recommendation that scholars who emphasize Milton's heterodoxies do not generally follow.

And yet the committee's continued recommendation regarding a cautious use of *DDC* does on at least one extremely significant level serve to vindicate Hunter's efforts. For if Hunter announced that his skeptical approach to *DDC* liberates *Paradise Lost* from the treatise's "endless mazes of theological split hairs" (*Visitation* 9), then the committee, even amid its eventual conversion to an enthusiastic embrace of Miltonic authorship, ironically enough, implicitly grants Hunter's wish for *Paradise Lost*'s liberation—a matter strikingly analogous to how the committee's latter-day belief in Milton's authorship was, as noted earlier, celebrated by Rogers (and, we must assume, by Fallon and Rumrich) for liberating Milton scholars from the bondage of *not* being able to freely apply *DDC* to Milton's epic. Significantly, these respective visions of liberation are in tension with each other, but, remarkably, the

former is arguably more in keeping with the committee's 2007 conclusions, even as the latter vision is what has prevailed in Milton studies as a whole.

And so the practice of using *DDC* to buttress scholarship on the entire Miltonic canon continues to ride high, and truly it never really stopped—it was only slowed down for a time by the tedious need, in book after book, article after article, to include the obligatory paragraph as an overture toward an annoying controversy that would eventually collapse, if not from airtight arguments by the other side, at least from its own inertia. But what about Hunter's vision of the liberated *Paradise Lost* and the attendant scholarship regarding the epic's theology that explicitly jettisons the perhaps stifling influence of *DDC* upon such theological analysis of the epic or, for that matter, of *Paradise Regained*? Such scholarship, I believe, is still lacking; indeed, even recent works that have argued for a more orthodox Milton have done so by either downplaying the heterodoxy of *DDC*'s Christology (Hillier) or by arguing that Milton's highly orthodox presentations of certain doctrines in his poetry are somehow compatible with the content of *DDC* (Smith; Urban, "John Milton").

But theological scholarship that jettisons *DDC* would be, I believe, in keeping with the wishes of C. A. Patrides, Hunter's partner in authoring *Bright Essence*, whose approach to presenting an orthodox Milton was not the earlier Hunter's practice of trying to bring *DDC* into the fold of orthodoxy, but rather to pronounce *DDC* as a strange aberration in the Miltonic canon. Patrides considered *DDC* something unworthy of Milton,[18] "a singularly gross expedition into theology" ("*Paradise Lost*" 168), a treatise whose theological oddities—including, in Patrides's words, "tritheism" ("Milton and Arianism" 70)—upholding "not one but three gods" ("*Paradise Lost*" 168)—were corrected in *Paradise Lost*, a poem whose "perpetual fertility" is "diametrically opposed" to "the depressing aridity of the treatise" ("Milton and the Arian Controversy" 246). In reading Patrides's writings on Milton's theology, one sees that Patrides spends minimal time on *DDC*, focusing instead on *Paradise Lost*.[19] Patrides died in 1986, five years before Hunter first put

forth his thesis, but I sense that he would have sympathized with Hunter's skepticism regarding Milton's authorship of *DDC*, even as Patrides's consistent denigration of *DDC* anticipates the later Hunter's attitude toward it. In any event, Patrides's clear preference to investigate Milton's theology apart from *DDC* has been afforded new credence, if not from Hunter's, Sellin's, Lieb's, and now Falcone's skepticism regarding the treatise's authorship, then from the committee's consistent cautioning—in 1997, 1998, and indeed 2007—against using *DDC* to explicate Milton's final writings, a caution repeated by Campbell and Corns in 2008 and most recently by Kerr.

Scholarly Applications Afforded by the Reemergence of the *DDC* Controversy: Confessions of a Fence-Sitter and a Tentative Declaration of Independence

So what does this all mean to my own work as a Milton scholar who emphasizes matters of theological concern? For myself, I believe the recent contributions of Falcone and Kerr, especially as understood within the broader history of the *DDC* authorship controversy, open up space to discuss Milton's later poems on their own theological terms, apart from the perpetual theological shadow *DDC* has cast on these poems. Speaking on a more personal scholarly level, I believe the recent reviving of this controversy has afforded an opportunity to revisit the various issues at stake with the controversy itself in a way that can offer clarity to my previously more confused posture toward *DDC* and my scholarly obligations to it. My own negligible contributions to the *DDC* controversy and its aftermath have been eclectic in their assertions, and they reflect what has been my overall uncertainties and lingering uneasiness regarding the provenance question and its larger ramifications toward Milton scholarship. Intrigued by Hunter from my first exposure to him, I was ultimately unpersuaded by his thesis, finding more compelling Lewalski's 1998 article and its various parallels between *DDC* and Milton's other works. My 2005 essay that noted the parallel between Milton's explicit identification with the parable of the householder (Matthew 13:52) in both the *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* and

the opening chapter of *DDC* argued that this parallel was another piece of evidence for Milton's authorship of the treatise ("Out of His Treasurie"). But having been increasingly persuaded by Lieb's 2002 insistence regarding *DDC* as a composite work in which Milton's exact presence could never be finally determined, and still intrigued by the debate regarding authorship and its ramifications for the different interested parties, I advocated in 2007 for a Gerald Graff-influenced pedagogical model that encouraged instructors to "teach the conflict" regarding *DDC* ("*On Christian Doctrine*"). It seemed like a great idea at the time—but then, of course, the essentially simultaneous appearance of *Milton and the Manuscript of* De Doctrina Christiana meant that there was, at least as far as the dominant Milton industry was concerned, now no more conflict about which to teach.[20] Oh, well—good thing I can laugh at myself. Nonetheless, still influenced by Lieb's article and Sullivan's review, I continued to quietly harbor my doubts about the extent of Miltonic provenance, doubts that were reinvigorated upon reading Falcone's early 2018 article. Consequently, when I revised my 2005 essay for inclusion in my late 2018 book *Milton and the Parables of Jesus*, I suggested in an endnote that my findings could be used, if not to attest to Milton's overall authorship of *DDC*, to "more cautiously assert that at least the parts of *DDC* that cite the parable of the householder are likely to be authentically Miltonic" (287n23).

But three years earlier I published an essay, to which Falcone references in his 2018 piece, that now gives me pause regarding its use of *DDC*. In that article, I demonstrate on the one hand that Milton's poetic presentations of the redemptive effects of the son's perfect obedience are fully orthodox and in keeping with Reformed writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[21] On the other hand, I argue that these orthodox presentations are paradoxically in keeping with Milton's Arianism as evidenced in book I, chapter 5 *DDC* ("John Milton"). It is an intriguing argument, even persuasive if one accepts that Milton did in fact write that Arian chapter. And given that by 2015 the authorship controversy had effectively been dismissed for nearly a decade, I decided not to push the issue. Besides—and more importantly from a

practical standpoint—Miltonic provenance, even if I did not find it completely convincing, fit my argument. I did not know for sure that Milton wrote that chapter of *DDC*, but apart from compelling evidence to the contrary, why would I not use it—that "invaluable quarry" of theological resources—to my scholarly benefit? That sounds cynical, but I really do not mean it that way. My point is that the resource of *DDC* is available, it is attributed to Milton, it helped my scholarship, and so I used it. I think that such a pragmatic utilization of *DDC* is a typical and understandable practice within Milton studies, but I wonder if it comes at the cost of a too-easy acceptance of the current received wisdom concerning a proper use of *DDC*, a use that exceeds the recommendations of the very scholars who are credited with liberating Milton studies from Hunter's "trouble-making" theory, a use that, ironically enough, stifles a fuller appreciation and analysis of the theological possibilities of Milton's later poetry by the implicit or even explicit expectation that readers and scholars understand that poetry within the confines of *DDC*'s theological rubrics.

And now, having not only read Falcone's and Kerr's recent essays but also having revisited the wider controversy in some detail, I wonder: Could I not in my 2015 article have offered an alternative argument, one that postulates that the orthodoxy of Milton's presentation of Christ's obedience and atonement—both early and late in his career—suggests that Milton's overall Christology was in fact broadly orthodox and that we do well to distance from *DDC* his presentations of the Son in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*? I also ask myself: If I had argued such in my essay, would it have been difficult to find a journal that would have published it, given that such an essay would have likely come across as sadly out of touch with the present state of Milton scholarship? This second question is a moot point, but the previous question makes me think of the scholarly possibilities that both Falcone's and Kerr's essays as well as the larger history of the *DDC* controversy open up: namely, the opportunity to investigate Milton's theology independent from *DDC*. At issue here is not the matter of conclusively disproving Milton's authorship of the treatise. I do not think that will ever happen, barring an entirely convincing new scholarly revelation. Nor am I

saying that it is somehow dishonest for scholars to make use of *DDC* in their larger discussions of Milton's writings. Rather, what is at issue is the recognition that *DDC* can rightly be understood as being sufficiently removed from Milton's later poems as to investigate theological matters in the poems themselves without deference to the treatise.

A specific example of such an investigation concerns my own desire to investigate the Christology of *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained* apart from the hegemonic influence of the famous/infamous book I, chapter 5 ("[On the Son of God]") of *DDC* and its presentation of a created Son of God (see Milton, *De Doctrina Christiana* 127-229), a presentation of which, in recent years, I have grown increasingly suspicious. I will not go into specific detail here, but, like Patrides, I find this chapter reeking of "depressing aridity," with the pedantic author's redundant, literalistic, and hopelessly unimaginative insistence that any son must be younger than his father being a far cry from *Paradise Lost*'s splendid use of poetic imagery to describe and narrate the workings of the godhead. More objectively, I find remarkable that the chapter's author can address and seek to refute various proof texts traditionally used to affirm Jesus' deity even as he neglects any discussion of John 8:58, in which Jesus proclaims, "Before Abraham was, I am," a verse in which Jesus echoes the LORD's proclamation to Moses from the burning bush (Exodus 3:14), a verse commonly used in sixteenth and seventeenth century writings as a prooftext regarding the Son's eternal deity,[22] a verse particularly pertinent to Milton's poetic presentations of the Son given the use of the phrase "I am" in *Paradise Lost* 6.682 and 8.316 as well as in *Paradise Regained* 1.263. I think it necessary to examine these poetic presentations and much else in both works on their own terms, apart from the assumptions embedded in these poems' presumed connections to *DDC*'s Arian presentation of the Son of God.

So I will conclude my present essay with a disclaimer of my own—with apologies to Stanley Fish and his aforementioned statement from 2001, which I will paraphrase for my own purposes—a tentative declaration of independence from *DDC*, as it were, as I work on my current essay on the Christology of *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*: I make

no final statement regarding Milton's authorship of *DDC* or any given section of *DDC*, but when I read *DDC* I.5, I sense that it was written—if not by someone other than Milton—by a Milton who was not codifying his final conclusions about the Son of God, by a Milton whose pedantic presentation of the Son's relation to the Father runs counter to the writings of one who demonstrates unmatched abilities to articulate theological concepts in artistic language, by a Milton whose seemingly exhaustive engagement with Scripture fails to address an obvious prooftext regarding the Son of God that is of paramount importance to his poetic presentations of the Son, by a Milton who is ultimately far removed from his final great poems, by a Milton to whose treatise I will not defer while I analyze these great poems, by a Milton to whose treatise I will not try to reconcile his poetic presentations of the Son. I realize that what I am writing runs counter to a dominant tradition of theological interpretation of *Paradise Lost*, running through Maurice Kelley, Barbara Lewalski, Michael Bauman, John Rumrich, Stephen Fallon, John Rogers, and others, arguably the default position of Milton scholarship since Kelley's *This Great Argument*. And I am aware that the fact that I have come to this conclusion will not settle the matter, but it does settle it for the purposes of my current work on the Son in Milton's late poetry.

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NOTES

[1]I would like to thank Calvin University for a course release through the Calvin Research Fellowship, which helped enable me to revise this essay. I also thank Susan Felch and the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship for allowing me to participate in the 2020 Writers Co-op, during which part of this essay was written. Thanks also to the anonymous readers for *Connotations* and their helpful suggestions for improving this essay.

I dedicate this essay to the memories of William B. Hunter, Barbara K. Lewalski, Paul R. Sellin, and John T. Shawcross, major participants in the *DDC* authorship debate who offered me great encouragement years ago.

[2]I first addressed this matter in Urban, "*On Christian Doctrine*" 239.

[3]See Bauman's *Milton's Arianism* (1987) and Isitt's *All the Names in Heaven* (2002). The late Bauman's Christianity is evident through his many Christian publications, while Isitt was a longtime professor at the theologically orthodox College of the Ozarks. I reached out to Isitt via email, and he gave me permission to mention here his own trinitarian beliefs.

[4]Even before his challenges regarding *DDC*'s provenance, Hunter may have been reconsidering his attempts to bring *DDC* into the fold of orthodoxy, something suggested in a 1989 introduction where he admits that he had "[p]erhaps [...] overstated my case" on the topic (*The Descent* 11).

[5]See reviews by Hale; Von Maltzahn; and Cinquemani.

[6]By contrast, in a 2001 essay, John T. Shawcross asserted in his opening sentence his firm belief that "Milton wrote *De doctrina christiana*" (161), going on to investigate the complexities of the notion of "authorship," and comparing DDC to four works of Milton—*Art of Logic*, *A Brief History of Moscovia*, *History of Britain*, and *Accedence Commenc't Grammar*—in which Milton drew from various sources in ways "not adequately acknowledged by today's standards" (163).

[7]In 2002 Rumrich also wrote "Stylometry and the Provenance of *De Doctrina Christiana*." Because of the similarities between this essay and his 2003 piece, I focus my discussion on the latter. Rumrich's 2003 essay was presumably written before Lieb's 2002 essay was available.

[8]Rumrich cites Campbell, "*De Doctrina Christiana*"; and Kelley, "On the State." In fact, Sellin, in an essay published in 2000, also had suggested that *DDC* was unfinished (Sellin, "'If Not Milton'" 253).

[9]Rumrich bases this perhaps impolitic statement on Campbell's 1980 article "The Son of God in *De doctrina Christiana* and *Paradise Lost*," which argues for an orthodox interpretation of the Son's work in creation as presented in book 7 of Milton's epic. One could counter that Rumrich has much invested in the presentation of a theologically heterodox Milton in *Paradise Lost* illuminated by *DDC*. See, for example, the collection *Milton and Heresy* and its introduction, as well as Rumrich's use of *DDC* in "Milton's Arianism," "Uninventing Milton," "Milton's God and the Matter of Chaos," "Milton's Poetics of Generation," and *Milton Unbound*.

[10]Notably, in 2004 Michael Bryson, an explicit champion of the heretical Milton, offered no disclaimer at all, writing only that "William B. Hunter's decade-long crusade to take *De Doctrina Christiana* out of the Milton canon appears to be motivated by a powerful desire to reconcile Milton with 'the great traditions of Christianity, being no longer associated with a merely eccentric fringe'" (18-19; quoting Hunter, *Visitation* 8)

[11]In a subsequent book (2008), Campbell and Corns repeat their conviction that *DDC*'s manuscript shows itself to be "a work in progress [...] still some way from being ready for the press" (*John Milton* 272).

[12]Campbell and Corns emphasize that Milton's "opinions on many theological issues changed in the course of his life. *De Doctrina* affords a view of his theological thinking in the 1650s" (*John Milton* 273).

[13]See, for example, Rogers, *The Matter of Revolution*, "Milton and the Heretical Priesthood of Christ," "The Political Theology of Milton's Heaven," and "Newton's Arian Epistemology and the Cosmogony of *Paradise Lost*."

[14]Curiously, the book received few scholarly reviews; I have located only four. The other two I do not discuss here, by Arnold and Kühnová, applaud the authors' seemingly definitive work but do not subject the book to scrutiny.

[15]Although Sullivan's *RES* review is dated March 2009, it appeared on *RES*'s website via "Advance Access" on September 6, 2008.

[16]The timing of this session is noteworthy, with Wilson referencing Falcone's 2018 article early in his presentation and Kerr's response to Falcone appearing shortly after the conference.

[17]Significantly, in a 2001 article postulating that Milton's enemy Alexander Morus might have been the author of *DDC*, Sellin notes that, according to a stylometric analysis Tweedie did for him, Morus's work of exegetical divinity *Ad quaedam loca Novi Foederis Notae* was reported to be "stylistically more like parts of [Milton's] First Defence and the 'Miltonic' parts of the *DDC* than other control texts examined to date" ("Some Musings" 66; quoting an e-mail from Tweedie).

[18]Rumrich sees a connection between C. S. Lewis and Patrides: "Lewis dismissed Milton's heretical opinions as 'private theological whimseys' that he 'laid aside' in composing epic testimony to Christianity's 'great central tradition'" ("Provenance" 219; quoting Lewis 92). Rumrich goes on to write that "Patrides followed Lewis's lead, claiming that Milton was an inept theologian and wisely left *De doctrina Christiana* unfinished" (219).

[19]See, in addition to Patrides's already cited essays, "Milton and the Protestant Tradition of the Atonement" and especially his book *Milton and the Christian Tradition*.

[20]A very recent example of how settled the matter of *DDC*'s provenance has become in Milton studies as a whole is evident in John Hale's statement, "we find Milton's authorship quite secure unless and until one undertakes to suspect everything" (*Milton's Scriptural Theology* 1). Hale's 2019 words, which reflect no awareness of Falcone's challenge in *Connotations* published the previous year, also demonstrate the degree of dismissiveness the larger field of Milton scholarship has shown toward those few scholars who continue to harbor doubts about Milton's authorship.

[21]In this essay, I specifically discuss not only Milton's late portrayals of the Son's obedience in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, but also his celebration of the infant Christ's obedience in the early poem "Upon the Circumcision."

[22]See for example, Calvin vol. 1, 2.14.2 [p. 483]; Wollebius 25; and Ursinus 348. Significantly, in a recent study on the theology of *DDC*, John Hale infers that Milton "bypasses" and "downplays" scriptural evidence for the Trinity (*Milton's Scriptural*

Theology 103), suggesting that in *DDC* "Milton does not find potential for Trinitarian orthodoxy because he chooses not to" (25).

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Marx's *scholia*: Annotations Involving Classical and Renaissance Texts in *Capital*[1]

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This article is the first entry in a debate on "Marx's *scholia*: Annotations Involving Classical and Renaissance Texts in *Capital*" (https://www.connotations.de/debate/marx's-scholia-annotating-texts-in-capital). If you feel inspired to write a response, please send it to editors@connotations.de

Abstract

My essay looks at the annotations in the first English printing of Karl Marx's *Capital*, volume 1 (planned by Marx even as he was finishing the book in German, edited by Friedrich Engels and published in 1886). Much can be learned from tracking Marx's use of literary texts in his footnotes, a practice that best can be understood in the context of his classical rhetorical training such that his annotations both contribute to and, as a kind of counter discourse, reflect the larger dialectical process carried out in his critique of political philosophy. My paper narrows the aperture on Marx's wide reading to focus specifically on the rhetorical value he obviously accorded to Homer, Aristotle, Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, Virgil, Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and Shakespeare.

Even though Marx is not writing a literary text as such, I argue that he is in fact doing a fair amount of literary criticism—all tucked away in his notes, going so far as to quote long passages from key works in the classical tradition and from the English Renaissance that he then annotates. In this regard he is, quite literally, the first Marxist literary critic. Marx was far more well read and literarily oriented than many readers realize, mainly because less attention tends to be paid to what is "below the line" on the printed page. My project brings the bottom-matter to light and explores just how literary *Capital* actually is. Although this may sound a bit perverse, nonetheless it also is true.

> The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.

The epigraph to my remarks comes from the conclusion of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. In 1956, this sentence was selected to serve as the main epitaph on his Highgate Cemetery monument in north London (figure 1), with the aim of summing up at a glance Marx's revolutionist life-work and literary production (see Yuille 16).[2] It also provides a fitting way to launch my treatment of the secret life of the annotation, as an accessory and adjunct to critical interpretation. My study concerns the affective rhetorical value accorded to classical and Renaissance works in *Capital*. Before proceeding, though, a few words about Marx's text and its transmission are in order.

1. Practical Considerations

While finishing up the first volume of *Das Kapital* in 1867, Marx already was planning in earnest an English version. Friedrich Engels, with whom Marx had collaborated on various projects since 1844, brought it out in 1886, three years after Marx's death.[3] Two decades in the making, this is the version that most closely follows and reconstructs Marx's original grand design, insofar as it incorporates the notes Marx added, whether in the margins of earlier printed editions or written on loose-leaf pages later collected into bundles, especially after 1870, when Engels permanently moved from Manchester to London to organize Marx's writings. In this regard, more so than the other versions and translations of *Capital* (see Anderson 72-74), the English edition bears the traces of what amounts to Marx's commonplace collection of quotations used to set in place and amplify the main nodes of his overarching political argument.[4] Moreover, as Engels records in the preface to the first English edition, "with the assistance of notes left by the author," he painstakingly transposed Marx's annotations to compose this most up-to-date version (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 4).[5] Given the involved and ongoing process of editing and translating required for Engels to realize Marx's projected *magnum opus*, what eventually would become

the three volumes of "A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production," I narrow the focus of my case study to just volume 1 which, as Engels pointed out, "is in great measure a whole in itself, and has for twenty years ranked as an independent work." (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 5)[6] More particularly, scrutiny of Marx's sections on accumulation and hoarding at the end of Part One will serve well to introduce my larger contention about the literariness of *Capital* overall, both because these sections provide a representative sampling of Marx's annotational craft, and also because the theme of hoarding as "progressive accumulation" (ineluctably incumbent on the capitalist) becomes for Marx a defining—indeed a personified—feature of capitalism (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 152). Such an approach, coupled with my ensuing analysis of other parts of *Capital* as well, will also bring to prominence the pressing heuristic relationship between accumulation and annotation.

With this much understood, let us turn now to consider Marx's pronounced affinity for annotation. I am using the standard definition of annotation here, meaning notes added by way of comment or explanation, in earlier times referred to as "scholia."[7] As Marx well knew, this term derives from the Greek word for "comment or interpretation" and denotes a grammatical, critical, or explanatory gloss. Such *scholia* at times line up side by side with and can be used to make direct reference to previous commentaries taken from earlier sources. This scholastic practice, characteristic of both Marx's critical approach and style of exposition, can be accounted for in part by *Wissenschaft*, the dominant ideology of nineteenth-century German universities, which stressed systematic—which is to say "scientific"—research methods (see Nyhart 251). Although an all-encompassing and somewhat abstract term,[8] nonetheless it can be instructive to consider *Wissenschaft* in its historical context as an offshoot of and distinct holdover from—and to some extent betokening the intellectual afterlife of—Renaissance Humanism, especially as regards the interwoven scholastic traditions of dialectic and rhetoric (see Giustiniani 183-85).

Whereas the term *scientia* in the late middle ages referred to the knowledge gained from books (inclusive of glosses and commentaries),

from the time of Vesalius to Galileo in the early modern period, "science" came to mean knowledge that could be learned from the systematic organization of one's research grounded in observation (see Sarton 35-43). This latter understanding of "science" is explicitly signaled in the title of Bacon's *Novum Organum Scientiarum* (1620), an ambitious program to renovate human learning through a method surpassing the syllogisms associated with Aristotle's body of work, the old "organum" or instrument. Significantly, Bacon's *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, like his series of proposed experiments in *Sylva Sylvarum* (1670) concerned with understanding the nature of things in the material world, is written in outline form with all of the signs of being an expanded and heavily annotated commonplace book (Book One of the *Novum Organum Scientiarum* transparently is headed "Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature"). With this epistemological genealogy of "science" in mind, we are in a better position to see in context the rhetorically grounded scientific practice of collocation as it pertains to the composition of *Capital*.

To collocate, as its etymology implies, is to place things side by side. The mere fact of their proximity assures that some sort of relation is initiated. In Marx's case, bringing classical and Renaissance quotations into his text deliberately sets up certain relations between those imported excerpts and his political critique, thereby providing a basis for his further critical reflection. The commonplace book compositional method historically has been used for compiling and collocating all manner of information; dating back to antiquity, it enjoyed a revival during the Renaissance (see Moss 2) and again during the nineteenth century (see Stokes 201-02). To be sure, commonplace books could have all kinds of different functions—whether social or academic—and could take on a variety of different forms, some going far beyond the more usual practice of transcribing and collocating excerpted quotations. Indeed, one's approach to the activity of commonplacing, most often undertaken with the aim of speaking or writing more eloquently, can be seen as a reflection of the discipline and goals of the compiler as well as the situational dynamics at the time of writing, such as materials

preferred or simply those able to be obtained. And so, while *Wissenschaft* may appear initially to be "tied to the key rhetorical principle of elocution" (Smith 177), my research into Marx's footnotes (in which he glosses, quotes, or otherwise engages with the likes of Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles, Xenophon, Aristotle, Plato, Thomas More, Bacon, and Shakespeare) indicates rather that *memoria,* the fourth canon of classical rhetoric, is what Marx has in mind from the start (see figure 2). And, moreover, it is what he keeps in mind throughout the many changes and additions made to *Capital* over the years. Marx's approach to annotation thus is very much in line with the Renaissance humanist practice of recalling and building on the works of classical writers; it remains a constant of his text and, while not *Wissenschaft* strictly speaking, forms the literary bedrock upon which his revolutionary treatise rests. Marx's recourse to an earlier, rhetorically grounded and mnemotechnically enriched mode of exposition enabled him to combine and deploy selectively scholastic commentary, traditional hermeneutics, and classical philology in the service of organizing his critique of political economy. A telling example corroborating this claim can be found early in the opening chapter, "Commodities," in a note on use-value:

> In English writers of the 17th century we frequently find "worth" in the sense of value in use, and "value" in the sense of exchange-value. This is quite in accordance with the spirit of a language that likes to use a Teutonic word for the actual thing, and a Romance word for its reflexion. (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 36)[9]

This observation about Marx's approach to annotation, as a kind of informed and carefully arranged running side-commentary, is consistent with what Anthony Grafton has observed of Marx's near contemporary, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), in his curious history of the footnote. By the mid-nineteenth century, especially in the *Geschichtswissenschaft* tradition, the footnote, so often denigrated today by readers as an author's tacked-on afterthought, in fact is at the very core of the literary life of the author's mind (see Grafton 64-73). For the classically trained nineteenth-century scholar of ancient texts, which Marx indisputably was, such notational apparatus is the foundation on which the main

discourse is predicated, from which it derives, and upon which it is firmly grounded.

2. Theoretical Considerations

As suggested above, Hegel's idea of science (*Wissenschaft*), which Marx initially embraced along with his academic training as a classicist, "is a linguistic and rhetorically based science that produces a systematic way of speaking about experience" (Bayer 208). Moreover, Thora Ilin Bayer continues,

> [i]n the final chapter of the *Phenomenology* on "Absolute Knowing," Hegel claims that the science of experience of consciousness is a memory theater. His science [*Wissenschaft*] is accompanied by an art of memory (*Erinnerung*), and this art produces a Gallery of Images (*Galerie von Bildern*). […] This is in accord with the Renaissance art of memory as described by Frances Yates in *The Art of Memory* [see Yates 17-62]. The memory is a treasure house of master images from which we can draw forth the dialectical stages of experience. These images are, so to speak, the middle terms of experience from which all *argumenta* or themes of consciousness can be entertained. They are the *topoi* or *loci*—the commonplaces—that hold consciousness together at its base.

The melding of this understanding of finding and unfolding an argument, so much a part of Marx's early classroom training, combined with his insights into Hegel's mnemotechnical description of the science of experience of consciousness, sets classical *memoria* center stage (see again figure 2). Recourse to a storehouse of commonplaces gives the practitioner of the rhetorical art of memory a point of departure—and of return—after the fashion of Aristotle's *topoi* and Cicero's *loci* discussed and put to use in Renaissance memory treatises (see Yates 114-18). Accordingly, this essay makes a case for attending more closely to Marx's rhetorically grounded use of literary works in his notes as mnemotechnical nodes strategically placed in his discourse. His seemingly digressive notes, which we should think of rather as self-conscious "meta-theoretical" reflections on his method of argumentation, constitute a counter-discourse to his formal, prosaic critical analysis. It gave Marx a ready way, scientifically, to implement a method for thinking

through topics anew, while at the same time taking into account how those topics had historically been formulated.

Marx's early intellectual development and academic training was suffused with the classical rhetorical tradition.[10] It bears repeating that both Marx and Engels received "a classical education from the *Gymnasium*, which involved learning Greek and Latin" and that "Marx, in particular, was very familiar with the philosophers and writers of ancient Greece" (Martin 52). This much is made abundantly clear from his dissertation topic, "On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." In this work we can glimpse how his engagement with classical philosophy shaped and directly affected his principal way of approaching ontology in his later writings (both "Being" as such, and—following Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, especially book 7—"beings in the world" as "things in nature").[11] Drawing from this reservoir of classical ideas concerning the relation of man and nature, Marx would later acknowledge his debt to, while critically questioning and demystifying, the historicizing schemata presented by Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach of this fundamental relationship. But before and beyond all of this attention paid to revising and criticizing an encompassing vision of "man's place in history" as an ineluctable process and motive force—attention that is evident in the years after finishing his dissertation, for example, in his 1842 *Anekdota* and 1843 "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State" (Marx, *Writings* 151)—Marx's own intellectual genealogy can be seen to derive from his study of the materialist philosophy of the ancients. His systematic and "scientific" approach, following Epicurus's lead, treated history as a natural process. Later developments of this theme in *Capital* additionally show a humanistically inflected approach to classical studies with respect to both his materialist research agenda and method of exposition.

As regards his thesis, for which he was awarded a doctoral degree from the University of Jena (15 April 1841), it is sufficient for our present purposes to observe two things. Firstly, Marx was an adept and close reader of Greek and of Latin literature; and, secondly, his treat-

ment of the Greek "philosophy of self-consciousness" argues that Epicurus's concept of the atom is superior to Democritus's more empirical view "because it implied independence, freedom, and an 'energizing principle' for experience" (Marx, *Writings* 51). At the time of his formulation of the critical emphasis on experience (and in particular "experience of consciousness") during his graduate studies, Marx built steadily on Hegel's effort "to overcome," as Thora Ilin Bayer has shown, "the Enlightenment's limitation of philosophy to critical reflection and to regain the ancient conception of philosophy as speculation"; further, Hegel proposes that "the individual has the right to demand that Science [*Wissenschaft*] should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint [that of *Wissenschaft*], should show him this standpoint within himself" (Bayer 207).

Precisely because he was so well-versed in the classics, Marx later showed an attentiveness to "'the quite specific circumstances' of a present's self-criticism"; namely, that "this present must be capable of self-criticism, in order to attain the science of itself" (Althusser 272). For example, in an 1837 letter to his father, Marx reports he has "translated in part Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (Martin 52); and later, in *Capital*, refers to Aristotle as an example of those philosophers who "thought within the limits of their present, unable to run ahead of their times" (Althusser 272). In the section of *Capital* on "The relative form of value" (I.1.1.3.a), he explains:

> Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form of commodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour of equal quality, by inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was founded on the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-powers. […] Aristotle's genius is displayed precisely by his discovery of a relation of equality in the value-expression of commodities. Only the historical limitation inherent in the society in which he lived prevented him from finding out what "in reality" this relation of equality consisted of. (Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 151-52)

Citing Aristotle enables Marx to elaborate the "'real impossibility' of commensurate exchange" (Kornbluh 29). Aristotle thus figures into the

vast literary storehouse from which Marx took his examples for the development of his own original, revolutionary discourse—but one still very much grounded in an earlier rhetorical method of exposition.

With this much having been observed about the rudiments of Marx's dialectically informed deployment of notational citations and commentary, let us turn now to review and consider the cultural work of the early modern commonplace tactic of collocation with which Marx was so familiar from his early studies, and which is evident in his recovering, assembling, and lining up passages from the classics in his footnotes and extended *scholia*. This approach to the digesting of already written material was discussed by Francis Bacon, that great systemizer of early modern categories of human knowledge, in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605): "For the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of commonplaces" (Bacon 129). Along these lines, Desiderius Erasmus formalized on a larger scale and in print what other Renaissance humanists already were doing (see Moss 102). The humanist anthologer *par excellence*, Erasmus, assembled over 4,000 proverbs and related commonplaces from classical texts, many taken from already existing epitomes. It is in this regard that we can begin to think of Marx as something of a well-read and deft anthologer as well, but one culling relevant passages and assembling quotations to "supplement the text by a running commentary taken from the history of the science" with special reference to "a critique of political economy" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 5).[12]

As we proceed from here in our examination of early modern humanist approaches to annotating, digesting, and collocating earlier texts, it needs to be stressed that Marx's "critique of political economy" (as announced in the work's subtitle) is an immanent critique which underlies the historical dynamic of the corresponding "scientific" field, namely the economic structure of civil and mercantile society. It is this which, in large measure, accounts for the ongoing commentary in the footnotes accompanying, indeed supplementing and corroborating, the argument of his main text. Hence my proposed intervention of reading

Marx in terms of the afterlife of European literary and rhetorical traditions and scholastic practices. This entails looking more closely at humanist approaches to handling and making use of the backlog of previously written works freighted with cultural capital; approaches that I contend have a direct bearing—associatively and analogously—on Marx's annotations, many of which he took directly from digests and anthologies available to him at the British Library in London during the 1860s.

3. Modeling Humanist Rhetorical Practices

The sixteenth century saw a boom of translations of Erasmus's textbooks and a surge in collections based on his works, "partly attributed to the gradual introduction of the new standards set by the humanist educational agenda" and coinciding more specifically with "the introduction of Erasmus's proverb collections in the curriculum" (Juhász-Ormsby 47). Perhaps as an expedient allowing him to augment his collection over time, perhaps in part to encourage readers to make their own unique connections to the material presented, he did not arrange the entries topically or alphabetically, the usual mnemotechnical expedient going back to Aristotle and Cicero of organizing a treasury (or *thesaurus*) of collected quotations under headings for easy recovery and perusal. Whereas Erasmus was, in his *Adagia*, principally interested in bringing together all manner of proverbs for further study and use, Marx valued organizational headings in the extreme, leaving a clear textual trace of his step by step critique of political economy in *Capital* by following a systematic—which is to say scientific—plan that is made visible throughout. For example (see figure 3), in a schema reminiscent of Aquinas's scholastic organizational procedure in his great *summa* or the branching topical off-shoots for which Peter Ramus was famous, chapter 3 of *Capital*, "Money, or the Circulation of Commodities," is divided into three sequentially linked topics: (1) The measure of values, (2) the means of circulation, and, most importantly for our present consideration, (3) money; which further is sub-divided into three sections, (a) hoarding, (b) means of payment, and (c) world money. In doing so,

Marx makes palpably clear the topics and their constituent parts to which his collocated quotations appertain. He places his *scholia* culled from select classical texts according to their proper headings, thereby exemplifying the rhetorical value of his accumulated textual capital—a concept later unpacked in *Capital* (I.3.7.2) as surplus value, namely that which is produced as a result of labor superadded to the value of the product by virtue of the process of production itself. Anna Kornbluh has observed in this regard that the "author of *Capital* continuously crafts that surplus of detail which Roland Barthes deemed 'the reality effect'"; for "*Capital* balances this social expansiveness with psychological interiority. This is a discourse of *both* history and individuality, *both* materiality and consciousness" (Kornbluh 118-19; original emphasis).

Such episodes remind us of the value Renaissance humanists associated with collecting and actively engaging in the maintenance of one's own mnemotechnic treasury. Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) advised his students to "have always at hand a paper book, wherein thou shalt write such notable things as thou read thyself, or hear of other men worthy to be noted […] that thou may have in a readiness when time requireth […] [T]he more often thou commit things to her [memory's] custody, the more better and faithfully will she keep them" (Vives E4^{v}–E5^{r}). Consonant with this precept, and by way of justifying its pedagogical utility, Erasmus collected many such sayings and anecdotes from Greek and Latin literature (see Blair 542), "worthy to be noted" so as to provide future readers "a ready and short way to learn virtue, be quickly dispatched, and […] have in a readiness sure rules by which they may be put in remembrance" (Erasmus, *Apophthegms* B5^{r}-B6^{r}). The "sure rules" are those basic principles associated with setting up and maintaining a commonplace book: users of this (or indeed any such compendium or epitome) would create their own individualized headings ready to receive the imported material, thereby making for easier retrieval when needed for future uses. In this respect Marx follows the practical aims underlying the commonplace book method as a recognized "aid to memory," used for finding one's argument (see Blair 542-

44), essentially replicating the first rhetorical canon of *inventio*, the gathering of fit material (see again figure 2). Moreover, Marx's cited and annotated classical quotations in his footnotes, like a proverbial trail of breadcrumbs, offer future readers a glimpse at what might be called "frozen *inventio*" (Plett 35); which is to say, a synoptic view of the stopover places on the way to his larger argument set up by virtue of his ingenuity and which, in effect, thereby constituted a kind of artificial memory. Such was the way of the *topoi* method of argumentation, originally developed by Aristotle for dialectical debates and later so fundamental to the academic and rhetorical traditions (see Rubinelli 43-59).

The trade in printed anthologized commentaries, like that in collections of sententious proverbs and historical anecdotes, was a pervasive feature of humanist literary culture. Marx intuitively appreciated such adages and glosses as an *aide-mémoire* for the construction and buttressing of dialectical arguments, thus paralleling Erasmus's recognition that in the proverb, "almost all the philosophy of the Ancients was contained" (Erasmus, *Adages* 83–84). Marx's ingeniously collocated sayings of Aristotle and Plato, as with his references to English Renaissance writers such as More, Bacon, and Shakespeare to be discussed in what follows, indicate the hallmark features of early modern *copia* in its broadest sense, the rhetorical exercising of wit and discernment to augment and develop one's discourse. This thematic concern with and cultivation of *copia* aptly characterizes Marx's tactical application of surplus value of intellectual capital that he had accumulated from his studies early and late, and which he carefully considered how best to deploy so as to make his arguments in *Capital* more compelling and engaging. The implicit metaphorical connection between venerable rhetorical principles and economic theory is indicative of a reflective and self-consciously performative style of exposition (see Kornbluh 120). Reliance on tropes of performativity in literary production, whether during the Renaissance or the nineteenth century, signals a metacritical self-awareness of the writer's place in the work which conveys to the reader a heightened level of experientially driven comprehension of the matter. For Marx, moreover, it calls attention to and thus gestures toward

demystifying the dialectical process operating in *Capital*. Augmenting one's writing and speech using the ornaments of *copia*, which included the excerpting of and alluding to classical texts, was for the Renaissance humanist a stylistic choice and an index to his idiosyncratic wit. For Marx, however, *copia* was not about mere adornment; rather it provided a ready way for him to performatively enact in his prose treatise, and to put to work therein, a self-reflective dialogical method of exposition. Like Erasmus before him, Marx was keenly aware that one must judge and weigh carefully whatever one alleges and borrows from earlier texts and imports into one's own discourse.

To illustrate the critical significance for Marx of this self-conscious attention to the merging of the manner of expression with the matter being expressed, let me briefly set up one particularly telling instance involving the Roman satirist Horace that runs parallel to a comparable passage of admonition in Erasmus's *On Copia*. In what amounts to the introductory section of his handbook, Erasmus self-reflectively models for his Renaissance readers the very practice about which he is instructing them, namely augmenting one's discourse with proverbs and classical quotations: "For as there is nothing more admirable or more splendid than a speech with a rich copia of thoughts and words overflowing in a golden stream, so it is, assuredly, such a thing as may be striven for at no slight risk, because according to the proverb, 'Not every man has the luck to go to Corinth'" (Erasmus, *Copia* 11). An already learned reader, one who has had "the luck to go Corinth" (for not everyone has the same opportunities, education, or access to sourcebooks of the classics), would know that this unidentified adage comes from Horace's *Epistles* (1.17.36); and, if you do not, then perhaps take it as a sign you are out of your depth. This is a work that Marx quotes, incidentally, in a footnote in *Capital* (I.3.10.5), the section on "The Working Day" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 265).[13] Moreover, as a point of interest, there are no fewer than six other references to Horace's works in *Capital* (see Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 1103). Marx's own Horatian admonition to his readers, comparable in both form and content to that of Erasmus, comes in the "Preface to the First German Edition," with reference to foreclosing the

objection that *Das Kapital* is not relevant to Germans since the examples focus mainly on modes of capitalist production in England. His quip, like Erasmus's, is also a call for self-assessment before preceding any further in his book. It comes in the form of an untranslated Latin tag, thus implicitly presuming a certain level and kind of learning on the part of his readers: "*De te fabula narratur*!" [this tale is told of you] (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 8).[14]

The respective book projects of Erasmus and Marx have still another similarity worth noting. Most of the ancient writers Erasmus quotes as illustrations, as with the Horace passage just discussed, were taken from Quintilian's compilation for aspiring orators rather than the original authors (see Erasmus, *Copia* 11). Marx, too, quoted classical authors from available anthologies and, also like Erasmus, knew quite well what he was looking for in those sourcebooks, as will be discussed later with special reference to his use of standard compendia and epitomes of the day when citing English Renaissance texts. By virtue of his training and critical acumen Marx had, proverbially speaking, "the luck to go to Corinth." He knew his classics well, especially the sayings of the philosophers and poetic anecdotes. His accumulated backlog of sources and quotations—whether drawn from his own books or those of his friends, anthologies that were ready at hand, his own notebooks or more likely loose-leaf sheets bundled together, or indeed from memory alone—enabled him to annotate his text in a way that creates a secondary or parallel discourse supplementing and advancing his argument about political economy. Comparable to Erasmus's approach to textual accumulation in the *Adagia*, which he subsequently used to augment his more trenchant discourses such as his *Discussion on Free Will* (1524), Marx shows his academically trained readers that he can bury them in quotations, thereby acknowledging he knows how the game is played and, moreover, shows he can play it as a master.[15] As Engels attests, Marx had an ample supply of notebooks and bundles of papers full of excerpted and transcribed passages from the works of others that ended up in *Capital*. The unfolding of his argument, especially in the last section of Part One, "Money" (I.3.3), is supported by and reflects

his notational apparatus, which creates a kind of double, echoic discourse carried on above-the-line, in his text, and below-the-line, in his notes.[16] Accordingly, a close reading of "Money" that traces the movement of Marx's *scholia* in action will substantiate this claim and, at the same time, establish a pattern for analyzing additional passages in *Capital* so as to make more clear the larger implications of my investigation.

4. Practical Applications

Even a cursory glance at the typographical disposition of these four printed pages (please see figures 4 and 5), makes clear that something is afoot as regards what is happening below-the-line relative to what is being argued above-the line. In the main text we read:

> But money itself is a commodity, an external object, capable of becoming the private property of any individual. Thus social power becomes the private power of private persons. The ancients therefore denounced money as subversive of the economic and moral order of things. (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 132)

And then, immediately in a footnote, Marx quotes six lines of verse from Sophocles's *Antigone* in Greek (see figure 4). The text resumes somewhat poetically, still in an annotational, supplementary mode of discourse: "Modern society, which soon after its birth, pulled Plutus [the Greek god of wealth] by the hair of his head from the bowels of the earth"—using then a footnote, in Greek, paraphrasing the line from Athenaeus's *Deipnosophistae* (from 6.233, although unidentified as such)—and picking up mid-line in his text to conclude that "Modern society […] greets gold as the Holy Grail, as the glittering incarnation of the very principle of its own life" (132-33). References such as these, far from being afterthoughts about how to amplify and add luster to his own discourse are, I contend, the result of collocated excerpts that set up the trajectory of Marx's prose argument about, in this instance, the deleterious effect on society of private "hoarding," as the topical heading of this sub-section declares. Such quotations are the kernels of thought giving rise to his arguments above-the-line carried out, as it

were, by proxy below-the-line. This approach resonates sympathetically with Kornbluh's view that the "ultimate argument [of *Capital*] is textual: as a whole some of the text's most pressing insights find their most intense formulation performatively […] through the connotative, associative, artful ways the language *works*" (Kornbluh 120; original emphasis).

Leading into these below-the-line collocated quotations from Sophocles and Athenaeus is an excerpt from *Timon of Athens* (4.3) in which Shakespeare sums up a series of age-old commonplaces about the corrupting, and transformational, power of gold. The speaker is Timon, once the wealthiest and most generous Athenian who now, owing to his sudden reversal of fortune, shuns human contact and retreats to the wilderness. In a masterstroke of dramatic irony, whilst digging for roots to slake his hunger, Timon finds a buried hoard of gold. Shakespeare's extended metaphor of gold being the root of societal evils and the message that one cannot eat gold are not lost on Marx. Here is the passage that he excerpted and transcribed from *Timon*:

> Gold, yellow, glittering, precious gold!
> Thus much of this, will make black, white; foul, fair;
> Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant.
> … What this, you gods? Why, this
> Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
> Pluck stout men's pillows from below their heads:
> This yellow slave
> Will knit and break religions, bless the accurs'd,
> Make the hoar[17] leprosy adored; place thieves.
> And give them title, knee and approbation
> With senators on the bench: this is it
> That makes the wappen'd widow wed again:
> … Come, damned earth,
> Thou common whore of mankind. (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 132n2)

This passage is a rhetorical *tour de force* characteristic of Shakespeare's most arresting dramatic monologues, full of antithetical parallels that enhance the persuasive power of the overarching satirical *de casibus* argument of the play about the fall from high to low, a philanthropist turned misanthrope. Its stark statement of this perennial theme clearly

caught the attention of Marx, who quotes it at length, although carefully omitting short phrases from the original that refer to Timon's more personal reflections (see Shakespeare 1114). His streamlining of the passage serves more forcefully—and with less *copia*—to drive home the more universal point concerning gold's timeless capacity to taint and invert the terms of domestic, social, and civic interactions. This is precisely the sort of passage one would copy out in a tablebook of collected commonplaces for future perusal and use. Further, this passage from Shakespeare may well have been deemed by Marx to be so emblematic of his theme that he had it in mind as he composed this section of *Capital* on "Money," writing toward it as it were, for so impassioned seems the ardor and so lyrical the tone of his above-the-line disquisition concerning gold's convertible power. He even intersperses a Latin tag amidst his own prose, reminiscent of humanist writers who nonchalantly dropped such commonplaces into their table talk and writings.

> The circulation becomes the social retort [a glass receptacle used in distillation] into which everything is thrown, to come again as gold-crystal. Not even are the bones of saints, and still less are more delicate *res sacrosantae, extra commercium hominum* able to withstand this alchemy. (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 132)

The footnote here, instead of glossing this doctrine originating in Roman law concerning certain things that may not be the object of private rights and therefore insupportable to being traded, rather involves a wry anecdote about "the most Christian king" of France, Henry III, robbing cloisters of their relics and turning them into money (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 132n1).

In his choice of the specific authors he cites, often to set up counterpoints, dialectically, in the main text, we can see Marx's mind at work, moving systematically from one mnemonic repository to another so that, rhetorically speaking, he might mine the meaning out of the groundwork of the classical tradition. In the section on "The Capitalist Character of Manufacture" (I.4.14.5), for example, he alludes to the "absurd fable of Menenius Agrippa, which presents man as a mere fragment of his own body" (Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 481), footnoted as the

commonplace analogue of state governance being compared to parts of the body—an anecdote incidentally recorded by Erasmus and, as Marx well knew, dramatized in the opening scene of Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* with Menenius Agrippa lecturing the Roman citizens (see Shakespeare 216).[18] Later in Marx's argument, when there are more footnotes per page than actual text (figure 5), he sets at odds the views of classical writers—again, such commonplace eristic exercises were a familiar part of humanist rhetorical training. He explains above-the-line:

> the standpoint of use-value, is adopted by Plato, who treats the division of labour as the foundation on which the division of society into estates is based, and also by Xenophon, who with his characteristic bourgeois instinct already comes closer to the divisions of labour within the workshop. Plato's *Republic*, in so far as the division of labour is treated in it as the formative principle of the state, is merely an Athenian idealization of the Egyptian caste system, Egypt having served as the model of an industrial country to others of his contemporaries, e.g. Isocrates. (Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 487-89)

Below-the-line, however, is where we find a compelling development of Marx's thinking that undergirds this argument with reference to historical precedent, which is to say classical sources. He quotes, in Greek, Homer's *Odyssey* (16.228) and then Archilochus as cited by Sextus Empiricus; continues with fragments from a speech by Pericles in Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* (i.141); and then refers to Plato on the "many-sidedness of the needs of individuals and the one-sidedness of their capabilities," in which Marx sets Plato's point in conversation with that of Thucydides. Marx moves on then, in a note, to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (I.8.2) with reference to the "excellence to be attained in the quality of the use-value," noting further that Xenophon "is already aware that the degree of division of labor reached is dependent on the extent of the market" (Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 488), having previously woven in a quotation on the same topic from Plato's *Republic* (2.2). From here he delivers a long quotation from Isocrates's *Busiris* by way of glossing the reference mentioned above-the-line; bringing this whole episode to a satisfying conclusion below-the-line with a quotation from Diodorus Siculus (1.74), whose ideas are evoked above-the-

line but whose name and textual trace is submerged in the double-discourse being carried on in the notes. This dialogic notational tactic thus can be seen as enlivening and animating the argument of Marx's more direct and prosaic treatment in the main text, in this case concerning the division of labor. It is as if the whole matter already has been laid out point by point in the excerpts from classical texts, and Marx simply is collocating and setting them up side by side so he can draw from them the pith and moment of the core argument about the production of relative surplus value. People who do not read the footnotes in *Capital* have no way of appreciating the extent to which Marx's remarkably influential text depends on his training in classical rhetoric and his intellectual predisposition toward the Renaissance humanist commonplace book method of composition.

To be sure, of course, there are many sections that use notes in the usual and more familiar way of alleging sources and authorities to corroborate claims, thus lending further credibility to his assertions; namely, notes that simply identify quotations or references by citing periodicals, state papers, royal charters, government statues, and data tables.[19] Scholastic annotation, as treated in this study, differs markedly from journalistic source-referencing. Marx's *scholia* are an integral part of his larger dialogical critique insofar as the footnotes enable him to speak through and at the same time to comment on the words and works of others. Marx thus leaves a legible trace pointing back to his underlying rhetorical habit of thought involving collocation while, at the same time, unspooling a profound dialectical through-thread in *Capital*.

5. Theoretical Implications

Judging from the backlog of ancient and English Renaissance texts selected and discussed by Marx, I would argue finally that he was engaged in reviving and repurposing the classical idea of *poiesis* (the activity in which a person brings something into being that did not exist before, usually associated with poetry, art, and other forms of cultural "making").[20] He does so in order to bring *poiesis* back into contact with

praxis (contrary to the Aristotelian philosophical tradition that linked *praxis* to *theoria*), such that for Marx *theoria* becomes a production of consciousness (see Balibar 41). Furthermore, another of the essentially literary aspects of Marx's self-conscious compositional *praxis* is the fact that he begins with (and indeed his analysis transparently is grounded in) metaphors and parables taken from Plato's dialogues regarding the fundamental constitution of consciousness as a mechanism for illusion, thereby reaffirming its always already fictive status as stories being told about human experience. By the same token, Francis Bacon's suggestive treatment of "Idols of the Mind" (figure 6), whence are shown to spring the fundamental errors in the human sciences as practiced up to that time,[21] became for Marx a key moment in the history of the genealogy of ideology. Such a moment (in the Hegelian sense of the term) enabled Marx to look from Bacon back to that prior, originary and inaugural moment in the history of ideology in the West; namely, "the two opposing ancient sources of the Platonic forms (*eide*) and the simulacra (*eidola*) of Epicurean philosophy" (Balibar 46).

Marx's debt to Bacon is made more explicit still in his reference above-the-line, in his text, to *Essays*, *Civil and Moral* (the twenty-ninth essay in the edition Marx was using, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates"), about the "profound and admirable" practice, instituted by Henry VII, that farmers should be "maintained by such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition, and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners and not mere hirelings" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 720). And then, below-the-line, Marx fills a quarter of the page with a note reflecting on Bacon's treatment of this provident king's agricultural measures in *The Reign of Henry VII* (1622). This annotation gives further insight into Marx's method insofar as this long passage is a direct, verbatim, copying out of a passage from White Kennett's often reprinted *A Complete History of England* (1719).[22] In writing *Capital*, Part 8, chapter 28, Marx returns to his notes taken from this book containing Bacon's account of Henry VII's reign for the basis of his own original, critical, and scathing treatment of ensuing English monarchs' "bloody

legislation against the expropriated, from the end of the 15th century, forcing down of wages by acts of Parliament," whereby, he goes on to exclaim, the "fathers of the present working-class were chastised for their enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers. Legislation treated them as 'voluntary' criminals, and assumed that it depended on their own good will to go on working under the old conditions that no longer existed" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 734).

Just prior to his allusion to Bacon's *Essays*, Marx quotes Thomas More's socio-political satire, *Utopia* (1516), the much-anthologized passage that begins: "in England your shepe that were wont to be meke and tame, and so small eaters, now as I heare saye be become so great devourers and wylde that they eate up, and swallow downe, the very men themselfes" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 720n1). It is clear that the text being quoted here comes from Ralph Robinson's sixteenth century English version (if not the book itself, then an anthology preserving period spelling and printing conventions). Thomas More figures significantly later as well in *Capital* (I.8.28), where three quarters of a page is devoted, below-the-line, to quotations and running analysis of *Utopia* (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 736). This is touched off by a discussion concerning statutes under Queen Elizabeth I (in 1572, and another in 1597), which Marx reproduces at length, a portion of which reads:

> Unlicensed beggars above 14 years of age are to be severely flogged and branded on the left ear unless some one will take them into service for two years; in case of a repetition of the offense, if they are over 18, they are to be executed, unless some one will take them into service for two years; but for the third offense they are to be executed without mercy, as felons. (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 735-36)

Much of his information in this long note follows closely sixteenth century sources such as Raphael Holinshed's celebrated *Chronicles of England* (1577, revised 1587), a text from which Shakespeare took many plots for his history plays; and, although not mentioned directly, Marx also copied out from it sections of William Harrison's *Description of England*, presumably unaware that this work, by editorial design, was published as part of Holinshed's *Chronicles*.

Still, Marx's affinity for generating *scholia* (specifically, his well-documented habit of taking notes on his reading and then mining his notebooks and bundles of loose papers for arguments he might tailor to his own purposes, further augmented by references to and words from classical and Renaissance authors), helps account for the ending of the first chapter of *Capital*, "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof" (I.1.1.4). It closes with a remarkable reference to Shakespeare, whose plays, as Marjorie Garber has observed, were so well known to Marx "that he alluded to them regularly in his writings" (Garber xxiii). Marx evokes the dim-witted but dutifully vigilant night watchman, Dogberry, central to the denouement of *Much Ado About Nothing*, to "elucidate his argument about the chimerical nature of exchange value and the way in which economists naturalize it" (Harris 13). The full passage reads as if Marx knew from when he began writing *Capital* in earnest that this is where he wanted the first chapter to end; as if he had the quotation in mind all along, perhaps preserved on a scrap of paper in a notebook, so that it might serve, quite literally, as the chapter's last word:

> So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or in a diamond. […] [T]he use-value of objects is realized without exchange, by means of a direct relation between the objects and man, while, on the other hand, their value is realized only by exchange, that is, by means of a social process. Who fails here to call the mind our good friend, Dogberry, who informs his neighbor Seacoal, that, "To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but reading and writing comes by Nature."
> (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 83)

The endearing familiarity with which Marx casts this reference, calling to mind "our good friend, Dogberry," speaks volumes about his ingrained rhetorical method of making use of collocated quotations and proverbs in the composition of *Capital*. Though at times lyrically evocative and full of allusive references, Marx clearly is not writing a literary text. And yet he is in fact doing a fair amount of literary criticism, which he both inserts into his text and also, more usually, neatly arranges, stores, and otherwise stows away in his notes. In this regard he is, quite literally, the first Marxist literary critic. Indeed, Marx was a

voracious reader and his use of quotations and allusions can be traced to many works, not just concerning philosophy and history, but also including the sayings of fictional characters (like Shakespeare's Dogberry),[23] showing him to be "one of the great mediators between the classical aesthetics of the eighteenth century and the realist aesthetics of the nineteenth" (Prawer 224).

Marx was far more well read in the classics and more literarily oriented than has been generally assumed (see Kornbluh 115), perhaps because so many readers tend not to pay much attention to what is placed below-the-line, at the bottom of the page; perhaps because some modern editors, to conform to their publishers' demands, do not preserve Marx's notes on the same page as the text to which they refer. Hence my appeal for giving serious and sustained attention to Marx's mnemotechnically imbued annotations; and, in the process, to appreciate just how traditionally rhetorical—indeed how literary—*Capital* actually is. Although this may sound a bit perverse, nonetheless it also is true: Marx is not just a part of a long scholarly tradition concerned with the mnemotechnic and analytic use of footnotes but also, it turns out, one of its greatest representatives.[24]

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Sewanee

NOTES

[1]A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the 15th *Connotations* Symposium at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, 31 July 2019; I am grateful for the helpful suggestions offered by members of the symposium, especially Matthias Bauer, Ingo Berensmeyer, Tom Charlton, Paula Lefering, Burkhard Niederhoff, Dan Poston, and Angelika Zirker. I also am indebted to my colleagues at Sewanee who read and commented on the expanded version: Harold Goldberg, Maha Jafri, and James Ross Macdonald.

[2]Fleeing the continent in 1849, Marx found refuge in London where he resided until his death in 1883, supported in the main by Friedrich Engels; from 1860-67 he worked assiduously on *Capital* in the British Library (Yuille 4-8).

[3]Just to provide further temporal and geographical bearings as regards their literary partnership, *The Communist Manifesto* was published in London, 21 February

1848, for the Communist League, a band of mostly German-born socialists with a revolutionary agenda.

[4]I am cognizant that the interpretative perspective of Marx's work advanced in this essay could be much more fulsomely supported with reference not just to the English translation of *Capital* but also the various German editions; and, moreover, as Engels points out concerning "the conditions of social production and exchange," the social critique of money, accumulation, and hoarding already is evident in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 4), as well as in, of course, the Urtext of 1858. While recourse to other translations indeed would serve to further illustrate my thesis, in the interest of space and also mindful of the discussion and debate aspect of this journal, I confine myself here to the English translation of the third German version edited by Engels, who had ready access to Marx's extant notes during the time when they both were in London and publishing collaboratively.

[5]Engels comments further in the "Preface to the English Edition" (dated November 5, 1886) about Marx's "method of quoting," disclosing that, in some instances, "[t]hese quotations, therefore, supplement the text by a running commentary taken from the history of the science" (5).

[6]English quotations from *Capital*, in the first instance, follow Friedrich Engels's edition (translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Marx's son-in-law, Edward Aveling), owing to the conscientious and faithful if sometimes quaint renderings of Marx's original. And, owing to the at times over-wrought syntax of Marx's discursive narrative and his periodic meta-theoretical digressions, in the second instance, when clarity of a sentence or an annotation is at issue, quotations follow Ben Fowkes's more recent English edition (published in association with the *New Left Review*). Although not as complete, properly speaking, as the first French version (cf. Anderson 72-74; and Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 4), Fowkes's edition has the added benefit of providing accurate notes on original source material and on the specific editions available to Marx when he was researching and writing *Capital*. Fowkes also includes a valuable 26-page "Index of Authorities Quoted." For the convenience of readers using other versions of *Capital*, citations of specific passages under scrutiny also are given as appropriate with reference to volume, part, chapter, section, and subsection.

[7]The history of textual "scholia," especially with reference to commentaries transmitted in the margins of medieval manuscripts, is well documented, ranging from the usual practices of the Greek tradition (see Reynolds and Wilson 10-11) to those in Roman antiquity (see Zetzel 335-36).

[8]*Wissenschaft* has a much broader meaning than the English word "science" (with reference to the objective "scientific method"), embracing the totality of knowledge in general and involving those academic disciplines—or studies—that deal with a systematically derivable body of facts or truths (see Nyhart 250-55, 268).

[9]Engels, likewise attuned to the subtleties of English word derivations, adds a note of his own as an addendum to Marx's note at the conclusion of the section "The two-fold character of the labour embodied in commodities" (I.1.1.2): "The

English language has the advantage of possessing different words for the two aspects of labour here considered. The labour which creates Use-Value, and counts qualitatively is *Work* [from the Anglo-Saxon], as distinguished from Labour; that which creates Value and counts quantitatively, is *Labour* [from the Latin] as distinguished from *Work*" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 47).

[10]Marx's relationship to the classical heritage has been the subject of many exemplary studies; with respect to this present argument about Marx's formulative academic engagement with works of antiquity, see especially Sannwald; Stanley; and Padgug.

[11]My contention here concerns simply what Marx gleaned from Aristotle's "more mature ontological project of the *Metaphysics*" (Kosman 28).

[12]See above, n4. It is in this same section of the "Preface to the English Edition" that Engels clarifies Marx's role as an anthologist: "in many instances, passages from economic writers are quoted in order to indicate when, where, and by whom a certain position was for the first time clearly enunciated" (5).

[13]Although originally left unattributed and in Latin in Marx's text, Fowkes positively identifies and translates the reference (see Marx, *Capital* [Fowkes] 376).

[14]The full line from *Satires* (1.1.69) reads: "mutato nomine de te fabula narratur" [change but the name, and the story is told of yourself] (Horace 8-11).

[15]I would acknowledge here Burkhard Niederhoff for suggesting that, although Marx did not pursue a professional post at the university, he likely was keen to display his qualifications for such a position to those who might be more inclined to entertain his arguments if they saw he was couching them along the lines of the accepted (if, at times, apparently pedantic) academic discourse of the day. This certainly fits with his Latin-only admonition (see above, n14).

[16]It is worth noting that this terminology used to describe the disposition of footnotes relative to the main text in book production (where a line conventionally is printed between text and notes) is the same as that used in classical economic investment analysis; namely "above-the-line" refers to costs above the gross profit, while "below-the-line" refers to costs below gross profit including expenses incurred in the manufacturing of the product and getting it to market.

[17]In Shakespeare's day "hoar" meant white and also moldy (see *Hamlet* 4.7.167 and *Romeo and Juliet* 2.4.133-34). Moreover the pun on "whore" and "hoard" cannot be overlooked here, as both terms directly pertain to the situation being depicted in this pivotal scene of *Timon*.

[18]The fable is alluded to in Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly* (1511), taken from Livy's *History of Rome* (2.32.9-12) by way of Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*.

[19]This is affirmed by Engels in his discussion of Marx's notational apparatus: "In the majority of the cases, the quotations serve, in the usual way, as documentary evidence in support of assertions made in the text" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 5); see also above, n5 and n12.

[20]On the distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* in ancient Greek thought, where *poiesis* originally was understood as "an acting that puts-to-work," see Agamben 68-74.

[21]The "Idols of the Mind" are explicitly described in that part of Bacon's *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, often printed separately, entitled *The Great Instauration* (aphorisms 38-53), and implicitly throughout his scientific utopian travel-log novel, *New Atlantis* (1626).

[22]This work generally is catalogued as being by White Kennett, who wrote the third and final volume and made corrections and emendations to the earlier two volumes which consisted of materials collected by John Hughes (first printed 1706). Cf. the editorial note identifying the version of this work then in the British Library (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 720). Marx also quotes with some frequency the tenth edition of Thomas Macaulay's *History of England* (1854), though not without critical commentary in a footnote: "I quote Macaulay, because as systematic falsifier of history he minimizes as much as possible facts of this kind" (Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 717).

[23]Marx reflects critically that Robinson Crusoe (the eponymous hero of Daniel Defoe's 1719 novel) has become a favorite theme of political economists for all the wrong reasons (see Marx, *Capital* [Engels] 76); the first edition ludically credits the book's protagonist as the author, which led some readers to think he was a real person and the narrative a true account.

[24]I am indebted here especially to the anonymous readers who helped me clarify and state more precisely my overarching thesis about Marx's annotations.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1
Marx's Grave, Highgate Cemetery, London
(photo credit William E. Engel)



inventio = invention, finding

dispositio = arrangement

elocutio = style

memoria = memory

pronunciatio/actio = delivery

Figure 2
Five canons of classical rhetoric
(© William E. Engel)

Thomas Aquinas & Peter Ramus



Figure 3
Exemplary Scholastic Organizational Schemata
(© William E. Engel, private collection)



gold one can even get souls into Paradise." (Columbus in his letter from Jamaica, 1503.) Since gold does not disclose what has been transformed into it, everything, commodity or not, is convertible into gold. Everything becomes saleable and buyable. The circulation becomes the great social retort into which everything is thrown, to come out again as a gold-crystal. Not even are the bones of saints, and still less are more delicate res sacrosanctæ, extra commercium hominum able to withstand this alchemy.[1] Just as every qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished in money, so money, on its side, like the radical leveller that it is, does away with all distinctions.[2] But money itself is a commodity, an external object, capable of becoming the private property of any individual. Thus social power becomes the private power of private persons. The ancients therefore denounced money as subversive of the economic and moral order of things.[3] Modern society, which, soon after its birth, pulled Plutus by the hair of

[1] Henry III., most Christian king of France, robbed cloisters of their relics, and turned them into money. It is well known what part the despoiling of the Delphic Temple, by the Phocians, played in the history of Greece. Temples with the ancients served as the dwellings of the gods of commodities. They were "sacred banks." With the Phoenicians, a trading people *par excellence*, money was the transmuted shape of everything. It was, therefore, quite in order that the virgins, who, at the feast of the Goddess of Love, gave themselves up to strangers, should offer to the goddess the piece of money they received.

[2] "Gold, yellow, glittering, precious gold!
Thus much of this, will make black white; foul, fair;
Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant.
... What this, you gods? Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides;
Pluck stout men's pillows from below their heads;
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions; bless the accurs'd;
Make the hoar leprosy ador'd; place thieves,
And give them title, knee and approbation,
With senators on the bench; this is it,
That makes the wappen'd widow wed again:
... Come damned earth,
Thou common whore of mankind."
(Shakespeare: Timon of Athens.)

[3] "Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν οἷον ἄργυρος
Κακὸν νόμισμα ἔβλαστε· τοῦτο καὶ πόλεις
Πορθεῖ, τόδ' ἄνδρας ἐξανίστησιν δόμων.
Τόδ' ἐκδιδάσκει καὶ παραλλάσσει φρένας
Χρηστὰς πρὸς αἴσχρα ἀνθρώποις ἴσχειν,
Καὶ παντὸς ἔργου δυσσέβειαν εἰδέναι."
(Sophocles, Antigone.)

his head from the bowels of the earth,[1] greets gold as its Holy Grail, as the glittering incarnation of the very principle of its own life.

A commodity, in its capacity of a use-value, satisfies a particular want, and is a particular element of material wealth. But the value of a commodity measures the degree of its attraction for all other elements of material wealth, and therefore measures the social wealth of its owner. To a barbarian owner of commodities, and even to a West-European peasant, value is the same as value-form, and therefore, to him the increase in his hoard of gold and silver is an increase in value. It is true that the value of money varies, at one time in consequence of a variation in its own value, at another, in consequence of a change in the values of commodities. But this, on the one hand, does not prevent 200 ounces of gold from still containing more value than 100 ounces, nor, on the other hand, does it hinder the actual metallic form of this article from continuing to be the universal equivalent form of all other commodities, and the immediate social incarnation of all human labour. The desire after hoarding is in its very nature unsatiable. In its qualitative aspect, or formally considered, money has no bounds to its efficacy, *i.e.*, it is the universal representative of material wealth, because it is directly convertible into any other commodity. But, at the same time, every actual sum of money is limited in amount, and, therefore, as a means of purchasing, has only a limited efficacy. This antagonism between the quantitative limits of money and its qualitative boundlessness, continually acts as a spur to the hoarder in his Sisyphus-like labour of accumulating. It is with him as it is with a conqueror who sees in every new country annexed, only a new boundary.

In order that gold may be held as money, and made to form a hoard, it must be prevented from circulating, or from transforming itself into a means of enjoyment. The hoarder, therefore, makes a sacrifice of the lusts of the flesh to his gold fetish. He acts in earnest up to the Gospel of abstention. On the other hand, he can withdraw from circulation no more than what he has thrown into it in the shape of commodities. The more he produces, the more he is able to sell. Hard work, saving, and avarice, are, therefore, his three cardinal virtues, and to sell much and buy little the sum of his political economy.[2]

[1] "Ἐλπιζούσης τῆς πλεονεξίας ἀνάξειν ἐκ τῶν μυχῶν τῆς γῆς αὐτὸν τον Πλούτωνα" (Athen. Deipnos.)

[2] "Accrescere quanto più si può il numero de'venditori d'ogni merce, diminuere quanto più si può il numero dei compratori, questi sono i cardini

Figure 4

Typographical layout of two consecutive pages (*Capital* [Engels] 132-33)



with a given quantity of labour, and, consequently, of cheapening commodities and hurrying on the accumulation of capital. In most striking contrast with this accentuation of quantity and exchange-value, is the attitude of the writers of classical antiquity, who hold exclusively by quality and use-value.[1] In consequence of the separation of the social branches of production, commodities are better made, the various bents and talents of men select a suitable field,[2] and without some restraint no important results can be obtained anywhere.[3] Hence both product and producer are improved by division of labour. If the growth of the quantity produced is occasionally mentioned, this is only done with reference to the greater abundance of use-values. There is not a word alluding to exchange-value or to the cheapening of commodities. This aspect, from the standpoint of use-value alone, is taken as well by Plato,[4] who treats division of labour as the foundation on which the division of society into classes is based, as by

[1] Amongst the moderns may be excepted a few writers of the 18th century, like Beccaria and James Harris, who with regard to division of labour almost entirely follow the ancients. Thus, Beccaria: "Ciascuno prova coll'esperienza, che applicando la mano e l'ingegno sempre allo stesso genere di opere e di produtte, egli più facili, più abbondanti e migliori ne traca risultati, di quello che se ciascuno isolatamente le cose tutte a se necessarie soltanto facesse.... Dividendosi in tal maniera per la comune e privata utilità gli uomini in varie classi e condizioni." (Cesare Beccaria: "Elementi di Econ. Pubblica," ed. Custodi, Parte Moderna, t. xi, p. 29.) James Harris, afterwards Earl of Malmesbury, celebrated for the "Diaries" of his embassy at St. Petersburg, says in a note to his "Dialogue Concerning Happiness," Lond., 1741, reprinted afterwards in "Three Treatises, &c.," 3 Ed., Lond., 1772: "The whole argument to prove society natural (*i.e.*, by division of employments) ... is taken from the second book of Plato's Republic."

[2] Thus, in the Odyssey xiv., 228, "Ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις," and Archilochus in Saxtus Empiricus, "ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἐπ' ἔργῳ καρδίην ἰαίνεται."

[3] "Πόλλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα." Every Athenian considered himself superior as a producer of commodities to a Spartan; for the latter in time of war had men enough at his disposal but could not command money, as Thucydides makes Pericles say in the speech inciting the Athenians to the Peloponnesian war: "σώμασι τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν." (Thuc.: 1, l. c. 41.) Nevertheless, even with regard to material production, αὐτάρκεια, as opposed to division of labour remained their ideal, "παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ, εὖ, παρὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες." It should be mentioned here that at the date of the fall of the 30 Tyrants there were still not 5,000 Athenians without landed property.

[4] With Plato, division of labour within the community is a development from the multifarious requirements, and the limited capacities of individuals. The main point with him is, that the labourer must adapt himself to the work, not the work to the labourer; which latter is unavoidable, if he carries on several trades at once, thus making one or the other of them subor-

Xenophon,[1] who with characteristic bourgeois instinct, approaches more nearly to division of labour within the workshop. Plato's Republic, in so far as division of labour is treated in it, as the formative principle of the State, is merely the Athenian idealisation of the Egyptian system of castes, Egypt having served as the model of an industrial country to many of his contemporaries also, amongst others to Isocrates,[2] and it

dinate. "Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.—Ἀνάγκη.—Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ." (Rep. 1. 2. Ed. Baiter, Orelli, &c.). So in Thucydides, l. c., c. 142: "Seafaring is an art like any other, and cannot, as circumstances require, be carried on as a subsidiary occupation; nay, other subsidiary occupations cannot be carried on alongside of this one." If the work, says Plato, has to wait for the labourer, the critical point in the process is missed and the article spoiled, "ἔργου καιρὸν διόλλυται." The same Platonic idea is found recurring in the protest of the English bleachers against the clause in the Factory Act that provides fixed meal-times for all operatives. Their business cannot wait the convenience of the workmen, for "in the various operations of singeing, washing, bleaching, mangling, calendering, and dyeing, none of them can be stopped at a given moment without risk of damage ... to enforce the same dinner hour for all the workpeople might occasionally subject valuable goods to the risk of danger by incomplete operations." Le platonisme où va-t-il se nicher!

[1] Xenophon says, it is not only an honour to receive food from the table of the King of Persia, but such food is much more tasty than other food. "And there is nothing wonderful in this, for as the other arts are brought to special perfection in the great towns, so the royal food is prepared in a special way. For in the small towns the same man makes bedsteads, doors, ploughs, and tables: often, too, he builds houses into the bargain, and is quite content if he finds custom sufficient for his sustenance. It is altogether impossible for a man who does so many things to do them all well. But in the great towns, where each can find many buyers, one trade is sufficient to maintain the man who carries it on. Nay, there is often not even need of one complete trade, but one man makes shoes for men, another for women. Here and there one man gets a living by sewing, another by cutting out shoes; one does nothing but cut out clothes, another nothing but sew the pieces together. It follows necessarily then, that he who does the simplest kind of work, undoubtedly does it better than anyone else. So it is with the art of cooking." (Xen. Cyrop. I. viii., c. 2.) Xenophon here lays stress exclusively upon the excellence to be attained in use-value, although he well knows that the gradations of the division of labour depend on the extent of the market.

[2] He (Busiris) divided them all into special castes ... commanded that the same individuals should always carry on the same trade, for he knew that they who change their occupations become skilled in none; but that those who constantly stick to one occupation bring it to the highest perfection. In truth, we shall also find that in relation to the arts and handicrafts, they have outstripped their rivals more than a master does a bungler; and the contrivances for maintaining the monarchy and the other institutions of

Figure 5

Typographical layout of two consecutive pages (*Capital* [Engels] 365-66)



Figure 6
Bacon's "Idols of the Mind"
(© William E. Engel)